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HISTORY

LIFE

GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS,

KING OF SWEDEN,

AND THE GREAT

VOLUME II

BY HENRY WALTER BAKER, M.A.



Printed by the University Press, Cambridge.

First published in 1895.

Reprinted.





*S. Holburn*

T H E  
H I S T O R Y  
O F T H E  
L I F E  
O F  
GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS,  
KING of SWEDEN,  
Surnamed The GREAT.

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VOLUME II.

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By the Reverend WALTER HARTE, M.A.  
Canon of WINDSOR.

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M.DCC.LIX.

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E R R A T A.

## VOL. II.

Page 13. line 26. for 2008, read 2016. P. 22. l. 27. embarked at Torstenfon, dele *at*. P. 51. Note. l. ult. for Cæfari, read *Cæfariis*. P. 124. l. 10. for Ritzingen, read *Kitzingen*. P. 131. l. 15. for Rayferfheim, read *Kaiferfheim*. P. 193. l. 5. for Imperiallifts, read *Imperialists*. P. 199. l. ult. for 1630, read 1637. P. 207. l. 28. for Scharalifki, read *Schevalifki*. P. 210. l. 24. for le, read *les*. P. 218. l. 32. for Radnitz, read *Rednitz*. P. 222. l. 23. instead of, for having, dele *for*. P. 285. l. 5. for generals, read *general*. Ibid. l. 7. for the colonel, read *a colonel*. Ibid. l. 15. for off a scaffold, read *on*. P. 298. l. 1. for picked out, read *pieced out*. P. 301. l. 12. states of his allies, dele *of*. P. 305. for Nurenberg, twice, read *Naumburgh*. P. 308. Note, for ELLIOT, read *ELIOT*. Ibid. for large train, read *no contemptible train*. P. 326. Note, for plans II. read *plan*. P. 336. for Hofkirk's, twice, read *Hoffkirck's*. P. 344. l. 28. for subfified, read *subfisted*. P. 338. l. 5. for Brenner, read *Brëuner*. P. 347. for courtiers, read *couriers*. P. 349, Note, l. 1. for fingularita, read *fingularità*.

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# PRINCES COTEMPORARY *with* GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS; *and concerned with him, or against him.*

## EMPERORS.

MATTHIAS ———— 1612—1619  
FERDINAND II. ———— 1619—1637

## POPEs.

PAUL V. ———— 1605—1621  
GREGORY XV. ———— 1621—1623  
URBAN VIII. ———— 1623—1644

## KING of FRANCE.

LOUIS XIII. ———— 1610—1643

## KINGS of SPAIN.

PHILIP III. ———— 1598—1621  
PHILIP IV. ———— 1621—1665

## KINGS of ENGLAND.

JAMES I. ———— 1603—1625  
CHARLES I. ———— 1625—1648

## KING of DENMARK.

CHRISTIAN IV. ———— 1588—1648

## KING of POLAND.

SIGISMOND III. ———— 1587—1632

## ELECTORS of MENTZ.

JOHN SCHWEICKARD } 1604—1626  
of Cronenberg }  
G. FREDERIC of } — 1626—1629  
Grieffenclau }  
ANSELM CASIMIR } 1629—1647  
WAMBOLD of Umstadt }

## ELECTORS of TRYERS.

LOTHARIO of Metter- } 1599—1623  
nich ———— }  
PHILIP CHRISTOPHER } 1623—1652  
Van So<sup>c</sup>TTERN ———— }

## ELECTOR of COLOGN.

FERDINAND, Duke of } 1612—1650  
Bavaria ———— }

## ELECTOR of BAVARIA.

MAXIMILIAN ———— 1623—1651

## ELECTOR of SAXONY.

JOHN GEORGE ———— 1611—1656

## ELECTORS of BRANDENBURG.

JOHN SIGISMOND ———— 1572—1619  
GEORGE WILLIAM ———— 1619—1640

## ELECTOR PALATIN.

FREDERIC V. ———— 1617—1632  
Chosen King of Bohemia 1619

## PRINCES, &c. of TRANSYLVANIA.

GABRIEL BETHLEM ———— 1603—1629  
CATHARINA of Brand- } 1629—1631  
enburg, who resigned }  
GEORGE RAGOTZKI ———— 1631—1648

The BOOKBINDER is to place this fronting the beginning of the History, Vol. II.



THE  
HISTORY  
OF

The LIFE of  
Gustavus Adolphus.

HAVING finished the preceding part of our History with 1631.  
some important transactions between England and Sweden;  
the reader may now be pleased to recollect, that we left  
Tilly at Alvede, where he had assembled to himself hardly  
more than 8000 men, out of all those victorious bands, which had fought  
under him at the battle of Leipsic. Thence he wrote to the elector of  
Cologne, ascribing his late misfortune, first, to the undue eagerness of  
Pappenheim; and, secondly, to a subsequent want of firmness in the  
Croatian horse; beseeching him, at the same time, to dispatch to him a  
strong re-inforcement, in order to raise the spirits of his dejected army.  
Upon which, the elector sent him a second supply of cavalry, and a  
considerable body of infantry. Tilly then having deputed Gronsfelt  
to protect the banks of the Weser, where George, duke of Lunenburg,

1631. and the archbishop of Bremen\* gave indications of espousing the cause of Gustavus, passed his army from the diocese of Paderborn, over a bridge of boats at Corvey†; and strengthening his train of artillery with twelve large battering pieces, taken from the town of Hamelen, directed his steps to Warburg. Soon after he invaded Hesse, and having joined himself with Aldringer, Fugger, and Mansfelt, advanced (whilst his majesty invested Marienberg) as far as Fulda, in order to succour the bishop of Wurtzburg, and shelter the electors of Cologne, Mentz, and Triers. But in short, this great commander, in the present conjuncture, hardly knew what steps to take: mortified with misfortune, and piqued to the heart upon having made a shipwreck of one half of his glory, he was quite bewildered in his own ideas, having nothing certain to resolve upon, except it was to regain his character by some service of a desperate nature. And this, it is manifest, he ought to have attempted; but the Lorrainers did not join him quite so ‡ soon as he wished, and when that junction was formed at Miltenberg, he fell suddenly into a kind of despondence, for he did not like the aspects of his new assistants.

And here it may be necessary, once for all, to give the reader a clear idea of this romantic expedition of Charles IV. duke of Lorrain, from the beginning to the conclusion; who, for a mixture of courage and ir-

\* This prelate had adhered firmly to the house of Austria through the former part of the thirty years wars; inasmuch, that the king of Denmark, by way of revenge, when peace was concluded at Lubec, still kept the isle of Femor to himself, although it was a part of the archbishop's patrimony. But when this ecclesiastic began to consider seriously the drift and intentions of the edict of restitution; he then saw, without the gift of divination, that archduke Leopold, the emperor's son, would annex the diocese of Bremen to those of Magdeburg, Halberstadt, &c. and allow the true owner a small annual stipend; not so much by way of right acknowledged, as under the appearance of an act of compassion. It was upon this account therefore, that he kept up a correspondence with Gustavus ever since the year 1629, and entered into a private agreement, of-

ensive and defensive, with the famous Salvius, some months antecedent to the battle of Leipzig: (for an abstract of the articles then concluded, see Chemnitius, Tom. i. p. 214.) And this was the true reason (which Burnet knew nothing of, or no way cared to own) why the king intended, *bona fide*, to land the British troops at Bremen, in order to protect his new ally from the insults of the Imperialists. *Chemnitz, ibid.* where it is made plainly appear, that the marquis of Hamilton contravened the king's intentions.

† This abby, famous for its convent of Benedictines, stands between the duchy of Brunswick and the bishopric of Paderborn. In its library is the only manuscript of the annals of Tacitus.

‡ Not till October 17, nine days after Wurtzburg and Marienberg were taken.

resolution,



resolution, hardiness to undertake, and inconstancy to execute, seems to have been the epitome of all mankind in those several passions and qualities. The duke of Bavaria proposed immediate and remote advantages from introducing this hero, who was his nephew, upon the grand theatre of action: he greatly wanted a support for Tilly, and to re-establish, if possible, the reputation of the league; having an inclination, likewise, to alarm France, with so powerful an armament on her confines; and hoping, by means of free passage through Lorrain (in case success should attend the catholic armies in Germany) to have the power of entering the *three* bishoprics, which had already begun *to change their livery*, if I may be allowed to make use of Spanheim's expression on the occasion\*. France, of course, took umbrage at the armament, which this prince was preparing; and insisted, that he should either disband his troops, or declare the object of their destination†. Charles (whether conformably to his first intentions, or not, cannot be said,) thought it necessary, however, to pacify so intermeddling and capricious a neighbour; but being allured by the promise of an electoral bonnet (for the emperor had privately threatened to proscribe the electors of Saxony and Brandenburg) he marched an army of 17,000 vigorous men, all well furnished with apparel and arms, in order to support Tilly in his present exigencies. For as, on the one hand, his imagination was flattered with the recent extinction of one protestant elector; so it was suggested to him by his new allies, on the other hand, that as the promised electorate would make him a principal member of the empire; of course, the whole empire would be obliged to support him against the encroachments of his most Christian neighbour: insinuating likewise, at the same time, that a prince of Lorrain was really and truly a part of the Germanic body, by virtue of an incorporation, subsisting antecedently, even to those connections we have above specified. For these reasons, he chose to shelter himself under the wings of the Austrian eagle; and animated with romantic hopes, passed the Rhine over a bridge of boats at Worms, where the bishop of Wurtzburg made his application to him immediately, and offered him all the treasure contained in his capital, upon

\* Memoires d'Electrice Palatine, p. 300. † Memoires de Beauvau, 8°. p. 16, &c.

1631. condition he could succeed in raising the siege. But the industry and bravery of the assailants prevented this scheme from taking effect, though Charles made long marches to join Tilly, and restore the spirits of his shattered troops, by so considerable a re-inforcement as that, which he conducted. Aldringer also (in conjunction with Fugger) had hastened with all possible expedition to meet them, leading under his command those veteran troops, which had performed such wonders at the siege of Mantua. The whole three bodies, when united, were supposed to make 50,000 men, and their train of artillery was a very good one. Nevertheless, whether it was that the Imperial troops had not recovered their astonishment since the battle of Leipzig, or whether the elector of Bavaria (who in effect was generalissimo over the generalissimo) allowed himself to be seduced by St. Etienne, the French ambassador, (having hampered himself by the prospect of a clandestine treaty:) or whether he waited to make a better market with the emperor, and therefore chose not to hazard his troops; or whether orders had been dispatched from Vienna, commanding Tilly to hold himself upon the cautious and defensive part, and run no risks in so critical a conjuncture, (all which reasons appear to me more or less probable and cogent) sure it is, and certain upon the whole, that though his Swedish majesty, at that time, conducted only an army of about 25,000 effective men, yet nothing considerable was either performed or attempted by the Imperial party, which had the mortification and disgrace to stand gazing aloof, whilst Wurtzburg was first taken, and Mentz afterwards fell a sacrifice: insomuch that the partizans of Wallstein continually cried out, "That Gustavus  
 " marched, and never fought; and that provinces were conquered,  
 " before couriers could carry news to Vienna, that the enemy had entered them."

We are told by some, that this want of courage in the Imperialists, or want of sincerity in the Bavarian, (conjoined with the delays, and cautious part, which the court of Vienna affected) exasperated Charles not a little; so that whilst the troops lay inactive in winter quarters, he posted away to the elector (who was his uncle \*) at Munich, with a

\* The elector of Bavaria married Elizabeth princess of Lorraine, Charles's aunt.



view to put matters on a better footing; but obtained nothing from him 1631.  
but good words and hospitable repasts. And to add a keener edge to the mortification he then felt, his favourite lieutenant-general, the prince of Phaltzburg, died during this interval; as also M. de Berry, knight of Malta. The former was an accidental son of cardinal Lorrain, and having married the amiable Henrietta, Charles's eldest sister, might have possessed the dukedom, if his modesty and equity had not induced him to decline the offer. The latter was Charles's natural son, a young man of great hopes and distinguished bravery.

In addition to these misfortunes, he met with no small disgrace in his return home; for as his army passed the bridge of Straßburg, the inhabitants and peasants fell upon his baggage, plundering and destroying no inconsiderable part of it; and a waggoner, with a sort of English freedom, took the liberty to whip the duke's horse, assigning this remarkable reason for so extraordinary an action, *Sir, a person ought to make more haste when he is flying before the great Gustavus\**. In this inglorious retreat, he had the unhappiness some weeks to be denied entrance into the village of Lichtenau, near Nuremberg, where one of his regiments then lay in winter quarters. In vain Charles menaced the corps de garde; they saluted him with a brisk discharge of their firearms, which, though it spared his person, terrified his horse to such a degree, that as they both fell together, they lay exposed some moments to a second salvo of musquetry.

If all things be rightly considered, neither he nor his army deserved better usage, or greater success. They set out at first in the style of novices and blusterers; insolently boasting to chastise his Swedish majesty, and send him back to his hereditary regions of frost and snow. No troops looked fiercer, when they marched undisturbed through neutral dominions: they seemed, likewise, to have a talent for plunder, outrages, violations, and murder. Their ignorance of foreign countries kept pace with their insolence; for, amongst other things, they asked the Germans, *What sort of animal the landgrave of Hesse-Cassel was, and if he was*

\* Vittorio Siri; *Memorie Recondite*, Tom. vii. p. 446, &c.

1631. *descended from a good family* \*. Their extortions too were none of the least: for his Imperial majesty sent commissary general Ossia to join them, and pay them according to agreement; but the misfortune was, that the said commissary had no money, and the Lorrainers were obliged to feed themselves at the point of their swords. Old Tilly suspected these troops from the first moment he cast his eyes upon them; for they began to lower their note, in proportion as they approached the Swedish army. He therefore placed them generally out of the reach of blows; and history assures us, they discovered no resentment on the occasion. But when the wary Walloon once left them, the vigilant Swedes soon advantaged themselves of their infirmity; gave them two slaughtering camisados, and drove them ignominiously out of Franconia, to pursue their rout to the luxurious retreat of Nancy.

Here is a faithful picture of an army undisciplined, immoral, and unpaid; collected from a country of ease, idleness, sauntering, and extravagance; and plunged in a moment into the strict, sharp, and regular service of war. In these cases, the *theory* and *event* soon corresponded: vice and neglect of discipline ruin not only the *troops*, but the *cause*. The troops are lost through want of vigilance, sobriety, military punctuality, and subordination: and the cause is sacrificed by those repeated acts of excess, plunder, and cruelty, which make every peasant an enlisted soldier in the enemy's behalf. Thus, after an expedition of only a few months, and without engaging in a single battle or siege, Charles re-conducted to Lorraine little more than one moiety of his army. Whereas, if these troops had been solidly good, and Tilly could have been supposed to have placed a confidence in them, Gustavus might have been extremely embarrassed from superior numbers. But there were two collateral reasons for Charles's return, which historians have not penetrated into; Richelieu plainly saw, that he had opened too much of his play, in giving Gustavus uneasy apprehensions about his tampering with Bavaria (for the time was not yet come, that he had conceived a deter-

\* Soldat Suedois, 194. This puts me in mind of a learned man, (the country he belonged to, importeth not) who, thinking he must say something civil to a Bavarian nobleman, asked

him very modestly, *If the elector, his master, kept a coach?* Yet, sir, replied the man of quality, *and 25,000 soldiers to run before it.*



1631.

mined jealousy against Sweden) and consequently drew the duke of Lorraine back, partly by good words, and partly by making movements, as if he designed to take Moyenvic; which he actually made himself master of soon after, notwithstanding Merci's obstinate defence\*. And what still induced Charles more and more to return homewards, was the discontent he received upon Walfstein's promotion; for, in truth, he expected that supreme command himself; and for these reasons, took a cold farewell of his electoral uncle; since all he could obtain from the court of Vienna, was, the separate command of his own army, when conjoined with Tilly; and the post of lieutenant-general, in case he served under Walfstein.

Thus ended the unprosperous expedition of the duke of Lorraine, if we except only two remarkable letters, that passed between him and Gustavus; which shall be taken notice of in their chronological order. The king being advanced so far in the conquest of Franconia published a very sensible manifesto, (for it was his custom always to make the pen keep pace with the sword) wherein it was alledged principally, after a full recapitulation of the motives, that induced him to enter Germany, " That his Swedish majesty expected assistance from all true patriots, " catholic, as well as protestant, in the reduction of the exorbitant " power, and unmerciful tyranny of the house of Austria; concluding " also, that the former would withdraw their troops from the emperor's service, conformably to the declaration of the electoral college " made at Ratisbon, where all contests with the crown of Sweden were " publickly disavowed.—That in consequence of seeing this promise " realized, he had reciprocally engaged with France to separate the interests of the leaguers in a private manner from those of the emperor, " and live in perfect harmony with the catholic electors and princes : " but they, on the other hand, had neglected his representations, and " commanded their troops to fight under the Imperial ensigns at the " battle of Leipzig:—Influenced by the success of that engagement, he " had pursued his enemies into Franconia, with a view to constrain them

\* Francis, baron Merci: he proved afterwards one of the greatest generals the world ever knew. It is a misfortune in the art of war, that his life was never written.

1631. " to comprehend their own interests, and detach themselves from the  
 " court of Vienna.—That he had courteously advertised the bishops of  
 " Wurtzburg and Bamberg, that he proposed to act towards them in a  
 " manner conformable to the strictest laws of humanity and genero-  
 " sity, but that each of these prelates still continued to shew himself a  
 " most active and determined opponent of the Swedish interests:—Nay,  
 " that finally, upon possessing the town and diocese of Wurtzburg, he  
 " had practised no sort of retaliation, nor exercised any single act  
 " of severity; such proceedings being contrary not only to the natural  
 " turn of his heart, but to the dictates of his common sense, and the  
 " very drift and nature of his plan, which was to relieve, rather than  
 " torment and persecute, his fellow-creatures \*."

Some few days after Wurtzburg was taken, the Imperial general and the duke of Lorrain approached Gustavus so nearly on the opposite banks of the Mayne, that the king, at the head of a good body of horse and dragoons, crossed the river privately in the night, and defeated four regiments of the enemy's cavalry †. Yet the close neighbourhood of so numerous an hostile army gave Gustavus no small solicitude, his chief consolation consisting only in seeing the river Mayne spread between him and Tilly: and for these reasons he kept an attentive eye on all the noted passes above Wurtzburg, and below it.

That the reader may form some notion of his majesty's vigilance, it may be worth remarking in this place, that having concluded from very distinct informations, that Tilly would attempt to cross the river at Wurtzburg and Oxenford both, and being in great pain for the preservation of the latter town, (distant from the former about sixteen miles) he came in the evening on horseback, attended only by a single groom, to Monro's lodgings in the remotest part of Wurtzburg, and having ordered his servant to call Monro down from supper, commanded him to draw up Hepburn's brigade, and appoint Hepburn to wait on him in the square before the house with all possible expedition. This little party, consisting only of 800 men, was reduced into form with-

\* Swedish Intelligencer, Part ii. p. 16, &c. † Monro's Expedition, Part ii, p. 80, 81.  
 Chemnitz, Tom. i. 176.



1631.

out delay, the pikemen and colours being left behind; when the king in an instant ordered Hepburn and Monro to march without giving them time to send either for their horses or their servants. Having walked briskly about two miles, the king then imparted his design to Hepburn, and being joined there by an escort of eighty horsemen, continued to advance seven successive hours without halting, and reached Oxenford before two o'clock that morning. There is something in this march of a very uncommon nature; namely, that a body of infantry, without any the least previous notice, should perform an expedition of sixteen miles length in a dark night, after the autumnal equinox, without having the opportunity of reposing themselves a single hour. But the reasons were as urgent on the one side, as the march was extraordinary on the other: for the town and pass were guarded only, at that moment, by 150 musqueteers, whom the king thought too weak to make any notable resistance; and hence it was, that the brigade, at its arrival, had not time to take the least refreshment, being ordered to possess the bridge and market-place, and continue under arms till break of day \*. Then the king repulsed the enemy with great vigour, and ordering Hepburn to defend himself like a man of honour, (with permission to blow up the bridge, and retreat to the head-quarters, in case the service proved extremely desperate) returned with all possible diligence to Wurtzburg, from whence dispatches passed night and day between Hepburn and himself.

It hath been observed by an old colonel, who served then under Gustavus, that he never saw his master's mind so greatly agitated, as in this present affair of Oxenford: for which, I think, one may venture to assign some very conclusive reasons. It is true, we remarked a few minutes ago, that the king conducted an army of twenty-five or twenty-six thousand men into Franconia: but then it must be remembered likewise, that he had a tract of river to defend, which extended itself near forty miles; and as one regiment was garrisoned in this city, where there was a bridge, and another stationed at that pass, where there was a ford,

\* Monro's second Expedition, p. 83.

1631. (Horn being detached with a small army to reduce the diocess of Bamberg) it appears to me extremely plain, that the king had not more than eight or ten thousand soldiers in his head-quarters at Wurtzburg, wherewith to oppose the combined army of the league, which amounted at that time to fifty thousand men. Nevertheless he, who, though not impervious to apprehensions of danger and difficulty, took care never to lose his presence of mind, resolved at first sight, (with that sort of intuition peculiar to himself and some few great commanders) to remain firm and unmoved at Wurtzburg; and augment his out-parties, if that were possible, rather than call them in to his own assistance.

He thus continued three days in a state of patient perseverance, when Tilly, who now began to think seriously of covering Bavaria, broke up his camp at a minute's warning, in the close of the evening; and presented his whole army, by break of day, before Oxenford, under appearance of attacking the town sword in hand; but, for the reason above assigned, (not to mention, that the Swedes, by their master's orders, had thrown up some very good extemporal fortifications) he only made the preparations and shew of a general storm, and suddenly pursued his intended journey with redoubled diligence. The king being soon advertised of the enemy's decampment, began to feel a second uneasiness for the brave Scottish brigade left in Oxenford, and dispatching in the very instant a re-inforcement of 500 musqueteers to Hepburn, enjoined him to dislodge forthwith under favour of the darkness, and file along unobserved on the same line with the enemy, so as to occupy the town of Weinsheim (a march of about sixteen miles) before Tilly could arrive thither. But as the Imperial general lay, at that time, close to Oxenford, being advanced further than the king imagined, Hepburn made use of his own discretion, without attempting to move a single step; for he saw plainly, that an enterprise of such a sort was not to be undertaken upon the footing of circumstances, as they then existed. The king likewise, after a short revision of his former thoughts, dispatched a second message to the colonel, thereby requesting him (in case the enemy continued advancing towards Weinsheim) to re-conduct his little party to the head quarters at Wurtzburg, where he had entrenched himself upon the



the same principles, which he formerly made use of in the famous encampment near Werben. 1631.

Hepburn's officers and soldiers were all amazed at the king's revoking his first orders, it being remarked by them, that they had rarely or never known him change a military disposition, after he had once framed it; a certain and no inconsiderable proof of that prince's uncommon acumen in the art of war.

And now his majesty having received assurances from the cities of Nuremberg, Ulm, Straßburg, and Francfort, determined at length to advance to the last mentioned place; but the town of Hanau was considered as an obstacle, being situated on a pass cross the river Kintz, at the distance of about one day's easy march from Francfort. But it was necessary first to procure the key of admission, and that was to conquer Hanau; which the Imperialists, about three years before, had blockaded fruitlessly for no less space than that of seventeen weeks.

Towards the acquisition of this place Gustavus directed his whole attention, and for these purposes entertained a secret correspondence with Philip Ludovic \*, the count thereof, who being born and educated a protestant, had consented privately, that the garrison should be surprised without bloodshed, it being agreed, that a certain postern-gate should be left open, unknown to Brandeis; who commanded a thousand Imperialists, whom Tilly had squeezed formerly into the town. It is true, the Imperial general pressed hard to introduce four companies more, which, it is thought, he would have swelled to twelve hundred soldiers at least; but the count, who was a person of some consequence, (his territory being esteemed one of the most fruitful in those parts of Germany) refused him peremptorily and promptly: for Tilly had surprised by force the town and castle of Babenhäusen, which had been mortgaged to him by one of his relations.

His majesty destined the conduct of this expedition to lieutenant-colonel Dewbatel †, who had risen to that command from a simple serjeant

\* Others say Philip Maurice; brother to the celebrated AMELIA, landgraves of Hesse-Cassel. *Not. Proc. folio, p. 400.*

† We have spoken of this enterprising officer He died in 1638, aged thirty-three. *Imhoff,* in a preceding note, and therein expressed our

1631. jeant in the short space of four years. To him were assigned six companies of Bauditzén's cavalry, and 1500 selected musqueteers, who served on horseback. Dewbatel performed a march of fifty miles in four and twenty hours, and crossing the Kintz, according to agreement, the city being most accessible on that side, entered the postern-gate with great dexterity, and giving the garrison on that part of Hanau, called the old town, a very desperate *camisado* at five in the morning (it being now the first day of November) cut to pieces two companies of Imperial infantry, seized and secured the gate, which parted the old town and the new, and made the count, to all outward appearances, a prisoner by force. Brandeis, a captain of infantry, governor of both towns, but residing in the new, would by no means, on the first intelligence, allow the enterprise to be practicable; it appearing to him almost humanly impossible for men to have made such an extraordinary march in so short a time. Another circumstance conspired likewise to misguide his judgment: he had sent unfortunately the day before to demand a re-inforcement from the garrison of Aschaffenberg, and concluded naturally, that these new comers were his own associates; and for this reason, when advertised of the confusion in the old town, forbid his officers to take the alarm and sound to arms. At break of day he perceived his error, and prepared to make a vigorous defence, having dispatched one of his domestics, who crossed the town-ditch by swimming, to the town of Steinheim, where then lay a considerable body of Imperialists\*, sufficient in number to give battle to the Swedes, at the distance only of about sixteen miles. But whether it was, that the king's commander had an eye or not to this event, thus much is certain, he protested he would agree only to a momentary parley, and took care to give Brandeis, from the town walls, a short interview with the count, who told him artfully, that being a prisoner, he should not take upon him to prescribe directions; nevertheless, advised him to make the best terms he could procure. Upon this the garrison was obliged to surrender at discretion, and resign both colours

doubts, whether *Dewbatel*, *Tubadel*, *Derwal*, *Tubal*, *Hubalt* and *Horebald*, were the same person or not.

\* The regiment of Einot, and some companies belonging to other regiments.

and



and arms at the city-gate, for Dewbatel told them all conditions must proceed from himself. The officers had their swords returned them, and so had the foldiers ; but, according to the usage of that age, as the colours were delivered to the conqueror, their military oath to the emperor was supposed to be void ; and of course most of the men enlisted themselves into the Swedish service, excepting about forty strenuous catholics, and all the officers. Amongst the prisoners was Francis, baron de Merci, (whom we have mentioned in the expedition of the Lorrainers) then serjeant-major to the regiment of Piccolomini. He had no command, being retired hither, with several other of Tilly's officers, on account of the wounds he had received in the day's service at Leipfic.

In consequence of this spirited undertaking, the king preferred Dewbatel to be colonel of his own regiment of guards in the room of Teüffel, who had been lately killed, and giving him commission to raise two or three new regiments, advanced him likewise to the government of the city he had just surprized. But this officer in the end proved very ungrateful to the memory of his late master, and left the Swedish service at a time, when his assistances were most wanted. And with regard to the count de Hanau, who had acceded to the king's party with so good a grace, his majesty made him a present of a signory contiguous to his own territory, in terms so gracious, that the manner of conferring the favour far exceeded the benefaction itself.

The regal army being now greatly shattered, and a considerable number of native Swedes destroyed, several regiments, with their respective officers, were incorporated into one corps, and called a *Brigade* \* ; which said *brigade*, if complete, consisted of 2008 men †, and carried the colours of the eldest colonel. Here the king made some revision of his favourite doctrine of brigades, and formed five of these brigades, in his own army ; namely, the brigade of *guards*, the *green*, (which Hepburn commanded as senior colonel) the *blue*, the *white*, and the *red*. But when a brigade is mentioned in the course of

\* Swedish Intelligencer, Part ii. p. 28, 29.

† Before this period, his majesty allowed men to a company, and eight companies to a regiment, which (exclusive of officers) made seventy-two musqueteers, and fifty-four pike-precisely 1008 common soldiers.

1631. these wars, as it was commonly more or less incomplete, according to the fortune of a campaign, the reader must, at a medium, suppose it to contain about 1800 men. Be that as it will, at this first institution, his majesty's strength was so diminished, that he could only make these incorporated combinations amount, each of them, (something more, or something less) to about 1500 persons. Nevertheless, the more entire regiments continued still to be undisturbed; and, as new corps were levying daily in various parts, care was taken to transplant into them the junior colonels from the several brigades.

Some few days before this reformation was made, his majesty cast his eyes on the town of Wertheim, and surprised in it the Italian colonel Piccolomini \*, who there lost good part of his regiment. Rottenberg upon the Tauber

\* Octavio Piccolomini. This gallant young man (whose family at Sienna took its rise from Catharine sister of pope Pius II.) proved afterwards a general of great repute. His father was master of the bed-chamber to Cosmo, grand duke of Tuscany, and general of his cavalry: and had served with great reputation in the Low-Countries, Hungary, Transylvania, and Barbary.

By the original picture, I have seen of the son, he was gracefully made, and of a very agreeable countenance. He had the eyes of his country of the finest sort, bright, piercing, yet not ferocious. He dressed out of the pedantry of the then mode, and has so much the look of a fine gentleman and person of fashion, that it seems to confirm an uncommon letter of Mazarine's to him, which the cardinal endites with a politeness relatively to the occasion, and tells him, that since it was the fate of war, that the French army should be defeated, he had rather Piccolomini should obtain that honour than any other general in Europe, being certain the prisoners would fall into the hands of a person of distinguished manners and humanity.

He was not only of a robust and healthy temperament, but so very alert and dextrous in the art of horsemanship, that, completely clothed in armour, (which in those days was none of the lightest) he could throw himself on the saddle of any common war-horse without touch-

ing the stirrup. He personally saved the battle of Lutzen from concluding in a total overthrow. At the head of 1000 cuirassiers completely armed, he made good the very point, where Gustavus in person made the most violent impression. Broken by fresh supplies of the enemy, and reciprocally breaking them, he kept his troops in spirits till the 10th or 12th attack, nor ever departed from the ground, where he had the honour to be first placed, though covered all over with wounds, and though three horses had been killed under him. Wallstein was so sensible, that such a soldier was in effect an army, that next morning he sent him, as a token of his esteem, from a generosity peculiar to himself, a present of 1600 l. sterling. On account of this and other kindnesses he never departed from his gratitude to the generalissimo, nor would he give any connivance to his assassination, though the emperor and his ministers were the contrivers and cause of it. Yet great as this man was in the subaltern duties of war, his character afterwards did not rise in proportion to his elevation: something more may still be wanting to form the commander in chief. However, we must observe, in honour to his memory, that he generally acted in conjunction with the archduke Leopold, and was often overruled and fettered by him. By peculiar good fortune he survived the thirty years wars, though present



Tauber was taken next, and a body of 9000 Lorrainers were attacked 1631. in their retreat homewards, who lost Mafon, their commissary-general, (whom the Swedes took prisoner) and their military chest. Mean while the landgrave of Hesse-Cassel co-operated vigorously with the king at the head of 10,000 men, and kept Gronsfelt in full employment about Paderborn. Rostock at length capitulated, to the great joy of Gustavus. The duke of Mechlenberg and Todt\* had besieged and blockaded it for a space, which one may call in war, time immemorial: but Virmond the governor made a most obstinate defence, and fought during the whole siege under red colours, which in those days was considered as a mark of irreconcilable resistance. At length the citizens and garrison began to mutiny, having lost all hope, after the decision at Leipzig. Nevertheless, Virmond had address enough to procure excellent conditions for himself and soldiers, and saved three thousand two hundred men, who were conveyed to Wolfenbuttle, where, by Mansfelt's orders, he joined Boninghausen. They then all acted against Bannier; whilst Oxenstiern advanced to bring the king a re-inforcement of 12,000 men, and the elector of Bavaria, on the other hand, astonished at the progress made in Franconia, assembled an army of 20,000 combatants near Donawert, and offered a garrison to the inhabitants of Ratibon, which they declined. The people of Augsburg returned the same excuse to Gallas.

Having mentioned Rostock, I must just take notice of a strange accident, which happened there in the beginning of this year. One Jacob

present in most actions of importance: and not only rencounters then, but pitched battles too, were much more frequent, and more sanguinary than they have been since.

He was thought so much a person of parts and address, as to be sent plenipotentiary to Nuremberg, in order to meet Charles Gustavus, prince Palatin of Sweden, and realize the stipulations made at Munster about drawing off the troops, and evacuating the various garrisons in the empire. Never did any work require more extensive knowledge in detail, or greater patience or dexterity; for the assistant generals on both sides traversed all advances towards a good understanding; inasmuch as in those days they

lived by the sword, and grew rich by the sword to such a degree, as, God be praised, hath never happened since in the land-service. Yet Piccolomini soon gave the finishing stroke to this immense and difficult undertaking. He then married Maria Benigna, a daughter of the duke of Saxony, and died a year afterwards in the 56th year of his age. *Azioni egregie da generali e da soldati Italiani dall'anno 1600 fino al 1700, 4. Ven. 1742.*

\* Todt, Achatius, (Ahaz) descended from a daughter of Eric, the degraded king of Sweden, whose epitaph was the following text of scripture; *Translatum est regnum, et factum est fratris ejus: a domino constitutum est ei.*

Vermeyer,

1631. Vermeyer, a native of Osnabrug, conceived a mortal hatred against the Imperial colonel Hatzfeld \*, for which no reason could be assigned. He artfully concealed his resentments a long time, and insinuated himself into that commander's opinion, which emboldened him to ask for some employment by way of amanuensis. It happened one day, in the absence of the domestics, as that officer was intent on arranging some papers, that Vermeyer came behind him with an axe, which he procured for that purpose, and, as he was stooping, stunned him with one blow, and then cutting off his head, carried it away in a cloth, hid it in a senator's house, and concealed himself. Being discovered and questioned why he had committed so horrid a murder, he replied coolly, *that Hatzfeld had deserved it*; and more than this not even the torture could extract from him †.

And now, before we return to Gustavus, it may not be amiss to cast our eyes, for a moment, on the concurrent operations of the elector of Saxony ‡; who by Arnheim's instigation artfully chose the reduction of Lusatia, (which by the way the emperor had given him as his share of protestant plunder about eight years before) and the invasion of Bohemia, for his departments. Having conquered all that he lost in Misnia, he received an extraordinary declaration from his Imperial majesty by colonel Paradeyfer; who, to save appearances, had been dispatched to Dresden in a ministerial capacity, and acted under the interposition of Cadretta, the Spanish ambassador then residing at Vienna. Cadretta, to use the language of those times, was, as we suppose, an *Italianized Spaniard*; for this memorial may be considered as an equal mixture of subtle falsehood and high Castilian rodomontade; since it was hereby declared ||, “ That Tilly had invaded Saxony *without or-* “ *ders* §, for which temerity he should receive condign chastisement one “ day or other: as the hastiness of a passionate and imprudent warrior “ had forced the elector into the arms of a *meer stranger*, who could

\* There was another colonel Hatzfeld, who was afterwards a general of some renown.

† Brachelii Hist. Nost. Tem. p. 270.

‡ Historical or Authentic Relation, in Low Dutch, fol. Part i. p. 149.

|| Soldat Suedois, 178, &c.

§ Tilly declares expressly the contrary in his letter from Halberstadt, which we have published.

“ neither



“ neither protect his friends, nor extirpate his enemies, and upon 1631.  
 “ whose precarious existence the whole fortune of an hazardous war  
 “ depended. That the house of Austria, on the contrary, confided in  
 “ a strength, which was unfurmountable, and laid claim to resources,  
 “ that were inexhaustible; renowned likewise, and admired in all ages,  
 “ for the hereditary character *d'une debonnaireté particulière*.” (Such are  
 the author's \* own words, and sorry I am, that I want an equivalent  
 expression, whereby to translate them.) The memorial then proceeded as  
 follows; namely, “ That to evince this latter assertion, more efficaci-  
 “ ous orders were then dispatched to the Imperial commanders in Lu-  
 “ satia (and this was really fact) to leave that province devoid of troops  
 “ at the elector's devotion: beseeching him to remember the solemn  
 “ oath he had taken to the emperor and empire, with a promise sub-  
 “ joined, of making all matters easy to the once oppressed and afflicted  
 “ protestants.”

To which declarations the duke of Saxony, with respect to outward  
 appearances, replied boldly and honestly enough: as also to a conven-  
 tion proposed, where Cadretta intended to be present in the character  
 of a mediator, and after having given, according to his custom, some  
 plentiful repasts and copious libations, besought colonel Paradeiser to  
 inform the courts of Vienna and Madrid, “ That having incurred  
 (than which nothing could be truer) “ the suspicions and reflections  
 “ of all good protestants, he had served his Imperial majesty faithfully,  
 “ and had been rewarded insincerely: that a declaration of this sort  
 “ ought to have preceded the battle of Leipzig, and not succeeded it:  
 “ and that he knew the wariness of Tilly's old age too well, to suppose  
 “ him capable of taking so rash a step without positive instructions:  
 “ since if the victory of that day had once fallen to the share of the  
 “ Imperial party, Cesar, and not Cesar's general, would have claimed  
 “ the glory of the Misnian irruption and depopulation†. That he had  
 “ joined Gustavus partly through resentment, and partly from a prin-  
 “ ciple of self-preservation: nor was he at liberty to detach himself

\* Frederic Spanheim, professeur alors en  
 theologie à Geneve.

† Soldat Suedois, p. 183—188. Le Vassor,  
 Tom. vii. p. 60—63.

1631. “ from him without incurring the imputation of ingratitude : and so  
 “ much the rather, as the accommodation proposed (for which, it must  
 “ be confessed, Paradeifer appeared to be furnished with plenipotentiary  
 “ authorities) tended not to the establishment of an universal peace, but  
 “ was only calculated to form a private union between the house of  
 “ Austria and that of Dresden. Nor was he to be informed, that a  
 “ secret disposition had been projected, whereby it was contrived to  
 “ transfer the electoral bonnets of Brandenburg and Saxony unto  
 “ other wearers : concluding with this short insinuation, that it was  
 “ much easier to despise Gustavus than to conquer him ; being a  
 “ prince alike respectable in his friendships, and redoubtable in his  
 “ animosities \*.

Nothing could be more pointedly worded than this spirited reply ; and yet the elector and Arnheim had, even then, a private inclination to become false to the cause of Sweden.

Mean while the prince we are speaking of, having reduced Lusatia, where Tieffenbach and Goëtz made but an imperfect resistance, entered Bohemia, and conjoined himself with old count Thurn, (who was now lieutenant-general to Gustavus, and commanded a little army of Swedes, on some occasions separate from that of Arnheim) which union inclined the Bohemians to give the elector a more favourable reception ; since, at the very instant he invested Prague, the inhabitants opened their gates with great chearfulness, so that don Balthazar di Maradas, the chief Imperial commander in that kingdom, and count de Michna, first commissary-general, were obliged to escape with all the garrison.

Walftein, previously to this, returned to his palace just before the electoral army approached Prague, and by the part he acted, probably smoothed the path of a second ascent to his master's favour. He exhorted the officers and soldiers to perform their duty like men of honour, told them fine stories of assistances from Hungary and Poland, and denounced severe punishments against such, as should behave with remissness or

\* Chemnitius de Bello Sueco-German. Tom. i. 218. And indeed *the king of snow* (as the Spaniards and Austrians affected to call him) performed his wonders in due time, and plucked the

best feathers from the wings of the Imperial eagle :

—— *gelida rex Suevus ab Arcto*

*Incumbit, sacramque aquilam melioribus alis  
 Expoliatur*——

cowardice :



cowardice: but saw plainly, at the same time, that the inhabitants were 1631. unkindly disposed towards his master, and that a garrison of noble number was not sufficient to defend such an extent of walls. Nevertheless, to support the spirit of his party, he made semblance first to enter into an accommodation with count Thurn, and left Prague under pretence of diverting the siege by concluding a decisive treaty with Saxony; whereas, instead of attempting one project or the other, he shaped his course to Budweis, and not the Saxon camp, having removed privately the whole cancellaria, or papers of state.

The elector then took up his residence in this nobleman's palace, and abolished the chapel called *Bella Victoria*, which had been erected in memory of the battle of Prague \*. Count Thurn succeeded Michna in the possession of his own house, which had been confiscated; and caused the heads of his protestant friends, that had been fixt upon the town gates, to be decently buried in the church of the Hussites. And here I must mention one remarkable circumstance; namely, that the city of Prague was *lost and re-taken, changed and received its religion, the self-same day*, at *eleven years* distance. And thus the marechal de Saxe took Prague at near an hundred years distance, the very same day, that his ancestor obtained it. The kingdom soon followed the example of the metropolis, with exception only of Pilsen, Budweis, and Tabor. The proscribed nobility and gentry returned, and took possession of their estates and houses. The goods of such Polish ecclesiastics, as absented themselves, were made a sacrifice to the fury of the populace; which paid also very little respect to the Imperial soldiery. Upon this account Thurn issued out a general protection, which run in the name of Gustavus †; and denounced severe punishments against all violators of the public peace. But though the people adored him as the genius of liberty and their tutelar angel; yet two Imperial privy-counsellors could not escape the transports of their resentment, for the multitude had been persecuted and exasperated beyond all imagination, since the battle of Prague.

\* Mercure François, Tom. xvii. Part ii.

† Swedish Intelligencer, Part ii. 204, &c.

## THE HISTORY OF THE LIFE

1631. Gustavus now began thoroughly to suspect the elector of Saxony, who had wasted too much time at first setting out, under pretence of punishing his own subjects, and amused himself with feasting and rioting in Walftein's palace, when he ought to have been clothed in armour, at the head of his forces, in the middle of Austria. The vigilant Croatians missed little of securing his person, whilst he was frivolous or insincere enough, amidst all the tumult of an important campaign, in pursuing a stag: upon which interruption, in order to enjoy his sports and Baccharah wine with greater security, he retired nearer home, as far as Leütmeritz, leaving the conduct of the army to Arnheim (who gained some advantage over the Imperialists near Limburg) and placing Hofkirck, an Austrian baron, with a strong garrison at Prague. Thus ended an expedition, more famous for the effusion of wine, than of human blood. ●

While the elector of Saxony was thus employed, we will just consider, for a moment, the operations of the Swedish and Imperial forces in other parts. Horn lay near Bamberg, between Gustavus and Tilly, in order to cover his master's flanks, and watch the motions of the latter. Banier, Todt, Hamilton, Lesley, the dukes of Mechlenberg and Lunenberg (not to mention the troops of Bremen) the landgrave of Hesse-Cassel, and the chancellor Oxenstiern (who indeed was now marching to escort the queen, and join the king) all commanded little separate armies in the northern and north-east parts of Germany, and were confronted in their turns by no less persons than Pappenheim, Tieffenbach, Goëtz, Gronselt, Boninghausen, Mansfelt, and others: to enter into an abridgment only of whose proceedings would make a multiplicity of wars, which the reader's mind could hardly comprehend; the king having at that time eight or nine separate armies on foot, each of them in full employment against an equal number of adversaries; not to mention some efforts made on both sides in Suabia, where old Sir Patrick Ruthven, and the duke of Wirtemberg, opposed themselves to the elder Montecuculi, and commissary Ossa.

And now midst the confusion and tumult of wars, the landgrave of Hesse Darmstadt, who, (not to degenerate from the character of his father)



father) was always a secret well-wisher to the courts of Vienna and Mentz, and found no small advantage in playing so clandestine a game, made proposals of accommodation betwixt all the contending parties then in the empire : himself and the margrave of Culmbach were to be appointed interpositors on the protestant side, and the archduke Leopold and the duke of Neuburg were to sustain the same parts in the catholic interests ; but the whole project soon vanished into air. At the same time the English ambassador \*, then residing at Vienna, sent his secretary, Richard Hurst, to London, in company with a Capuchin friar, with instructions to make some fresh proposals concerning the restitution of the Palatinate. Couriers also were dispatched upon the same errand to Madrid and Bruxelles. From all which operose proceedings nothing resulted, except that the English laughers had their jest, and said, that the emperor could not be extremely warm in his circumstances, when he was obliged to employ a plenipotentiary, who was not master of a single shirt †.

At this time her Swedish majesty arrived at Stetin ; and the duke of Pomerania, with great politeness, paid his compliment to her immediately, and besought her to stay one day, and honour with her presence a comedy and balet, which he had appointed for her amusement. She answered like the illustrious consort of the Great Gustavus ; that the state of the times required prayers and public humiliations more than interludes and bergamascos ‡ : that in the midst of his festivities, she should be reflecting on the dangers, which her husband was hourly exposed to, and consequently be alone and absent, although surrounded by a crowded theatre. Matters of public honour and ceremony being thus abruptly, but civilly decided, the duke made her majesty a present of a rich casket, and several valuable miniatures ; and the queen, not to be deficient in magnificence, sent him back a vase and basin of massy gold : and, to exceed him, if possible, in politeness, made a compliment to the duchess of a fine coach and six horses, that were most beautifully dap-

\* Sir Robert Anstruther.

† Memoires d'Electrice Palatine.

‡ That is to say, *masques à la façon de Bergame*,

a town in Italy. The word occurs both in Shakespeare and Johnson.

1631. pled. Then from Stetin she passed on to Berlin, the place of her nativity, and thence to Dresden.

We will now return to Gustavus, who, till the town of Hanau was taken, had great doubts what steps to pursue: nor were his perplexities quite removed when Dewbadel conquered it; for though he had his choice of two routes, either to Nuremberg or Francfort, (in the districts round the former of which lay the temporal princes, and in the latter, the three spiritual electors) yet he could not easily induce his mind, which part of the alternative to embrace. Tilly well foresaw, that each of these plans would present itself to the king's consideration, (for great generals want no intelligence, whereby to be informed of the nicer operations of a campaign) and therefore of course, when Gustavus approached Nuremberg, he, in consequence of that motion, filed off to Francfort; and when he perceived, that the king declined advancing to the former place, passed him by a forced march in the night, and placed his army directly in the road to the latter \*. In this dilemma, where the sword might not so conveniently take place, (for the Imperial general was extremely cautious and wary) the king applied himself a second or third time to the arts of negotiation, and procured at length a final ratification of the treaty, which had been long agitating; on his side at least, with the patricians of Nuremberg, whereby he gave his honour to relieve them or perish, in case Tilly should besiege them vigorously.

His peace of mind being thus recovered, and all greater difficulties smoothed, he appointed Axel Lily to be governor of Wurtzburg, and leaving Horn as general by deputation in the circle of Franconia, embarked at Torstenson on the Mayne with all his artillery, and marched his army in two columns, on either side of the river, as far as Aschaffenberg, himself leading that division, which approached next to Tilly. The body of troops he then conducted, amounted only to 7000 infantry, and 4000 horse. He had few native Swedes with him, having assigned the major part of such as remained to Horn, Banier, Lesley †,

\* Swedish Intelligencer, Part ii. p. 20, &c.

† Sir Alexander; an old Scottish general, governor of Stralsund when Gustavus entered Germany.



Todt, and his other generals. Never army made a quieter march in an hostile country, (for Horn lay encamped at Bamberg betwixt his master and Tilly :) so that one would have imagined the king was making a procession in his own dominions, at the head of his subjects; inso-much that an old colonel in the Swedish service hath declared, that the five days march under Gustavus from Wurtzburg to Aschaffenberg had more the aspect of a journey of pleasure than a military expedition.

At Aschaffenberg, where the elector of Mentz had one of the finest palaces in the empire, was expected, on account of the wealth therein contained, a sort of resistance no ways contemptible; and the rather, as the garrison consisted of one regiment of Tilly's old Burgundians, and twice the number of electoral forces: but they all dislodged under the protection of darkness, and were replaced by Banier's regiment of infantry.

The town of Steinheim was next conquered by meer force, and 600 foldiers, who made two thirds of the garrison, enrolled themselves under the Swedish ensigns. His majesty made a compliment of the castle and signory round it to the count de Hanau's mother, unto whose family they anciently appertained; and this act of generosity so endeared him to the said nobleman, who was no inconsiderable protestant prince, (having five earldoms under him, and about 700 villages \*) that he, and the seventeen counts of Veteravia †, some of whom were Lutherans, and some Calvinists, entered into a public treaty ‡ with Gustavus; consigned to him all their passes and fortresses; agreed to pay a contingent of 2500 l. a month during the wars, and recall such subjects as then served under the emperor. Nay, they had the boldness to assert, in their counterpart of articles given to Gustavus, that this prince was compelled by meer impulse of conscience to enter Germany; and that the house of Austria aimed at nothing less than universal domination over the minds and liberties of mankind: having seized the ter-

\* Swedish Intelligencer, Part ii. p. 35.

† Some of these families had more earldoms than one, as the Nassaus, Waldecks, Solmes's, Isenbergs, &c.

‡ It was not signed till the Swedish army arrived at Francfort, and consisted of a long preamble by way of manifesto, and eleven interchanged articles.

1631. ritories of the said contractors, purely to shew what, and how much arbitrary power can effect, either with or without reason, and bestowed patrimonial inheritances (that were never forfeited) upon a set of *new* men, who till that time were hardly known to the empire.

From Steinheim the king advanced to Hanau, where he only supped, to the great mortification of the magistracy; and then causing all his drums to beat, marched seven miles farther that night, till he reached Offenbach-castle, which lay at no great distance from Francfort. Here he rested one day, having sent the count de Solmes before to prepare the incident of his admission. The magistrates then besought Gustavus to consider their oaths to the emperor, and not only leave their town in a state of neutrality, but pay some regard to their annual fairs, which were the chief means of their subsistence. To which the king replied, *That the tacit compact of their obligation to his Imperial majesty had been already violated; that the word neutrality conveyed an odious sound to his ears; and that he felt astonishment to be informed by them, that their fairs had more weight with them than their liberty and their consciences, since they considered things more in a private light as tradesmen and negotiants, than in a public light as members of the world and Christians* \*. Upon this the commissioners interceded for some fresh protraction of time, in order to consult the elector of Mentz, their ecclesiastical sovereign: but the king, who seized all incidents as they flew along before him, cut them short by observing, (and here he raised his voice a little with a tone of authority) *That he could easily excuse them from taking a step of so much trouble: for being master of Aschaffenberg, their prince's place of residence, there was no elector of Mentz, except Gustavus; and that he would give them a more plenary and effectual absolution in government matters than the aforesaid prelate could then pretend to do* †.

The magistrates, astonished with a firmness so decisive, consented without delay, for themselves and the people, not only to take an oath of fidelity, but allow the Swedish army ingress and egress, and admit 600

\* Le Soldat Suedois, p. 266.

† Ibidem.



soldiers into Saxenhausen, a pleasing and elegant part of the suburbs, 1631. divided from the city by a fair and large bridge.

As this town, in one respect, might be considered as the most illustrious city in Germany (it being a common saying, that he who possesseth Francfort a year and a day, is master of the empire) the king, in order to make his public entrance and procession with greater solemnity, passed through it, riding all the way with his head uncovered; bowing to the better sort of people as they saluted him, and speaking courteously to the artizans and inferior populace\*. This cavalcade was preceded by fifty six pieces of artillery (the more ponderous cannon being transported down the Mayne in boats) and then followed seventy four ensigns of foot, and forty five cornecies of horse. As the whole ceremony was performed with inexpressible regularity, a larger body of forces than this could not march through the town in one day; and of course, to preserve the greater decorum, the next morning twenty six more troops of cavalry closed the procession. So that all of them, according to the best calculation I can make, (not to mention the corps, that guarded the artillery along the river) amounted upon the whole to about 14,000 effective men: which addition the king had gleaned up in the short space since he left Wurtzburg. Only two soldiers detached themselves from their ranks to make some petty depredations, and both were condemned by martial law to suffer death the next day.

The magistracy fitted up the Imperial palace of Braunfels† for the king's reception, who dined there the very day he entered the town, making choice of the same room where the emperor eats at his coronation. But when they pressed him to sleep there the ensuing night, as the place of residence during his stay, he declined the request, and courte-

\* It was usually his custom to discourse with all the town's people, that flocked round him, and ask them a thousand little questions, that meant nothing, but affability. He disliked flattery and compliments; and when those, who affected the courtly and polite style, accosted him in such language, he generally desired them with a smile, to reserve that tone of discourse for her majesty and her maids of honour.

† Gustavus, who afterwards lodged there, was so delighted with it, that he asked his generals one day, if they saw any defect in it? and when they returned their answer in the negative, replied gravely, *that he perceived one, which quite dissatisfied him: for as the palace was not built upon wheels, he could not possibly contrive to roll it to the sea shore of the Baltic, and thence transport it to the city of Stockholm.*

1631. ously told them, *that he could repose himself contentedly in the open field, and desired no other apartments than what his pioneers constructed for him, according to their taste, in extemporary architecture: adding, that the body of an army could not subsist without its head; and that he was obliged to take his chance in common with the meanest soldier that served under him\**. All which was at that time nothing more nor less than a political pretext: it was his intention, under the advantage of the profoundest secrecy, to invest the strong town of Hoëchst; which he surrounded by ten o'clock that evening, as it lay at no great distance from Francfort, and made himself master of it the day succeeding. And it was for this reason, under pretence of doing himself and the city an honour, that he marched his forces through the town, and made them stand to their arms at the opposite gate till night came on, and then (without giving the neighbourhood the least apprehensions) conducted them unexpectedly to the walls of Hoëchst.

It was here that George, the landgrave of Hesse-Darmstadt, (though others, it must be confessed, suppose the place to be Steinheim, which appears to me not so probable) sent a message of proposals, by one of the gentlemen of his bed-chamber, to the king, who being somewhat displeased at an application so devoid of ceremony, asked Swalbach (for that was the person's name,) not without a certain degree of warmth, *if his master thought it beneath him to make a visit in person?* Upon this, the landgrave, whose character we have touched upon in a preceding paragraph, posted away to Francfort with all possible expedition; where his majesty (who by this time was returned thither) took the opportunity to insinuate, during the course of a repast, *that it might have proved more prudent for him to have joined the other protestant princes, who entered into the Leipzig confederation, and trusted to a manly and spirited resolution, than thus to have played a separate clandestine game, and lent an ear to the vain and illusory promises of the court of Vienna†*. Nevertheless, he shifted his bargain to such a degree, backwards and forwards, and tormented Gustavus so much with reservations, excuses, subterfuges, palliations, and promises, that the latter, merely for the sake of holding this Proteus in any shape, (who happened to be son-in-law to the elector of Saxony, a prince, who then

\* Le Soldat Suedois, p. 269. † Ibid. p. 272.



required to be dextrously managed \*) consented to allow him a sort of 1631. neutrality, and absolved him from the common military contingent, which all other contracting powers had agreed to furnish. In consequence of which, he consigned to the Swedes the strong castle of Ruffelheim (in much the same manner as hath been mentioned before with regard to Custrin and Spandau) and ceded to his majesty free possession of all the forts and passages, that lay in his territories †.

At Francfort, a more explicit sort of personage joined Gustavus, who for one day had made a second journey to Hoëchst, in order to return God thanks for his victories without the interruption of a crowd of spectators; and that was William, landgrave of Hesse-Cassel; who conducted with him all the troops he could conveniently spare, which amounted perhaps in the whole to about 6000 foot, and 3000 horse. This prince had not been inactive whilst Tilly attempted to raise the siege of Marienberg; for during that interval he made himself master of Minden and Goëtingen, and advanced thence into the Palatinate, where he surprized the town of Vacha.

A treaty being now signed betwixt his majesty and the people of Francfort ‡, great attention was immediately paid to the negotiation and commerce of this illustrious city; for the king published a placard with relation to the two annual fairs, wherein he allowed an impartial toleration of religion to all mankind, granting the merchants of every sect and persuasion (Jews as well as Christians) free unmolested passage for themselves and their goods, and signifying the same under pain of the highest displeasure to all his commanders; which he confirmed next year by a second edict, giving his generals to understand, in their several districts, that if any travellers were plundered, or their effects detained by force, they themselves should be answerable for the loss in their own persons §. And hence it happened, in consequence of this extraordinary care and generosity, that the city of Francfort, for the space of three years, engrossed great part of the wealth and substance of the four upper circles in the German empire.

\* Puffendorf de Rebus Suecois, l. 3, p. 54.

† Chemnit, Tom. i. p. 200.

‡ Ibid. p. 201.

§ Ibid. p. 205.

1631. The possession of a town like Francfort, without the loss of a single person, produced congratulations and applauses to his majesty from all quarters: and upon this occasion, some of those court-sycophants, who are always buzzing their ill-conceived and ungracious compliments into royal ears, told him with a foolish countenance of admiration, that he resembled Alexander the Great, not only in the immensity, but in the rapidity likewise of his conquests; adding moreover, with a particular emphasis, that he possessed, or had at his devotion, the two places, where the Imperial crown was kept, and where the emperor received his consecration: upon which the king, who dealt often in the ironical style, replied gravely, and without seeming to feel their encomiums, *That hitherto, God be praised, he had not been ambitious, like the destructive and ravaging heroes of antiquity; but contented himself with that diminutive spot, which lies wedged in between the Rhine and the Baltic\**.

Whilst things went on thus peaceably at Francfort, Tilly ravaged the marquisate of Anspach with great licentiousness, and found in and near the capital thereof abundance of arms, and a considerable number of excellent horses. In this outrageous irruption, the very tombs and vaults of the reigning family were plundered; nor was the *cordón* of diamonds spared, which decorated the body of the old general, who, though he had commanded against the emperor at the battle of Prague, yet afterwards, by means of his retraction, merited better terms from the troops of the house of Austria. From hence Tilly sent the administrator of Magdeburg to Ingolstadt, whom he had carried round the empire as a trophy ever since the storming of Magdeburg: and here the coldness between him and Pappenheim (to whose impetuosity he attributed the ill success at Leipzig) proceeded at length to such disgust and disagreement, that the latter thought fit to retire with a separate army into Westphalia, and left the commander in chief to besiege Nuremberg, who hoped thereby to draw Gustavus from the banks of the Rhine: but the patricians had raised a little army in their own defence, and admitted a count de Solmes as governor on the part of Sweden. The Im-

\* Fred. Spanheim's *Soldat Suedois*, p. 275.



perial general summoned the magistracy to surrender their city in behalf of his master, and demanded of them 15,000*l.* by way of contribution: to which the only answer made, consisted of a brisk discharge of artillery, insomuch that one of the cannon-balls pierced the horse-litter where Tilly sat; who, partly disappointed at so petulant a resistance (for the town had lately given Aldringer assurances of fidelity and loyalty,) and partly chagrined, as a prisoner in the Swedish interests had set fire to his magazine of powder, found himself obliged to direct his intentions to some second object; or, in other words, dispose his troops into winter-quarters; a part filing off towards Bohemia to watch the Saxons, and the rest being dispersed through the Upper Palatinate: both, as far as we can now discover, without any apparent reasons, excepting that he hoped, as a report was then spread of Wallstein's being recalled, to throw the king upon that general's hands, and entice him far off from the metropolis of his friend and patron, the duke of Bavaria. If this was the real intention (for many think he feared to confront the king in a second pitched battle\*) it proved afterwards to be either ill conceived or unfortunate; for it inspired Gustavus with the idea of penetrating into Bavaria (part of which by this movement was left naked and defenceless) some few weeks sooner than he first proposed. Indeed, from the beginning to the end of this affair, he shewed himself to be no ways puzzled by all Tilly's diversified shiftings and efforts; knowing well, that Wallstein could perform but little till the spring ensuing. Of course, the instant he received the news, that Nuremberg was invested, he dispatched the landgrave of Hesse-Cassel with his army to disturb Tilly, declaring solemnly he would march himself to raise the siege in case there appeared to be any occasion: and the moment the Imperial forces decamped towards Bohemia and the higher Palatinate, he formed the scheme of crossing the Danube in those places where it was weakly defended.

It is now high time to observe, that the loss of the battle of Leipzig had given the emperor inexpressible uneasiness, inasmuch as it had ruined the rich harvests of twelve the most prosperous, though not the most glorious, campaigns, that are to be met with in history. Upon a

\* Galeazzo Gualdo, Part i. l. 2.

revision of what had preceded, he found himself without resource of men and money. Many of the veteran legions (which in the course of *one* war are hardly ever to be replaced) had been carelessly and wantonly disbanded; and his torrent of successes had been uninterrupted to such a degree, that none of his ministers thought it necessary to lay up good provision of wealth in the exchequer. The civil and the military officers lived by plunder, extortions, and confiscations, and arrogantly concluded, that their incomes could never be exhausted.

Prodiges and omens, according to the interpretation of those times, augmented the horrors of a superstitious prince. The eruption of mount Vesuvio, which chanced to happen soon after the battle of Leipzig, put all Europe into a new consternation\*. A woman was delivered of a birth singularly monstrous, near Vienna; and one of the emperor's counsellors of state dropt down dead at his feet, as they were discoursing about a tower†, which had been erected as a trophy to his glory; and (which was greatly interesting) he now knew from good authority, that Maximilian, elector of Bavaria, was attempting to negotiate a separate treaty with France. All these concurrent circumstances at once obliged him, and terrified him, to attempt to cajole the several powers in Europe, or bring them really into his interests: so that he talked in a new style to Anstruther, the English ambassador, about the restitution of the Palatinate; paid his court to Gustavus, by the intervention of the landgrave of Hesse-Darmstadt; and made his applications to the elector of Saxony, through the interposition of the Spanish ambassador: and dispatching, lastly, the baron Curtius with fresh proposals to the court of Versailles, ordered him to express himself in a very different style from what the court of Furstenberg had formerly used, after the reduction of Mantua. Nevertheless Gabriel Oxenstiern, the Swedish plenipotentiary, was

\* Nani, Historia Veneta, Tom. viii.

† The inscription was,

TROPHAEUM  
DEO VICTORI OPT. MAX.  
IN MEMORIAM B. VIRG. MARIAE, SS. IGNATHI,  
ET FRANCISCI XAVERII,  
FERDINAND. II IMPERAT.  
MDC.XXVII.

The tower belonged to the Jesuits new college at Prague.



much better received; for France knew how to distinguish between the pretended interests of religion, and the real advantages of the house of Austria\*.

In the next place, the emperor reformed all the offices of his court, and annihilated those, that were superfluous. He reduced the number of the noblemen of his bed-chamber from twenty nine to only six; and humbly requested contributions from all the princes of his own house, as also from the princes and states of Italy, and from the pope. The king of Spain and the king of Hungary (in conjunction with his consort) furnished him each with 150,000*l*. The great duke of Tuscany subscribed very generously; but when the Hungarian cardinal Pasman† was sent to make an essay on the papal purse, the holy father‡, artfully enough, refused to receive a *cardinal* as an *ambassador*; and insisted moreover, that the present war could not be considered as a war of religion. To which Pasman replied, like a man of probity, ability, and spirit; for he was not only a profound politician, but (which was then rare, as well as now) a politician that led an exemplary and irreproachable life; of course the public paid a great regard to all he said and did. He told the pope in so many words, That he valued himself on having spirit enough to engage in *secular matters*, when they were so *nearly connected* with his duty, as a *Christian*: and delivered this disculpation of himself with so much firmness, that Urban immediately granted him an audience; sagaciously foreseeing, that it was less dangerous to hear his arguments, than reject them unheard. In consequence of which, the unsuccessful prelate had only the jejune satisfaction to protest aloud to all mankind, “That the holy and infallible father had extracted more notions of doctrines from *Tacitus* and *Machiavel*, than from the *Evangelists* and the *Apostles*.”

\* *Memoires d'Eleonore Palatine*, &c. 306.

† Archbishop of Gran, or Strigonium. Some say his family name was Harrach, and that he was brother-in-law to Wallstein. The baron de Rabata attended him, who paid his visit to the o-

ther Italian princes. *Le Vassier*, Tom. vii. 110.

‡ Urban VIII. who had been nuncio to Clement VIII. in France, and held Lewis XIII. at the baptismal font.

1631.

The emperor then condescended to ask supplies from his own subjects. Cardinal Ditrichstein \* subscribed eight thousand pounds; the prince of Eggenberg † fifty thousand; count Michna sixteen thousand; the bishop of Vienna ‡ thirteen thousand; and Stralendorf §, vice-chancellor of the empire, nine thousand pounds.

As Tilly grew old, and was neglected by the soldiery; as he was unsuccessful in his last great campaign, and devoted besides to the Bavarian interests; one supreme commander was wanted, to make some counterpoise at least, against the predominant fortunes of Gustavus. The Spanish faction proposed Ferdinand, king of Hungary, the emperor's son; who had married the infanta, sister of Philip IV. and had patronized and strengthened the interests of Madrid at the court of Vienna. The German party recommended Walstein, as a general of great experience and unbounded generosity; for which reason he was peculiarly happy in levying troops at the shortest notice, that could be imagined. Indeed, if we except Pappenheim (Tilly being supposed to be out of the question) there was no alternative of choice: and Pappenheim, to give him his due, despised courtiers, court-applications, and court-intrigues. He wanted to be *illustrious*, but not *rich*. *Glory* was his *object*, and *that* he procured by the point of his sword. Of course, in all this caballing, and all these distresses, (not unhappily perhaps even for Gustavus) he was neither recommended by a single person, nor even thought of: yet, deriving his reputation only from himself, he never once murmured or remonstrated; never once entertained a thought of resigning, or quitting the service; but quietly, patiently, and steadily, performed

\* Francis, cardinal and prince of Ditrichstein, bishop of Olmutz, protector of the hereditary dominions, commissary-general and plenipotentiary-governor of Moravia, &c. See more in a preceding note.

† John, duke of Crommau, and prince of Eggenberg; one of the fourteen cabinet-counsellors, director of the council, knight of the order of the golden-fleece, hereditary *maréchal* of both the Austria's, &c. &c. *Court Calendar*

*of Vienna*, 1632. It was he, who advised the Mantuan war. *Paganino Gaudenzio; Singolarita delle guerre di Germania*, 171.

‡ Antony, prince, and abbot of Crembs-Münster, privy-counsellor, and director of the privy-council. He had great grants out of the forfeited lands in Franconia.

§ Peter Henry, baron; privy-counsellor, vice-president of the aulic council, &c. &c.

his



his duty; and died, as he lived, a faithful subject, an inferior commander, but a hero. 1631.

Charles of Lorrain wished fruitlessly for Walstein's employment, as we observed before; and count Furstenberg, who had served under Tilly, amused himself with the hope of being chosen in effect generalissimo, by the help of his kinsman of the same name, who was then president in the cabinet of the king of Hungary; for he aspired to no other post than to be military counsellor and director to that prince; but miscarrying in this project, he resigned his commission and retired from affairs.

The Spaniards were much startled with the thoughts of Walstein's revocation; for they formerly, in conjunction with the elector of Bavaria, had contrived his disgrace; nevertheless, like good courtiers, they submitted with seeming complacency; and, to dissemble better their consciousness of past affronts, made him a compliment of the order of the Golden Fleece; for they knew the spirit of the man, and his vindictive temper. They saw likewise, that Ferdinand was young and inexperienced, and that he could not make a campaign without vast expence.

And to pay court to the generalissimo still further, (who loved no foreign troops except Italians, whose quickness of parts he admired, and whose connexions with their respective princes he knew to be inconsiderable) they made him an offer, by the capuchin Zuiroga, to pay annually 100,000 l. into the military chest, by way of equivalent for a body of forces, that were to have marched from the Low Countries\*; which alternative he thought fit to embrace with great complacency. Thus ended this cabal of faction; and most readers will be apt to imagine, that the German party prevailed by mere superiority of reason. But perhaps neither *their* representations, nor *those* of the Spaniards, determined the important affair in question; for it is probable, the emperor gave the preference to Walstein purposely on account of a favourable horoscope, which his astrologer had erected for that general: and the rather, because it is well known, he had a secret repugnance to humble himself before a subject, and submit in effect to ask his pardon†.

\* Le Vassor; Tom. vii. 135.

† Puffendorf de Rebus Suecicis, fol. p. 58.

1631. Upon this, Maximilian, count Walstein, master of the horse to the king of Hungary, who was the general's nephew and favorite; the baron de Questenberg\*, privy-counsellor and aulic-chancellor, (who had been, and still continued his patron at court;) and the prince of Eggenberg, were all dispatched to him with full authorities to make him an offer of the supreme command, and a salary of 100,000 l. a year†. Walstein was then at his palace at Znaïm in Moravia, the Saxons having dislodged him from his fine places of residence at Prague, and in Silesia. He coldly declined making a visit to Vienna, pretending humility, and protesting the title of *his highness* (as duke of Mechlenberg) would offend his ears; since it would be a sensible mortification to him, to be treated upon the footing of a prince of the empire. But this was mere grimace and affectation; for few people were desirous of giving him the title, and many contested it.

He then entertained them with a prolix homily, on the instability of human greatness, the charms and advantages of retirement and recollection, and the emptiness of ambition. He lamented the disgrace of his master's arms, and inveighed bitterly against his own personal enemies; "observing haughtily enough, that if he undertook to remedy all the blunders of Tilly, and the elector of Bavaria, he justly merited to have his name affixed, by way of infamy, to every gibbet in the empire;—That the emperor had cut off his right arm, and now wanted to fight a duel, at swords, with the great Gustavus:" nevertheless condescended (under the name of the king of Hungary‡, and not otherwise) to undertake the command for three months; and at length,

\* The very person, who formerly carried him his dismissal, when he had been cashiered by the intrigues of the diet at Ratisbon. He was a minister of parts, and acquitted himself very dextrously in his embassy to England, after the death of Gustavus.

† Le Soldat Suedois, 298. *Mercur. Franc.* Tom. xviii. p. 94. Strictly speaking, the sum amounted to 108,000 l. *per annum*; but it was agreed to pay him 9000 l. or 100,000 florins, at the end of each month. This salary carries with

it the shew of a very high and haughty demand; yet whoever coolly considers the proposals, which this man makes the emperor in the next page, (and under which his Imperial majesty thought fit to acquiesce) will not be startled at the contemplation of a stipend so very extraordinary at its first appearance.

‡ This prince took the supreme command of the army upon him after Walstein's death, and succeeded his father to the Imperial throne, in 1637, under the title of Ferdinand III.



1631.

seeming to be fatigued, and over-persuaded by the solicitation of his friends, accepted the employ, as a sort of perpetual dictatorship; the terms of which, considering them to proceed from a disgraced subject to the first monarch in Europe, are such perhaps as can be hardly equaled in history. For he was to be Spanish, and Imperial generalissimo in Germany, and master of the supreme decision in concluding a peace.—His Imperial majesty, and the king of Hungary his son, were obliged never to enter the camp;—and his remuneration was to be given him, either in the lands he conquered, or in the hereditary dominions;—all confiscations were to be at his disposal, and that without the concurrence of the chamber of Spies, or the Imperial council;—he was to grant protections, passports, and pardons, without dependency;—his demands for provisions and money, were always to be answered;—and, in case of a retreat, the hereditary dominions were to be open for the reception of his army\*.

He then, in his letter to the emperor, told him (after having paused near six weeks, on the proposals, that had been made him, namely, from the beginning of November till the middle of December,) that, for his own part, he had been over-persuaded into the step, which he had taken, and sacrificed his private judgment to the partiality and affection of prince Eggenberg; obliquely reminding his master, that his actions, whether more or less meritorious, had not been repaid with any proportionable acknowledgments or remunerations†; and that with respect to himself, he felt great repugnance to hazard his person, his quiet, and his honour, a second time; adding further, that his principal wish was, to see a good peace soon established; and far from any vanity of conducting great armies, and making a figure in future history, he chose rather to collect this body of troops, and then resign the command into the hands of the king of Hungary. In short, (which is a case not very common) he bore his prosperity with much greater philosophy and dissi-

\* See Chemnitz, Tom. i. 242.

† This was talking in a high style; for in a few years, from a simple gentleman and page, he had been created generalissimo of the Imperial forces, duke of Fridland, Sagan, and Glogau,

(with rich donations in land, and the power of coining money, in gold as well as silver) and invested, lastly, with a principality of the empire, whose revenue, in times of peace, might amount to 200,000*l.* a year.

1631. mulation, than he did his adversity; though in the latter he had acquitted himself to the admiration of all courtiers, and politicians.

His proposals to the ministry for supplies of money were magnificent and extravagant like himself. He demanded three millions for raising, equipping, and maintaining, an army of 70,000 men. He proposed to have five regiments of Walloon cuirassiers completely armed; and had another project, of levying ten regiments of Cossacks: but this scheme, if I remember right, never took effect: however, except I am much mistaken, Vladislaus, king of Poland, made a promise of sending such a supply to the Imperial army.

About this time there went a tradition, that when the emperor lamented to him, that he could not raise a sufficient number of forces, wherewith to oppose Gustavus in the full career of his prosperity; he asked his Imperial majesty, how many men he desired to levy? The quantity of troops wished for, being specified; Walstein replied, with great vivacity, "Let me beseech you, Cesar, to raise just double that number: it is true you cannot maintain 50,000 fresh men; but 100,000 fresh men, will support themselves in the enemies countries\*." But be this as it may, he requested in the last place, (and that favour had not been granted in the preceding part of the war) that twelve regiments should be quartered in Moravia, fourteen in Silesia, six in Upper Austria, as many in the Lower, and the rest in Bohemia: for the empire was devoured from one end to the other; and his resolution was, that his men, and his horses, should be supported and maintained in good heart and high spirits. Never did a subject open a campaign with such powers and advantages; and as he knew, that great numbers of Imperial officers and soldiers served under Gustavus, he published a placard to advertise them of a general amnesty; and that all of them should be received by him with open arms. Upon this the emperor invited him to make his appearance at the public diet, that he might in person receive a confirmation and sanction of his new command from the electors and princes of the empire, there assembled: in reply to which proposal, Walstein alledged, that he wanted no countenance but

\* *Reflexions Militaires & Politiques de Santa Cruz. Tom. iv. p. 7.*



from his own master ; and then, to preserve decencies a little, made a visit for a month, under pretence of ill health \*, to the famous *Caroline* baths † near Egra.

The Spaniards expressed transports of joy (having taken a little time to digest their chagrin and resentments) upon this revocation of Walstein: for the same natural acuteness and subtilty, which made them in the preceding century the inventors and finishers of scholastic learning, rendered them likewise in this age the masters of civil artifice and negotiation; since in truth they governed England, France, Germany, and all Europe, more or less. Even the elector of Bavaria affected to wear a good countenance, in order to conceal a very afflicted heart.

Upon this, Walstein caressed all the officers of note; that had served under him; as Gallas, (whom he had made his deputy or lieutenant-general,) Montecuculi the elder, Tieffenbach, (against whom he had some disgust) Balazar di Maradas, Holk, Piccolomini, Terfca ‡ his brother-in-law, and Isolani, commander of the Croatians; giving them commissions to levy a considerable body of fresh forces, and to recall all those, if possible, who had migrated from the Imperial ensigns; and appointing Znaïm, in Moravia, for the general place of rendezvous. He then furnished the abovenamed officers with large sums of money out of his own coffers; and in three months time collected 30,000 approved troops, (most of them veteran soldiers) with a good train of artillery: for notwithstanding he was remarkably severe in his punishments, yet the men of service were all ambitious to act under him, for he rewarded with a bounty rarely to be paralleled in a sovereign prince. And by way of displaying the extensiveness of his power up-

\* Itinerarium Thomæ Carve, &c. Tom. i. 81. We shall speak more of this scarce book in a succeeding note.

† *Carlsbad*: in Latin *Thermæ Carolinæ*. These waters are esteemed to be some of the best in Europe; both externally and internally. They were discovered anno 1370, in the reign of Charles IV. by means of a little spaniel, who, as he was pursuing his game, burnt his feet in

crossing the source, and howled exceedingly. The accommodations there for strangers are very passable, the country round romantic, and the provisions excellent.

‡ So the Latin and Italian writers call him; but his true name was Tertzky, and such name we shall give him, in the subsequent parts of this story.

1631. on his re-establishment, he made some alterations, then unheard of, amongst the subordinate generals, who before that time were very few; (one only being allotted to each particular destination :) and therefore, without consulting the emperor or Imperial ministry, he created at once four generals of artillery, and eight serjeant-major-generals *della battaglia*; which latter officers, as we shall mention them upon various occasions, had command over all colonels, were invested with the power of raising recruits, and disposed and arranged the troops in the day of battle\*.

And here it may be worth while to say something more diffusedly than usual, concerning the life and conduct of this extraordinary phenomenon, previous to the time our period of history commenceth. Sarrafin, it is true, in a very spirited essay†, performed a part of this task for me, about a century ago; but as I have found nothing amongst my materials, whereby to corroborate the better half of what he asserts, it is my duty to consider him in the character of a lively writer, whose principal view was to surprize and astonish the reader. And of course it is probable, if I may be allowed to indulge a private thought, and hazard a slight conjecture, that he (who was at that period a French resident in Germany‡) proceeded upon the ground-work hereafter mentioned. At the time this general's disgrace was meditated at the diet of Ratisbon, 1630, there was a little pamphlet§ handed about by the Spanish, French, and Bavarian faction, (whether published or not, I want authority to say) which contained an exaggerated detail of Walsstein's life and actions; of his acquisitions, buildings, and equipage; of his humours, and severities; of his extravagancies, and profusions. As this essay was compiled chiefly, *ad invidiam*, with a view to promote the intrigues of a party; it is natural enough to conclude, that though it contained many striking circumstances, yet it exhibited also various misrepresentations and untruths. Wherefore under this class may be arranged, with cer-

\* Hist. delle Guerre di Ferd. II. &c. by Galeazzo Gualdo, p. 59.

† La Conspiration de Walsstein.

‡ This appears from the MS. papers of Sir Thomas Roe, who corresponded with him.

§ See a relation of the diet of Ratisbon, in the year 1630, faithfully translated out of the Latin printed copy, with marginal notes, 4°. London, 1632, containing ten pages.



tain restrictions, the following assertions in Sarrafin, De Prade, and 1631. others, that his palace was built on the ruins of an hundred houses, and was the most magnificent structure, that belonged to a subject: that the stable surpassed all description: that each horse, as the *Inamorato*, the *Orlando*, the *Belladonna*, the *Spetzafirro*, &c. had a rack and manger of polished steel; that the stalls were divided by intercolumniations of Bohemian marble\*; and that behind each horse was placed its picture painted in full proportion by the best Italian and German masters: that the capricious owner had ordered an officer to be put to death for appearing at his levee with *jingling spurs*, and hung a valet de chambre for presuming to wake him without directions†.

If the palace of Walsstein, now at Prague, be the place in question, it is nothing more than a nobleman's fine house; nor were the offices and gardens uncommonly extensive, even at that time, for a person of Walsstein's rank and fortunes. The countess of Walsstein very politely allowed the author to examine all the apartments, where nothing struck him of the extraordinary kind, either in the size of the rooms, or in their number, or magnificence. The stables are good ones, and that is all: and as to the pictures of the horses, the most knowing persons at Prague appeared to be less instructed about them than the enquirer.

But probably enough, the original palace might be ruined, or granted away to some other family upon the general's disgrace; though, if I mistake not, the prince of Furstenberg once told me, that Walsstein's land-possession, at least, were permitted to descend to his successors; and that his wife, born countess of Walsstein, enjoyed a very considerable part of her ancestor's estates. Yet, nevertheless, Carve‡, who saw

\* The Bohemian marble equaleth, if not exceedeth, any sort, that is now found; of which the curious, who pass through Tuscany, may see a proof in the chapel of St Laurence.

† He only struck him. Galeazzo Gualdo, 42.

‡ *Itinerarium R. D. Thomæ Carve, Tripperariensis, Sacellani majoris in fortissima juxta & nobilissima legione strenui domini Colonelli D. Walteri Deveroux sub sacr. Cesar. Majestate stipendia merentis; cum historia facti Butleri, Gordon,*

*Lesly, & aliorum: Impensis Autoris Mogunt. 1639. ii. Tom. in 12°.*

This curious and scarce book was first shewn me at Vienna by Charles baron de Firmian, nephew to the late archbishop of Saltzburg, audic counsellor, &c. and Imperial minister now at Naples, to which excellent person (who, without flattery, may be pronounced one of the best historians in the empire,) I acknowledge myself in this and many other respects to have singular obligations.

1631. this place in the days of its owner's prosperity, tells us, that the salon was furnished with excellent paintings, and the cabinet most richly carved and gilt. In the antichamber stood fifty guards, all cloathed in one sumptuous uniform; and more immediately round the general's person attended daily six barons and six knights, as likewise threescore pages, the sons of gentlemen, who strove to place them in the way of fortune: for these young people were all instructed in the manners of a court, and the military exercises. At the innermost door of the antichamber were placed four persons in the character of gentlemen-ushers, who asked the title, quality, and business of visitants, and introduced them accordingly. Ten halbardiers constantly made the tour of the district round the palace; for Wallstein was more impatient of noise than any humourist, that hath ever been represented upon a public theatre. Whenever he made a journey, which was usually on matters of business, for he loved solitude, he affected to be attended by fifty coaches, drawn by six horses; as many waggons carried his plate, and the equipage of his tents and kitchen. He had moreover ten glass coaches of state, which fifty grooms attended, each mounted on a fine steed, and leading another \*. These horses were all lodged at Prague in one magnificent stable, adorned with marble mangers, into each of which a jet d'eau conveyed limpid water at pleasure. The garden was large and elegantly decorated with statues, fountains and fish-ponds; in the midst of which stood a large aviary, enclosed above and round with an arabesque fret-work of gilt wire. His table likewise was served magnificently; and the writers of that age mention one *uncommon* piece of pomp attending it, namely, that he had clean cloths and napkins curiously folded and impressed at every fresh repast. He erected a second palace at Gedsin, upon the same principle with that at Prague, excepting, that it was adorned with a large park, which afforded a range to 300 horses, a tower being erected in the middle, where a groom always lodged, who summoned them morning and evening with the sound of

\* I have seen myself a certain *con-commissary*, and the reader, who knoweth the empire, may easily guess *where*, (whose brother then acted as a *negotiant*) ride out for a single mile to take the

air, attended by an empty coach and six, two running footmen, and six grooms, each leading a fine horse: which (all things considered) makes Wallstein's affectation less extraordinary.



a bugle-horn to come to the stables to be cleaned, and eat their food. He purposed to have performed greater wonders still at the castle of Sagan, had not death prevented him \*.

With respect to Walsstein's education and life †, what appears to me confirmed by good authority is, that he was born the son of a Bohemian knight, and educated a protestant. He was of a spirited and turbulent disposition from his childhood, and hated mortally all literature and private tutors. Upon this, his father placed him in the style of a companion with the children of the marquis of Burgau, son of Ferdinand, archduke of Austria. Here he stayed some years, and minded religious matters no more than classical ones; for setting one day at a sermon preached in the family (the chapel being at the top of the house) he dropped asleep, and contrived to tumble out at a window, which had been opened on account of the violent heats, and receiving no sort of harm from so stupendous a fall, he, who from his childhood was singular in all things, took occasion from this event to conform himself immediately to the popish religion. He then made the tour of France, Holland, England, and Italy, and fixed at Padua, being now fully convinced of the expediency and advantages of learning. Here he applied himself to classical and historical erudition with infinite assiduity, making judicial astrology his recreation and amusement. Previously to this, he had studied at Altdorf near Nurenberg, where a new prison had been erected for offending students, and the rector of the university *in terrorem* had given orders, that it should take its name from the party, who should first be confined therein. Walsstein's impetuosity soon made him the prior delinquent, and, as the beadles were conducting him into this apartment, he made a pause at the entrance under some pretence, kicked a little spaniel, that belonged to him, into the room, and shut the door; "Now, gentlemen, said he, the prison must take the dog's name, and not Walsstein's ‡." Returning home from his travels very ambitious, but moderately rich, he directed his addresses to a Bohemian wi-

\* Itinerarium Thomæ Carve, Tom. i. p. 90, 8°. Rostock 1668.

&c.

† Anecdote communicated to the author.

‡ Vita Walssteinii ex Italicis, Galeacii Gualdi,

1631. dow advanced in years, but an heiress in her own right, and extremely well enriched with the goods of fortune ; for Bohemia, next to England, makes the best provision for the fair sex of any country in the world. At length traversing a rival greatly superior to himself in birth and wealth, he had the good success to marry her ; but having no children, jealousies ensued, and our adventurer was supposed to suffer considerably from the effects of a philtre, which the incensed lady contrived to give him. Nevertheless, at her death he found himself master, without exception, of her whole fortune, which was a very abundant one ; and in the Venetian war raised a regiment at his own expence, and carried it to the service of the archduke, where he behaved with great reputation, and was created a baron by the emperor. He was then made governor of Moravia, and being accused of some peculations, as well as acts of arbitrary power, procured his peace at court by a timely sacrifice of rix-dollars in abundance to the ministry \*. The protestant party fixt their eyes principally upon him at the first breaking out of the Bohemian troubles ; but he attached himself immoveably to the interests of the house of Austria, and underwent a confiscation of his goods and estates in Bohemia, where, some assure us, he performed a notable piece of service to the emperor by pure chance ; for having raised a company of cuirassiers at his own expence, he happened to enter Prague just at the instant when count Thurn and an armed band of nobility forced their way into the Imperial closet, where they proposed terms of very hard digestion to their master ; and the count particularly at the end of his remonstrance pointed with his right hand to the hilt of the sword, which hung by his side : but upon hearing the sudden trampling of horses, he and his followers supposed themselves to be betrayed, and retired abruptly. Wallstein then marched 5000 Moravians to join Bucquoy the Imperial general ; but they all deserted him upon being informed what measures their countrymen had taken at home in defence of their liberties. However Wallstein posted on to Vienna with the mi-

\* He was cited to Vienna, it is thought, by the prince of Lichtenstein, then vice-roy of Bohemia : and count Nogarosa, first colonel under

him, used to declare, that he refunded ten thousand pounds on this occasion. *Arndii Vita Wallensteinii*, p. 31.



litary chest: and upon this the Moravians seized the cardinal Ditrich- 1631.  
stein, who was then amongst them, by way of pledge; and though the emperor wanted money as much, perhaps, or more than any of his ministers, yet he found himself obliged to make the exchange, and pay the ransom, that was demanded. Some authors likewise observe, that at the beginning of these civil discords and dissensions, he made his master an offer of levying a body of 30,000 men at his own expence, upon condition, that he was made a general \*. But this account can hardly be considered as true, except we suppose, that an additional cypher hath annexed itself to the sum by pure accident: nevertheless, it is certain, that in 1621, he defeated a part of Gabriel Bethlem's cavalry, in Moravia, and being accused a second time at court, restored himself into favour by the same means he practised before, and cultivated count Harrach's † good graces, one of the Austrian prime-ministers and grand maréchal of the court, with so much address, that he espoused his daughter with an immense fortune: nevertheless, her beauty, piety, and virtue exceeded her fortune. It was he alone, who made the peace of Lübeck, thereby reconciling the emperor and king of Denmark: which great event (in case a Gustavus had not existed) might have erected the house of Austria into an universal monarchy: and, on this account, he was created duke of Fridland and Sagan, and received afterwards the investiture of the duchy of Mechlenberg. From this moment he rose apace in military command, and succeeded the marquis of Montenegro on his dismissal. What relates to him from that period, hath, and will appear, in the course of this history, excepting only the affair of his assassination, which happened two years after the death of Gustavus.

It is remarkable of Wallstein, that he rose upon no man's ruin; and as to treason (supposing there was any) most people imagine he cast himself down the precipice, merely because he discovered his destruction

\* At that time the post of a field-general was very great; for the commander of one army had only a lieutenant-general under him, who was probably serjeant-major of *battaglia*, and general of artillery, and then came the colonels.  
† Leonard Charles; who was also hereditary master of the horse for Lower Austria. *Court-Calendar of Vienna* 1632.

1631. to be inevitable ; and with regard to his first disgrace at Ratibon, it was partly owing to the private machinations of cardinal Klefel, who, on his revocation from exile, concerned himself in no other political matter \*.

Walstein, though bred in courts, detested all court-promises and compliments ; often insisting, that rewards magnificently bestowed, and discipline (by which he meant punishments) severely kept up and observed, were the only machines requisite to put an army in due and effective operation. It was a maxim also with him, that a commander in chief should never familiarize himself with his generals : and for this reason (without being an humourist in the present case, as some have represented him) but purely to keep his officers at something more than a respectful distance, he affected to eat alone, and professed a sort of natural antipathy to noise : inasmuch, that his generals and colonels, when they went to his levee, silenced the music of their spurs (large jingling rowels being then in use) by the application of a bit of silk twist, in order to pay court to their commander's particularity.

He loved to be obeyed in the meanest trifle : and having signified one day, that he preferred a plain red scarf to any other, an inferior officer, upon hearing the report, took off a very rich scarf embroidered with gold, and trampled it that moment in the dirt. Walstein sent for him forthwith, and made him a colonel. Nevertheless, he had some severities and particularities, that bordered upon madness : for when any person made a noise, he used to cry, *bang that brute* ; and discarded an horse-officer for appearing in his presence-chamber without his boots.

He had a magnificence and generosity beyond whatever appeared in any subject. He sent Piccolomini 1600 l. the day after the battle of Lutzen : and as Isolani, with his Croatians, had harassed Gustavus extremely in

\* This cardinal, as we have observed elsewhere, was bishop of Vienna, prime-minister, and favourite to the emperors Rodolphus and Mathias, but displaced by Ferdinand. He was recalled some years before his death ; nevertheless, declined all concern with state affairs, except

in the instance here alluded to. Gregory XIV. passed an ample justification in his favour (which was one of the last acts he signed) having had his cause under deliberation four years. He died in 1630, aged 77.



his camp near Nurenberg, he made him a present of 600 l. and a fine Spanish horse. When an officer had performed any remarkable service, it was customary for the commissary-general to give him an entertainment, and there was a sort of honorary wine allowed by the government, or the commander in chief, on the occasion. After this repast at count Michna's (for he was then commissary-general) cards and dice were produced, and Isolani lost all his money. Walfstein heard thereof, and sent him, whilst he continued in company, 300 pounds more; which so astonished the Croatian commander, that he vowed he would never game from thenceforwards, and hastened directly to the general's tent to return his thanks. At that instant advice came in, that a Swedish convoy was marching from Wurtzburg. Isolani, without orders, (for he knew Walfstein loved to be anticipated upon such occasions) leaped on his horse, which waited at the tent door, conducted a body of troops, that stood always in readiness, and beat the enemy.

When Peroni, the manager of his family, hired Battista Seni at Vienna to be his astrologer extraordinary, and agreed with him for a pension of seven pounds ten shillings a month, Walfstein told him, with a countenance of anger, that he was not to exercise his Florentine œconomy under his roof, and particularly towards men of letters. He then ordered Seni sixty pounds for the expence of his journey, which was only forty miles, allowed him ever afterwards a coach and six horses, and paid him an annual salary of three hundred and fifty pounds before hand.

He maintained the subordination of discipline with a religious exactness, and degraded more inferior officers than one for the slightest degree of negligence; so that the higher sort found themselves obliged to study his looks as well as his words, for he affected taciturnity upon all occasions, except essential ones. He copied Scipio in rewards, and Hannibal in punishments: he loved spirit in a military man, even at a time when it was culpable to shew it, and released a Walloon captain, who chose rather to die by a manly resistance, than submit to bodily chastisement. The story in a few words was thus. This officer conducted the  
part

1631. part of an escort, which attended Walstein, but digressing more than he ought from the high road, the general ordered a person superior in command to strike him; upon which the Walloon drew his sword, and attacked him and the other assailants very manfully. Walstein then with a nod put a stop to all further proceedings; and as he discovered so high a spirit in the delinquent, not only forgave him, but made him a present of 200 pounds\*.

As to his religion, he had abjured *one*, and practised the *other* (as the catholics thought) very imperfectly: for he disliked many ceremonies in the popish church, and detested the jesuits above all men, constantly insinuating, that persecution ought ever to give place to civil prudence. He loved the splendor of a magnificent table, but restrained himself to strict moderation both in eating and drinking. With respect to the fair sex, he never indulged any unlawful amours: nor was *that* the fashion of military men in the age I am speaking of. Indeed the service was so sharp, and so un-interrupted, that there was no time for such unsoldier-like digressions, nor was it customary then for officers to spend the winter-season luxuriously in their own metropolis. We read but of two commanders in the Imperial and Swedish service, who kept their paramours, and those were Holk and Coningsmarc; which latter durst not have done so, till many years after the death of Gustavus. Nor did two men ever more mistake themselves in the talents of gallantry; for Holk was disfigured with the loss of an eye, and Coningsmarc was ugly beyond description. Now it is plain their brother generals envied them not these sort of pleasures, but rather considered such intercourses as beneath the attention of an able and vigilant officer: for when Coningsmarc quarrelled with the *maréchal de Guébriant*, and separated his forces from him in a very abrupt and ungenteel manner, the *maréchal* said aloud, at the head of his troops, "Let him go—I wish him and his whores a good journey—I want the assistance of no such heroes as himself;—but let him take his army of strumpets with him."

\* Galeazzo Gualdo, p. 43.



We find \* in Walsstein the same disapprobation on a like occasion. 1631.  
 For when he was at Prague or Znaïm, one of his generals (supposed to be Holk) sent him a letter to request the favour of passing a few days with him ; to whom Walsstein, understanding, that Holk's mistress bore him company, returned this short message ; “ That he and his lady would  
 “ be pleased to point their course to his other palace at Gedsin ; for as he  
 “ was erecting a fine edifice there, and purposed to people the village  
 “ adjoining, he thought that place in Bohemia the properest for them,  
 “ and most accommodated to their inclinations.”

We may observe further, with regard to Walsstein, that he allowed no precedence of quality throughout the army, not even in princes ; but ordered each officer to take his place conformably to the military rank and station then subsisting. He knew the value of good *intelligence*, and never spared his purse upon that article : insomuch that Chiefa, one of his favourite colonels, tells us, that he had observed him more than once to have appropriated a thousand pounds a month to such purposes : and hence it was, that he apprized the emperor minutely of Gustavus's invasion, when the Austrian and Spanish politicians had never once dreamt of such a visit. He loved an enemy, if he was a brave man ; and on this account walked himself at Pappenheim's funeral procession. That he had arrogance is not to be disputed ; for he once declared, that he would scourge Gustavus out of Germany :” nor was it uncommon for him to reject a colonel, who brought to him the Imperial recommendation in his pocket : and when some sycophants (a set of men he mortally hated) attempted to ruin an officer, who had forgot to return him thanks for a commission lately bestowed, his answer was, “ That the poor man is so possessed with gratitude, that  
 “ he hath not power to return his acknowledgments.”

He was rather successful, than great or inventive in the art of war, and much better qualified to raise and subsist an army (in which talents he was admirable) than to conduct it scientifically in the day of battle.

\* Hist. du maréchal de Guébriant par Jean de Labreur, fol. Par. 1684. The same author wrote the curious voyage of Madam the maréchale

Guébriant ambassadeur extraordinary and plenipotentiary into Poland, 4°. Par. 1648.

1631. He fought upon the Low-country principles of arranging men in great square masses, but placed much confidence in the size and number of his field-artillery. His character for personal courage has been depreciated by some, because he sat in a horse litter during the important decision at Lutzen; but it is probable a fit of the gout compelled him to appear in that situation. Some likewise have impeached him of cruelty, and alledge as a proof the court-martials, which he held at Prague after the defeat above mentioned: but the generality of writers are inclined to conjecture, that the philtre, which his first wife gave him, discomposed his intellects to a certain degree. But be that as it will, true it is, Gustavus always considered him as disturbed in his judgment: and this perhaps may account for his boasting to take Stralsund, "though it hung from heaven, by an adamant chain;" and for the extraordinary answer likewise, which he gave an officer, who told him (by mistake) that the king of Sweden had stormed an old castle \* deemed inaccessible, which made a part of his camp near Nuremberg; "Sir," said he abruptly, "the Supreme Being cannot take that castle:" a profaneness of expression, which nothing would have allowed me to insert here, had it not been my purpose to suggest, that Walstein approached very near to the verge of madness.

As he rarely spoke in company, but kept his attention fixt on other men's discourse, Sarrafin has given him the character of being *at once penetrating and impenetrable*; the antithesis of which expression sounds very elegantly, but proves not Walstein, as he intended to be, a great man. Something more ought to have been remarked, not only by way of panegyric, but in order to explain the assertion. The person, who is at once penetrating and impenetrable, (effectually, and not superficially,) must talk, as well as listen, if he hopes to obtain substantial information. There must be not only the *sciolto viso*, as well as the *penfieri stretti*, but he must contribute his quota of plausible meaning and ambiguous significance, and that frankly and unreservedly, in order to elicit secrets of real importance from others. This was Gustavus's uniform practice, and all contrary proceedings argue a poor and timorous

\* Altenberg.



rous spirit, anxious of being over-reached, and suspicious concerning 1631.  
its own weakness ; for the taciturn politician sets the mark of Cain upon his own forehead : *his face is against every man, and the face of every sensible man is against him.* Gustavus, Oxenstiern and Richelieu were open and peremptory ; Walstein, Gondamar and Mazarin were reserved and startlish ; for they had not parts to be great ! and when true greatness is wanting, then low cunning must shuffle and distribute the cards as well as it can.

But to give the finishing hand to this digression : the Imperial general after the death of Gustavus grew so powerful, that the court of Vienna, from that moment determined, to put an end to his authority, or his existence ; and after discussions and reflections of two years duration, decided at length in favour of an assassination, attended with circumstances so extraordinary, that it hath been represented on public theatres in more countries than one \*. Nevertheless, to bring the story into a shorter compass, I must just observe, as I have suggested before, that when Walstein found his destruction to be unavoidable, he tried to secure himself by the fidelity of his soldiers, and made some remote attempts to feel the pulses of the Swedes and Saxons : for the emperor and his ministers had raised him so high, and were so much obliged to him, that they had no expedient remaining, as *politicians*, but to kill him. To enter into which whole point minutely would demand a distinct work ; for no part of history hath been more discussed, and with greater degrees of uncertainty, than the supposed defection and treason of Walstein ; since the accounts are so various, the repugnancies so abundant, the methods of operation on his side so absurd and hazardous, that no man can pronounce categorically concerning him, except, (in case there was a real rebellion) any original writings are preserved in the archives of Vienna and Dresden †: for as to those, which Carve has  
pub-

\* There is an English tragedy on the subject.

† I therefore agree with my friend M. de Voltaire, " That the conspiracy of Walstein is received as an historical fact, and yet the world hath been long ignorant of what kind it was."

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Ann. d'Emp. Tom. ii. And here lay the difficulty ; as the assassins were Scottish and Irish, the foreigners could never well understand their accounts in common conversation ; so that the genuine relation was conveyed by some of them

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to

1631. published\*, he was so nearly connected with the most daring and determined persons among the assassins †, that I cannot presume to build upon them, without incurring the risque of violating the impartiality of an honest historian.

It being determined then, at Vienna, to make Walstein a sacrifice, care was taken to sound the inclinations of the generals. Gallas and Piccolomini, both Italians, and officers of repute then serving under him, refused, peremptorily, to have any hand in so unsoldier-like an action; though the former expressed a sort of acquiescence, in case other persons might be found, who would undertake the task; and of course withdraw from his general, under various pretences.

It was now high time for the Imperial ministry to ruffle Walstein's temper, in order to force him into some acts of extravagance. Of course a snare was spread for him, and that not unartfully ‡; for the emperor commanded him, under pretence of favouring the hereditary dominions (as the power of the Swedes was considerably weakened, and as the elector of Saxony began to waver in his friendship towards them) to dispatch a small army against duke Bernard, near Passau, and appropriate 6000 chosen cavalry, to act under the cardinal infant, in the Low Countries; than which no scheme could be better calculated, either with a view to weaken Walstein's hands, or facilitate the assassination, that was then projected. The Imperial general *now comprehended*, what before he *suspected only*; but dissembling his more private thoughts, contented himself with exclaiming at random, that his abilities, as a soldier, were called in question, and that his poor troops would be harried and starved; which affected the colonels, that were with him, so deeply, (especially such as were his friends and favourites) that they made him an offer of not deserting him, under any signal affront or disgrace. This happened at Pilsen.

to their correspondents at home, and published afterwards in England. This circumstance gave rise to Carve's book, which contains the only good materials a foreigner can find, who has not perused the English accounts.

\* *Pacta quædam, inter Fridlandiæ ducem,*

*& principes cum eo paciscentes, ducem scilicet Saxoniz & Marchionem Brandenburgensem, Electores, &c. Tom. i. p. 120.*

† He was chaplain to colonel Walter Devo-reux, who killed Walstein.

‡ *Brachellii Hist. nostror. temp. p. 309.*

Walstein



1631.

Walstein then, for some secret reasons, preferring Egra\*, made a visit to it in the Christmas holidays; and as he always confided more in foreigners, than native Germans, ordered colonel Butler (not him, who behaved so well at Francfort upon the Oder) to attend him with an escort of 500 horse and 200 infantry, all Irish. Gordon, a Scotsman, at that time commanded the garrison of Egra, (in whom Walstein placed no small confidence, as he had raised him from a private foot soldier †, and made him lieutenant colonel of his brother ‡ Tertzky's regiment) and in conjunction with Gordon, acted one Lesly his countryman §, who served in the capacity of watch-master-general ||.

By this time Walstein began to feel great uneasinesses; for Gallas, who had engaged to bring Aldringer with him from Vienna, was not arrived; and Piccolomini and Coloredo had both absented themselves, upon various reasons, or pretences: and therefore, before he left Pilsen he sent for Gordon and Lesly, separately, in order to fix them in his interests with greater security. And here it must be observed, that neither Gordon, Lesly, nor Butler, at that time, had any private intelligence with each other; but the second of these three had received some private innuendos from the ministry\*\*, which (with Carve's permission) amounted to a plan of what the emperor wished to see effected. Here, likewise, it may be worth remarking, to the perpetual honour of the German and even Italian nations, that neither officers nor soldiers could be found, who would embrue their hands in their general's blood,

\* M. de Voltaire, in his *Annals of the Empire*, Tom. ii. says, Walstein resided at Egra; but he only slept there one night.

† Puffendorf, p. 139. Gordon, says Pagano Gaudentio, might have answered the proposals of the Imperial ministry more nobly, and more honestly, in the words of Grillon, colonel of the guards to Henry III. who being requested to murder the duke of Guise, replied frankly, "that he was a soldier of honour, and would never embrue his hands in the blood of a person, from whom he had received many signal benefits." *Le Singolarita delle Guerre di Germania*. 4°. 1640.

‡ Tertzky and Walstein married two daughters of count Harrach.

§ If I mistake not, the descendants of this officer are now counts, and settled in Stiria.

|| M. de Voltaire calls him *Lacy*, which is an inaccuracy, and by mistake makes him captain of the guard to Walstein. (*Annales d'Empire*, Tom. ii.)

\*\* *Itinerarium*, Tom. i. p. 95. Carve was present at Egra, when the transaction happened; and says afterwards, that Butler owed to the garrison, and to his own regiment, that the fact was committed *jussu Cæsari*.

1631. (though at that time, setting the dishonourable nature of the action apart, no surer method could be taken of procuring a good degree of court-favour;) and therefore, to the everlasting ignominy of Scotland and Ireland, Lesly, Gordon, Butler, Devoreux, Burk, and Geraldine\*, undertook this ungenerous deed; which was not an assassination of one, but a massacre of many: for they invited Walstein's chief favourites to supper, and killed them during the rites of hospitality, unprepared, not man to man, but by the assistance of a band of soldiers, who were all their countrymen, excepting only a single Spaniard.

Lesly now being better instructed, and hoping to penetrate further into the general's designs, paid his court to him when he was advanced within nine miles of Egra, when Walstein received him very graciously, but opened his mind with great bitterness against the emperor, and king of Hungary. Upon this, Lesly returned, and informed the governor of all that had passed; for even yet they understood not each other's inclinations and intentions; but next morning met Walstein at one mile's distance from the town, and conducted him to his own house, where he explained his injuries with equal acrimony, and greater precision, than he had done before. In consequence whereof, Lesly (who seemed to answer for Gordon) told him, that he had left his country to advance his fortunes; that his sword was both his livelihood and his creed; and that upon supposition his oath to the emperor was rendered void, he would serve a second master with like fidelity. Mean while, Butler stood thunderstruck with this discourse; and as they walked from the general's house to the castle, dropped some random hints in Walstein's favour: to which Gordon replied with some emotion, (and as being governor of the town, he was then the principal person amongst them) You, gentlemen, may do as you please; but death itself shall never alienate me from my duty and affection to the emperor. Upon which, Butler produced a letter from Gallas, wherein his Imperial majesty commanded all his officers to withdraw their allegiance from Walstein.

\* Also Macdaniel and Brown. *Mercurie François.*



The conspirators having thus understood each other, determined to 1631. destroy their general without delay. It was first resolved to send him and his associates prisoners to Vienna; but immediate death was then considered, as the less operose and more effectual decision of the two. Upon this, Gordon was appointed to give a public supper in the castle, (it being then the festival days, succeeding Christmas) and Butler was requested to bring Wallstein's four favourites, namely, the colonels Tertzky, Illo, Kinsky, and Nieman, which latter was the general's secretary. As the castle was a fortification within a fortification, no place could be more convenient for the perpetration of so horrid an action; and Gordon took care, not only to fill it, more or less, with such soldiers as he could best confide in, but, after the close of the evening, conveyed secretly into the castle, by a postern gate, captain Devoreux, and watchmaster Geraldine; at the head of fifteen men, selected for so desperate an enterprize\*; whilst captain Burk, with an hundred soldiers, was ordered to wait the event in the city, and keep peace in the streets. This was one of those measures extremely ill concerted, which took its rise from over-precaution; for though Burk's party was not supposed to be participants of the complot, yet if that officer alone had proved false to his associates, (and Wallstein's generosity, to say the least of it, was equal, if not superior, to that of an emperor) the general himself might not only have escaped, but destroyed all the conspirators, and perhaps the house of Austria, by way of appendage; for Butler's regiment was ignorant of the conspiracy; and that of Tertzky, which composed the garrison, would hardly have acted against its own colonel. But Burk, through a sort of soldier-like punctiliousness, right or wrong, kept his promise inviolable, as also the secret, with which he was entrusted.

In the course of the desert, at about half hour after nine, Gordon, or Lesly, proposed the health of the elector of Saxony; upon which, (the better to conceal their evil intentions) Butler professed to be greatly surprized, and declared he would drink to no man's prosperity, who was an

\* Wallstein, as generalissimo, had issued out their purposes the better, the conspirators changed the watch-word of the night; but to carry on ed it with respect to their party.

1631. enemy to Cesar. On a sudden the conversation grew loud and vehement, (which being agreed upon as a signal to Devoreux and Geraldine) in an instant, two doors opened on either side of the room, and Devoreux and Geraldine entered; the latter with a partizan in his hand, and the former with a sword, attended each by seven or eight soldiers, who had their swords drawn. *Long live Ferdinand the second*, cried Devoreux, *And long prosper the house of Austria*, replied Geraldine. Butler, Gordon, and Lelly, seized the candles, and held them aloft. The table then was overturned in a moment, whilst Illo had presence of mind enough to fly to his sword, which hung up against the wall; but in the act of reaching it, was pierced through the body, and expired with it undrawn in his hand. Tertzky was equally brave, and more fortunate; for seizing his sword, which hung up in the same manner, he planted himself in a corner, maintained the combat so long till he killed three of the assailants, (the idea of his being invulnerable\* greatly dismaying them) and in the pauses of his defence, (for he fought like an enraged lion) befought the soldiers, *to desist for a moment, and he would undertake, hand to hand, the villains Gordon and Lelly*: (for Butler appeared to him to be honest) *after that, gentlemen, you are sixteen in number, and have full power and liberty to kill me. But scoundrel*, added he, looking sternly on Gordon, *is this the way of giving your friends a supper†?* Kinsky resisted manfully, but unsuccessfully. Nieman made an effort to escape, but was seized in the attempt. He begged hard for his life, and desired to be considered

\* Some historians give Tertzky's resistance to Illo, and Illo's to Tertzky; but the character agrees best with Tertzky, who, on account of his presence of mind, and intrepidity, was reputed to be *gefrorn*. *Bertius de Bellis German.* 4°. 545. Having mentioned this popular error of the age more than once, it may not be unentertaining just to observe, how the invulnerability, here spoken of, was obtained; and to what degree the incantation extended. Now the party, requiring to be *frozen*, procured a magician to mark his body with talismanical signatures; and whenever any immediate danger was expected to approach, swallowed four paper pills, containing each an enchanted verse, of which the tutelary effects lasted six times the

same number of hours. During that period, neither ball, nor sword, &c. entered the flesh; and the contusions being touched by a pen-knife, and squeezed, healed themselves immediately.

Nor did the death of Tertzky disprove the belief of his being *gefrorn*; for, said the wise maintainers of that doctrine, as he came to a friendly entertainment, he had no need to entangle his digestion by swallowing a precautionary dose of paper-labels.

M. de Voltaire, contrary to all history, tells us, that Walstein's friends were *strangled*. *Ann. d'Emp.* Tom. ii.

† Merc. Fran.



in the character of an amanuensis, rather than a soldier; but the conspirators had no ears for such distinctions. A duke of Lerida was mortally wounded by Tertzky in the conflict, whom we suppose to have been a young volunteer in the emperor's army. 1631.

In an instant, Devoreux, (to whom the honour of murdering Walstein had been allotted) having broken his sword in the late rencounter, snatched a partizan from one of the soldiers, and taking with him thirty fresh men, which had been concealed for that purpose, flew directly to the general's lodgings; when, just as he entered the porch, a musquet, which belonged to one of his followers, happened to go off, but gave no alarm to the domestics within. Knocking abruptly at the outward door, the porter admitted him; but knowing his master's delicacy, in regard to harsh and obstreperous sounds, bid him take care how he committed such indecencies; "Friend, said Devoreux, this is a time for noise, and not for sleeping:" and upon that, all his soldiers rushed in after him. He then ascended the staircase, with an affectation of hurry and disturbance; and finding the door fastened, (for Walstein, who had heard the explosion of the musquet, and the confusion below, had doubly bolted it) demanded where the gentleman of the bed-chamber was, who kept the key? but that person not appearing, he knocked rudely at the door, with great furiousness\*. Mean while, the report of the massacre had reached the neighbouring apartments, where Tertzky's and Illo's wives were lodged, who made the streets resound with their shrieks and lamentations; and therefore whilst Devoreux remained in suspense, at the chamber-door, Walstein examined the windows in hopes to escape; but soon recollected the depth to be such, that it was impossible for him to save his life by an attempt of that nature. He then put his head twice out of the casement, and cried aloud, "Is no man my friend? Will no one assist me?" Upon which Devoreux, growing impatient, knocked thrice, but received no answer. He then commanded his soldiers to burst the door, who made five attempts without success; but applying himself to the task singly, and making a judicious effort, just against the lock, he flung it into the room with great vehemence.

\* The author of the *Mercure François* saith, that Butler attended below.

:631.

Walstein stood in his night-gown and shirt, near a table: he had neither sword nor pistols with him; whether by accident, or design, I cannot say; for perhaps he expected only to be taken prisoner. The assassin accosted him abruptly thus; *Are not you the betrayer of the emperor, and the empire?* To which no answer was returned. He then made him an offer, of a few moments, to repeat his prayers; but Walstein replying nothing, extended his arms in order to open his naked breast, and received Devoreux's partizan through his heart; not enunciating a single syllable from the beginning to the end, and expiring with a groan, which terrified all the accomplices, that stood round. Ferdinand II. ordered 3000 masses to be said for his soul, and thus the tragedy ended.

The character of this man by Sarrafin, (which, though neither *just* nor *true*, equalleth Sallust's description of Catiline, as to elegance of style, and quaintness of antithesis) is supposed to be the master-piece of French writing in *that* way; which is the most pleasing, as well as most dazzling part of all historical performances. It is the portrait-painting of an historian; and, as commonly managed, proves to be the most easy task he can undertake. But to perform the work as it ought to be executed, — *hic labor, hoc opus est* :—for the slightest tincture of mediocrity must not be allowed to enter into these sorts of pictures; there must be no error in the outlines, no concealment of imperfect features, no false heightening in the proportions, or colouring; in a word, every thing must be so *individuated*, as to belong properly to no other person.

Characters delineated with such a strength of hand, and such a fidelity of subject as these, are, I must modestly confess, beyond my power to exhibit; and therefore I have chosen generally to *mark* the men, and leave my reader's better judgment to combine the *whole together*. Nevertheless, it may not be amiss to preserve a supposed epitaph, in Walstein's favour, then handed about the empire; which appears, by no means, to be the worst composition of the several fugitive pieces of that period.

*Vitam*



1631.

*Vitam privatam odit animus regius,  
 Magnanimus ardua molitur:  
 Ambitionis nec meta, nec regressus,  
 Aut pereundum, aut regnandum:  
 Non judicanda eventus, quæ ratione acta sunt;  
 ACTIONES SUNT VIRTUTIS, EVENTUS FORTUNÆ.  
 Iustum erat ut Sceptrum regium quæreret,  
 Qui Cæsarem dedit.  
 Quod fecit, licet,  
 Quia fecit, ut regnaret.  
 Cæsarem cadentem erexit Walstein,  
 Cæsar eveltus prostrernit Walstein,  
 Qui in adversis socium habuit, in prosperis servum non sustinet:  
 Veluit perdere, quem non potuit remunerari:  
 Nimum meritum odium peperit:  
 Dum victoriam alteri parat,  
 Invidiam sibi struxit;  
 Gloriam dedit Imperio, Imperium sibi ruinam.  
 Vitam, opes, amicos pro Cæsare toties exposuit:  
 Vitam, opes, amicos Cæsar semel abstulit:  
 Vita cessat, Fama durat.  
 Quis nescit tua virtute partum, auctum, firmatum Imperium?  
 Nihil aliud injustum fecisti,  
 Nisi quod ingrato nimium fideliter serviebas.*

In short, Walstein was a composition of the *great*, and *little*: these two words decide his character.

I may by this time, perhaps, obtain the reader's permission to return to his majesty at Francfort; who paying but slight regard to the severe beginning of winter, crossed the Mayne the first day of December, and made himself master of several important places in the Palatinate, which the Spanish garrisons cautiously evacuated, at the very rumour of his approach: so that in three days, he conquered that romantic tract of mountains, called the Bergstraß, which extends, more or less, from

1631. Darmstadt to Heidelberg; which town, at that time, it was his purpose to besiege, and then restore the Lower Palatinate to its unhappy owner: (the former intention he told Vane, and that, I believe, without dissimulation \*;) yet his prudence would not allow him to leave Oppenheim, and its strong fortrefs † behind him; as the Spaniards were then masters of the river, and could pour forces upon him on either side. Therefore, all on a sudden he turned short, and directed his course to Oppenheim, betwixt which and him the Rhine lay, as also the fortrefs above named, defended by a garrison of 1000 men, and protected by deep fosses, and good fortifications. The cannon in the town took effect cross the river, and raked the flanks of the assailants of the fort in more places than one; and as Hepburn and Monro were sitting together at supper, a ball of twenty two pounds weight passed betwixt their shoulders, in the midst of their conversation, but injured neither. And here it is remarkable, that Gustavus would employ neither general nor engineer to take a survey, either of the town or fort; (the passage of the Rhine being of great consequence to him) but, on the contrary, examined every circumstance of situation with his own eyes, and discharged, in his own person, the duty of a common corporal or a peasant: yet the king made only a feint of crossing the Rhine at this place, having privately provided himself with boats at Gernsheim, a small town about five miles to the southwards. For he was determined to perform this adventurous exploit at all hazards, by way of giving reputation to his troops, and spreading terror amongst his enemies; knowing likewise, that Tilly was too far off to impede his project in any shape; and wisely foreseeing, that on the completion of this event both Oppenheim and the fort must fall of course, as also the whole Lower Palatinate, and the electorate of Mentz. The fort surrendered the next day, and Oppenheim, being first retarded, was taken sword in hand. Nine hundred Italian soldiers threw down their arms, and asked for quarter. As the first circumstance absolved them from their allegiance to the

\* Spanheim, who wrote from the archives of the Palatin-court, always supposes Gustavus to be sincere, concerning the restitution of the elector to his patrimonial dominions. Mem. de Louïse

Juliane, 4<sup>o</sup>. 306, &c.

† Stern-Sconce. N. B. Great part of this account was communicated to England by capt. Masham, who then served under Hepburn.

emperor,



emperor, the king made a present of them to Hepburn, in order to refit his broken brigade; but these birds of passage, not liking the severity of a German winter and Swedish campaign, all took their flight to a warmer region, at the approach of spring. 1631,

His majesty then had the curiosity and ambition to cross the Rhine, first in a small wherry, in order to reconnoitre, in person, the shore, that lay opposite to him, being attended only by four persons\*; but the Spanish centries soon compelled him to retire, and postpone his more general embarkation till the next morning. He then passed over 300 men, under the conduct of count Brahé, in one large boat, that the Spaniards had sunk, and which an honest fisherman had discovered to him, whom he rewarded very bountifully; and some few minutes afterwards, transported the same number in another boat of equal size, all picked soldiers, draughted from the regiments of Ramsay, Spense, and lord Rea. This body of troops, being all infantry, with the king at their head, seized an hedge, which happened to run parallel to the banks of the river, and by the help of this natural entrenchment, defended themselves with amazing intrepidity, in spite of all the efforts of a thousand horse and dragoons. It is true, the king acknowledged more than once, that he found it a disagreeable piece of service, to oppose cavalry and musqueteers on horseback with half the number of infantry, and expressed some uneasiness to his officers upon that occasion: nevertheless he pursued his point with astonishing firmness; nor had he lost one inch of ground, when a fresh re-inforcement arrived, which soon brought the affair to a complete decision. In consequence whereof, he commanded public prayers throughout his army†; and ordered a triumphal column to be erected, as a memorial of his crossing the Rhine. It was sixty feet high, raised on a square of rustic work, and crowned at top with a statue of the Swedish lion. And here an ingenious Italian author, in his *Singularities of the thirty years wars*‡, prefers Gustavus to all the Roman generals; since *the former*, saith he, in the space of two campaigns, crossed the

\* Chemnitz, Tom. i. 203.

‡ Le Singularità della Guerre di Germania,

† Heylmanni Leo Arctovii, 4<sup>o</sup>. p. 47. Schef-feri Memorab. 99. 124. p. 177.

1631. Elb, the Oder, the Rhine, the Danube, and the Lech; whereas the *latter* never had power to pass over the two rivers first mentioned; nor could they penetrate into Pomerania, and much less to the shores of the Baltic ocean.

Being now arrived in the Palatinate, the king, say some historians, told the elector very gallantly, “ That he considered himself as a man “ of chivalry, and despised the resentments of Austria and Spain, whilst “ he employed his troops in restoring an injured princess (meaning the “ electress) to her dominions, after a banishment of the same duration “ with the siege of Troy.” But let historians assert what they please, we shall not contend but that Gustavus made this speech on some other occasion; but at the present period, there appears to us an anachronism therein; for that prince did not arrive till eight weeks afterwards, and paid his first visit to Gustavus, at Mentz, on the tenth of February, 1632. And indeed, honest Monro\* clears up the whole difficulty; for he tells us, the king made this declaration to the English and Scots officers, the evening after he crossed the Rhine, in order to animate them with a fresh zeal for the queen of Bohemia, with whom he discovered them all to be enthusiastically enamoured.

Stockstadt and Worms being next taken, (concerning the chronology of which I am not perfectly assured, as accounts differ) and Oppenheim, as the king predicted, and the fort, that belonged to it; his majesty then marched directly to Mentz, which he had blocked up, on the Francfort side, by the landgrave of Hesse Cassel's army, and a little navy of boats stationed on the Rhine. Here don Philip de Sylva, the Spanish general in those parts, having thrown the overplus of the country garrisons into Frankendale, placed himself at the head of 2000 selected men, in behalf of the elector Anselm Casimir, who, being a prince of foresight, had contrived, at that time, to make a visit to his brother, at Cologn. Gustavus lost many soldiers in the beginning of the siege, and the Spaniards made a shew of the old Castilian resistance. This town was invested in the midst of as severe a winter, as had almost ever been known: the landgrave discharged his duty very briskly on the opposite shore, and

\* Part ii. p. 93.



some batteries, which the king contrived to erect on a platform of 1631. boats in the river, annoyed the besieged from a quarter, whence they had no apprehensions of being molested; insomuch, that a general assault being once prepared, don Philip (in spite of his rodomontade of fixing the pillar of limits to Gustavus's progress) found himself possessed, on a sudden, with certain prudential influences, and surrendered upon terms not extremely honourable; for the troops obliged themselves to serve no more against the crown of Sweden. In truth, this governor perceived, at first glance, that Gustavus had not served his apprenticeship in the Low-country wars, (the practice of which was the model of military perfection, in the Spanish and Austrian services;) but that he had other resources, other inventions, and a quite different sort of operation, both in sieges and battles. Of course, he repented now of the speech he had made the elector, who asked him, if 2000 soldiers were sufficient to defend the town against Gustavus? "Sir, said he, by that timorous question I know you to be a church-man; I have men enough to repulse three kings of Sweden."

Next day\*, which made the king complete thirty seven years of age, his majesty entered the town in great pomp, and set apart the Friday ensuing for a general act of thanksgiving. As the severity of the cold was scarcely to be endured, he reposed his infantry, by intervals, within the town-walls till the beginning of March; nor would he so much as hear of don Sylva's capitulation, till he had promised for himself and garrison to do no mischief, either at their departure, or before it. Thus Gustavus subdued the electorate of Mentz, and two thirds of the Lower Palatinate, at one stroke; which amazing rapidity of conquests, here and elsewhere, forced a very solid historian † to break out into the seeming raptures of a rhetorician; although it is certain, that he contained himself within the strict bounds of truth: "The king, saith Nani, turned his motions towards Upper Germany, where, making a tour of pleasure, rather than a campaign, he rendered himself master of all Francia, and the adjacent countries: insomuch, that *Fame*, according

\* Wednesday, December 14. Others make his birthday the 9th.

† Hist. della Repubblica Veneta, libr. vii. 466.

1631. “ to most men’s judgments, required more time to publish his progress,  
 “ than he employed in subduing provinces.”

Great store of provisions was found in Mentz, not to mention 80 pieces of artillery, and 600 quintals of powder. The inhabitants paid about 8000 l. by way of rescuing themselves from military plunder; and the elector’s fine library was bestowed, by the king, on chancellor Oxenstiern, who had destined it as a present to the university of .....\*, but it was lost unfortunately in crossing the Baltic †. His majesty treated the ecclesiastics with great lenity, but forced the *spirituality* of the Jews (as it was then called) to contribute near 3000 l. towards defraying the expences of the siege. He incurred some danger by approaching too near the walls; for one of his pages was killed by a musquet-ball, as he presented a letter into his hands; upon which, De Pau, the Dutch minister, who then happened to be standing by, seized the opportunity, to advise his majesty to be more careful of a life so valuable. *My lord ambassador, said Gustavus, towns are not taken by drawing diagrams in a private lodging; and if the school-master is absent, the children will be tempted to close their books: and besides, sir, no king, as yet, hath ever been killed by a cannon-ball ‡.* Colonel Axel Lily §, an officer of good repute, was less fortunate. He came only to receive his master’s commands, in some other parts of Germany, and as he was sitting at supper with Hepburn, and remarking to some friends, that he had no peculiar business in a place, which happened to be exposed to the fury of one of the town-batteries, a cannon-ball pierced the tent that instant, and carried away one of his knees: but the king made him amends, as far as he could, by heaping on him military employments to so considerable a value, that honest Monro || complains of Axel Lily’s very singular good fortune, and that with an air of envy and peevishness.

The king then strengthened Mentz, in a manner equally expeditious and surprizing; for he drew lines round some hills, that commanded the

\* My account says *Academiæ Arrhusiensi*, yet it is one is at a loss to know what university this could be; since, in the times of Gustavus, we recollect none in Sweden, except Upsal and Dorpt. There is a town, named in Latin *Arrofia*, which corresponds with the adjective *Arrhusiensis*, and which the Swedes call Westeroahs, but no university is

to be found there. *Mem. communicated.*

† Heylmanni *Leo Arctous*, 4<sup>o</sup>. p. 44.

‡ Bertius de Bell. German. 320.

§ The author of the *Mercure François & De Prade* do him the honour to call him M. De Lille.

|| Expeditions, Part ii. p. 95.



city, and having joined them to the old fortifications, rendered that space 1631. capable to contain an army of 20000 men\*. In the next place, he fixed two bridges over the two rivers: *that* across the Rhine, consisted of sixty one arches, raised on huge flat-bottomed boats, (and at the extremity of it he traced out and fortified another camp, large enough to contain 10,000 soldiers;) and *that*, which passed over the Mayne, reposed itself on great piles, for a considerable space, at either end, and was then constructed upon fifteen large boats, in that point where the current ran extremely strong; and on the angle, formed by the confluence of the rivers, was erected a royal fort with six bulwarks, which commanded the navigation of either stream; and gave laws besides to the landgraviate of Darmstadt, and the countries adjoining†.

Here the king, for the first time, opened all the splendor of a magnificent court, which was rendered brilliant by the appearance of five sovereign German princes who came to treat with him, or depended upon him for their well being: nor must we forget, that political business intermingled itself with courtly pomp; for you might have beheld here, at the same period, twelve or thirteen foreign ministers and ambassadors; not dispatched hither by way of compliment, but intrusted, each and all of them, with transactions of the utmost importance. Such, amongst others, were Sir Robert Anstruther, (who came to render an account of his negotiation at Vienna) and Vane, from England; De Brezé, and De Charnacé, in behalf of France; not to mention De Pau, and many more of the same stamp, whom we shall consider, more or less, in proportion to their business; and lastly, arrived the queen of Sweden‡, the rex-chancellor Oxenstiern, and the king of Bohemia||.

Anstruther, who had been formerly resident at Copenhagen, and then ambassador to the diet of Ratisbon\*\*, from whence he had passed on

\* The famous engraver, Matthew Merian, about this time published an elevation, or what is called a bird's prospect, of the town and bridge, as well as of the old and new fortifications.

† Historical or Authentic relation, in High Dutch, Tom. ii. p. 31. fol.

‡ Jan. 10, 1632.

|| Feb. 10, 1632,

\*\* The diet of Ratisbon began in June, 1630, but on what day we cannot precisely ascertain, there being an error of calculation in the *Mercurie François*, (Tom. xvi. pagg. 233, &c.) Wednesday, June 29, being placed for Wednesday,

1631. on to Vienna, in order to solicit the restitution of the Palatinate, (which, after the Swedes entered the empire, ought to have been re-demanded by the English sword in hand) had nothing to impart to Gustavus, but what provoked him, and raised his indignation\*. For this minister had been instructed at Whitehall, to use the tenderest, the most pacific, and most humiliating expressions; being commanded, not to solicit an act of justice, but to request a favour from pure, free, gratuitous benignity. And, indeed, his condescensions and deprecations were so mean and plaintive, that it is probable, the emperor might have inclined an ear to such supplicatory representations, (as Gustavus then portended something of consequence to the house of Austria) if it had been in his power to have restored the Palatinate, *under certain restrictions*, to its ancient possessor. But Great-Britain, by the tampering of fruitless negotiations, pacific interruptions, temporary compliances, and insubstantial expedients, had played the game out of its hands; and what the poet hath remarked, on the mangled body of Deiphobus, might be applied, with greater justice, to the disfigured and dismembered aspect of the Palatinate :

—— *Laniatum corpore toto,  
Deiphobum vidi, lacerum crudeliter ora;  
Ora manusque ambas, populataque tempora raptis  
Auribus, & truncas inboneſto vulnere nares;  
Vix adeo agnovi pavitantem & dira tegentem  
Supplicia.* ——— Virg. *Æneid.* lib. vi. l. 494.

For not to mention how the dominions of the lawful owner had been doled out in lesser parcels; the infant of Spain laid claim to the Lower Palatinate; and the electors of Bavaria, and Mentz, possessed the higher. So that Anstruther found just that reception, which a weak man merits, who undertakes to discharge a foolish commission.

day, June 19. Nor is it sure, whether the author computed by the new style, or the old: nevertheless, the diet certainly ended the 3d of Nov. O. S. next ensuing; and then Anstruther removed to Vienna, and delivered the speech we

here allude to, which is preserved at full length in the APPENDIX.

\* Lotichius, Tom. i. p. 913, 914. *Memoires d'Electrice Palatine*, p. 302.

The



The next person, who made his appearance on this public theatre, was the marquis De Brezé, ambaffador extraordinary from the French king; concerning whom, it may be worth while to remark, that he was more a man of good fortune, than a negotiator; for he had the advantage to marry Richelieu's fister, and commanded the king's own regiment of guards; being, likewise, a counsellor of state, marechal de camp in the French armies, and governor of Saumur. The occasion of his embassy into Germany, (where De Charnacé then was) arose from a deputation, the catholic princes of the empire had sent to Louis XIII. to recommend to him the cause of their religion; and implore him not to favour the protestant interests, which were then become too predominant. Of course, it was urged by the prelate, who undertook the employment, (with whom co-operated all the secret enemies of Richelieu, and the several ministers dispatched to Vienna by the catholic princes\*) that Gustavus had determined to extirpate the Romish religion, from its very lowermost roots; that he entertained a private correspondence with all protestants, in the various parts of Europe; that he had an oblique eye to France and Italy, as well as to the territories of Bavaria, the catholic electors, and the house of Austria. For why else did he omit, for a season, to undertake his principal enemy, the emperor, in his hereditary dominions, and transfer the seat of action to the Upper Rhine?

Infinuations of this sort startled a mind enclined to bigotry; and, of course, Louis gave some indications of being alarmed: but Richelieu soon raised him (at least for a short space) beyond a state of fluctuation and timidity, and assured the German bishop, that the king, his master, had the best intentions imaginable towards the catholic religion; and that he (the cardinal) should constantly support and cherish them, with a zeal indefatigable. On the other hand, he took care to inform him, from the plenitude of his own power and knowledge, that the king of Sweden had no object in view, but the house of Austria; from whence the princes of the league might detach themselves, in case they maintained an *exact neutrality*: but if, on the contrary, they supplied the emperor, tacitly or clandestinely, with men and money, allowing likewise

\* Bernard, Hist. de Louis XIII. Liv. xv.

1631. to his troops quarters and passage, it was then natural for a man of spirit, like Gustavus, to infest his adversaries. Nevertheless, far from being difficult, added he, it is easy too, not only to support the Romish religion, but give it the predominance also in the empire, and that independently of the enormous puissance of Ferdinand, which tends to augment itself day by day: so that catholics and protestants are all alike interested, to repress the boundless ambition of the house of Austria\*.

Upon this, the bishop of Wurtzburg, whom Louis received so very graciously as to allow him to be *covered*, returned to his constituents, silenced at least, but neither satisfied, nor convinced; and they, for their parts, still continued to cast a wishful eye towards the interposition of France; which threw out allurements for them without number; whilst Gustavus, who then had no misgivings with regard to that power; appeared (as was really the truth) to suspect nothing. Therefore, upon the same views, they dispatched, at or near this time, the bishop of Osnabrug to the infanta of Bruxelles; but as this prelate, who understood heraldry better than church affairs, or political matters, valued himself greatly on his birth and station, it was his misfortune to visit a court, which then happened to be genealogically mad; so that the Spaniards, instead of giving him the compellation of *highness*, which he expected, considered him rather as a poor suppliant. Upon which he returned unsuccessful, and as thoroughly displeased as the Polish ambassador, whom we lately mentioned on the very occasion.

But to return to De Brezé. France, after the bishop of Wurtzburg retired into Germany, had many reasons, beside *such*, as her own historians chuse to mention, for interfering, more or less, with the affairs of the empire, and the progresses of Gustavus. It was one thing to see the emperor humbled, and quite another thing to suppose him extinguished. Some check given to the house of Austria appeared highly desirable; but the unbounded rapidity of a protestant prince's conquests seemed to portend a second house of Austria invested with double powers. But the passage of the Rhine, (of which France was jealous beyond description) was considered as a symptom, that menaced her very dissolution; and

† Le Vasser, Tom. vii. p. 75.



upon that event, even Richelieu grew alarmed, and conceived, not only 1631.  
an inappetency to the prosperity of Sweden, but a mortal jealousy against the king himself. Of course, means were to be found, (and such was Gustavus's temper, that it was absolutely necessary to keep these means a secret) whereby to divert, or check the successes of our northern hero; to withdraw the elector of Bavaria from his attachments to the Imperial interests, and make him a precarious and dependant being on the court of Versailles; and, lastly, to admit (as lying nearer to her) the three ecclesiastical electors, under the wings of her all-healing influence; ever bearing in memory, how dextrously she had swallowed the delicious morsel of three adjacent bishoprics\*, on a like occasion, in the preceding century.

Of course, the cardinal, in order to divert the conquests of Gustavus, always insinuated an opinion tinged with some wrong advice, whenever an opening presented itself; and the better to check the rapidity of his progresses, took care to pay the stipulated subsidy at great distances of time, and in small proportions.

To these retardments and interpositions other circumstances helped to contribute; for the elector of Bavaria, at certain times, considered the house of Austria as over-powerful; and of course he, as well as his catholic electoral brethren, contemplated France, in case of extreme danger, as a sort of protection against the emperor. Allurements were thrown out to them, with no unsparing hand, by the French minister; and no dexterity of clandestine negotiation ever once omitted. So that at length, a private treaty was concluded † between the courts of Versailles and Munich, about the time Gustavus alarmed the empire by storming, sword in hand, the strong and important town of Francfort on the Oder.

And here it may be worth observing, as the transaction hitherto hath hardly been noticed in history, that a concealed negotiation had been carried on (previous to this treaty, more than a year and a half) betwixt Louis XIII. and Maximilian of Bavaria; conducted on the side of France,

\* Metz, Toule, and Verdun.

† Signed at Munich, by the elector, May 8,

1631. Vid. APPEN. and by Louis XIII. May 30. 1631, at Fontainebleau.

1631. (who appears to be the projector) by cardinal Bagni \*, a friend and confident of Richelieu; and managed, in behalf of the electoral interests, by one Joëcher, who was considered, by his master, not only as a well-read *jus-publicist*, but as an artful statesman. This private intercourse had lasted from the middle of October, 1629, till the end of December, the same year. So that Richelieu played a deep game in the empire, before Gustavus landed in Pomerania; and it is remarkable, that Joëcher afterwards signed the very treaty of 1631, which we are now considering. And as this politician was a principal manager in the publication of the *Anhaltine Cancellaria*, taken by the Austrians in the battle of Prague †, (whereby much injury was done to the elector Palatin, king of Bohemia) Rusdorf, who was that prince's minister, both in England and the empire, took the liberty, by way of reprisal, to exhibit to the public the original letters, and preliminary agreements, that passed between Bagni and Joëcher, and made the *Cancellaria Bavarica* ‡ not only a counter-part to the *Cancellaria Anhaltina*, but a sort of supplement to the *Vindiciæ Palatinæ*: which work may be considered as a master-piece, in point of method, beautiful Latinity, and a clear arrangement of facts and arguments.

Thus matters stood, till the beginning of May, 1631; when Maximilian, the most politic prince in Germany, found himself upon the point of being reduced to a situation, that demanded all his parts and address. On one hand, Gustavus was approaching to the southward; and on the other hand, he was to make friends at Paris, and Vienna, and (if possible) over-reach them both. He had engaged too deeply with the emperor, to retreat openly; nor cared he to lose that

\* To this illustrious politician, Gabriel Nau-dé pretends to address his famous work, entitled, *Considerations politiques sur les Coups d'Etat*; though, in truth, he composed it at the request of M. d'Emery, superintendant of the finances, Bagni being dead at the time this treatise was published: which (except a few printed copies distributed to private friends) made its first appearance in Holland, 1667, and hath since arrived to the 12th edition, if not further.

† In the library at Munich is preserved a mi-

litary and political journal of all extraordinary transactions, from the first beginning of the thirty years wars, till the period here mentioned; written by the prince of Anhalt, (a general of high repute in the army of the union) and considered, till this moment, by the Bavarians, as a valuable MS. as indeed it is. There is no question but it was taken in the defeat on the *white mountain*, near Prague.

‡ Added, by way of appendix, to the *Vindiciæ Causæ Palatinæ*, fol. 1640, fine loco.



delicious morsel, the Upper Palatinate: yet, at the same time, he saw 1631. himself on the edge of a precipice, and that only France (in case of a very probable accident, the invasion of Bavaria,) could support him from falling. This treaty, between Louis and Maximilian, was of the defensive nature only, and determinable at the end of eight years: their reciprocal engagements were, not to succour their respective enemies, in any manner; but, on the contrary, to furnish troops to each other, in proportion as the hereditary or *acquired* dominions of either party, should happen to be attacked\*. Nani indeed tells us, and Puffendorf † confirms the account, that France engaged to fix the Imperial diadem, in case of a vacancy, on the head of Maximilian: but this appears not upon the face of the treaty itself, and of course must have been contained in some separate article, mutually ratified and interchanged as a distinct convention; which is not unlikely, from the following words, *Quandoquidem ex urgentissimis causis necessarium est, ut hæc amicitia & defensio hoc tempore tantum inter regem & electorem Bavaricæ conclusa, nulli pateat, sed secretissima maneant, &c.* Nevertheless, be these things as they may, the whole agreement was diametrically contrary to what had been stipulated between his Christian majesty and Gustavus, at the treaty of Berewalt. And this was the private mystery, that induced France to persuade the king of Sweden to sign a *neutrality of fourteen days*, some time afterwards, with the elector of Bavaria, and the other heads of the catholic league; a breach of faith, which Gustavus resented extremely, though just then he did not comprehend the intricate motives, upon which De Brezé's negotiation was founded.

Yet all these artifices could not overcome the bold good sense, and honest policy, of Gustavus; since Bavaria reaped no fruits from the above-mentioned treaty: for when the crisis came, she durst not dismember herself from the house of Austria; inasmuch as France talked two languages, in proportion as the danger was remote, or as it approached

\* See the original treaty in the Appendix.

† Dissert. sur les alliances entre le France & le Suede, 12°. 1709. This, which I take to be one of Puffendorf's best performances; is as just a satire

upon the interfering and intermeddling temper of France, as can be perused: it was written originally in Latin.

1631. nearer, notwithstanding Maximilian had engaged to supply 3000 foot, and 1000 horse, (or the equivalent in ready money) in case France was attacked in her hereditary dominions, or in her conquered ones: and Louis had articed to support Maximilian, in his electoral dignity, against all invaders, and maintain him, not only in his original possessions, but in his new conquests; furnishing a contingent of 9000 infantry, and 3000 cavalry. And hence it happened, that when Kutner, the Bavarian envoy, upon the nearer approach of the Swedes, made a requisition of the troops, which France had stipulated to produce, Richelieu, who knew how to distinguish as well as Maximilian, (for they were both school-men in the art of politics) pronounced with a firm and decisive air, "That the convention, betwixt France and Bavaria, was *purely defensive*, and regarded only the house of Austria, and not the crown of Sweden: for as Tilly, added he, detacheth troops from the army of the league, against the elector of Saxony, without the consent or privity of my master; of course, his most Christian majesty is not obliged to extricate the prince, you serve, from the perplexities and embarrassment, into which his imprudence hath plunged him."

Yet, upon the whole, it seems astonishing to many, that the cardinal should have allowed his master to have concluded with Bavaria, upon any terms, an agreement so directly opposite to the interests of his great ally the king of Sweden, and so destructive of the Palatin's pretensions, whom Gustavus was determined to support, upon the principles of a man of honour, and a Christian: and, indeed, in general it may suffice to say, that the whole tribe of French historians seems to chew this treaty, in order to swallow it, as if it was something of a very austere and unpalatable taste. But Richelieu \* wanted, at all hazards, having

\* The life of this statesman hath been so often written, that I shall only subjoin a short note concerning him, which may contain some few things, that are not to be found in every history.

This man's birth, and education, promised nothing; but he had the secret of introducing himself into favour, even against the inclination of the prince that raised him. He had the power of

tears, equal to Cromwell; and preferred war, merely because men had not then time to scrutinize his actions, and form cabals against him. It may be said of him, that he saved and united France, supported Italy, checked and betrayed Sweden, plunged Germany and England into confusion, and weakened Spain; being an instrument of Providence, saith a discerning and acute Italian,



having first secured the duke of Bavaria, to preclude the emperor from the power of sending troops to disturb the siege of Moyenvic; and desired likewise, (but with all due dissimulation and secrecy) to counterwork Gustavus, and clog the rapidity of his conquests; for the passage of the Rhine, if God had pleased to prolong his Swedish majesty's life, must have broken all the schemes of that minister, who never foresaw, that matters could proceed so far; and must, likewise, have checked and humbled France to such a degree, that we might have felt the good effects of it to this very moment. 1631.

De Brezé proposed in general, with great appearance of friendship, an amicable accommodation with the duke of Bavaria, and the other princes of the catholic league, under the form of *neutrality*; which was to subsist correspondently to the duration agreed upon: but the answer made him was, that indisputable proof could be produced, of the insincerity of these persons; who, in truth, intended nothing but to protract time, collect their forces, and procure fresh and more advantageous terms from the court of Vienna. But the French minister, still continuing to urge this grand scheme of a preliminary pacification\*, ventured at length to assure Gustavus, that in case he and his friends thought fit to accept the terms proposed, and might happen afterwards to be assaulted by the troops of the house of Austria, or the catholic league,

Italian\*, allowed to exist for the glory of his own country, and the ruin of Europe in general.

He is supposed, by many, in his early days, to have written a satire against the constable Des Luynes; drawing a parallel between him and the constable De Luna, a Spaniard: which his enemies afterwards took care to reprint, *mutatis mutandis*, and apply to himself; but the true author of this invective, was Le Sieur Chaintréau.

He is believed, by many, to have left behind him a civil and military plan; which France follows, more or less, to this hour. When he had gained Alsatia, he was heard to say, that he had extended the French dominions, as far to the eastward, as could be supposed maintainable; and

protected them with a fine natural fossé, called the Rhine; predicting, at the same time, that the armies of his nation could rarely prosper in the empire; which effects might arise from the coldness of the country, and the difficulty of retreating, from the change of white bread to black, and light pleasant wines for wretched small-beer. The English army suffered, in a similar manner, under the marquis of Hamilton, and perished of the same malady, which their ancestors underwent at the battle of Cressi, but with less glory; for the disaster sprung, not from such local causes, as we have already assigned, but from an immoderate affection for new honey.

\* Chemnit. Tom. ii. p. 227.

\* Battista Nani,

1631. then his master should pay the subsidy stipulated at Berewalt, in such manner and proportions, as the king and French ambassadors should, at the present conjuncture, agree on; upon condition his Swedish majesty, at the same time, engaged to support France, by retaliation of hostilities against the emperor and his associates, upon supposition they directed their arms to the prejudice of the former\*.

Gustavus soon perceived some fallacy here, but could not precisely develop it. He foresaw, in general, the result of the three artifices above mentioned; and had some apprehensions from the politic Isabella, who was making great preparations towards some expedition in the Low Countries. His own uncommon good sense reminded him too, that the terms proposed were over advantageous, on the protestant side, to be deemed real: yet out of pure politeness to the French king, and in order to convince Europe of his pacific and generous intentions, he sketched out to De Brezé a *slight plan* † of what he proposed; namely, “That the Imperialists, and princes of the league, should invade no country, which  
 “ hath not been hitherto the seat of war; and that he would resign into  
 “ the hands of the duke of Bavaria such places, as he had conquered in  
 “ the Lower Palatinate, till an amicable adjustment could be settled between that prince and the king of Bohemia; and that he would restore to the elector of Triers all the towns he had made himself  
 “ master of in his dominions, excepting Spire. But then, continued  
 “ he, I must expunge the bishop of Bamberg from all participation of  
 “ these concessions; for that prelate hath amused me dishonourably, and  
 “ deceived me basely.” He then subjoined, with respect to the houses of Austria and Bavaria, “That not only the hereditary dominions of  
 “ Sweden, but the provinces acquired by the Swedes in the German war,  
 “ must be all alike comprehended in every subsequent and general system  
 “ of pacification: as also each degree and branch of interest, that could  
 “ be supposed to bear a reference to his good ally, the elector of Saxony;  
 “ and that all usurpations, made upon the protestants in Lower Saxony,

\* Chemnitz, Tom. ii. p. 227.

† As this memorable fragment is not preserved in the *vast collections of treaties*, we have

spoken of it more diffusely, than had otherwise appeared to be necessary.



“ from the breaking out of the Bohemian troubles in 1618, should 1631.  
 “ be restored back to them, with full reparation of losses, and discharge  
 “ of arrears; that the emperor and princes of the catholic league should  
 “ give dismissal to all foldiers, that had been forced from their native  
 “ territories; and re-deliver, likewise, a number of prisoners, amounting  
 “ to eleven or twelve thousand, which were at present artfully incorpo-  
 “ rated, in very small parcels, among their troops; that no temptations  
 “ should be made use of, to allure them back into the Imperial service;  
 “ that the king’s conquests should remain in his own hands, till a final  
 “ decision could be agreed on; that communication and free commerce  
 “ should be opened between all countries then engaged in hostilities;  
 “ and prisoners dismissed on either side without ransom\*.”

In addition to all which, the king had the wonderful consideration, as well as quickness of thought, to make terms of deliverance in express words for the unfortunate administrator of Magdeburg: but that prince had so little trust in his protector, and such unsettled notions of the pro-

\* Chemnit. Tom. ii. p. 227, &c.

I have seen a second account of this plan, which, though equally spirited and sensible, differs from the present in many respects. If the reader pleases, it shall be laid before him in my own words, selected from another part of my history.

“ As no attempts and efforts were spared from  
 “ various quarters, to induce the king to give a  
 “ general peace to the emperor and the catholic  
 “ leaguers, it is reported (though I do not pre-  
 “ sume to recite this paragraph upon indisputable  
 “ authority,) that Gustavus delivered to De  
 “ Brezé and the German ministers a rough  
 “ sketch of the following particulars.

“ That the Imperial edict, touching the resti-  
 “ tution of the *Bona Ecclesiastica*, should be re-  
 “ tracted. That persecution should be abolis-  
 “ ed, and free exercise of religion granted to all  
 “ men. That Bohemia, and the annexed pro-  
 “ vinces, should be advanced to their pristine si-  
 “ tuation, and the banished protestants re-instat-  
 “ ed in their ancient possessions. That the elec-  
 “ tor Palatin should be restored to his patrimo-  
 “ ny and dignities, and that the duke of Bavaria

“ should make restitution of the electoral title.  
 “ That the town of Augsbourg should be permit-  
 “ ted to return to its former liberty, and manner  
 “ of government. That the jesuits, as public  
 “ incendiaries, and enemies to the repose of man-  
 “ kind, should be banished the empire, and their  
 “ possessions transferred to the religious of other  
 “ orders. That the monasteries forcibly seized,  
 “ in the duchy of Wirtemberg, should be re-  
 “ assigned to the disposition of the prince. That  
 “ the members of the cathedral church should be  
 “ half papists, and half protestants. And, lastly,  
 “ that his majesty of Sweden should be chosen  
 “ king of the Romans, by way of acknowledg-  
 “ ment for the cares and dangers he had passed  
 “ through, in procuring peace and liberty to the  
 “ empire.” The reader may find a third copy  
 of this plan in the *Swedish Intelligencer*, Part ii.  
 p. 62. It consists of fifteen articles, and has the  
 appearance of being genuine. In truth, all the  
 copies seem to be modifications of the same gene-  
 ral design, drawn up at different times, and re-  
 touched in various places. Soldat. Sued. p. 375,  
 &c.

1631. testant religion, that he destroyed Gustavus's generous efforts in his behalf, by making himself a convert, at, or near this period, to the church of Rome \*.

France was made arbitress of this general pacification, and avenger of frauds on either side. But whilst the king reasoned upon a substantial, and universal peace, the Bavarian minister presented him a paper, in his master's hand-writing, which related only to a *neutrality* for himself and associates, as a sort of preliminary; drawn up and worded in such a manner, as required a resignation of all conquered countries on the part of Gustavus, to be voided, *ipso facto*, upon signing the articles. This put the king out of all temper, and matters hung in suspense for about a fortnight: which produced to the emperor and duke of Bavaria a part of those advantages, which they proposed to reap, by creating momentary intervals from business, and imperceptible delays.

During this short pause of negotiation, with respect to Bavaria more particularly, other persons made their appearance on this political theatre; but before we enter into an exact detail of their several important and interesting transactions, it may be worth while to observe, that at this time the most renowned of all statesmen, the reichs-chancellor † Oxenstiern came to Mentz, to receive his master's orders, and bear a part with him in the fatigues of business. This great man, whom, on account of his wisdom and sagacity, one supposes to be aged, was but a few years elder than Gustavus. He had the advantage to be descended from one of the best families in Sweden; but greater still was the advantage, when I inform the reader, that he was a minister of the king's own finding out, and of his own formation. He was, at one and the same time, both statesman and general; in which latter capacity he chiefly acted, since his sovereign had entered Germany, for he conducted a small separate army in Polish Prussia. But when political and civil matters began to multiply on the king's hands, as well as military opera-

\* Chemnit. Tom. ii. p. 227, &c.

† *Reichs-chancellor*, according to the German way of writing, or *riks-chancellor*, conformably to the Swedish, signifies the chancellor of the kingdom; who, in the times we are speaking of,

was prime-minister. In the reign of Charles XI. the title was suppressed, and hath ever since been executed by an *office*, consisting of more, or fewer persons. *Memoirs communicated.*

tions,



1631.

tions, he was commanded to reside at Erfurt, in the old Roman capacity of *legatus ab exercitu*, to which place he conducted the queen of Sweden at the head of his troops; and then afterwards appeared at Mentz, having not seen his royal master during the space of ten months and upwards. It cannot be said, that the king wanted this great man's advice, by way of instruction, (which will appear from what shall be related in their first interview;) yet still he had uncommon occasions for his assistance, having more political business to execute than any single person could well perform; and purposing likewise, (which was something more) to negotiate only a few days at Mentz and Francfort, and then shew the Germans, for the first time, what mighty things might be effected in a winter's campaign.

Instead of drawing Oxenstiern's character, (which, according to custom, I shall leave the reader to combine from various parts of the present history) it may suffice to observe, that the French themselves, after several disquisitions and discussions, give him the preference even to Richelieu; and as to other nations, they have never supposed him to have had any rival in political reputation. This, indeed, is saying the whole, that can be said, in a single period: nevertheless, it may not be disagreeable to relate some things concerning him, which are not common, and some things likewise, which appear to me entirely new.

After the king's death, it may justly be said, that he had the whole affairs of Europe upon his hands, till the conclusion of the peace at Munster, which made a period of sixteen years duration. He induced the protestant princes of Upper Germany to subscribe to the treaty of Heilbrunn in 1633, conformably to a plan his master had sketched out a few months before his death; and this was the grand foundation of an union, which subsisted, more or less, till the conclusion of the wars. In 1635, he held a conference with Richelieu at Compiègne\*. These great men knew each other intuitively, and agreed in a moment: for the cardinal trembled at the thoughts of attempting to over-reach a statesman, whom

\* From that time he always took pleasure to tell the French, that the dried salmon of the Baltic, recommended by a well-tasted poivrade, greatly excelled the superb bisques, which he had the honour to partake of at the cardinal's table.

1631. he found endued with talents far superior to his own ; and moreover they had each of them the same parts to act, the same inclinations, and the same interests.

His answer to the Polish ambassadors at the treaty of Stumbsdorf\* shewed great delicacy, presence of mind, and a turn for severity. The high-chancellor of Poland, at his first entrance into the chamber (where a triangular table was placed in order to avoid precedence in sitting) began thus ; *Ut a nobis incipiat humanitas, precamur vobis, domini Sueci, BONUM diem* ; to whom Oxenstiern replied with great liveliness, *Et nos, ut non simus ingrati, precamur vobis itidem BONAM mentem !*

It was his private opinion, that Sweden ought to have no farther concerns with France in the course of the war, than in receiving good pensions from her : and when affairs were reduced to the lowest ebb after the fatal defeat of Nordlingen, he still kept firm to this doctrine, but concealed it artfully ; well foreseeing that France would prescribe him laws, and wrest Alsatia out of his hands by little and little, whenever she joined the Swedes with a large military force. Nevertheless, the reformed council, that co-operated with him (nine of the twelve being native Germans) soon allowed themselves to be dazzled with the gratuities and promises, which Fiquiere the French minister scattered copiously among them ; and thus our statesman was at length compelled to resign Philipsburg to the house of Bourbon, which he did with inconceivable reluctance, and after a thousand delays of his own creating. He then sent his son †, or nephew ‡, (I am not certain which) into England, to solicit succours : but as he had no letters of credence from her Swedish majesty, the court of London affected not to comprehend how Oxenstiern could create ambassadors. The sagacious prime-minister soon perceived this demur to be a mere evasion, and recalled his delegate, without giving his mistress Christina the least trouble.

When he sent his son, a young man of great hope, in conjunction with Salvius, to the treaty of Munster, this new negotiator was much

\* Anno 1635.

† nephew, Bernard. There was also a Gabriel

‡ His son was named John, † and his Oxenstiern employed as a minister.

dismayed



dismayed upon considering his want of age and experience, and startled likewise at the gravity of the Spanish plenipotentiaries on the one hand, and the quickness and penetration of the French ministers on the other hand. He therefore petitioned his father by letter, either to recall him, or send him some aged and able director; to which the chancellor replied only in a few words, having briefly touched upon other matters; *Mi Fili, parvo mundus regitur intellectu* \*.

And here I may venture to hazard another traditional Swedish anecdote. The chancellor had a strong inclination to marry this son (who, by his picture, was not handsome) to queen Christiana: but she, who was an original in every sort of caprice, happened to be pre-possessed in favour of another nobleman, whose name was Todt; whether son, or not, of the general who served under her father Gustavus, I cannot say. Yet be that as it will, this pre-occupation of hers touched old Oxenstiern to the very heart, and of course he took care upon all occasions to traverse her inclinations, disturb her repose, and perplex her affairs in such a manner, that at length he paved the way remotely to her future abdication †.

But to return to the transactions in Germany: the king received Oxenstiern with great marks of affection and esteem, and having sent his own coach and equipage to meet him, passed whole days uninterruptedly with him in the cabinet. This minister, in his journey from Prussia, had held a conference with Arnheim, which, one may venture to pronounce, was managed with uncommon dexterity and ability on either side; for the former was renowned for artifice, and the latter, on account of his solidity, was supposed to have no superior, except his master.

When Oxenstiern arrived at Mentz, there happened an extraordinary trial of political skill; for the subject had a secret inclination to gain and merit the ascendancy in point of genius over his sovereign. This was an example of human vanity highly pardonable: but one thing must be observed incidentally to the advantage of Gustavus; namely, that the minister had weighed the difficulty proposed, and turned it,

\* Memoirs communicated to the author.

† Ibid.

1631. and stated it to himself in every light for three months successively ; whereas the king appears to be attacked by meer surprize, and yet returned an unpremeditated answer with a force of reason irresistible.

To understand this curious piece of history better, it may not be amiss to advertise the reader, that it appeared an error to most generals and politicians in those days, that Gustavus, immediately after the battle of Leipzig, should point his course to the banks of the Rhine, and not have marched directly into the hereditary dominions of the house of Austria, and so on to the metropolis. It was the same fault (alleged they) which Hannibal committed after the battle of Cannæ \*. The great Oxenstiern was of this opinion †; for the moment the king allowed him to converse in private, *Sire*, said he, *I should have been much better pleased to have paid my duty to you at Vienna, than at Mentz ‡.* His majesty, who pierced into the drift of this speech with a single glance, told the chancellor coolly, (notwithstanding his natural effervescence of temper,) for he knew the person he spoke to had parts enough to judge of things, and receive conviction : *That for his own part he had weighed matters with great exactness, and that only superficial appearances presented themselves against him. I know my men*, continued he, *in the elector of Saxony, and Arnheim his generalissimo : the one is irresolute, and does not love me ; the other is insincere, and mortally hates me. They may do very well to keep the protestant spirit alive in Bohemia and the incorporated provinces, where all, that I can expect from them, is, that they should produce a sort of revulsion, which may serve to administer force against the Imperial troops, till providence allows me to give a second and more decisive stroke in some signal engagement. But change the scene ; suppose the elector on the banks of the Rhine, and I in Austria or Bohemia. The whole state of the question is then entirely altered ; for there is not a protestant prince in all the district, where the elector of Saxony now commands ; so that in case of any infidelity, he can engage no one power to follow his example. But here he would be in the very centre of all the princes and states, who entered into the confederation at Leipzig : and*

\* Vittorio Siri ; *Memorie Recondite*. Tom. vii. 350—52.

† In the same sentiment is the ingenious au-

thor of the *Histoire politique du Siècle*, à Londres : 4°. 1757.

‡ Le Vassor : Tom. vii.



be and Arnheim (who leads him blindfolded, and is a better jesuit than a soldier) are both timid enough to submit meanly, if they are defeated, and self-interested enough to sell me and my cause, in exchange for some good acquisition, in case the enemy should obtain any eminent success. In either part of which alternative, the princes of the union would naturally copy the conduct of the first protestant power in Germany; and upon this elector's defection, I being in Bohemia, Moravia, or Austria, how is a retreat to be conducted from thence to the Baltic, (the only resource that would then be left me) with Wallenstein in my rear, and Arnheim in my front? — No, Sir, in the game Gustavus is to play, he must be AMONG the protestant princes himself, and must be the FIRST man among them too.

Oxenstiern struck with conviction, stood for some moments astonished, and never afterwards made the least reply: for though he had revolved this subject in his mind from September till December, yet he plainly saw, that Gustavus was not only a better warrior, but a greater politician than himself; since a momentary decision, in a critical point like this, is greatly superior to a long series of negotiations, where there are frequent opportunities of revising and retouching, and where things in their own fluctuating nature often help out themselves. And it was this circumstance, probably, that made Nani break forth into the following political rapture, *Stando le sue virtù consolidate et unite, non si sopeva discernere se alla militare perizia a alla civile attribuerfi dovesse la palma* \*. And upon a like occasion, the most sensible, candid, and correct Caraffa, expresses himself as follows; *Parem Gustavo Suecia nullum, reliquis orbis paucos dabit* †.

The next person, who made his appearance, was the baron de Sclavata, who came in behalf of the elector Palatin, to make that prince's compliments to Gustavus on account of his extraordinary successes, and sollicite some provisional agreement with reference to the re-conquering of the Lower Palatinate. Him the king received with uncommon testimonies of humanity and courtesy, and ordered Horneck, one of his colonels, to return with him to the Hague, where Frederic then was, instructed

\* Hist. Ven. libr. ix.

rata, 12°. Col. Agrip. 1639. p. 479.

† Caraffa Coment. de Germ. Sacra Restau-

1631. in what manner to settle several preliminary difficulties, and commanded to request the elector to hasten to the Swedish camp with all possible expedition: *for*, said the king, *I am determined to restore that unfortunate prince to his possessions and dignities: but let me beseech him first to make sure of England, who must advance some money, as well as discharge some old deficiencies* \*.

This step gave the most lively terrors to the duke of Bavaria, and induced him probably to forget his convention with France, and adhere to the emperor without reserve; and the rather, as his new acquisition, the Upper Palatinate, appeared to be intended for the first sacrifice, and as Gustavus treated his adversary with all that respect and ceremony, that could be supposed to be due to a king of Bohemia.

The duke of Neuburg attempted next to obtain a neutrality, building much on the interest of his brother Augustus, who served under the king, and had the good fortune to be a favourite: but as this prince had permitted the Imperial army to retreat through his dominions, Augustus knew Gustavus too well, to venture to interpose. The duke thought him insincere, being conscious he had injured him in fulfilling his father's will, and therefore petitioned humbly to appear in person; but the king denied him †.

The deputies of the elector of Triers ‡ were treated in their turn with an higher degree of just resentment, for this prince had maintained avowed hostilities against Sweden. Some of his troops had taken the castle of Moltzberg by surprize, and others had killed young count Solmes and all his companions. The elector accompanied the negotiation of his deputies with a letter to the king, conceived in terms of haughtiness and indifference, alluding likewise to certain *promises*, which some persons had made to a *nameless* power. Upon which Gustavus gave Stock, chief of the deputation, and one of the gentlemen of the bed-chamber to the elector, the following answer unpremeditated; *That his*

\* Le Soldat Suedois.

† Ibid. 354.

‡ Historical or Authentic Relation, in High Dutch, Part ii. p. 20.

‡ Philip Christopher de Sottern. He was also bishop of Spire.



*master's letter was a sort of petition presented to him sword in hand: 1631. that he knew well enough what was meant by insinuations of promises and engagements; and that understanding his own business without a tutor, and what France had a right to expect from him, and what she had not, he should fulfil his inclinations in the manner he thought best, and bring some visitants into the electorate, who would expect good cheer and warm lodgings \*.*

He then granted certain conditions of neutrality to Ferdinand, elector of Cologne, brother to the duke of Bavaria; the terms whereof were extremely rigid, but as things then stood, it was thought expedient to admit them; for the protestants were to enjoy free exercise of religion and commerce; no supplies were to be allowed the emperor, and the catholic league; the diocese was to be open to the troops of Sweden; and agents on the king's part were to reside in the metropolis, in order to see all the articles justly performed.

At calmer intervals for more important business, care was taken to cultivate all subordinate collateral interests; for by this time the states of Lower Saxony, and the Hanse Towns, in consequence of the conclusions agreed upon at Leipzig, had determined to raise 12,000 men under the conduct of George duke of Lunenburg; and the rather, as they had some reason to hope (though that hope was built only on external appearances) that a good understanding had been established between the kings of Denmark and Sweden.

And now whoever shall consider attentively all these various transactions of politics, (great in their consequences, multiform in their nature, extensive in their operations, and referring likewise not only to that incoherent mass of interests the Germanic body, but to France and England, and all the powerful states in Europe) will, I may venture to say, find it difficult to convince themselves, that the whole of this vast work was fully discussed, and effectually adjusted within the compass of a *single fortnight*, and something more. Nor was the king even then unmindful of military matters, nor did he consume the holidays of Christmas in riotings and festivals; but, on the contrary, repaired the fortifications of Mentz, issued out orders for raising new regiments,

\* F. Spanheim, 358. Historical or Authentic Relation, Tom. ii.

1631. and kept the face of a campaign in the parts round him under his own inspection ; whilst the good discipline, the temperance, the decent and religious deportment of his soldiers, charmed not only the catholics in general, but even the jesuits, who made panegyrics upon them in the pulpit : but whether through gratitude or necessity is more than I shall take upon me to determine.

The king next made himself master of the castle of Koëningstein near Francfort, which, after a fortress of the same name in Saxony, Hohentweil in Suabia, and Hermanstein [Ehrenbreitstein] in the electorate of Triers, seems to me to have been as strongly situated by nature, as it is possible to imagine. No sooner had his majesty entered Koëningstein, but a representation was made to him by the counts of Stolberg, that the electors of Mentz in 1581 \* had usurped this strong place from them, and that it was a part of their lawful patrimony : upon which, without any remonstrance, excuse, delay, or explanation, he restored it to them, reserving to himself nothing more than all the artillery and stores of war. Pappenheim and colonel Cronenberg had made this fortress their favourite magazine, where they reposed their military acquisitions ; which said plunder, as it belonged to *brave men*, the king bestowed generously on the *most courageous persons* he could discover among his officers and soldiers ; and thus made a fine compliment both to enemies and friends. And, indeed, it is highly probable, that his regard for Pappenheim was so great, that if he had not dextrously hit upon this expedient, he would have contrived means to have restored his effects to him by some uncommon kind of warlike gallantry.

Nor had the landgrave of Hesse been idle during the preceding summer and autumn ; for having cleared his own country of Imperialists, he made irruptions into Westphalia, and the abbacy of Fulda. As he joined the Swedes with 12,000 men, and did good service at the siege of Mentz, his majesty purposed to make use of his troops in order to raise the siege of Nuremberg ; but finding the alarm false after a march of

\* Geographic universelle de Hubner, Tom, v. 435.



three days, allowed him to return to the protection of his own dominions, and the extending his little conquests near home. 1631.

As to Tilly, we left him passing along in full march by the town of Oxenfurt \*, whilst Gustavus Horn, with an army of 8000 men, attended his motions in the bishopric of Bamberg, and kept alive only a defensive war. Upon this the general of the league invested Nuremberg; but as the king had thrown 3000 troops into the town, with a good governor, and a considerable number of experienced engineers, (so that the garrison, in conjunction with the burghers and neighbouring peasants, made 10000 effective soldiers) he soon found himself obliged to desist from his enterprizes, having lost Schlavata, a colonel of Croats in one attack, and upwards of 500 private men. Soon afterwards one of his magazines blew up at Schwabach †, which consisted of twelve hundred quintals of powder, upon which he said, with a deep sigh, "That fortune at length had thought fit to desert him." Dividing his army therefore, not unskilfully, into two parts, (if retreating towards Bavaria may be called an act of true judgment) he commanded Cratz and Aldringer to observe the motions of Horn near Bamberg and the upper Palatinate: and retired himself to Nordlingen (having first had an interview with his electoral master) in order to guard the dukedom of Bavaria from all invasions on the part of Gustavus, who, as he supposed, intended to make his irruption on the Wirtemberg-side, because he had many well-wishers in that territory, and abundance likewise of sincere assistants. Mean while the subtle elector of Bavaria convened a diet of catholic leaguers at Ingoldstadt ‡; and having concerted measures with De Char-nacé, St. Etienne, De Lisle, and other French ministers and agents then at Munich, formed the project of obtaining, by means of France, a short *armistice* from Gustavus, and in the interim dispatched his chancellor to Vienna in order to conclude a fresh bargain there, by which he might be enabled to desert France the moment he could acquire all the advantages, which she had the power of procuring for him.

\* November 6.

formerly a famous foundery for casting letters.

† There is a type in printing, called the Schwabach character, there being in this town

‡ December 12, 1631.

1631. As to Lower Saxony and Westphalia, the dukes of Mechlenberg and general Todt invested Wismar, where colonel Graham made several furious sallies, but at length surrendered, upon condition, that a month's space should be allowed him to consult Tieffenbach on the occasion. After Graham had evacuated the place, Todt found him guilty of breach of articles in various instances, and being so fortunate as to overtake him on his journey, gave his troops a total overthrow, and detained him prisoner till he could receive his majesty's orders. The Imperial colonel offered 2000 l. for his ransom, but could not obtain it. Todt then joined the archbishop of Bremen, who brought him a re-inforcement of five incomplete regiments, which made in the whole, it is probable, about 2000 men.

As to Banier's operations in these parts, we have spoken already under the article of the marquis of Hamilton's campaign : but when Pappenheim perceived, that Lunenberg and Todt had joined themselves to the Swedish general, he made several forced marches (in which part of military conduct he had no equal) and with great dexterity escaped from them.

The Saxons found but slight resistance in Bohemia, and if Arnheim had acted the sincere and honest part, he ought to have marched directly into Moravia, (which the king advised him to do by letter) where he might have disturbed and ruined all Wallstein's new recruits, which had been cantoned in that dutchy. Wallstein on the other hand thinned the Saxon army, by offering all deserters double pay, and the same rank they possessed among their friends. Tieffenbach spared no pains to levy soldiers in Hungary, but there was no money to put them in motion ; and without that previous viaticum, neither man nor horse could find the use of their limbs. Upon this account a national diet was convened, but the states declared they could produce neither soldiers nor ducats, fearing the incursions of the Turks on the one hand, and the warlike preparations of Ragotzki on the other hand ; insisting also on the privilege of not being obliged to defend their sovereign out of the limits of their country ; and adding moreover, (which shewed they  
spared



spared no pains to find excuses) “ That there had always been a good 1631.  
 “ understanding between the crowns of Hungary and Sweden.” Nor  
 was this unlikely, considering the sea and a thousand miles of *terra firma*  
 were spread between them.

Wallstein, to the infinite mortification of the house of Austria, quar-  
 tered all his troops in the hereditary dominions, excepting only a circle  
 of twelve miles round Vienna. Merodé was then dispatched into the  
 Low Countries to levy 5000 cuirassiers, and Dhona made a journey into  
 Poland in quest of the Cossacks. A second attempt too was levelled  
 against the virtue of the elector of Saxony; and as his kinsman Francis  
 Albert, duke of Saxe-Lauenberg (who had served the Emperor both in  
 Poland and Italy) was thought to be the most proper solicitor, that could  
 be found, he was authorised (say various authors \*) to resign his em-  
 ploy upon some pretended disguest, and undertake this negotiation in  
 the best manner he could. But Arnheim durst not venture to set his  
 master to sale upon so abrupt an application: and indeed the affairs of  
 Sweden at that time were too prosperous to allow the general and  
 minister (for Arnheim concentrated both characters in his own person):  
 to embark in a measure so extremely hazardous.

We now come to the conclusion of the year 1631, which, from the  
 feast of St. John Baptist (the day Gustavus landed) to the eve of the  
 new year, may be considered as a period the most fruitful in events, of  
 any campaign, that is to be found in modern history. For the king in  
 six months space had traversed from Stralsund, and the mouth of the  
 Elb, to the high Rhine, or in effect was master of Germany from the  
 shore of the Baltic ocean almost to the lake of Constance; which in  
 truth made an extent of country not much inferior to the whole king-  
 dom of France. To recite the circumstantial progress of his conquests:  
 would carry with it more the appearance of a tedious elaborate index  
 than of an instructive or amusing history; for it would exceed in a

\* We speak this with certain precautions, be considered with uncommon impartiality, as  
 because Francis Albert's character, with re- well as exactness; as shall be performed here-  
 ference to the death of Gustavus, demands to after.

1631. tenfold proportion the catalogue of ships recounted by Homer ; and who has Homer's secret of such minuteness of detail, either interesting or delectable to the generality of readers ? since the king in his own person (not including the transactions of his generals in other places) had conquered all the principal cities and fortresses in Pomerania, Brandenburg, Saxony and Mecklenberg ; subdued, more or less, the four circles of Franconia, Suabia, and the two Rhines ; chased the elector of Mentz out of his country ; reduced the whole Lower Palatinate, and proposed to open the ensuing campaign (which was to commence on new year's day) by an irruption into Bavaria. Louis XIII, as well as the elector of Bavaria, stood both thunder-struck at the rapidity of these advances ; and Italy too began to tremble at the astonishing progress of this new Alaric, who was ready to set his foot upon the stair case of the Alps. Yet whatever the merits of the cause might be, an humane and compassionate writer cannot but lament the miseries and sufferings of mankind, as well as the effusion of blood upon this occasion ; since it is highly probable, if we comprehend the havock made by pestilence, famine, and other accidents, that near half a million of people were supposed to lose their lives in Germany only, in the course of this single year of 1631.

The new year had hardly presented itself a few minutes, when duke Bernard surprized the important town of Manheim by extraordinary address : for ordering 500 horsemen to approach the city-gates at midnight in full gallop, they pretended to be Imperialists, who had been broken to pieces in an engagement with the Swedes, and that their enemies in the very instant were pressing at their heels. The gate was immediately opened at such an urgent representation, and the Swedes entering pell-mell made a dreadful slaughter among the Spaniards. Yet the garrison soon recovered their terror, and made no contemptible resistance ; but in the interim, duke Bernard scaled the walls, and poured in a fresh supply of assailants on all sides. Maravalla the governor was taken prisoner, and having paid his ransom, returned to his superiors with all the punctuality of a good Castilian : nevertheless his head was publicly struck off at Heidelberg ; and indeed there was something



something truly pitiable in his case, for an inferior officer had opened 1631.  
the town-gate without his knowledge.

Frankendal and Heidelberg were then slightly blockaded ; and as to  
Spires, perceiving with what alacrity the Swedes conquered towns, it  
prudently thought fit to enter into an accommodation some few days  
before Manhiem was surprized.

During this tumult of business, his majesty could neither digest nor  
forget the needless and petulant interference of the duke of Lorrain,  
who had marched a considerable army to Tilly's assistance. He there-  
fore dispatched a letter \* to him, the substance of which, together with  
the answer the duke returned to it, may prove perhaps no ways un-  
entertaining to the more curious part of my readers. He there tells  
Charles, (whom he calls his *kinsman* and *thrice dear friend*) "*That he*  
"*omitted writing to him, whilst he marched in armour at the head of his*  
"*Lorrainers, for fear such a politeness might be misconstrued into timi-*  
"*dity : but as he was now reposing himself in his own dominions, he thought*  
"*it but reasonable to suggest to him, that being a prince independant, and*  
"*unfettered with connexions and obligations, it seemed to him extremely*  
"*strange, that he should carry hostilities into a climate hardly known to him,*  
"*and embroil himself in quarrels, that did not concern him, merely out of*  
"*enthusiastic gallantry and gaiety of spirits, without any motives deducible*  
"*either from religion, or other valuable considerations :—subjoining at the*  
"*same time, that it was impossible for him to be ignorant of the justice*  
"*of the Swedish cause, and of the atrocious violence of the enemy ; of*  
"*the tender humanity, moderation and liberty of conscience he had shewn the*  
"*catholics ; and of the extraordinary concessions he had made the chief-*  
"*tains of the league, with a view to establish peace and Christian benevolence*  
"*through the empire ; and that he desired, as he now approached the fron-*  
"*tiers of Lorrain, the favour of being made acquainted with his present*  
"*and ulterior determinations, and that explicitly, without any reserve,*  
"*subterfuge and exception, since a categorical answer of this nature would*  
"*determine the next step he proposed to take †.*"

\* Riccius de Bellis German. 345, 346.

† This letter bears date from Mentz December 29, 1631.

1631. Charles, who was squeezed into a dilemma between Sweden and France, considered this proposal as a providential deliverance, and replied in a transport of joy ;

“ That he was charmed with the honour of receiving a letter from so illustrious and great a king, beseeching him to assure himself, that though appearances were against him, and he might justly seem to merit some gentle reproof for presuming to enter into the lists of combat with so renowned a warrior ; yet all this proceeded from the laudable ambition of desiring to emulate his majesty’s valour, and that he never once conceived an unkind or ungenerous thought concerning him ; and consequently hoped he should incur no blame for attempting to assist the unfortunate and distressed, since that very principle made one distinguishing point of view in his majesty’s character. That, for his own part, he thought it neither safe nor honest to refuse to satisfy the emperor’s requests, and give activity to the treaties, that had long subsisted between the courts of Vienna and Nanci, especially when solemnly called upon to fulfil his own engagements, and those of his family : and that, besides all this, he had been well informed from indisputable authority, that some steps had been taken in the assembly at Leipzig, prejudicial to his glory, and the tranquillity of his subjects. For these reasons, as the war admitted of no alternative, he thought it baseness to postpone it, and generosity to begin it :—nevertheless, he embraced the offer of his majesty’s friendship with all possible gratitude and respect, and so much the rather, as the progress of the Swedish arms portended no destruction to the catholic religion. Of course he should refuse no proposal, provided it was compatible (as he well foresaw it would be) with the justice and reputation of a prince, whom he respected beyond expression, and who had done him the honour to acknowledge him for a relation \*.

This letter wanted neither sagacity, nor politeness, nor address, nor dissimulation. Gustavus was politician enough to take it

\* Nanci, Jan. 21, 1632. *Mercure François*, Tom. xviii. 144—5.



in part of sufficient payment, and the rather, as France requested him so to do : for which the reason shall be assigned immediately. This procedure was highly gracious in Gustavus, for his army breathed such a spirit of revenge against the duke of Lorrain's troops, on account of the incredible ravages and outrages they had committed in Germany, that some regiments quartered near Worms, (who expected orders for making an irruption every moment) had procured colours, where a man was depicted cloven in two with the stroke of an axe, and a body of soldiers, with lighted torches in their hands, marching against the word L O R R A I N, which was written in large uncial letters opposite to them \*.

1631.

But the real reason of Charles's complaisance was owing purely to the treaty of Vic †, which he had signed with France just one and twenty days before he answered the king's letter. By this agreement, several articles were crammed down his throat of very difficult digestion ; for he was to renounce the interests of the emperor, Spain, and the catholic league ‡, and make no future treaty without the consent of France ; who, on the other hand, obliged herself to assist him upon condition only, that his dominions were attacked ; and took care to insert a clause, that free passage should be granted to the French army, whenever it was thought expedient to march troops into Germany.

About this time the landgrave of Hesse-Darmstadt renewed his solicitations for the public tranquillity, being in truth a secret pensioner to the court of Vienna, and the king had condescension enough to write to the electors of Saxony and Brandenburg on the subject, as also to the magistrates of Lubec (that being the principal of the Hanse towns) and to several princes and states ; well knowing at the same time, that it was only wasting a little ink and paper for the sake of decorum ; since from the beginning to the end he amused himself by styling the landgrave *pacificator general of the holy Roman empire*, and christening his money,

\* Spanheim's Soldat Suedois, p. 370.

† Voyez le Recueil des Traitez de consideration & d'alliance entre la couronne de France & les princes et etats etrangers depuis

l'an MDCXXI jusqu'à present MDCLXXII. Sine loco 12°.

‡ This was contained in a secret article, signed six days afterwards.

1631. which he deposited at cards and dice not very willingly, by no other name than *l'argent d'appointement*; alluding thereby to his private communication with the house of Austria \*.

And here an event of a more serious nature presented itself; for his majesty was informed, from an authority worth listening to, that half a dozen jesuits at Augsburg had bound themselves by solemn oaths and execrations to assassinate him: and what confirmed men in belief of this horrid conspiracy was, that a Flemish priest had been found near his bed-chamber, late in the evening, with a ponyard in his bosom. But Gustavus replied only to the remonstrances and representations of his friends, by assuring them, *That a king, circumstanced and employed as he was, must not lock himself up in a box:—that wicked men could not always effect what they wished to perform:—that providence was more to be relied upon than regiments of guards:—that God knew how far and how long he should be pleased to employ him, and in the event would raise up others more able and more operative than himself;—for the Supreme Being, continued he, would never make his work depend on one breath, or one person* †. And this was the substance of all his answers upon similar occasions; so that when his ministers and generals pressed him one day in particular to look more watchfully round him, and place proper guards about his person, he replied abruptly, and somewhat peevishly, *that they took great pains to teach him to distrust in God* ‡.

Mean while Gustavus in his private hours of reflexion, was not thoroughly pleased with Richelieu's duplicity in reference to the late treaty agreed upon between France and Bavaria; and perceiving plainly

\* To understand the secret history of the landgrave's conduct better, (who had lately married a young daughter of the elector of Saxony) we must look more nearly into the transactions of that age; and then we shall find, that the elector Palatine, about the time of the battle of Prague, had conveyed two signories to this prince by way of securing them to his own uses: but when Frederic grew unfortunate, the landgrave claimed them as his own proper possessions, and upon this, Mansfelt invaded his coun-

try, and detained him a prisoner; but procuring his liberty in a few days, and perceiving the house of Austria to be all-powerful, he obtained a grant from the emperor, not only of these two districts, but of several lands in Veteravia, which belonged to the counts of Solms, Isenberg and Lovenstein, who all served under Frederic. Secretary Fowler's Life of Sir G. Duglafs, fol. 223.

† Soldat Suedois, p. 374. &c.

‡ Le Vassor, Tom. vii. 102.

that



that the cardinal, and the cardinal's director, father Joseph, had formed 1631.  
 a scheme of reducing him to a piece of French mechanism, signified to Louis XIII, that he desired a *private conference* with him concerning matters of the most extraordinary importance, and of course dispatched Horn to Metz upon that errand. But Louis naturally timid, and endued with very moderate parts, trembled at the thoughts of managing a momentous conference with a king, who talked several languages with uncommon energy and propriety, and whose superior genius rendered him absolutely a master both in the field and cabinet. Upon this the marquis de Brezé (now returned for fresh instructions, as he had not been able to effect any general pacification to the advantage of France) was dispatched a second time ambassador to Mentz with a pompous equipage, attended by numbers of the young French nobility. Gustavus entertained him and his attendants most magnificently. Excuses then for declining the interview proposed were made in abundance, and all grounded upon the French king's infirm and delicate state of health: "But Sire, said the marquis, approach but a little towards " Lorraine, and cardinal Richelieu shall meet you at the place appointed." *Monsieur l'ambassadeur*, replied his majesty, with a tone of decision, *all kings are equal: my predecessors have never given place to the kings of France. If your master thinks fit to dispatch the CARDINAL half way, I will send some of MY PEOPLE to treat with him* \*. Nevertheless, it was the French maxim at that time to talk to Gustavus in a very high style, which, considering his spirit and temper, shewed want of address and common good sense in that political nation: for de Charnacé, the other ambassador, on some similar occasion, namely, on demanding the armistice †, gave him one day (in order to check the rapidity of his conquests towards Alsatia) a full detail of the immense number, as the world then computed, of his master's troops. *Sir*, said Gustavus, *I own your king hath abundance of soldiers; but indulge me only in one day's march before him, and I will give him the meeting at Paris; and save him the trouble of conducting an army by long journeys into Germany* ‡. It was

\* Le Vassor, Tom. vii. 102.

† Swedish Intelligencer, Part ii. 61.

‡ Le Vassor, Tom. vii. p. 103. Swedish

Intelligencer, Part ii. 61, 62.

631. then objected, that his majesty had violated his engagements with France in crossing the Rhine, (a point of great uneasiness to the French nation beyond all dispute :) to which he replied likewise, with an air of coldness, *That the most Christian king had given him an equal disgust in delaying to pay the Swedish stipend.* A French army and mine, continued he, *can never compose the disorders of Germany: leave then to me the correction in the empire of all, that is amiss; and if the king your master be in good earnest, let him turn his arms against Spain, and make a diversion in favour of the general cause* \*. Upon this the cardinal and the capuchin † began to consider Gustavus not only as the greatest conqueror in the world, but as a person superior to all common efforts of political artifice; and their king on his part fearing a second interview might be proposed, retired from Metz to Paris with the precipitation of a monarch, who had been defeated in battle. Yet willing to effect something of the low kind, rather than miscarry totally, and concluding little expedients (the baffled statesman's momentary cordials) to be better than absolute nothings; De Brezé at length, being disappointed in his grand scheme of an universal peace, or at least, a general truce, contrived in the last resource, in conjunction with the several ministers of the princes of the league, to extort from the king a sort of *armistice* ‡ of fourteen days duration, which Gustavus granted, partly to avoid being teized, and partly with a view of exhibiting to the public some manifest proof of his pacific inclinations: in both which points he justified his good temper and benevolence, at the expence of his victories. For Pappenheim either knew not of the *truce*, or never regarded it; the infanta Isabella found an opportunity to march her troops to the assistance of the league; the duke of Bavaria gained time to circumvent Gustavus and Louis too, by driving a fresh conclusive bargain at Vienna; and France found means, during this interval, to give new laws to Lorraine, and adopt the elector of Triers under her own protection;—a long catalogue, (if we consider its production and ripening to be only the work of a single fortnight) fruitful of dark and mischievous events; contrived by artifice, executed

\* Swedish Intelligencer, Part ii. 61, 62.

† Father Joseph.

‡ For the original of this treaty see the  
APPENDIX.

with



with insincerity, and extorted from a brave and benevolent prince, who 1631.  
regarded duplicity so much the less, as he had parts and spirit to make his enemies repay him for such ungenerous conduct with a double proportion of interest ! Nevertheless, a statesman or general, blessed with but one half of Gustavus's abilities, must have been destroyed by such a combination of falsehood, as well as total violation of all public good faith.

In order to bring about this mighty project of an armistice, De Charnacé received instructions to leave Munich, and co-operate at Mentz with De Brezé : but some few days before he quitted the former place, he made an attempt (being then as false to Bavaria, as he proved the next fortnight to Sweden) to persuade Maximilian, that he, of all princes, ought to permit Gustavus to extend his conquests as far as possible ; since, in case the house of Austria should be ruined, the Imperial diadem would be transferred of course from the family of Vienna to that of Bavaria. He then played the rhetorician upon the elevation of Walstein, (the elector's mortal enemy) to the supreme command ; but Maximilian was too old a politician to allow himself to be over-reached by French eloquence ; nor could he bear the thoughts of relinquishing that delicious acquisition, the Upper Palatinate. He therefore kept firm, at all hazards, to the Imperial cause, as did also his brother, the elector of Cologne.

No sooner had De Charnacé arrived at Mentz, but he began to ruffle the king's temper with those unaccountable sallies of vivacity, which seem congenial to Frenchmen, (and to say truth, this minister was invested with a double portion of them ;) since at the very time he was to solicit a favour, and that of no common nature, he could not help throwing out some lively invectives on the presumption of the Swedes for taking the liberty to cross the Rhine. The king, who had been tired above measure with these insolent impertinencies, and felt himself exasperated to the quick at such a dictatorial assuming of pre-eminence, gave him to understand very concisely once for all \*, *That if his Christian majesty was offended, he could not help it : and that whoever forced him back,*

\* Monro's Expedition, Part ii. 100.

1631. *must take the pains to effect that work sword in hand.—That he was geographer enough to know his way alike to Paris or Vienna, and that his soldiers would relish Champaign and Burgundy, as well as Rhenish or Moselle. And therefore for these reasons, he humbly conceived a king of France would not affect to imitate THAT power, who alone can say, HITHERTO SHALT THOU GO, AND NO FURTHER.* And indeed he well knew France to be not so formidable as she then affected to appear. Her army at most amounted to little more than 50,000 soldiers: nor did the revenues exceed forty-five millions of livres. Commerce was regarded with a careless eye, and the police greatly neglected.

The two French ambassadors being thus humbled into a sort of real or pretended modesty, implored the king at all events to grant an armistice for a single fortnight, which Gustavus allowed with great reluctance, much against his own private judgment, merely to prevent importunity. *For, Sir, said he to De Brezé, the princes of the league are insincere. I have made them offers more than once of living with them on a friendly footing (provided only, that they contributed a moderate sum towards the subsistence of my soldiers;) but instead of accepting these terms upon principles of honour and honesty, they have created both delays and obstructions, which fully convince me, that they want only to amuse me and gain time. Witness the deliberations and resolutions lately taken at Landsküt and Ingoldstadt: from whence it appears, that the bishop of Wurtzburg and the Bavarian ministers talked one thing at Metz, and that their constituents perform quite another thing in Germany. Read these letters, Sir, and then suppose yourself to be better instructed.*

What the substance of these intercepted letters was, appears not from Le Vassor, whom I am copying, but *one* \*, if I remember right, was addressed from the duke of Bavaria to Pappenheim, wherein he charged him to undertake *immediately* the reduction of Westphalia, enclosing a bill of credit on Cologne for 9000*l.* which sum he engaged to see repaid at Augsbürg. Nevertheless, before the cessation of arms could be obtained, Gustavus proposed once more the plan of a *neutrality*, as it was then called; or rather a short system of preliminaries, all tending to a

\* Chemnitz, Tom. i. 228.



general pacification \* ; which he charged the ambassadors and ministers to transmit to their respective courts for confirmation, inasmuch as he and France had agreed concerning them. Of these we have already given the reader *two* different transcripts, and referred him to a *third*, in the preamble of which there is one passage worth noticing ; namely, “ That  
 “ this armistice was granted purely out of regard to the earnest inter-  
 “ cessions of the most Christian king †.” 1631.

As to the armistice itself, I have seen only two translations thereof, the one in English, and the other in French, both made public the year succeeding its signature : to the former of which I have referred my reader in the *Appendix* ; and with respect to the plans of pacification mentioned by me, I conclude upon revision of the matter, that they were only subsequent elucidations of the king’s meaning, dispatched by him to the parties concerned, or to the Swedish ministers residing with them. Be that as it will, these are all signal proofs of his majesty’s sincerity and good faith, which will appear still in a stronger light, if we consider the instructions conveyed by him on the occasion to Gustavus Horn, and, as it seemeth to me highly probable, to all his generals ; namely, “ That it  
 “ was granted out of pure indulgence to the court of France ; and that a  
 “ positive answer to the proposals of pacification was to be returned in  
 “ the space of a fortnight from the princes therein interested. It was  
 “ agreed, that Pappenheim should evacuate Westphalia, and the arch-  
 “ bishopric of Magdeburg ; and that the troops belonging to the elector  
 “ of Bavaria and the catholic league should be withdrawn likewise from  
 “ Bohemia : (all acts of hostility being supposed to cease on either side,  
 “ and power reserved to retaliate injuries with injuries :) yet nevertheless  
 “ under this restriction, that blockades and sieges already begun should  
 “ proceed in the same manner, as if no cessation of arms had been agreed,  
 “ on ‡.

As this letter to Horn bears date from Hoëchst, Jan. 10, it is probable the king had ratified the agreement the day before, or that very morn-

\* See pag. 72, 73.

† Swedish Intelligencer, Part ii. p. (2.

‡ Letter to Gustavus Horn, dated at Hoëchst.  
 The author of the Merc. Franc. says Mentz.

Vid. APPENDIX, January 10, 1631-2. That very evening (being Tuesday) the king met the queen at Hanau. Swedish Intelligencer, Part ii. p. 68.

1631. ing at Mentz, and was advanced thus far on his road, in order to meet the queen at Hanau, whom he found there, to his highest satisfaction, the self same evening. Her majesty made her public entrance in a manner not devoid of magnificence, being accompanied by the young princess of Brandenburg her sister, and escorted by numbers of noblemen, and 1200 horse, commanded by old Ruthven. The king received her at the entrance of count Hanau's palace. Never meeting, after a long separation of twenty months, was more affectionate and tender; for they knew well each other's merit \*. Eleanora flew to him with a transport of joy, that is not to be described, and throwing her arms round his waist, *Now, Sir, said she, the great Gustavus is at length taken prisoner!* Which † particular sort of expression was so much applauded by the public, and passed so frequently from mouth to mouth, till acquiring fresh variations in travelling from Germany to England, it was at length reported by the London news-writer, that the king of Sweden was literally and *bona fide* an Imperial prisoner: which, it is probable, gave no great dissatisfaction to the English ministry. Be that as it will, the king made his consort a present of jewels to a very considerable value.

This heroine had left the pleasures of Stockholm, in order to share the fatigues of war with her husband, and brought with her no contemptible supply of soldiers ‡, artillery, and money. Nor was she in the least dismayed at an extraordinary accident, which befell her in the first minutes of her embarkation; for one of her principal ships (surnamed the *VASA*, by way of distinction,) sunk directly to the bottom about half a league from shore, merely through some fault in its construction: since the sea in that place was devoid of rocks, nor was there wind enough to ruffle its surface ||.

\* Fu incontrata (la regina) & raccolta da i popoli e dalle milizie con applauso. & pompa veramente regale, ma si caramente dal re suo consorte, che ne stupirono i circostanti, in vedendo da petto di tanta fortezza uscir così traborchevoli le tenerezze, e lusinghe de i più viscerati amanti. P. Pomo. libr. ii. 57.

† Swedish Intelligencer, Part ii. 68.

‡ Of these, 4000 were destined to join the marquis of Hamilton, and the residue, (4000 more) were conducted by Oxenstiern to reinforce the king.

|| Schefferi Memorab. Suec. Gent. 8°. p. 20.



During this momentary repose at Hanau, advices came, that Pappenheim paid no regard to the cessation of arms: upon which the king, determined to chastise him, ordered several regiments to file off from Francfort, and advanced in person immediately, as far as Guelenhau-1631.sen, twenty four miles in his way to Westphalia; nor would the queen desert him, but hearing there, that the danger he apprehended was blown over, returned to Francfort. For in violation of the truce the Spaniards had crossed the Moselle, and the infant's troops were in full march towards the Palatinat; the duke of Bavaria made preparations for renewing the war with inflexible diligence; the elector of Triers behaved with duplicity; and the duke of Neuburg allowed Tilly to take possession of his metropolis. Thus, whilst they all effected mischief, in greater or lesser degrees, the king, like an honest and punctual soldier, gained nothing but an inactive interval for the refreshment of his army.

During this interim, the elector of Bavaria not only refitted his shattered troops, but found his opportunity of extorting higher advantages from the Austrian necessities, inasmuch as the emperor had long balanced between restoring Wallstein, or breaking with Maximilian. At length he and his ministry, upon mature deliberation, thought proper to leave the first difficulty to work its own way, and pay an exorbitant price for the assistance of the prince last named: which retardment of glory (though only in idea) redoubled Wallstein's hatred against Bavaria.

Mean while the elector, perceiving France could not influence Gustavus in greater matters, and discovering likewise, that that prince had a violent inclination to restore the Palatin to his hereditary dominions, dispatched Donnerberg, his chancellor, to Vienna; and bidding adieu to the interposition of France all at once, gave him authority to make the best market he could with the Imperial ministry, who received him with open arms\*.

Donnerberg protested that though his master might want means, yet that he would want no means to the house of Austria, since he had no other way to the throne, which Richelieu offered

1631. him \*; but that Sweden had almost overturned his system, by that terrible shock, which the defeat of Leipzig gave him; and that the infants had besought him to take no adventurous step, till the catholic princes had recovered themselves from their terror and dismay. He frankly owned, that the clandestine elevation of Wallstein †, the investing him with so much power, and reposing such undue confidence in a meer subject, had a little disconcerted him in the articles of friendship and fidelity; and so much the more, as that general had been removed at his instances and solicitations.—Nevertheless he privately hoped, that the emperor had been forced into these measures by pure necessity, and that Wallstein would never presume, when he opened the campaign, to march into Bavaria, or canton his troops in that electorate:—of course, as the possession of the Palatinates began now to appear precarious, he thought it consistent with the emperor's prudence and equity, to *transfer* the Upper Austria ‡ to him provisionally, and by way of *hypothèque*, not only as an indemnification for his past expences, but as a sort of equivalent for the Palatinates, which Gustavus was determined to wrest out of his hands. Upon these terms he made his Imperial majesty an offer of all his services, having previously raised the ban, and arrier-ban of Bavaria to that very purpose, fortified and guarded the banks of the Lech and Danube, and placed good garrisons in all the fortresses and cities on that side of his country §.

These proposals were a cordial of comfort to the Imperial ministry; yet the assignation of Upper Austria, by way of pledge or mortgage, was a sort of nauseous drop, mixt with the composition, which rendered it to a certain degree unpalatable.

Their answer was, that the emperor would content his old ally, not only in this instance, but in realizing also some promises of the same nature, which he had made before. That Wallstein in effect forced his

\* Bernard; Hist. de Louis XIII. Lib. xv.

† He does not name him in the memorial, but mentions only the elevation of a certain person.

‡ There are reasons to suspect it was rather that part of Upper Austria called Ober-Ens, or *supra*

*Anisum*, which had been mortgaged to the duke at the beginning of the Bohemian wars, and resumed upon the cession made him of the Higher Palatinat.

§ Fred. Spanheim. p. 380.



own way; that the necessity of the conjuncture was his only patroness, since no other man could collect an army at so short a notice, and when the emergency of affairs was so very critical. Nevertheless, care had been taken, that all competitions and jealousies should be removed; and that the elector of Bavaria should receive neither affront, neglect, or injury, from him. Be that as it will, Walstein hearing what part Maximilian had acted with regard to him, grew so enraged, that he made no secret of his future intentions. 1631.

During the continuance of this truce, France, 'who always cast a languishing eye on the western banks of the Rhine, laid the ground-plot of a new machination against Sweden, by drawing the elector of Triers more immediately under her protection; and dispatched the count de Brullon expressly into Germany upon that errand: of which we shall speak more distinctly, when we come to the signature of the treaty itself. But as Gustavus was of a temperament equally prudent and inflammable, of course she entered into this act of guardianship with wonderful slowness and timidity; for Richelieu knew the interposition to be of a cast very delicate: since if he had sowered, or ruffled Gustavus too abruptly, he foresaw, that the Spanish party would have extracted great advantage from such an inadvertency, and kindled up a misunderstanding betwixt the two crowns. It sufficed therefore for the present, that the elector published a memorial\* concerning the cessation of hostilities during the truce, which the Spanish troops despised, and the members of his own chapter rejected.

Richelieu then changed his attack, and tampered, dextrously enough, with the city of Strasburg, (a sort of game, that was played afterwards with more success in regard to Brisac;) sparing no pains to induce the magistrates to place themselves under the protection of France. But an old burgomaster, who, from principles of good sense, and a true zeal for the welfare of the public, found himself more inclinable to embrace the tutelage of Sweden, checked the French emissaries very appositely,

\* The original letter, dated from Herman-Rein (Ehrenbreitstein) Jan. 14, 1631<sup>1</sup>/<sub>2</sub>, is preserved in the *Swedish Intelligencer*. Part ii. 69.

1631. and begged his fellow-magistrates to recollect a similar case with reference to the three cities of Metz, Toul, and Verdun. This remonstrance confounded the whole project; and for these reasons Gustavus, thoroughly affected with the preference these Strasburgers shewed him, always opposed a deaf ear to Richelieu, when he besought him to give his parole of honour, not to enter into Alsatia. The truth is, the French minister stood in awe of Gustavus, and wisely dissembled a disgust, which he had not courage either to explain or vindicate.

About the same time, Gonsalvo de Cordoua, who commanded the Spanish army in the Palatinat, was sent ambassador to Paris, to make remonstrances against the protection, which Lewis XIII. afforded the protestants, whereby the catholic cause was greatly injured. But Richelieu resumed the old tone, and told him, that the present war was purely political, and not religious: of course all persons were left at full liberty to embrace that party, which most favoured their private inclinations, or conduced most to their interests. Upon this, Gonsalvo returned thoroughly dissatisfied, and refused a present the king offered him, of a sword richly garnished with diamonds\*.

We have observed before, that the troops under this general's command had been guilty in his absence of several infractions contrary to the terms of

\* A ridiculous circumstance once happened to this commander, who had been lieutenant-general to Spinola, and governor of Milan. In the campaign of 1621, it was his intention to possess a little walled village, in the Palatinat, called Ogersheim; and of course he dispatched an officer, at the head of a body of troops, upon that errand. On the first alarm, nine tenths of the inhabitants removed to Manheim, excepting about twenty insignificant people, and a poor shepherd, who, besides being a brave fellow, was a person of rural festivity, and uncommon humour. The shepherd in good time fastened the gates, let down the draw-bridge, and made a wonderful shew of resistance. A trumpeter accosted the town in form; upon which event, the few inhabitants, that remained, made their escape through a postern gate, and left only the shepherd and his shepherdess big with child. This

unaccountable peasant, in the style of representative of the garrison, gave audience from the walls to the military herald, and made his bargain of capitulation inch by inch; contracting at the same time for the preservation of estate, and the free exercise of the protestant religion. Let the reader judge what surprize the Spaniards felt, when they entered the village; yet the droll preserved the muscles of countenance inflexible, and some weeks afterwards, when his wife lay in, desired the great Gonsalvo to be *sponsor*, which honour the pompous Castilian, for the jest's sake, could not decline, and on the contrary sent her some very handsome presents.— This account, saith a veracious historian, (*F. Spanheim. Mem. d'Eleâ. Palat.*) might appear to posterity, to border a little on the romantic kind, if the notoriety of it had not been a circumstance indisputable at the time it happened.



the cessation agreed on ; for Isabella's 10,000 Walloons had reached the Lower Palatinat by long marches from the Low Countries, having crossed the Moselle during the continuance of the truce, and then the combined Spanish army ventured to pass the Rhine near Spires, which the Rhingrave opposed very valiantly : but that brave officer missed little of being destroyed, by paying no regard to the repeated advices given him of the enemy's approach ; and if captain Hume, at the head of four troops of horse, had not resisted the united efforts of the whole Spanish army for half an hour, matters had taken a turn exceedingly untoward. Which confirms a doctrine, that can be never too much inculcated into military men, that an undue degree of courage, when it borders upon a neglect of danger, is as fatal to the service as downright poltroonery.

Enraged at such violations of compact, (not only here, but on the side of Pappenheim, Maximilian, the electors of Triers and Cologne, the duke of Neuburg, and France itself, as shall appear immediately) his majesty returned post-haste to Francfort, and having first dispatched Monro with a body of infantry (for the Rhingrave had only horse) placed himself at the head of a small army, in order to give battle to these faithless invaders : but the terror of the name of Gustavus soon compelled them to repass both the Rhine and Moselle ; nor did they think themselves in safety till they had reached the duchy of Luxemburg.

At length, namely, on the twenty fourth of January, the armistice expired, and many attempts were made by Richelieu to protract it eight days longer : but Gustavus, who had been thoroughly mortified and disgusted, though he justly foresaw and predicted all its ill consequences, replied peremptorily, *that he had made that sacrifice to France, and was too good a politician to venture upon a second experiment of the same nature.* Upon this, De Charnacé, De Brezé, and St. Etienne, learned to act a more decent and more cautious part ; and when they teized and implored the king to entertain a moment's patience longer, he not only gave them a positive refusal, but told them moreover, that nothing should ever induce him to give up Mentz, Bamberg, and Wurtzburg.

*I muß.*

1631. *I must keep the ferula in my own hands, continued he, in order to regulate and chastise the duplicity of your good ecclesiastical friends and allies* \*.

The truth was, the French for some months past had grown very uneasy at Gustavus's victories, and being conscious of a private treaty formed with the elector of Bavaria, proposed not only a *neutrality*, but an *armistice*, and the *continuation* of the armistice, by way of feeling his Swedish majesty's pulse, and retarding the rapidity of his conquests. At the same time, they paved the way to a separate agreement with the elector of Triers, and assembled a considerable body of troops near Metz, under pretence of suppressing an insurrection formed by the duke of Orleans, giving out in the interim clandestinely by their emissaries, that this force was intended to prescribe laws to the conquests of the Swedes. To retard matters more, care was taken to pay the subsidy very slowly, and imperfectly: and what confirms the truth of these assertions yet further, is, that the French court could not conceal its joy, when the news arrived of Gustavus's death.

The war was now revived with double spirit on the part of Sweden, and plans for new operations were dispatched to Banier, who opposed Pappenheim in Westphalia, to Horn, who faced Tilly in the diocese of Bamberg, to Arnheim and Thurn, who acted against Don Baltazar and Tietzenbach in Bohemia and Moravia, as also the dukes of Mechlenberg and Lunenberg, Todt, Ruthven, duke William of Weymar, and others, who all commanded separate armies. As to the marquis of Hamilton, he was then at Francfort in company with Vane the English ambassador.

About this time it is the custom of the English historians, to represent Gustavus as dictating in a very high tone, and maintaining the character of a person elated with an extraordinary train of successes. Any one may easily see, that he had real reasons to alter his style, without incurring the imputation of vain-glory and haughtiness; for he plainly discovered, that Charles, in spite of all the prosperity, that attended the Swedish arms, had a diffidence, or an inappetency, of engaging himself into any treaty, that breathed spirit and magnanimity. Upon which unhappy disinclination Gustavus touched gently, but feelingly, in his letter, which gave an account of the battle of Leipzig.

\* *Le Vissier*, Tom. vii. 104.



A part of Vane's instructions were not quite palatable to his Swedish majesty; for he had orders to conciliate him with the king of Denmark, upon some conditions, that were not compatible with the temper of a man so jealous of his honour, as the former was known to be. It is true, Vane had commission likewise, to enter into stricter connexions with Sweden; but either this commission was clogged with private restrictions, or the ambassador wanted parts and courage to seize the proffered opportunity. He was commanded likewise to consult Hamilton previously to all difficulties and all emergencies, which was giving an insight and power to an inferior general, which did not conform itself to Gustavus's doctrine of subordination. Vane paid his first visit to that prince at Francfort \*, where Gustavus told him without ceremony, (as Vane's commission related chiefly to the restitution of the Palatinat) that he could make no distinct answer upon the subject, till a league was previously concluded betwixt him and the elector Palatin, which was to be the basis of a subsequent alliance between Charles and himself; to which Vane, who declared he was invested with full powers, signified an inclination to assent. But to that point Gustavus replied, that as he was tender of promising one iota more than he could perform, it would be highly necessary to bring France into the system: nevertheless, without depending upon success in that particular, he would at all events discharge the duties of a man of honour, and reserve to himself the glory of executing something beyond what he promised. Nor was this a piece of state-artifice, or political parade, as time afterwards fully discovered †. Upon which, says Mr. Guthrie, who (bating some few trifling inaccuracies) hath given us the best account of this transaction, Gustavus added, "That Charles had been too slow

\* We have proved elsewhere, from Vane's own papers, that this meeting was first at Wurtzburg.

† In confirmation of this assertion, of which many proofs are produced dispersedly in the course of our history, I shall subjoin one authority more on the faith of MSS. extracted from a letter of Mr. John Dinely, at the Hague, to Sir

Thomas Roe, bearing date Feb. 24, 1632.

"The chancellor (of Sweden) your friend, hath assured her majesty, (the queen of Bohemia) that his glorious master had never other meaning but to restore it (the Palatinat:) no more hath he," namely Oxenstiern, who faithfully endeavoured to fill up the outlines of the plan, which Gustavus left him.

1631. “ in sending him, Vane, and that if he had sent him *before he had con-*  
 “ *cluded the treaty with France, he would have been at liberty to have*  
 “ *fallen upon Bavaria* \*. The ambassador answered, I make use of the  
 words of his own dispatch with Charles, “ For our coming too late  
 “ there, was no fault to be justly imputed to us ; for had his majesty of  
 “ Sweden demanded reasonable conditions, the alliance had been conclud-  
 “ ed : but leagues and business of so great importance could not but have  
 “ slow motions ; yet he besought his majesty of Swedeland, to give  
 “ him leave to commemorate the proceedings of his master towards  
 “ him, since his majesty’s coming into Germany, viz. That he had  
 “ permitted him to make as many levies of his subjects as he had de-  
 “ sired ; that he had since sent the marquis of Hamilton to him with  
 “ a royal assistance, and so opportunely, as it could not be denied, but  
 “ that the marquis landed his army at a seasonable time, to the amuse-  
 “ ment of the emperor and the encouragement of the confederate pro-  
 “ testant princes, as it appeared by the effects, that followed thereupon,  
 “ by the speedy uniting of their arms under his command. And  
 “ that though his Swedish majesty, next under God, was the only im-  
 “ mediate instrument, to whom the glory of this great revolution  
 “ was to be attributed ; yet it could not be denied, but that the subjects  
 “ of Great-Britain had done him great and remarkable service both in  
 “ these and his former wars, and that these were neither to be concealed  
 “ nor forgotten, nor the real assistance now sent unto him.

“ His majesty of Sweden acknowledged, that the king of Great-  
 “ Britain had proceeded with him as a friend ; that he was a wise and  
 “ virtuous prince ; and that none could wish more prosperity to his per-  
 “ son and affairs than he did ; and that he would do his best to assist  
 “ him, in the business of the Palatinat ; but he would then have him

\* Here must be some mistake, for no new treaty had been made with France since that of Bernwalt, Jan. 13, 1632; so that the king could only mean, that during the existence of the truce, and upon supposition it tended to a general pacification, he was not at liberty to attack

Bavaria, which enjoyed the Upper Palatinat ; nor could Gustavus be supposed to allude to the treaty France had concluded with Bavaria, May 8, 1631, since the moment the truce expired, he turned his arms against the elector.

“ follow



“ follow his advice; that he had too long depended upon the Spanish 1631.  
 “ treaty, which was a fault, and had prejudiced us much; and that  
 “ nothing was to be expected from them but parols. The ambassador  
 “ replied, If that were a fault, it behoved him to be wary in his ne-  
 “ gotiation, not to make an alliance, that might be disadvantageous to  
 “ his master, either in honour or judgment; and that whatsoever  
 “ should be the event, he doubted not but that God would bless both  
 “ his councils and his actions. His majesty of Sweden replied, That  
 “ for the present he could not stipulate to make war with Bavaria,  
 “ though he intended not to let him escape; for that it could not be  
 “ but of great advantage, if he could secure the catholics, which he  
 “ was in a fair way to effect; for, according to his articles delivered  
 “ unto *Charnassay*\*, the electors of Triers and Cologne had accepted of  
 “ the neutrality. The ambassador asked, Whether his majesty had re-  
 “ ceived any act of their own? He said no; but the marquis of *Pressay* †  
 “ had assured him thereof; that he had not yet heard of Bavaria, nei-  
 “ ther could he yet say any thing thereunto, until either Charnassay  
 “ or Horn, whom he had sent into France, were returned.

“ His majesty of Sweden then said, He would make him two pro-  
 “ positions; which were, he would either oblige himself to restore to  
 “ the king of Bohemia what the Spaniard held, and treat with France  
 “ and Bavaria for the restitution of what he possesses; which if he  
 “ would not restore, he would then undertake a war with him, so the  
 “ king would enter into an alliance with him against the Spaniards,  
 “ if he should attack him in any of his dominions.

“ Gustavus at the same time added, That in order to do things effec-  
 “ tually, he expected Charles to furnish twelve thousand men, and his  
 “ contingency of troops, and twenty five thousand pounds a month in  
 “ money to maintain them. Those were very high demands, and Vane  
 “ was appointed to treat further with Horn, *the chancellor of Sweden* ‡.

\* De Charnacé.

† De Brezé.

‡ Horn was a Swedish general, Oxenstiern

was chancellor of Sweden; but as Horn made the treaty of Bernwalt, and was sent afterwards ambassador to Metz, he is mistaken for a civil officer.

1631. " But when the conferences opened, the Swedish minister made the following high demands.

" 1. That the Palsgrave should hold his country as a donative of the king of Sweden.

" 2. That he should make no martial levies without the Swedes consent.

" 3. That during this war he should furnish the Swedes with so many thousand men upon his own pay.

" 4. That two of his chiefest towns should stand cautionaries for the performing of covenants.

" 5. That he should make no league nor article with any other prince without the Swedes consent.

" Those proposals were thought by Vane to be absurd, and as haughty as the terms, that had been proposed to the king of Bohemia by the emperor himself. Hamilton, who was present at all the conferences, had made him sensible of the reluctance, which Gustavus had to suffer the British auxiliaries to march into the Palatinate, or into any of the territories, that were well-affectioned to the king of Bohemia. Charles and the king of Bohemia were sensible of the same thing, and from the haughty manner, in which Gustavus treated, they more than suspected, that he intended to make himself master of Germany, or at least to give law to all the princes of the empire. But to bring matters to an issue, Vane proposed, that Hamilton should have the compliment of Swedish soldiers, that had been first stipulated him; that they should be paid with English money, and augmented with a new body of troops from Great-Britain, so as to make a strong army, which Hamilton was to lead into the Palatinate. Had Gustavus really meant as disinterestedly for the king of Bohemia as he professed, he would have embraced this proposal; but, instead of that, he treated it with disdain, and ordered the negotiation to be broken off."

Thus far Mr. Guthrie: but as to the latter part of his assertions, care has been taken to make a proper reply to them elsewhere. Indeed his Britannic majesty mistook his interests in entering into any negotiations



ations about the Palatinate with the house of Austria: for in the first place, the court of Vienna had no intentions ever to come to an accommodation; and in the second place, the hereditary dominions of the elector had been doled out in so many parcels, that it was hardly possible to repossess them by an act of resumption, and then restore them to their ancient owner. The tree was felled; the elector of Bavaria had seized the timber-part thereof, and every other catholic neighbour fagotted up as much of the branches, as he could ransack together, for his own use. So that the emperor (especially as Gustavus was now powerful in Germany) could not possibly *redemand* with decency *what* he had *given*, or *recall* with any appearance of justice what he had *sold*. Therefore, saith Spanheim\*, who wrote from his heart upon this subject, and to whom I am indebted for the idea of the picture I am now delineating, the court of London judged extremely ill, in hoping to wrest the Palatinate from so many interested persons by remonstrances or embassies; it being alike ridiculous to attempt to confront a musquet ball in a coat of armour composed of parchment records.

On the other hand, the catholic princes pretended only, in a sort of ironical way, to have their alternative of eighty years in the church-possessions: and the Imperial ministry suggested, (in imitation of what was once said to Metellus) that the voice of law could not be heard amongst the clashing of arms, and that there was no antidote against the will of a Cesar.

I have seen some other accounts, which inform us, that Vane pressed Gustavus somewhat abruptly and indelicately on the subject of the restitution of the Palatinate, telling him in so many words, that he had annexed his royal promise to the completion of that event; which assumption Vane proved oddly enough: "For, Sire, said he, you declared positively, on your first entrance into Germany, that you would re-instate all the oppressed and injured protestant princes; of whom the elector Palatin is first, not only in dignity, but in misfortunes." This logic of imputation was built upon the interpretative authority of a *manifesto* only; and a *manifesto*, in general, is a sort of rhetorical

\* Mem. d'Electr. Palat. p. 302.

1631. nosegay, which kings now and then, for variety sake, present the public with, (whilst enterprize, invasion, and bloodshed, are privately concealed behind the scene) in order to amuse their fellow-creatures, or mislead them, or lull them into a tranquil inattention: for this anthology in politics is the

— *Lucus & ara Dianæ,*

*Et properantis aquæ per amœnos ambitus agros.*

Nevertheless Gustavus had no duplicity upon this occasion\*; and as he both loved and pitied the unfortunate prince in question, allowed Vane's conclusion to be honestly, though not logically, deducible; and promised to effect the restitution of the Palatinate, upon condition his Britannic majesty would maintain an army in Germany, of 8000 foot and 3000 horse; to which the ambassador replied, very indiscreetly, "That his master did not chuse to make a purchase at a higher price than the thing was worth."

Yet Gustavus still maintained a secret affection for the unfortunate elector, and solicited the French king to co-operate with him in restoring an oppressed and proscribed prince to his dominions, whose ancestors had supported Henry IV. against the enemies of the house of Bourbon: proposing likewise, at the same time, *that* notable expedient of augmenting the *number* of the electoral college; which masterly stroke of politics was thought so necessary, as to be carried afterwards into execution at the congress of Munster. But Louis durst not presume to advance a single step, being dismayed by the effects of the clandestine treaty, which his minister had thought fit to conclude with the duke of Bavaria. Things therefore being thus circumstanced, Gustavus took Frederic upon his own hands, and made his friends a promise of re-instating him, upon condition he indulged his Lutheran subjects in the free exercise of their religion, and considered himself as attached and obliged only to the crown of Sweden: giving him however to understand, at the same time, that an affair of this sort required dexterity

\* Compare this passage with the note annex to page 103.



and management in him, the king; and that his promise depended eventually upon a variety of circumstances; so that the terms it was conceived in were only general and indefinite; however his majesty was sincerely in earnest, and that sufficed. 1631,

As Slavata, the king of Bohemia's minister, had long before this time reached Holland, and informed his master, that Gustavus expected to see him with great impatience, Frédéric having returned thanks to the states in full council, and requested the continuance of their generous protection to his wife and children, undertook his journey to Francfort forthwith, accompanied by the states general to the gates of the Hague, by the prince of Orange as far as Wesel, and by lord Craven on to Francfort. The Dutch government, at parting, made him a present suitable to his high rank, and the nature of his expedition. An escort of 2500 horse and foot convoyed him to the territories of Hesse Cassel, and the landgrave's troops conducted him to Francfort, where he arrived February the tenth, with a retinue of forty coaches (some were sent by Gustavus in order to do him honour) and seventy domestics on horseback. He saluted the king and queen next morning at Hoëchst, (the unfortunate place where Tilly defeated Christian, duke of Brunswic) and returned with them to Francfort the same day, where Gustavus gave him a magnificent entertainment; nay oftentimes allowed him precedency \*, under pretence he was a king and elector both †; and he and his consort always addressed their discourse to him with the compellation of *your majesty*; which respect the young landgrave of Darmstadt once omitting, whose father had been no good neighbour to Frederic, the king of Sweden rebuked him with no small degree of asperity ‡. Yet notwithstanding all these affectionate offices, he still took care to retouch the subject we have lately mentioned, and obtained a promise from Frederic, whose mind was strongly prepossessed in favour of Calvinism, to grant free exercise of religion in the Palatinate, to all such as made profession of the opinions of Luther. Yet this prince's joy,

\* Mercure François en l'an 1632, p. 163.

† Swedish Intelligencer, Part ii. p. 76.

‡ Bertius de Bellis Germanicis.

1631. who seemed to be born only to prove unfortunate, was soon diminished by the effects of a disaster, supposed by many to proceed from design; for the castle of Heidelberg\*, his once-accustomed place of residence, and the ancient seat of his predecessors, was suddenly injured by a violent fire, and the fine front thereof entirely destroyed. The Spanish garrison seemed pleased with the misfortune, and stood with folded arms contemplating its ruin. This circumstance was so much the more afflictive to the elector Palatin, as he had performed vast works with respect to the palace or castle of Heidelberg, which any one will soon acknowledge, when he knows the rock, on which the building is erected. He perfected likewise, with immense expence, the fortifications of Mannheim, begun by his father Frederic IV.

Gustavus had been vigilant enough the preceding year, to dispatch the chevalier Rache first to Venice, where he succeeded well †, next to Genoa, and then to the thirteen cantons of Switzerland, concerning which embassy we have spoken minutely elsewhere. The emperor set himself earnestly to traverse this negotiation, and wrote to the respective sovereignties of each state, making them protestations and promises in abundance. He caused the archduke Leopold to write another letter in substance the same, and full of politeness and civility ‡; and then deputed Arnoldin, counsellor of state, and first secretary *à secretis*, to Walstein; who expedited him directly into Poland, in order to levy the little army of Cossacks formerly mentioned. But the Poles trembled to think of opposing Gustavus a second time; and though they favoured the Imperial cause greatly in their private inclinations, yet the request was passed by unnoticed. Some few noblemen made a clandestine levy of a company or two, and nothing more. Isolani succeeded better, in raising 8000 fresh Croats, a set of troops Gustavus hated mortally, on account of the ravages and cruelties committed by them; and as they spared nothing, he usually allowed them no quarter, and,

\* During the war of the succession, in 1693, this structure was entirely destroy'd and the town ruin'd. The very tombs of the electors were not spared; of all which devastations, and of preceding ones,

melancholly marks still remain. But the country round it is a terrestrial paradise.

† Historical or Authentic Relation, in Low Dutch, fol. Tom. i 176.

‡ Mercure Suisse de Fred. Spanheim. p. 22.



on the contrary, received none from them. The emperor then finished 1631. the holidays by confiscating the duchies of Jagernsdorf and Troppau, and bestowing them on the prince of Lichtenstein\*.

It was now determined, that Pappenheim should act at the head of a flying army of 18,000 men †; and to help forwards this project, the elector of Bavaria sent him 15,000 l. ; and as that prince had now made his final political decision with respect to France, De Charnacé and St. Etienne retired from Munich, each desirous to see his master first, each dissatisfied with his negotiation, and well prepared to accuse his co-adjutor. In short, these gentlemen of pacification were so enraged with each other, that a challenge had passed between them.

In the next place, the deputies of the elector of Cologne made fresh proposals of accommodation ; but Oxenstiern received them with an air of roughness, and proposed conditions to them, that were over hard of digestion : nevertheless De Pau, ambassador from the states general, met with a favourable audience from the king, who dispatched Oxenstiern immediately to the Hague to facilitate matters, and dispose them to ripen into some perfection.

Mean while new misunderstandings broke forth on the side of Poland, with reference to the truce concluded in 1629, between that kingdom and Sweden ; upon which the king deputed Ruffel, one of his privy-councillors, to be his ambassador, and gave him a letter both to Sigismond and the states of the realm, who received this minister very coldly, till at length the matter was amicably composed by the intervention of the English ambassador ‡ : which gave his majesty great ease, for he less feared the interposition of any power than that of Poland ; and to convince the public that he omitted no probable negotiation, even at the greatest distance, dispatched an agent to George Ragotzki, prince of Transylvania, in order to create a fresh irruption into Hungary || ; than which no proceeding, *ad hominem*, could be more justifiable, as the em-

\* This is confirmed by the author of the *Memoirs of the house of Brandenburg*.

† *Saggi d'Historia del Pietro Pomo*. Lib. ii. p. 55. quarto.

‡ *Historical Authentic Relation*, in *Low Dutch*, fol. Tom. ii. p. 2—7, &c.

§ *Ibid*, p. 27.

1631. peror, two years before, had sent Arnheim with an army into Poland to assist Sigismund against the Swedes.

Though the campaign of the year 1631 had lasted (on the side of Gustavus particularly) till the festival of Christmas, yet the troops had hardly a common breathing-space allowed them to recover their fatigues, if we except the short fortnight's interval of cessation from hostilities; for the king actually took the field in February, and Wallstein on his side began to make a semblance of doing the same: for having collected all his officers together, he found his regiments fully completed, and ready to march. The emperor sent him eighty cannon of immense size from the arsenal at Vienna, and seventeen large pieces were conveyed to him from Breslau and Lignitz. Couriers passed and repassed every moment between Bohemia and Austria, and Wallstein, who loved to rhodomontade, dropped insinuations to make people believe, that they brought him money; but the military jokers said (who have a dry laconic sort of wit peculiar to themselves) "That they rather moved too nimbly and too frequently for men employed in that capacity \*."

\* Others report the *bon mot* thus, "Qu'il ne falloit pas s'ebahir, s'ils alloyent viste, parceque leur charge n'estoit pas grande." *Mercure François*, Tom. xviii. pag. 125. *Soldat Suedois*, p. 351. *N. B.* At and near this period there is one thing very remarkable; That the famous *Mercure François* and the *Soldat Suedois* both use the self-same words to the amount of a considerable number of pages. Now each work, in the parts relative to the present period, made its appearance the same year, 1633; yet there are reasons to conclude, that the *Soldat Suedois* is the incontestable original, as it was composed by Frederic Spanheim, then professor of theology at Geneva, (one of the best historians of that age) at the request of the Swedish ambassador to the Swiss cantons, whom I suppose to be the chevalier de Rache, a person of great parts and address; who knew the interior of Gustavus's affairs almost as well as Oxenstiern himself.

This circumstance pays no great honour to that oracle of French history, the *Mercure*, which, when compared with the German, English, Italian, and Scottish relations, appears to be superficial, defective, and erroneous in numberless instances. Of course it hath been our care to select sparingly from it, except when it is supported with collateral confirmations; and we heartily wish, that father Bougéant in his elegant history (as to style and method) had made it the companion of his researches, but not the guide. Yet in justice we must acknowledge, that the judicious Le Barre took greater precautions; for he examined more than twenty times THREE books with his own eyes, and whatever he relates may be depended on with safety; whereas Bougéant, in the military, and commonly historical parts, consulted only the *Mercure*, Lotichius, and Puffendorf.



Commissions were now issued out for levying fresh troops in behalf of Sweden, and Christian, the third son of Charles, count Palatin of Birckenfeld, being newly created general of horse, had orders to form an army in the marquisate of Baden, and the district round Strasburg, in which town Frederic, margrave of Baden-Dourlach, was attempting to bring a negotiation with the inhabitants into conclusion. A treaty was then signed with the deputies of the administrator of Wirtemberg, whom the king reproved with some little asperity, for renouncing the conclusions at Leipzig on the first approach of the Imperialists. Orders were then given to raise a second body of troops in Suabia, where Ossa commanded in the emperor's behalf, and extend the Swedish influence to the source of the Danube; which put the Switzers into no small consternation, though the duke de Rohan, and the chevalier de Rache, at length explained away their fears, and kept them easy.

And now by the middle of February his majesty opened the campaign with the siege of Creutznach in the Palatinat, a small town defended with one of the strongest castles, for situation, perhaps in Germany. The peasants had so great an affection for the king's service, that they levelled the roads of their own accord for the approach of his army, and procured him constant intelligence. The garrison consisted of 600 veteran Germans, Walloons, and Burgundians. The fortifications rose one above another in such a manner on the lower side, that Gustavus called them (being greatly surprized when he contemplated them) *the devil's works* \*; and one half-moon in particular he surnamed *the devil's head*. For these reasons he made his approach on the other side, having sent to Mentz for some new arguments, to persuade the garrison to listen to reason, and lodged lieutenant-colonel Douglas all night near the walls, at the head of 300 Scots, who had performed so well at the storming of Oppenheim.

Gustavus took a survey of the castle, but approached so near, that his brave generals, out of pure respect, gave him the honour of precedency. An huge stone hurled from the wall missed little of putting a

\* Swedish Intelligencer, Part ii. p. 77.

1631. period to his curiosity; and a person, who stood next to him, was shot through the brain with a musquet-ball \*. Soon afterwards, being dissatisfied with what he could discover, and the rather, as he was naturally short-sighted, he went out privately, and calling a serjeant to him, whom he knew perfectly well, as he did half the men that served under him, *Fellow-soldier*, said he, *clamber up, and take a just view of yonder work, and here are forty pieces of gold to make you happy afterwards* †.

The serjeant performed his business, and returned unhurt; yet Gustavus could not rest contented with his relation, but mounting the steep of the hill, extended himself flat on the ground, to take a view of the fortifications, and made the soldier lie by him. Even then he could not command the works as he desired; so dismissing the serjeant he clambered still higher by himself; then returning to his army, declared, with a voice of cheerfulness, *Now will I be master of yonder castle by five o'clock to-morrow evening*.

Next morning a mine was sprung, which opened a small entrance, but very steep, full of loose rocks, and difficult of ascent; a general storm was ordered, which colonel Winckle commanded. The English volunteers composed the van; and lord Craven, who was then very young, lieutenant-colonel Talbot, and Mr. Masham marched at the head of it. As the difficulties of ascending were almost unsurmountable, the assailants were repulsed in their first attempt, which put Gustavus into a small transport of rage; yet at the same time he took particular notice of lord Craven's gallant behaviour, and, with a smile, patted him on the shoulder, and bid him return to the attack, which he did, at the head of all the troops. The contest lasted two hours, and was very sharp and obstinate, for the besieged behaved with incredible resolution; at length a German officer, though the Burgundians and Walloons opposed him strenuously, mentioned aloud the words quarter and

\* Galeazzo Gualdo confounds this story, and the king's answer thereupon, with a similar accident, which happened at the siege of Mentz. Libr. iii. p. 81.

† Many particulars relating to this siege were transmitted from Germany by Sir Jacob Arley, who afterwards defended Reading against the parliament forces.

surrender,



surrender, and Craven, who was the very foremost man, seized this incident with a lucky presence of mind, and extending his hand to him by way of accommodation, the firing ceased. And here it must be remarked, for the honour of the Swedish discipline, that though the town was taken by storm, yet the soldiers never once broke their order, or presumed to open the door of a single inhabitant; which when the townsmen saw, they recovered immediately from their terrors, besought the officers and private men to enter their houses and refresh themselves, and poured forth acclamations of joy upon being restored to their lawful master, the elector Palatin. As Gustavus was piqued at the slaughter, which the obstinate defence of this town had caused amongst his men (for it had resisted him a whole fortnight) he obliged the garrison to march out without their colours, and not to serve against him for six months on the *eastern* side of the Moselle; *if, says he, you find me on the western banks, (whither by the way he purposed to march) do your worst, and spare me not* \*. The loss in the king's little army, (for he conducted only a small detachment) was by no means inconsiderable as to private men: but the death of colonel Halle chagrined him much †, having lost his brother or kinsman, an excellent commander, in the battle of Leipzig. Not one of the English officers escaped without wounds. Lord Craven received the push of a pike in his thigh: Sir Francis Vane, brother to the earl of Westmorland, was shot in the hip-bone, Masham was hurt by a large stone and a firebrand, and Talbot was killed, as he stood next man to lord Craven. Colonel Alexander Ramsay, an officer grown gray in the Swedish service, was appointed governor; but not being able to execute the charge (for he lay ill at Wurtzburg of the wounds he received there) his majesty destined this post of consequence to Ramsay's lieutenant-colonel, George Douglas ‡, concerning whose conduct, with reference to his master, we shall say something remarkable in the progress of our history. The garrison, however, as a testimony of their bravery, were permitted to

\* Swedish Intelligencer, Part ii. p. 82.

† Heylmanni Leo Arctovii, p. 47.

‡ This account reconciles the seeming con-

traditions between the Swedish Intelligencer and Fowler's life of Douglas, fol. Lond. 1656.

p. 216.

1631. depart with their arms. A thousand loads of corn, and five hundred hogheads of Rhenish wine, were found in the castle. During this siege the king sent for one of his colonels in a great hurry; the officer returned his duty to his sovereign, and said he would wait on him the moment his barber had dismissed him. On his arrival Gustavus told him, with a little tincture of acrimony, *That he would make an excellent cavalier to conduct a campaign against the ladies: whilst you shave, Sir, said he, with good fortune I can take a town* \*.

About this time, or rather a few days before, the important town of Ulm consented to receive a Swedish garrison of 1200 men, and Sir Patrick Ruthven, the eldest Scottish colonel in rank and service †, was appointed governor, who, by uncommon vigilance, suppressed two conspiracies in their infancy. He was a favourite with his master for different reasons. He always behaved gallantly in the field; and when the king wanted to regale ministers and officers of the adverse party, in order to extract secrets from them in their hours of cheerfulness, he made Ruthven field-maréchal of the bottles and glasses, who could drink immeasurably, and preserve his understanding to the last ‡.

The

\* Galeazzo Gualdo, p. 82, libr. ii.

† His majesty never liked any general turned of sixty, and when Sir Patrick Ruthven arrived towards that age, he made him governor of Ulm, by way of a reputable sine-cure.

‡ I have a very gallant letter by me from this officer to the earl of Northumberland, who had traduced the reputation of a young gentlewoman, whom Ruthven esteemed, and libelled the whole Scottish kingdom in some poetical invective; but as upon a nearer examination I find this letter to have appeared in print, it may suffice to extract the following passages;

“ It is probable your lordship dares do *any* thing, but *that* which is *good* and just.—  
“ Think not to bear down these matters by greatness, or denial;—nor flatter yourself to pass invisible in your courses, like another Gyges.—It was never known before, that to refuse Northumberland’s unlawful lust was a crime for a gentlewoman.—As for me and

“ my countrymen, know, my lord, that such *blows*, as come in *rhyme*, are too weak either to reach or harm us.—Sorry I am, that the north must now see how long it hath been mistaken in Northumberland’s spirit; and yet who would not commend your wisdom in chusing such a safe course, to wrong a *wo-man* and a *prisoner*: the one of which cannot, and the *other* by nature and quality of the place *may* not, right his own wrong? Wherefore setting aside the most honourable order of the garter, and protesting whatsoever is here said is no ways intended to the nobility and gentry of England in general;—I do only in regard of *your* person affirm, that whatsoever in these *infamous* verses is contained, is *utterly false and untrue*: and that yourself hath dealt most *dishonourably*, *unworthily* and *basely*; and this I will *ever* maintain. If these words sound harshly in your lordship’s ears, blame yourself.—Forgetting  
“ yourself,



The king next commanded his troops to invest Baccharah, but when the trumpeter summoned Paul Bredangle the Spanish governor to surrender, he made him a present of a dollar, and a bottle of that excellent wine, for which the place is so famous, returning him many thanks for the honour, that was done him. Yet in the event, having lost the town by storm, he was obliged to capitulate for the castle, and duke Bernard allowed him his sword and horse. As to the men, they all embraced the Swedish party, excepting only one company \*. The king then published a programma †, in order to procure free transportation of goods to the Easter-fair held at Francfort, and exonerated them from duties in those territories, that were occupied by his own troops, taking care, at the same time, to secure all public roads within the limits of his conquests from civil inspectors and military robbers; and, lastly, to protect Franconia both from France and the ecclesiastical electors, he planned out and fortified a city conformably to his own principles, on the confluence of the Rhine and the Mayne, which he called Gustavusburg; but the common soldiers always named it *The Priest's Scourge*; because it gave laws to the three ecclesiastical electors, and the neighbouring prelates ‡.

This campaign, one of the greatest perhaps the world hath ever seen, all circumstances being rightly taken in, and duly considered, was opened with immense preparations, as times then stood, on either side; for Gustavus and his allies produced 100,000 foot and 40000 horse, and the Imperialists and princes of the catholic league were prepared to bring into the field a still greater number of forces.

Walsstein (perhaps from a principle of unwillingness) was not yet ready to act, but Tilly had assembled his army at Nordlingen, and from thence dispatched two detachments, one into Suabia, and one into Bohemia. Impatient to be revenged of the disgrace received at Leipzig,

"yourself, you have taught others how to dishonour you; and remember, that though nobility maketh difference of persons, yet injury acknowledged none. Patrick Ruthven." [MS. in the Ashmole collection.]

\* Lotichius; Tom. i. 1010. Heylmanni Leo Arctous, p. 48.

† Lotichius; ibid. 1016.

‡ Galeazzo Gualdo, libr. ii. 78.

1631. he determined to fall upon Horn, who lay encamped at Bamberg, the bishop of which place attended him, who made no ceremony of cloathing himself in armour like a common cavalier.

The Swedish general had taken this town by composition just a month before, and having lodged a sufficient force therein, had his soldiers not indulged too much in the pleasures of a rich and plentiful city; the inhabitants formed a conspiracy, which was debated afterwards with great secrecy in the town hall, and the substance of their resolutions communicated to the garrisons of Forcheim and Cronach, who conveyed privately some bands of armed men to the assistance of the Bambergers. At the point of time agreed, out broke one general insurrection all in an instant, but Horn, who lay encamped not far from the walls, hearing the explosion of musquets and other noises, rushed immediately into the city at the head of a regiment or two, and soon terrified the conspirators into obedience. Yet this brave and good man, who copied his master in every virtue, had such an absolute dominion over his passions, even in the transports of sudden resentment and indignation, that he commanded his troops (who in their fury had killed near twenty inhabitants) to grant full and unconditional quarter to all the citizens; and as the people of better condition had retired to the public market-place in a body, he gave them all their lives (though most of them were then in arms) without terms, and without hesitation. Nor did he allow his soldiers, if we except the college of the Jesuits, which made him no proposals, to plunder a single church or monastery, though the clergy had been particularly active in this conspiracy. All which may still be considered as more extraordinary, since he knew the king disliked the bishop of Bamberg more than any prelate in the whole German empire; but judging well, as was his custom, and coolly in all things, he concluded, that abstinence from bloodshed, and raising a moderate contribution, by way of compensation for past offences, were proceedings much more conducive to his master's service, as well as his honour, than resentment or retaliation could possibly be; and therefore, with great dexterity of good sense, he affected rather to fix the foundations of the crime on the intemperance and negligence of the  
Swedish



Swedish garrison, which tempted the inhabitants into a rebellion \*. 1631.

Tilly approached Bamberg at the head of 16,000 men: Horn had only 10,000 or 12,000. The former, by a sort of concealed march, advanced near the Swedes before they were well apprized of his motions: nevertheless, Horn on the first notice made the round of the trenches, for his army lay cantoned within the town, and encamped without, and the entrenchments he began to throw up were of vast extent, for Bamberg not being surrounded with walls, is called the largest village in Germany. He then ordered Bauditzen's regiment to be drawn up as a corps de reserve in one part of the city; but the lieutenant-colonel misunderstanding the commands, that were sent him, marched directly into the fields, and fell into an ambuscade. The retreat of this regiment gave the alarm to that of count Solmes, and as the latter was composed of new raised men, they soon gave place to 2000 Imperialists, who charged them under the command of Cratz and Farenbach, at the head of the old regiment of Cronenberg's cavalry. Horn had now no resource remaining, but to retire and secure the bridge; but Farenbach's division pressed so hard upon his heels, that they entered the head of the bridge pell-mell with Horn's people, and if he had not valiantly repulsed them in the suburbs, with such few scattered troops as he could collect together, he had lost the day; for the old regiments, in whom he placed his only confidence, had not yet formed themselves in the town, and, fortunately for him, the gress of the catholic army had a march of half a mile still to perform. Tilly, who had experience enough not to let slip so signal an opportunity, dispatched in a sort of gallop the flower of his cavalry, to secure the bridge; but Horn had contrived in the space of twenty minutes to blow up a part of it, and barricado the remainder; so that the residue of the day was employed in a continued discharge of musquetry. However, towards evening the Imperialists brought two pieces of cannon to act against the extemporary fortifications raised by the Swedes, which determined Horn to retire, after he had embarked his baggage, artillery, and am-

\* Bertius de Bellis German. p. 154, &c.

munition.

1631. munition. Himself, at the head of Bauditzen's regiment of horse, secured the rear, and crossing the Mayne at Eltman, he broke that bridge behind him, as also another, which he passed at Halstadt. And then writing the king a very sensible letter\*, informed him, " how he " had declared previously in a council of war, that a naked town of " such vast extent was no ways defensible : and that he had been dis- " appointed of the re-inforcement which duke William of Weymar " had engaged to bring him, on which he reposed his greatest confi- " dence." He then gave an ample narrative of the whole transaction, which, bating the suppression of a slight circumstance or two, that made against him, corresponds exactly with all my other accounts, and of course due regard hath been paid to it. The king, who considered a well managed retreat to be a better proof of military genius, on some occasions, than even a victory, sat down highly contented with the prudence and dexterity of his lieutenant-general.

This slight disgrace (which Gustavus used to call a meer *cacade*,) was the first the Swedish army had undergone since its entrance into Germany. One may attribute this misfortune to various causes, such as the misunderstanding the general's message, the cowardice as well as negligence of Solmes's regiment, for not being used to labour they had omitted to fortify their station with any entrenchments ; whereas, on the contrary, the other soldiers in the Swedish service were accustomed to be their own pioneers ; and Horn, though otherwise an excellent officer, and remarkably cautious, seems in this instance partly blameable, as he neglected to furnish himself with no better intelligence. Yet, by way of extenuation, many excuses may be alledged in his behalf. The commanders in those days had the disposal of no money for secret services, and the genius and turn of war dealt more in surprises and ambuscade than it hath since. The Swedes lost about 600 men in the engagement and the retreat, and about 500 were taken prisoners. Count Solmes received a musquet-ball in his foot, and died of the fever it occasioned some weeks afterwards.

\* Dated from Gelterheim, March 7, 1631-2.



Tilly entered Bamberg the next morning, and dispatched the cavalry of Breda's and d'Espagni's regiments, and the whole corps of Croats, after the fugitives. They destroyed and gleaned up a considerable number of stragglers on the road; but Horn contended hard for every disputable inch of ground, and made them sensible more than once, that he was only marching from Tilly, but not flying from him.

The elector of Bavaria, than whom no body judged better in their own affairs, had private reasons to be mortified even for this success of his general, for he feared lest an attack of so brisk a nature might exasperate Gustavus, and induce him to cross the Danube, and make a visit to Munich, by way of retaliation. Mean while Horn, impatient of revenging himself, had the dexterity to procure intelligence, that a large body of Imperialists lay secure in their quarters, at half a league from Bamberg. Marching therefore by night, at the head of his cavalry, and conducted by a peasant through a large wood, he almost ruined the two horse regiments of Plancard and young Merodé, which latter officer was glad to make his escape with nothing on but his drawers: four companies avoided the ill fate of their comrades, being ordered forth an hour before to escort a convoy. The Croats dislodged on the first attack, nevertheless one part of them threw themselves into a church-yard, which was walled round, and as Horn had no musqueteers with him, he found it impossible to force them. Upon this Tilly moved forwards with all his army, in order to bring matters to a general battle; but Horn disposed his troops in such a manner, that the wary Walloon did not think proper to engage him\*.

His

\* This great man, whom Gustavus used to call *his right arm*, kept alive the glory of Sweden till the peace of Münster; and afterwards his very enemies admired him, for his extraordinary clemency to the perfidious town of Bamberg, and for his tenderness and humanity to the Romish clergy; insomuch that the writers of that party give him the character of *merciful, quamvis hæreticæ superstitionis cultor*. He was an exact disciplinarian, and kept up the strictest religion amongst his troops.

VOL. II.

At the siege of Biberach near Ulm, 1634, he had been extremely ill used by the governor, who had held out till resistance was a sort of madness. All things being prepared for a general storm, the fury of which it was imagined nothing could resist, a trumpeter made an offer of capitulating; but Horn enraged beyond measure declared peremptorily, he would sacrifice the commander and his garrison to their obstinacy. In that instant a crowd of young women of condition issued out of the town; one seized

R

his

1631. His majesty, impatient of the slight disgrace, which had thus befallen his lieutenant-general, grew impatient to give Tilly the decisive blow ;  
not

his stirrup, the others fell down on their knees, weeping and filling the air with their lamentations. Horn soon discovered signs of emotion, and changing in a moment the severity of his countenance into a look of graciousness, mildly desired, that one would be pleased to represent the requests of the whole body : upon which a young lady, bolder than the rest, took the legation upon her, and told him in that broken interrupted eloquence, which nature inspires upon these occasions, " That they asked for the preservation of their honour, and the lives of their innocent relations." His answer was to this effect : " I lay, said he, my indignation, my resentments, my injuries, and revenge, at your feet. Tell that blockhead and brute of a governor, [colonel Straßholt] I respect your tears, as much as I despise his sword. Let him send a trumpeter to me, and receive conditions. Heaven knows, I thankfully embrace the alternative of saving the lives of the innocent instead of massacring an herd of barbarian soldiers." [Bertius de Bellis Germanicis, p. 558. &c.]—Nevertheless he disarmed the garrison, and would not allow it to march out with any one mark of military honour.

Benedictions were poured upon him in abundance, and it is probable, the fair sex made this effort upon his resolution, as it was well known he had married Oxenstiern's daughter, one of the most beautiful and virtuous women in Sweden, and that he and his wife had been a pattern of conjugal constancy and affection. He lost this excellent creature, and two children, (who all died of the plague) in the year 1631, and, what is more remarkable, held her in his arms for several hours at the very moment in which she expired. He then transported her body to Sweden in a silver coffin, and, though a young man, never forgot her so far as to venture upon second nuptials. [Monro's Exped. Part ii. 29.]

He then pushed the Swedish arms as far as the town of Constance, the siege of which did him great honour ; but never showed himself a greater

man, than at the council of war preceding the fatal battle of Nordlingen, 1634 : And though the duke of Weymar, in a transport of youthful rage, dropt some insinuations, which proved he did not then distinguish between calmness and courage in a brother-general, yet Horn neither gave him an unkind look, nor a severe answer, but submitted patiently to the opinions of the younger and more impetuous officers, behaved like a lion in the day of action, led his men on to fifteen several attacks, in order to possess three half moons in the enemy's retrenchments, stayed upon the field almost till the last man, and in co-operation with Cratz gave the Swedish army a decent retreat, which otherwise must have been massacred without redemption. This generous conduct pierced duke Bernard to the very soul : for, after the battle was over, he tore his hair and beat his breast, like a person distracted : " I," said he, am the ignorant soldier, and Horn is the wise man.—Where is the brave and experienced camp-master general ?—Alas, he is a prisoner, he is a prisoner !—and fortune hath cruelly reserved me, to be walking about the world in full liberty."

The Imperialists carried Horn directly to the king of Hungary's tent, where the cardinal infant then was. He politely made an offer to kneel and kiss their hands ; they both raised him, and told him, they would accept the mark of his esteem, if he would perform the compliment standing. The king said he could not but congratulate himself upon overcoming, by any accident, the bravest and best man in the Swedish service : to which the general modestly replied, That fortune had been kind to him in the midst of her severity, by consigning him into such generous hands. He then retired to a tent appropriated for him, where the principal Imperial commanders paid him a visit of ceremony. Yet in spite of these civilities, the house of Austria knew his merit too well to release him on a sudden, but kept him prisoner upon parole for eight years only. He was at length exchanged against



not but that a digression of such a nature was at this time disagreeable 1631. to him: for having embarked his artillery on the Rhine, he had fixed his thoughts upon besieging Cologne, a place at that time meanly fortified and thinly garrisoned, but abounding in wealth, inasmuch as the whole nobility and gentry round had there deposited all their riches and valuable moveables\*. The king was piqued likewise at the elector's † conduct, who had used all collusions with him in the completion of a treaty lately proposed between them ‡: which indeed was not unlikely to happen; for that prelate, besides being strongly attached to his brother the duke of Bavaria, possessed with him the arts of dissimulation, sagacity, and intrigue, in a high degree. Of course, he had negotiated more or less with Gustavus ever since he advanced into Franconia; yet at the same time contrived the embassy, which the bishop of Wurtzburg undertook to execute in France. No man was more zealous than he in promoting the edict of restitution, yet after the battle of Leipzig it was customary for him to say, "How inconsistent is *that* Imperial decree, "which purposes to recover cloysters at the expence of bishopricks?"

against John de Wert, whom the French had taken. Horn went directly to Paris, to return the king thanks, who treated him most magnificently, and made him a present of a sword set with diamonds, valued at 2000l.

A genius like Horn could not live idle during a long imprisonment, for he composed a *treatise* in his solitude *on the duties of a complete and perfect general*. [Schefferi Memorab. Suecicæ Gentis, p. 49.] I had once hopes of procuring a transcript of this MS. which, whenever it chances to be published, (if the MS. mentioned to me proves the same, for it was only said by a German possessor, that it was written by one of Gustavus's principal generals) may prove the most scientific book in the art military.

Had Oxenstiern listened to this commander's advice, who flew to him at Francfort on the occasion, it is probable the Swedes had not lost the alliance of the elector of Saxony; for that prince could not bear, that the duke de Weymar

(descended from the right Saxon-line, which Charles V. had displaced) should be a general in chief, and prescribe laws to him.

I shall observe, lastly, that it was always Horn's custom to observe the countenance of his men before an engagement, those near him with his naked eye, and those more remote by the help of a pocket-glass: and if he discovered any marks of irresolution in their looks, he always marched them up briskly against the enemy; alledging for a reason, that this manœuvre gave a flow to their spirits, and infused into them a certain idea of superiority; a practice the late earl of Peterborough always copied in his Spanish campaigns, (as he himself assured me) and from the same motive.

\* Brachelü Hist. nostr. temporum, 277.

† Ferdinand; bishop of Paderborn.

‡ The plan of it is still preserved: It consisted of eleven articles; in some of which great care is taken of the protestant interests.

1631. In a word, he was the first man, who developed Pappenheim's genius, and that alone sufficeth to demonstrate his discernment.

Yet Gustavus now, contrary to his original intentions, was obliged to spare him: in spite therefore of wintry torrents and miry roads, he marched from Francfort to Aschaffenberg, and at length joined Horn at Geldersheim, where the combined armies amounted to 30,000 effective soldiers; yet expecting still fresh re-inforcements from the several bodies of men, that acted under Banier and others, he made a visit to Wurtzburg, in company with the elector Palatin, and returned next morning to Ritzingen\*, where he had established the general rendezvous of all his troops, that lay cantoned in that neighbourhood.

Tilly alarmed at these denunciations of violent war, and apprized likewise, that Walstein was determined to sacrifice him, and that his master, the elector of Bavaria, was much dissatisfied with his late enterprize, made the best retreat he could through the Palatinat, draining all the garrisons as he passed along, in order to cover the frontiers of Bavaria with the whole force he could possibly collect. Gustavus, on the other hand, apprehensive that Walstein might be obliged, contrary to his inclination and intentions, to form a junction with Tilly's army, determined to put the latter out of all power of resistance as soon as possible; and the rather, because Tilly began to distrust his men and his own fortune. So that this slight misfortune, which had befallen Horn, compelled the king not only to make a forced march and succour his general, but induced him likewise, by imperceptible degrees, to make an irruption into Bavaria somewhat sooner than he first intended, and broke the projects he had formed of besieging Cologne, investing Heidelberg, and purging the Lower Palatinat of all the Spanish forces. It remained therefore only for him to consign the army, which was to act on the High Rhine, to Christian count Palatin of Birkenfelt, and duke Bernard of Sax-Weymar; but these two officers hurt the common cause much by their

\* The bishop of Wurtzburg, five years before, seized this town and signory, during the minority of the margrave of Anspach: and that pre-

late and his successors have had the dexterity to retain them ever since.



misunfannings and jealousies; infomuch that Oxenstiern, supreme director in those parts, positively declared, that it was highly expedient to entrust great military employs to men of more moderate rank and parentage; since princes and persons of very noble extract, overlooking reproof, and considering themselves as a sort of beings placed beyond the reach of soldier-like enquiries, executed just so much of the orders given them, as suited their own humours and their own interests.

Maximilian perceiving the tempest to direct its course against Bavaria, had once a mind to dispatch his orders to Tilly, and compel him to retire into Bohemia or Austria, and consequently draw the war after him into the hereditary dominions. This would certainly have proved his best policy; for Wallstein, upon resuming the command, must then have acted vigorously and in earnest. But the elector wanted courage, or quickness of determination, (though far from being deficient in either respect) to make this masterly diversion, conscious of being himself the firebrand, that had kindled up all this dreadful blaze of war, and fearing to dismantle his own frontiers, and leave them naked to the revenge of the protestants, who considered him as the prime object of exemplary punishment. Ferdinand too, who had reasons to be disobliged with Bavarian duplicity, was perhaps not displeased to see Wallstein lie by, and have the power to give his troops a breathing space of refreshment: and Wallstein, on the other hand, was not dissatisfied to behold the two men he mortally hated, pressed too hard by a victorious monarch. He therefore positively refused to join Tilly, under pretext, that his army was not yet in condition to take the field, and alledging, by way of excuse, that Gustavus would harass out and consume the Imperial forces, whose duty it was to contest the passage of so many disputable rivers, as protect Bavaria on that side:—and indeed few countries in Europe are better fortified with running waters, than the electorate is in those parts, through which Gustavus was obliged to make his irruption.

Thus his majesty pursued Tilly step by step, and succeeded him more times than once in the same bed, at the distance only of four and twenty hours. The city of Nurenberg, which had been always generously  
true.

1631. true to the protestant cause, received him with open arms †, entertained him sumptuously, and presented him with a pair of silver globes of a considerable size, which taught him to carry on the war, not so much in a geographical sense, (for there the king wanted no lights) as in a military one, for their insides were replenished to the full with new-coined ducats; and as the Germans always love the *allusive* and *emblematical*, the concealed meaning of the present was, that the terrestrial globe implied conquest on earth, and the celestial one a crown of glory hereafter in heaven: which conception was not unworthy of the very best Italian poets.

As the Imperialists had it in their power to have taken Nuremberg by storm or siege, it was thought a great omission in them to leave a town of such wealth and consequence, open and defenceless, to the king of Sweden; but the truth of the case stood thus: Walstein was too far off, and wanted besides to embroil matters in that part of the empire; and the elector and Tilly were so alarmed, that they could not spare a single man from the defence of Bavaria.

Willsburg castle stood directly in his majesty's way. It was so situated, had he been fortunate enough to have conquered it, as to have been highly serviceable, not only to the Swedes, but all the protestant powers in the circle of Franconia. For these reasons the elector, some weeks before, had commanded Tilly to secure this strong pass and fortress, which he easily effected by terrifying the lawful owner, the margraves of Anspach, and her children, who maintained it only with a few soldiers and their own domestics. The king, in the most cautious and best-guarded terms, demanded this place in behalf of its natural and legal possessor; and assured the governor, he might hope for the most punctual good usage, that could be imagined, with regard to his father's lands and castle, which lay just by. But no arguments could prevail on a young military enthusiast of the name of Pappenheim, and only son to that general\*. He very respectfully sent his majesty word,

† Historical or Authentic Relation, in Low Dutch, Tom. ii. p. 59.

\* Though most historians call this young man Pappenheim's son, yet they have not been aware



word, *That the ruins of Wilsburg-castle should be his monument.* Gustavus 1631. believed him on his father's account, and for the first time took the answer of the governor of a town in part of payment.

Banier, during this retardment of two days, invested Neuburg, the residence of the duke, who bears that title; but having summoned the commander and received a positive refusal, he marched away without loss of time. Gustavus made himself very merry with the conduct of his general, and asked him, *if he thought to take a city with a paltry epistle* \*? Nevertheless the town was soon afterwards evacuated voluntarily by Tilly's troops. His majesty had some reasons to be afflicted, (for he was not really angry) at Banier's disappointment; (who in truth was not strong enough to besiege Neuburg in form, nor was there time to spare) because the possession of it, at that juncture, would have given free entrance into Bavaria, and excused the passage of the Lech.

But as the sharpness of this winter, which happened to be uncommonly severe, gave no check to the operations of war, so of course it put no stop to the briskness of negotiating and intriguing. Cardinal Pafman, to whom Walstein was nearly related by marriage, crossed the Alps to make a second effort in Italy, charged with an abundant packet of invectives, and prepared to harangue with infinite volubility on the stupendous progresses of our protestant hero, who (to use the orator's own words) was determined to extirpate the whole catholic religion, tear up the very foundation of the sacred see, and invade Italy itself in the character of another Attila. It was suggested likewise,

aware of a certain difficulty in chronology: for Pappenheim's first wife, Ludomilla countess of Colorath, brought him only one child, named Wolfgang Adam, and he was born in 1618. (By his second wife, Anna Elizabetha countess of Oebingen, he had no offspring.) So that by this account the young man, here mentioned, could be little more than thirteen years old: which makes me suspect, that the person in question was a nephew of the general. And that there lurks some concealed mistake, is plain, because other historians call him young Tilly, whereas that commander was never married.

Pappenheim's son, in the year 1647, was shot

through the arm and heart in a duel, by general Goltz, whom he challenged at Coloredo's table, for speaking disrespectfully of his friend, serjeant-major-general Sperreuter. Coloredo placed guards at the town-gates, to prevent any ill consequence, (for no duel could be fought in a camp, or where the commander in chief resided) but the combatants conveyed themselves down the ramparts, and sent their horses privately into the fields. Christopher count Walstein, and colonel Schevaliski, were their seconds. Wassenbergü Florus Germ. p. 800.

\* Swedish Intelligencer, Part ii. 140.

that

1631. that the king of Spain had neglected Italy, the Low Countries, and both the Indies, in order to support the catholic religion; so that the subversion thereof (in case such an unfortunate event should ever take place) must be attributed only to the lukewarmness and inattention of Christ's vicergerent \*. Under this ambassador extraordinary acted likewise, as permanent ambassador, the duke de Savelli, dispatched by the emperor on the same errand, and fulfilling now Gustavus's prediction of becoming the slashed doublet better than the cuirass. With both these co-operated vigorously the Spanish minister; and Borgia, who, if I mistake not, was then cardinal-secretary, gave them all the assistance, that lay in his power; for the court of Madrid had lately purchased his friendship, by bestowing on him the archbishoprick of Seville, a slight refreshment of gratitude, which amounted to something more than 30,000 l. a year. Eleven Spanish and Italian cardinals attended the Austrian ambassadors to the Vatican on the day of audience, but the pope would not allow them to be present: and after a full discussion of arguments on either side, it appeared, that the opinions of the conclave were divided, which enraged the Spanish faction to such a degree, that Pasman took the liberty to give vent to his passions, in an oration equally furious and unguarded. The pope, who was secretly inclinable to the opposite side of the question, felt himself hurt to hear his conduct so severely scrutinized in public assembly by a cardinal, and told Pasman in the way of reply, " that the emperor fairly merited all the difficulties, that had be-  
 " fallen him, having wasted both his treasures and his troops by car-  
 " rying an unjust war into Italy: otherwise he might have chastised  
 " Gustavus at his own leisure, and upon his own terms. That stories  
 " of Alarics and Attilas might serve very well to embellish a romance;  
 " and as for the irruptions of Goths and Vandals, without going back  
 " to Procopius and other ancient historians, he could suggest an in-  
 " stance of fresher date to the house of Austria, which happened on-  
 " ly in the preceding century; during the fury of which, all Italy was  
 " desolated, and Rome itself sacked and plundered. He observed like-

\* Chemnitz, Tom, i. 243.



“ wife, that the processions of Charles V. in Spain, (where liberty was  
 “ the pretext, whilst the knife was held to his throat,) had added so- 1631.  
 “ lemn mockery to determined injustice, and convinced mankind, that  
 “ ambition passed precipitately over all bounds, and that the barbarians  
 “ of the north were not the only enemies of Christ’s church\*, . . . .  
 “ That for his own part, he knew his duty, and took care to  
 “ perform it; and for these reasons did not greatly relish any invectives  
 “ against his conduct and government; and added lastly, which ap-  
 “ pears to be a very extraordinary effort of indignation, That the  
 “ protestant Visigoth (to carry on Pasman’s allusion) shewed less spirit  
 “ of persecution than the catholic Cesar, since the wars of Gustavus  
 “ affected neither the consciences of men, nor the altars of the Supreme  
 “ Being; and that fewer outrages, and acts of rapine and cruelty,  
 “ had been committed since the battle of Leipzig, than had been per-  
 “ petrated in Italy, at and after the siege of Mantua. Thence returning  
 “ to his own conduct, he remarked briefly, That to traduce his  
 “ administration was easy; to arraign, and convict it, extremely dif-  
 “ ficult.”

The holy father having thus disburthened his mind, by giving vent to  
 his private opinions, frankly made an offer of some pecuniary assistances  
 to the emperor, much indeed inferior to what the court of Vienna ex-  
 pected. However he excused himself by an allegation of the enormous  
 expences, which the Mantuan war had thrown him into; and this being  
 too true, the Imperial party made no attempts to invalidate his  
 assertion. Nevertheless, for decency’s sake, he thought fit to make up  
 the deficiency of money by spiritual bounty, and of course appointed  
 an universal jubilé; made a procession in person to the churches of St.  
 Peter, and St. John de Lateran, and published a brief, wherein he ex-  
 hortated all catholic princes to extirpate heresy, and unite in the bond of  
 friendship, against the common enemy. But the Imperial deputies de-  
 clared roundly, that this sort of paper-credit would neither wage war,  
 nor pay the soldiery†.

\* Fr. Spanheim, 342.

† Ibid. 344.

1631. Antony baron de Rabata, governor of Gradisca, counsellor and chamberlain to the emperor, had been dispatched to the princes and republics of Italy, on the same errand, and under the patronage of Vienna and Madrid: but the doge and senate of Venice gave him fine speeches instead of subsidies, alledging, as the pope had urged before, "that the Mantuan war had entirely discomposed the state of their finances; so that the two goddesses of the Megarensians, which then presided in the Venetian government, namely, *Poverty* and *Impossibility*, restrained them absolutely from imparting any supplies to his Imperial majesty." The concealed truth was, the republic had entered into good intelligence with Gustavus some months before. See p. 182 \*. The common-wealths of Genoa and Lucca held the same language: nevertheless the great duke of Tuscany (allured with the hopes of being created king of Etruria †) made a promise of actual assistances, proportionable at least to his circumstances, though perhaps not adequate to the necessities of his friends; and the duke of Modena engaged likewise to send some troops, or conduct them himself. But when Rabata made his entrance into Mantua, the populace rose with an intention to murder him. The duke composed the tumult with great moderation, and pointing in dumb show to the ruins occasioned by the last siege, gave the ambassador to understand, that all he could hope for was to retreat in safety.

Mean while Gustavus, (as Tilly had retired from the Upper Palatinat into Bavaria, and broken down all the bridges on the Danube from Rayne to Neuburg, excepting only that of Donawert, over which he passed his army,) foreseeing wisely, that a young enthusiast, like Pappenheim, might create some untoward retardment in the progress of his affairs, resolved at once to leave Wilsburg-castle to the chance of accidents ‡, and invest Donawert with all possible expedition, as Tilly was

\* Chemnitii Bellum Sueco-Germanicum, Tom. i. 244.

† Idem. Ibid.

‡ The king left a garrison at Weissenburg,

(which stands about a mile from Wilsburg) under the command of colonel Sperreüter, to prevent young Pappenheim's incursions.

then



then labouring to erect a formidable fortification on a little hill near the town. So that if by an extraordinary effort of dispatch, he had not prevented this work from advancing to any tolerable degree of perfection, it is probable, in case of receiving a repulse, he must have marched seventy miles to Ulm, (no road being passable for the main army, at that season, but by way of Nordlingen) in order to have crossed the Danube at the place first mentioned. Donawert therefore was of great consequence to the king, not barely in point of proximity, but as this passage hath ever been considered as the key of admission into that part of Suabia, which leads to Bavaria, across the Lech. Of course, having reviewed his army, and received duke William of Weymar's reinforcement, he advanced thirty miles, from Wilsburg to Donawert, in a day and a half, and contrived to take the town and cloyster of Rayfersheim, a rich abby of Cister-tians, as he passed along.

Rodolphus, duke of Sax-Lauenberg, (the same who had rescued Tilly at the battle of Leipzig) commanded the garrison then in Donawert, which consisted of 1200 regular foot, a body of train-bands, and some companies of Cronenberg's dragoons. His majesty having made himself master of an important outwork, to the north-east, from whence the defendants retired into the town by means of a concealed gallery, dispatched a trumpeter to summon the governor to capitulate, who returned only this short answer, "That the king, " better than any person living, knew the duty of a set of men, " who had nothing to rely on but honour and the point of the sword: " and that he had no tribute to pay his majesty except in gun- " powder\*." Upon this, both parties performed their respective business with great earnestness. The garrison made a very furious sally, and one company of Cronenberg's men penetrated half through the Swedish lines. In repulsing this sally, the commanding officer (who was a Scotsman) behaved ill, but Gustavus pardoned him at the inter-

\* Swed. Intelligencer, Part ii. p. 135—138. Chemnitz. Tom. i. 254.

1632. cession of his countrymen, having first degraded him. The battery consisting of twenty huge pieces of cannon, which the king raised on the north-east side, only sheered the bridge sideways, without performing such execution as was first expected; which two circumstances induced him, at Hepburn's suggestion, to consider the situation of the town with fresh attention: and observing there lay an angle of ground to the westward, formed by the influx of the Wernitz into the Danube, which angle commanded the bridge, which crossed the latter river, and leads to Bavaria, (for Donawert stands on the northern bank;) he, without delay, gave Hepburn orders to march his own brigade five miles up the Wernitz, where lay the bridge of Haf-fort, and then descending along the opposite shore, to post his men in the angle of confluence after such a manner, as to command the Danube-bridge by his field-pieces, and even his musquetry; which position made it difficult for the besieged either to escape or receive succours. Hepburn, who took with him lord Craven, Malham, and all the English volunteers, conducted his men silently to the place appointed, and lodged them a little after midnight along the garden-walls, and ditches, and hedges, that flanked the passage across the river. Upon which the governor, perceiving himself invested on every side the town, discontented and desirous to capitulate, and Tilly at the same time unable to raise the siege, himself not satisfied with the thoughts of surrendering upon dishonourable terms, conceived a sudden resolution (as the breach to the north-east was now rendered assaultable) to pass the bridge, on the king's side, at break of day the next morning, in despite of all the Swedish musquetry and artillery. But this design took air, for the Swedes over-heard a hurry in the town, and the loading of baggage waggons, about midnight. The duke, it is true, passed the bridge, but saved only a handful of men, for the fire, that he sustained, was most unmerciful. The residue of the garrison, having first made an unsuccessful sally at the Wernitz-gate; attempted to cross the bridge on Hepburn's side, who gave them likewise a very rude reception: nevertheless they cleared their passage  
at



at all events, and contrived to break the bridge behind them in an imperfect manner, and barricaded the town-gate with numberless loads of dung, the removal of which cost the Swedes so much time, that the rear of the garrison secured their escape, losing however upon the whole not less than 500 men. Mean while the king stormed the town walls and Leather gate [*Lederthor*] sword in hand; and as many baggage-waggons stood laden in the streets, it was with great difficulty he could restrain his soldiers from pillaging them, and the whole city; which, according to the usage of war, was looked upon in the light of fair plunder. The king then secured the north banks of the Danube as far as Ulm.

Thus the town of Donawert was besieged and taken in forty eight hours, though strongly garrisoned, and situated on a mountain of difficult access; the loss whereof was considered as more inauspicious, as it happened to fall a sacrifice to the Swedes on the elector of Bavaria's birth-day. This city, once Imperial, had been placed under the ban of the empire in 1606, and at length regained its civil and religious liberties, by the means of the great protestant deliverer. Solmes's regiment of infantry, (which had behaved so ill in the late action at Bamberg) was placed therein by way of garrison; for the king did not chuse to trust that body of troops in the day of battle. He then returned Hepburn public thanks, for suggesting the idea of crossing the Wernitz, and for executing his plan with such judgment and valour.

No sooner was the town of Donawert taken, but the king ordered this officer to throw up a strong half-moon, and entrench his brigade at the foot of the bridge, next Bavaria: and then dispatched the Bohemian baron Cochtitzki, at the head of some chosen cavalry and dragoons, to pursue the fugitives. His majesty then reposed himself at Donawert four days, partly to prepare matters for the great incident now approaching, and partly to restore and new fortify this important passage, as a safe and secure key of retreat, in case of disappointments or disasters. Yet the gross of the army lay not idle; for such as acted not the part of engineers, pioneers, and mechanics, made

1632. made incursions into Swabia, where many towns of consequence (some of which belonged to the emperor) were all taken sword in hand; as Guntzburg, the capital of the Burgau, the rich abbey of Elchingen, Gundelfingen, Lauingen, Hochstadt \*, Dillingen, (where the bishop of Augsburg usually resides) and Kirchberg; not to mention a strong castle on the banks of the Lech, called, if I mistake not, Obernsdorf, belonging to the rich family of the Fuggers. In this enterprize Hepburn commanded; and though the place was well supplied and strongly fortified, yet the garrison felt the influences of a sudden panic, and perished most of them in the very act of attempting to escape.

During this interval of repose, as matters now began to wear a very serious aspect, a trumpeter was sent blindfolded to the king, with orders to solicit letters of safe-conduct for the French ambassador then residing at Munich. At first Gustavus gave him a positive refusal; but knowing his own firmness, and determined not to suffer his generosity to be abused a second time, he at length consented. Nature had been no ways unsparing, in giving St. Etienne (for such was the minister's name) a plentiful portion of national vivacity; and it is probable likewise, he presumed too much upon the force of being nearly related to father Joseph, who held a correspondence with Gustavus and Oxenstiern. Of course, one day he had the confidence to tell the king, "That if he did not spare the catholic princes, his most Christian majesty would be obliged to march an army into Germany, in order to support them; since they had all expressed an earnest desire to shelter themselves under the protection of France." *Agreed*, replied Gustavus, being thoroughly exasperated; *nevertheless the king, your master, may spare himself the trouble of a long journey into Germany: let him only express a desire to make a campaign against me, and I will treat him with a battle under the walls of his own metropolis.*

\* There are many towns of this name in Germany; but here the duke of Marlborough and prince Eugene gained a complete victory over the French and Bavarians, Aug. 13, 1704.



Yet France and her ministry still persisted to interfere under one pretext or other; and therefore some few days after the holding these conferences \*, a treaty † was proposed between Louis XIII. and the elector of Triers, by virtue of which the former engaged, “not only to assist  
“the said elector against all his enemies, but oblige the Swedes to evacuate the electorate of Triers and bishopric of Spire,” which belonged likewise to this prelate. Now in order to understand thoroughly an affair so intricate, it may not be amiss to remind the reader, that France had long languished to receive this electorate under her patronage, and to this purpose had dispatched the count de Brullon to Triers, just to sow the seeds of those future incidents, which La Saludie ‡ now was commanded to bring to maturity.

Indeed the elector, out of fervent zeal for the interests of the catholic league, had brought himself into a very precarious as well as dangerous situation; for the Spaniards possessed Coblenz, and most of the strong places in his dominions; and though Gustavus, at the intercession of France, during the negotiation of the truce, had generously restored him the important fortress of Ehrenbreitstein, yet that monarch, enraged now to the heart at the barbarous murder of a young count Solmes, (cut to pieces, together with his followers, by a party of electoral troops) made no scruple to declare, in the transports of his resentment, that he would dislodge the elector in person from his castle, then supposed to be impregnable. Dismayed and astonished at these menaces, the elector remained some days in a state of irresolution; when at length the French minister revived his spirits, by advising him to address a letter to Gustavus, wherein, far from discovering signs of fear, or demeaning himself by abject humiliations, it was his interest to throw out some oblique, but intelligible insinuations, with reference to the interposition and protection of a certain power behind the scene ||. What reception these representations found with Gustavus, and what sort of answer he returned to them, hath been already mentioned.

\* April 9, 1632, at Ehrenbreitstein, otherwise Hermanstein.

† See the APPENDIX.

‡ Louis de Briançon de la Saludie, mestre de camp et plenipotentiaire, &c.

|| Hist. de la Vassor, Tom. vii. 148.

1632. [Pag. 80, 81.] So that it may suffice to observe, that the king's reply was of such a nature, as threw the elector into mortal agonies, and obliged him to offer Richelieu a piece of blank paper, with authority to inscribe thereon what conditions he pleased. How far the cardinal either presumed, or intended to go, cannot well be ascertained; for that he dreaded Gustavus is a circumstance known beyond contradiction: yet, be that as it will, he thought he had an opening to effect somewhat, and conceived an hope of availing himself more or less from the elector's terrors. But this expectation was purely chimerical, for France, during the life of Gustavus, never once over-reached him, or extorted any advantage from him, except by importuning his good nature and his generosity; which, considering Richelieu's abilities, is saying as much as can be alledged in behalf of our hero.

Thus all that resulted from a connexion so extremely hazardous and delicate, was only this, that the elector published a manifesto to justify his conduct for placing himself under the protection of France: and indeed one may see the style of Versailles branch itself out like so many political veins through the whole surface of the composition. Yet the cardinal (besides obtaining, that the castle of Ehrenbreitstein should be put into the hands of a French garrison) had still some views behind a traverse-scene, which he hoped to unfold one time or other; for he knew Gustavus not to be immortal, and then expected to take the cards into his own hands. And, though this foundation may seem at first to be insubstantial and trifling, because it was laid deeply under-ground, and out of sight; yet France has continued to repose herself upon it even till the present hour, and has raised upon so casual an ichnography the superstructure of Alsace, Lorrain, &c.

And here, having so often mentioned the two electors of Cologne and Triers, it may seem surprizing, that such little notice hath hitherto been taken of the third ecclesiastical elector, the archbishop of Mentz. But the truth was, the king had disarmed this prelate by taking possession of most of his territories, so that it no where appears, that France considered him as an object worthy to be inveigled or cajoled; nor did she solicit his co-operation in the great plan relating to a neutrality.

It



It is probable too, that Richelieu looked upon him, not only as an 1632. enflamed religionary, but as a devoted friend to the courts of Vienna and Munich : and thus much is certain, that the elector finding himself in such evil plight after the loss of his capital, wished extremely to behold a general pacification, and of his own meer motive requested the emperor, to permit him to lay some plan of that nature before Gustavus \*, who returned him such conditions, as we have formerly mentioned in the two rough-draughts †, that were transmitted to the perusal of all the catholic potentates then concerned.

By the taking of Donawert, and securing a free passage over the Danube, Tilly soon perceived his Swedish majesty's real intentions against Bavaria ; and therefore, with all possible expedition, broke down a second bridge, then in his power, which crossed that river between Neuburg and Rayne, and destroyed likewise a third, which leads over the Lech, at a small distance from the last-named town. On the possession of this important entrance into Bavaria the king had set his mind, from the very instant he crossed the Danube at Donawert, and dispatched the flower of his dragoons and commanded musqueteers to make a lodgment there, for then he had escaped the perillous undertaking of forcing his passage across the Lech. But Tilly knew too well the extraordinary consequence of this inlet to Munich, and, as he had the power in his hands, prevented the enterprize on the king's part, to whom this consolation remained, that he had not lost a single moment in attempting to realize what he had projected ‡. Tilly then cantoned his troops in lesser and greater divisions, all along the Bavarian side, between the Lech and the Aach, from Rayne to Augsborg, both which places he garisoned, and spread himself in fair order on the banks opposite the Swedes to the extent of sixteen miles. But foreseeing principally where his majesty would make the grand attempt, he there erected some enormous batteries, and entrenched the larger part of his select and veteran soldiery.

\* Vittorio Siri; *Memorie recondite*, Tom. vii. pag. 457, 458.

† See pag. 72, 73.

‡ Burgi Mars Sueco-Germ. 171.

1632.

His majesty's first attempt was to restore the bridge, that had been fresh broken down near Rayne; but this undertaking, through the intervention of some unforeseen difficulties, was rejected almost in the same moments it was first conceived. Thence pointing his course towards Augsburg, he employed many hours, attended only by a friend or two, in contemplating the approaches to the river, and the circumstances of landing, and making a lodgment, as well as forming an attack, on the side, that lay opposite to him; finding at length, to his own mortification, as well as Tilly's honour, that the old general had erected his batteries, and entrenched his men precisely over-against that segment of a circle, in the middle part of whose arch it was resolved finally to throw over a bridge. And here a new retardment presented itself; for the king foresaw at first glance, from the torrent-like rapidity of the stream, and the inequality of its banks in point of height, that his own portable bridges could be made use of with no tolerable prospect of success. Nevertheless, for the satisfaction of his army, he made one experiment, which verified his conjectures with too much truth. Having therefore entrenched his men under the protection of a strong parapet along the bank, and fixed his more general encampment behind them near Northeim, he erected three batteries, consisting of seventy-two huge pieces of cannon \*, one in the center of the segment, and the two others at the extremities of the arch; which latter position gave him great advantages over his adversaries; for their artillery could be raised only on a strait line, and that of the Swedes half-flanked them, and raked them obliquely, when the grand engagement came on. And thus, during an uninterrupted cannonade of four days duration, the king brought his new scheme into perfection: for at a little village called Obernsdorf, which lay embosomed in a valley at the distance of about half a mile from the place intended to be crossed, he employed

\* Santa Cruz remarks with admiration, that Gustavus passed the Lech by dint of generalship; for having, saith he, erected a battery of seventy [seventy-two] large pieces of cannon over against the main body of the Imperialists, and thundered upon them several hours, he

crossed the river at a place unexpected, and entrenched himself before he could be observed. *Reflexions Militaires & Politiques, traduites del' Espagnol de M. le Marq. de Santa Cruz de Marzenado, Tom. ii. 238.*



all his artificers to construct a fabric on a principle of his own invention, adapted to the nature of the river; and as the case was uncommonly urgent, as well as important, found himself obliged to dismantle all the gentlemens houses, farms, and villages round him, in order to procure an addition of useful and solid timber. Mean while, at the hazard of his life, (for the fire of artillery and musquetry was unceasing on Tilly's side) he employed himself every hour, in examining the banks, slopes, and winding of the stream; and spared neither money nor preferments, to gain intelligence of the variation of depth in that very part of the chanel, where he intended to pass.

There are few rivers of the same size, whose passage appears so difficult as that of the Lech: I speak this from ocular observation. It takes its rise in the country of the Grisons, and at the time of year, when the king crossed it, partakes more of the nature of a torrent than of the river, for it is swollen with snows from its very source. It measures forty yards across at the point (between Rayne and Thierhaupten) where the bridge was erected, and the bank of the Swedish side was about eleven feet higher than the bank opposite; where for a small space the ground was tolerably firm, and then declined gently into a morass knee-deep in slime and water, on the right hand hardly passable, and garnished on the left (where the soil rose a little) with beds of osiers. This morass being once cleared, (nor was the passage long) the land mounted, with an easy ascent, to Tilly's entrenchments.

But the construction and fixing of the bridge appeared more difficult to his majesty than the fighting part. He disliked greatly the inequality of the banks in respect of height (which rendered a bridge of boats or of pontons highly inconvenient, if not entirely useless;) and knew likewise, that the bed of the river was a sort of cone inverted: which intelligence he procured by various artifices, one in particular extremely curious; nevertheless, I shall decline relating it, having some doubts concerning the authenticity of the narration.

1632. Being now apprized of the depth and shape of the chanel, he contrived, in the next place, a set of treffels of various heights, and with unequal feet; their form in general, as here represented.



These were firmly secured to strong piles, driven deep into the bottom of the river. The planks then were spread over the whole, and well fastened.

To lay this bridge in sight of an intrenched army of equal force, and alike supplied with large artillery, was a second difficulty still remaining, which demanded, at one and the same time, feints and illusions of all sorts, precautions, activity, prudence, and intrepidity.

Of course the king posted 1000 commanded musqueteers behind a parapet of mould and turf on each side of the intended bridge, who, to prevent Tilly's people from approaching to procure intelligence of what was contriving, maintained an uninterrupted fire day and night. He then opened two large batteries at convenient distance from the point where he proposed to cross the river, and from these furiously thundered on the Bavarian camp without intermission. Nor was his artillery idle in other places; it was only contracted in its extent, and divided into smaller parcels.

Mean while, to augment the confusion, and perplex the eye-sight, he ordered little fires to be kindled in pits near the batteries, which were constantly fed with smoky combustibles of pitch and green wood.

Tilly suspected something, but knew not what; nor ceased he to flatter himself at intervals (in case the erecting a bridge was supposed to be practicable) that the king would hardly presume to cross a river, clear a morass, and ascend a hill, under the aspect of an entrenched army of equal force, and supported with a train of artillery alike considerable as his own.

And



And here, to judge better of the catholic general's situation, it may be convenient to observe, that the ground on Tilly's side, bating a small swampy tract of foil, rose by degrees to a moderate hill, cloathed here and there with shrubs and large thorn-trees; where, about mid-way (including from the foot of the said hill to Tilly's main body) lay intrenched two considerable corps of infantry in a line parallel to the royal camp. Behind them crept a little rivulet in form of a bow, (the bent part towards the Swedes) within which the artillery was planted; whose effects were felt on the opposite side of the Lech. After that succeeded a wood, which skirted up to a considerable height; in the front of which (the shrubby part being cleared in certain spaces, and the timber-trees felled, and interlaced by way of defence in front and flank) were posted six bodies of chosen infantry, amounting to about 8000 men. The residue of the foot was disposed judiciously here and there; and the horse on a remoter line formed two wings at a distance on either side, in like manner as the Swedish cavalry was disposed, each party being removed beyond the reach of cannon-shot.

The king had some slight misgivings with reference to the enterprize he had determined to undertake \*; and therefore (which was a sort of practice he rarely dealt in) convened all his generals to a council of war, in order to collect their several opinions. Horn, the promptest to execute, as well as the most cautious to resolve of any commander in the Swedish service, made strong remonstrances against attempting to pass the Lech; and the major part of the superior officers concurred with him: "for he urged the difficulties both of the banks and bed of the river, "and represented the force and quantity of Tilly's battering artillery. "He remarked in the next place, that a repulse or defeat would raise "the drooping spirits of the Bavarians, and bring Walstein on the "back of the Swedes, in a country full of rivers, where it was next to "impossible, at one pass or other, to decline a battle; and therefore "proposed, with all due deference and submission, to secure and fortify "the frontier towns, both in the Upper Palatinate and Bohemia, till

\* Vittorio Siri; *Memorie recondite*, Tom. vii. pag. 459.—461. Le Vassor, Tom. vii. 163, 164.

“ that

1632. " that period shamefully neglected by the elector of Saxony ;—by  
 " which means it would not lie in Walstein's power to force the king's  
 " troops into a decisive engagement ; remarking further, that the Im-  
 " perial generalissimo ought first to be crushed ; whose immense pre-  
 " parations, (not yet advanced to a state of maturity) were, in the even-  
 " tual progress of things, likely to become extremely formidable.—  
 " Wherefore, upon the whole, it appeared best to him, to march directly  
 " into Moravia, and destroy the present and future hopes of the house  
 " of Austria all at once\*."

Now whoever understands the characters of men, and state of history at this period, will be enclined, it is probable, to think with me, that the drift of these reasonings seems to proceed upon the same principle, which Oxenstiern, Horn's father-in-law, urged to Gustavus, when he entered Franconia instead of Bohemia †.

The king loved Horn, (whose great talents he honoured, as well as his integrity) and heard him patiently ; but at length replied, with a good deal of fire, *That the enterprize was less difficult than appeared to the human mind at first sight : and that the very best veteran troops, that ever existed, had always some misgivings after a total overthrow. Fortune, said he, is the guardian-angel to men of heroical resolution ;—and Donawert is a sure retreat in case of disaster :—nor let it ever be said, that Gustavus declined an enemy, who fled before him ;—since a delay, precaution or digression of that nature would be instructing and enabling an old and experienced general to re-inforce and re-establish an army ill-provided for at the present juncture, and extremely weakened. Walstein likewise is removed from us at a great distance, and hath many lessons still to infuse into his soldiery.—In a word, let us cross this barrier, mistakenly supposed to be unsurmountable. Behold, the expected land of plenty lies open to us ! A land, which hath carefully been nurtured in peace and wealth for twelve continued years, whilst the whole Germanic empire hath been more than once ravaged and devoured from one end to the other ‡.*

\* Le Vassor, Tom. vii. p. 163.

† See page 78.

‡ Bertius de Bellis German. p. 324. Siri Mem. Rec. Tom. vii. 459.

Thus



Thus the king gave his opinion (or rather part of his opinion) as a 1632.  
 man of spirit, without entering into the discussions of a philosopher. Indeed it is probable he saw the thing in lights undistinguishable to Horn and us; or embraced his own scheme from a high persuasion of success; and the rather, as the undertaking was compendious, enterprising, and full of glory; it being a maxim with him, as well as Pappenheim, "*That it was possible to execute many achievements in war, merely because the generality of mankind supposed them impracticable.*" But be that as it will, whoever has had opportunities to contemplate the rapidity of the river towards the approach of the vernal equinox, the steepness and inequality of its banks, the irregularity of the channel-depth, the exposure of the bridge in front and flanks, the entrenchments and batteries on the opposite side, the continued slope of ground rising immediately from the Bavarian shore to the forest-trees, that crowned the whole, (not to mention a morass knee-deep in ooze and water) must, I think, confess, that this was the most daring, as well as brightest action in the military life of Gustavus, and such as hath never yet been exceeded by any general ancient or modern.

And now, Thursday morning, April the 5th, whilst the balls of the side batteries (which stood at the extremities of a bow, for such figure the Lech there formed) met in an angle, and tore every thing to pieces at 150 yards distance in the point, that approached the intended bridge, the king, under favour of a smoke and thunder inexpressible, passed over by frequent attempts in two boats, which he had procured, some chosen engineers, pioneers, and soldiers, who made a lodgment; and, what was still of greater consequence, threw up several mounds of earth: one to protect the mouth of the bridge from the direct fire of Tilly's ordnance, and two side-parapets to guard its flanks from such batteries, as he might occasionally erect upon a change of circumstances. To encourage these first undertakers, he made each man a present of about thirty shillings English.

Previous matters being thus adjusted, all hands united to fix the bridge, and when the morning arrived to a sufficient brightness, Tilly beheld this astonishing attempt, but at the same time knew not how

1632. to counterwork it. To dislodge these new comers appeared impossible on account of the unmerciful fire of the Swedish batteries ; and it was foreseen too, that such an undertaking must have brought on by degrees one general massacre of all the army. It remained therefore only for him to raise two batteries against the sides of the bridge : and here appeared a new inconveniency ; for not to mention the parapets, which the Swedes had cast up, the bank on the Bavarian side, though inferior in height to that on the Swedish, yet at the same time rose higher than the morass beneath it, and obstructed the aim of the gunners, as well as the passage of their balls.


On these accounts Tilly chose rather to undertake the defensive part, and having given orders to erect an half-moon in front, commanded his pioneers to deepen and widen the lines of his entrenchments, and employed all other hands he could spare, in hewing down a breast-work of large trees, interlacing them one with another, and sharpening the branches near the trunk into a sort of *chevaux de frise*. So that when the king heard the noise of the saws and axes, he directed all his gunners to give them in the wood one general salutation from the whole train of artillery by way of morning-compliment.

In the space of a few hours, the machinery of the bridge was fixed, the surface planked, and the sides guarded : which happened to be effected the more speedily, as the king's Finlanders could all exercise the business of carpenters, inasmuch as in their native country each man among them was his own mechanic.

It was the king's first care to relieve the pioneers and soldiers across the river ; and then the colonels Wrangel \* and Gassion had the honour to pass the bridge at the head of such a body of troops, as was supposed to be necessary ; a part of which filled the new entrenchment, and the rest, being all commanded musqueteers, lined the osier-bed on the left-hand, where they performed wonders in the heat of the conflict : but when Gustavus contemplated the bridge, and ground on either side, he declared in a whisper to some of the generals, that stood near him, *That he*

\* Charles Gustavus Wrangel. He com- entered Bavaria. Anno 1646, in conjunction  
manded afterwards the Swedish army, which with Turenne.





*H. W. dehn.*

A Imperial Infantry, the rest consisted in the Wood.

B Cavalry.

C Breast work & Batteries.

D Imperial Infantry where Tilly was shot.

E A River.

F Tilly's Batteries against the Bridge.

G Archers & Longmen.

## PASSAGE Over the River LECH.

H Swedish Infantry.

I Cavalry.

K Swedish Batteries 72 pieces.

L Foulard Horse crossing the River.

M The Lech.

N Imperial Infantry.

*A. W. sculp.*





*would compound for a victory at the expence of one thousand excellent soldiers\*.* 1632.

Yet though he felt for his brave associates, he discovered no dismay with respect to himself; but, on the contrary, continued on the foot of the bridge for six and thirty hours, without intermission. Mean while Tilly erected two new batteries near the banks of the river, in order to play thwart-wise against the flanks of the bridge: but though the theory was good, the executive part proved ineffectual.

During this interval, his majesty had conveyed one half of his army, cavalry as well as infantry, across the Lech, though many good officers, friends as well enemies, had publickly declared, that the enterprize was not feasible, at the head of a fewer body of troops than one hundred thousand †. Upon this, Tilly commanded the flower of his forces to give the Swedes battle before they could form themselves, and no less person than Aldringer undertook the employment. A part likewise of the dragoons, that served under him, received orders from the generalissimo, to pass between the osier-bed and the king's cavalry, with full directions to possess the mouth of the bridge at all hazards, and preclude re-inforcements one way, and the power of retreating another way.

When Aldringer, then general of the artillery, descended the hill, he found the Swedish discipline to be such, that the troops could form themselves at the beat of a drum. He hoped likewise, that their ardour might have prompted them to have given him the meeting half way: but here the king imposed his negative, who expected wonders from the two new raised batteries, which were erected not only as a feint to conceal the construction of the bridge, but with view express to cut through and through the Bavarians obliquely, whenever the great conflict should happen to begin.

Aldringer conducted the attack without dismay: but the fire (from the two batteries especially) was so fierce and unmerciful, that it was impossible for the dispute to subsist long. A part of the cavalry made a desperate effort to seize the bridge, according to instructions; but at-

\* The Swedish Intelligencer says 2000. Part ii. 147.

† Heylmanni Leo Arctois.

1632. tempting to file between the grofs of the Swedish forces and the bed of ofiers, (which Tilly fupposed to have been a vacant fpace left open by inadvertency) they received fuch uninterrupted volleys from the mufque-teers therein concealed, that, in fpite of all their endeavours, they were broken immediately. His majefty was not literally in this action : his prudence kept the afcendency over his vivacity ; and therefore with great coolnefs he planted himfelf at the foot of the bridge, on the Ba-varian fide, partly to give the troops their inftructions with precision, as they paffed over ; and partly to take care, that not a fingle Swede, who had already croffed the river, fhould attempt to retreat.

Aldringer ftill preffed on, the fecond time, with a refolution, that bordered upon ferocity ; but a cannon-ball grazed upon his temples, and he was removed fenfelefs out of the field of battle. This ftroke was the more fatal, as it ever afterwards difcompofed the beft head-piece, for memorials and inveftives, then in the empire \*.

And now came the great Tilly's inevitable hour. He perceived, that no man could replace Aldringer except himfelf, and defcending from the wood with a frefh body of his old Burgundians, renewed the attack, in a manner well becoming his laft efforts ; for whenever a regiment gave way, he feized the colours, and advanced towards the enemy † ; nor could the troops defer an aged general, who had been victorious in thirty fix pitched battles, and fignal engagements, and who carried the marks of more than fifty campaigns in his own perfon. But in a lefs fpace than that of twenty minutes, he received a ftroke on the knee from a falconet-shot ‡, which weighed about three pounds, and fwooning away feveral times, from the agony of the fracture, as well as contufion, was removed out of the battle to Ingolftadt, in the elector's own coach. Mean while, to augment the general confternation, two confiderable parties of Finland horfe, impatient to fee their bre-

\* Le Blanc ; Hift. de Bavière, Tom. iv. p. 374.

† Burgi Mars Sueco Germ. p. 175.

‡ Bougeant, and the author of Annals of the empire, whom I will not fuppoſe to be M. de V. give him this wound in the retreat, whereas the

Swedes never purſued him. [Tom. i. p. 287.] Bougeant ſays likewise, that Guſtavus employed *three* days in conſtructing and ereſting the bridge, inſtead of *two* ; ſince by the diary it appears, that he began it April 3, and croſſed it on the 5th, early in the morning,



thren engaged on the opposite banks, plunged into the river like men possessed, and crossed it by swimming; upon which event, conjoined to the former, and the rather, as evening began to approach, the Bavarian forces broke away imperceptibly, and the Swedes having gained and secured their passage, remained in their own station by the king's orders, without advancing; who contented himself, at the close of the evening, to march over the bridge, at the head of his own regiment of guards, and pass the night on the Bavarian side. 1632.

All this time his electoral highness continued over-cautiously in the wood, at some distance from the sharpness of the fire. Though generalissimo of the troops, he durst not take the command upon him, but posted away to Ingolstadt somewhat unbecomingly, and left good part of the troops, cavalry especially, that lay remote, who knew nothing yet of their general's misfortune, to shift for themselves. Which reminds us of a parallel passage in history. When Justinian was wounded, and obliged to be carried off from the walls of Constantinople, the emperor retired, and the whole garrison lost its courage. Yet this happened not at the battle of Lutzen, where every Swedish colonel was in part a general, and one half of the common soldiers deserved to be colonels.

Thus ended the battle of the Lech, though the king as yet knew nothing of Tilly's misfortune. With regard to this transaction, it may be remarked, that the armies on either side were nearly equal, as were the trains likewise of battering artillery; for the king had seventy two large pieces of cannon, and Tilly seventy: but in point of management, the Swedish engineers were greatly superior; and it was in this respect, that Torstenson, then general of the ordnance, gained that great reputation, which he maintained afterwards in every other branch of military knowledge. So that the more clear-sighted in the art of war ascribe this victory to three co-operating causes; *one* the result of good sense, and *two* the product of invention and genius: under the former head, they class the extraordinary *celerity*, wherewith the king performed his business; and under the latter they arrange his superior intelligence in point of *gunnery*, and the *construction* of a bridge made precisely for the river Lech, and no other. Nor was it uncommon, at that time for learned men to

1632. observe, that the passage of the Lech was far superior to that of the Granic, and that Gustavus's architecture in the chanel of the river was more difficult to execute than that of Julius Cesar across the Rhine; inasmuch as the one, even after the discovery of cannon, effected in two days, what the other could hardly perform in the space of ten: and certain it is, that the intervention of artillery (to say the least of it) may be demonstrated to counterbalance that difference of breadth, which is to be found in the two rivers, the Lech and the Rhine.

The action lasted about six hours, but was much sharper than that at Leipsic. What numbers the king lost hath never appeared, yet from the nature of circumstances he could not suffer so much as the army of the league; because, as Tilly entrenched himself behind a large number of forest-trees, he lost many men in one uninterrupted cannonade of six and thirty hours duration, merely from the disparted fragments and flying shivers of the timber. All that we know is, that a count Merodé, and several brave officers, were killed and wounded; and one thousand Bavarians left dead on the spot.

Upon the whole, from all that appears to me at this distance, Tilly would have done better, (provided such conduct had not disheartened his followers) to have left the bridge and passage free to his Swedish majesty, without contesting them\*: for, had he spared himself his descent from the eminence, enlarged and deepened his lines, interlacing them well with the forest-trees, that stood before him, (there being no passage for the king to file along by the banks of the river, without running an extreme risk in flank) and fixed his batteries so, as to have played only on the Swedes, when they approached his entrenchments, where it was not practicable to transport their heavy artillery, or bring it to act; it is more than probable, that Gustavus must have suffered greatly, or been obliged to have crossed the river in some second place. For in the part, where the Swedes must have been constrained to attack, they could only have advanced with two regiments in front, while Tilly had room to oppose them with just three times a superior number. This, it is thought, was the general's private and reserved opinion: but as the junior officers had

\* Monro's Exped. ii. p. 120.



conceived a notion, that his personal courage declined with his riper days, and half-expired on the arrival of old age, (than which nothing could be falser) he was induced to affect, both now and at Leipzig, a certain gallantry and sprightliness of valour, not quite reconcileable to his maturer judgment. And considering the petulant fervour, and piquancy of sarcastic insinuations, in the younger part of military people, it might not be ill judged for all commanders in chief to leave the field of action, when they have once reached their grand climacteric; for the old courser will make an effort, right or wrong, when the spur of honour is applied to his flank, and his abilities of activity are called in question.

But to return from the present digression. When the king saw the difficulties I have just described, he frankly told his generals, who crouded round him, *That he considered the passage of the Lech as a better day's service than the performance at Leipzig* \*; and when cardinal Pasman, the Imperial ambassador extraordinary at Rome, heard the news, he said coolly, "The scene is closed, and the game is over:" which, whether it related to the downfall of popery, or the house of Austria, at this distance cannot be specified.

The king, as we observed before, rested all night at the foot of the bridge, and next morning there were reasons to think, that the enemy had dislodged: but before any certainty in that particular could be acquired, Hepburn received instructions to conduct the remaining part of the infantry over the bridge, in order to introduce a second and more obstinate engagement; during which interim one Forbes, a Scots captain, at the head of thirty musqueteers, was sent to examine the position of the Bavarians. He found two horse-centries at the edge of the wood, and nothing more; who being sent to the king, and interrogated by him, declared strenuously, that they never heard a single syllable concerning the departure of their companions. A part of the royal army pursued the fugitives to the walls of Rayne, and stormed the town sword in hand. And here it was first learnt, that Tilly was wounded desperately, if not mortally,

\* Swed. Intell. part ii. p. 147.

1632. This victory of the Lech alarmed one half of Europe, and astonished the other. France, who had rejoiced to see the house of Austria humbled to one precise degree, began now to conceive certain uneasinesses, both from fear and jealousy ; insomuch that Louis XIII. told Soranzo, the Venetian ambassador, upon receiving an account of the passage of the Lech, “ That the powers interested in desiring to behold  
 “ a partial reduction of the house of Austria had hitherto offered up,  
 “ with a safe conscience, their sincerest wishes for the prosperity of the  
 “ Swedish arms ; but then, continued he, no human being could ever  
 “ conceive, that matters should have advanced, with so amazing rapidity,  
 “ to such extraordinary lengths. Inform therefore the senate,  
 “ that means must be devised, whereby to check this impetuous Visigoth  
 “ in the career of his victories, which may prove, in the conclusion,  
 “ as fatal to us, as to the emperor and the elector of Bavaria.” Now if this be true with respect to France, the house of Austria had still stronger reasons to take the alarm ; for she depended on one single man, and that was Wallstein ; and the duke of Bavaria, who, when the war was removed from his frontiers, had despised or deceived every power, with whom he negotiated, began now to feel the sharpest disquietudes, upon three several accounts ; he had neglected to oppose his whole force against the king’s crossing the Lech, (for a part of his army lay stationed near Ratisbon :) he apprehended the death of his admired general every moment ; and beheld Gustavus penetrating, by full marches, into the very vital parts of his dominions. England fell back into the national folly of resigning the continent to its own care ; so that the conduct of an Elizabeth, and the maxims of Burleigh, Cecil, and Walsingham, passed for the reveries of politicians, who had not considered their maternal country as an island. The elector of Saxony had a disinclination to the prosperity of Sweden from the very beginning. The king of Denmark entertained certain self-interested views, which shall be analyzed immediately. The states general traversed Gustavus in the late negotiation with the town of Cologne ; and the prince of Orange, under various pretences, kept an army of observation on the frontiers of their dominions.

Gustavus



Gustavus beheld all these jealousies, counter-operations, and pretended friendships, with a countenance undismayed, and without making any remonstrances or recriminations. Indeed he remarked one day, in great confidence to a friend, whom he trusted, *That he now perceived he had pushed his conquests too far, and given umbrage, as well as disquietude, to certain potentates. It may be difficult,* continued he, *to preserve the acquisitions I have made to the southwards ; so that of course the more prudential part will be to confine myself within the northern regions, and erect a kingdom, if that be possible, of which the Baltic shall form the centre.* This account we owe to that impenetrable, as well as all-penetrating statesman the abbé Siri \*, who affects to have assisted at every conference in the character of a political ubiquitousian ; but for my own part, from a cool examination of future facts, I have some mistrust with regard to the authenticity of the present anecdote, since the king, far from retrieving the supposed mistake, marched on to Ingoldstadt, and then to Munich, with the very words recent upon his lips. Nor was this any new idea, wherewith to surprize his majesty's understanding ; as appears from the answer he gave to Oxenstiern, as long before as the preceding Christmas †.

France seems first to have discovered the hook of Gustavus approaching her lips, and pretending only to nibble, and play round it, without swallowing, hoped to see its point blunted, if not disarmed, by some accident or other.

To co-operate with these views, she threw Bavaria in his way, as a rugged rock concealed under water ; and that attempt not succeeding, placed the elector of Triers there as a sort of entangling weed : which latter effort served to create some slight embarrassment ; for a perplexing treaty was signed at Ehrenbreitstein (four days after the passage of the Lech ‡,) whereby she engaged to support the said prelate against all opponents, and oblige the Swedes, (which was still more) to evacuate the electorate, as well as the diocese of Spires.

\* Vittorio Siri ; *Memorie Recondite*, Tom. vii. pag. 464, &c. and pag. 546.

† See pag. 78, 79.

‡ April 9, 1632. See the APPENDIX, where the treaty is preserved at large.

1632. In less than a fortnight from this period, the king had likewise some inauspicious misgivings, with reference to the conduct of Christian, king of Denmark, whom the Imperial and Spanish ministry tried to allure into their interests by all imaginable temptations. The infanta in some degree almost over-reached and ensnared that politic prince : for under pretence of making him the compliment of proposing conditions to Gustavus with regard to a general peace, she in effect made him a person interested, in case his Swedish majesty should not listen to an accommodation ; for she left the plan of the reconciliation partly, if not entirely, to his management. Gustavus had sagacity enough to desire earnestly to avert this blow, but, for prudent reasons, not caring to send a minister in form on that errand, gave private instructions to one of his generals \*, in whom he could confide, (who was going by chance into Holstein to raise recruits) to make his court to king Christian, and endeavour to penetrate into his intentions ; commanding him to give his Danish majesty obliquely to understand, that by a speedy engagement in this protestant war, he might fortunately secure to his children the possession of those bishoprics, which the emperor had usurped by virtue of the peace at Lubec. Christian felt the force of this argument, but at the same time could not dissipate the terrors, which the severe usage of the house of Austria, joined with his own misfortunes in the late war, had infused into him. Nevertheless, he dispatched two senators to Gustavus, with instructions to assure him, “ That he was deeply penetrated with  
 “ a just sense of this protestant enterprize ; but that the oath he had taken  
 “ at the pacification of Lubec, had unfortunately restrained his hands :---  
 “ That he participated with Gustavus in all his conquests ; and would  
 “ never impede their progress in any shape ;---but at the same time pre-  
 “ sumed gently to remind him, that, as the success of war is often perio-  
 “ dical, even under the direction of the ablest commander, it would  
 “ highly become so just and generous a prince to give a solid and glori-  
 “ ous peace to Germany : to effectuate which, he was ready to make a  
 “ tender of his best services, by way of mediator or arbitrator.” To this proposal Gustavus replied, *That his present passion and ultimate object*

\* Bauditzen.



was to procure peace to the distressed and proscribed protestants, which in 1632. truth could only be effected by a new and strict union between all the princes and states, who made profession of the reformed religion. Our enemies, observed he, are insincere ; and seek only to create advantageous delays. Intercourses, arbitrations, and negotiations will produce nothing but remorse, and disappointment : the house of Austria must be reduced to such a point, as not to be able to interfere a second time. If therefore the king your master will labour unreservedly to bring about this union among the protestants, and conjoin himself with me in the prosecution of so good a work, whereby each party shall become mutual guaranty for the protection of the whole ;—If he will only thus think once with me, my life shall be responsible for imposing silence on the house of Austria\*.

Christian liked the doctrine, but begged to be excused from putting it in practice ; nevertheless, from that day secretly wished prosperity to the arms of Sweden, and dextrously extricated himself by little and little from the snare, which the artful Isabella had spread under his feet.

The king having secured the town of Rayne, and dispatched Horn to pursue Tilly, shaped his course directly to Augsburg, making himself master of the town and cloyster of Thierhaupten, and likewise of Friedberg as he passed along. In this march he refused to listen to any proposals of neutrality from the part of the duke of Neuburg, being dissatisfied with that prince's former duplicity. Sir, said he to the deputy, *Your master has acted contrarieties: not contented to deceive me, he has had the dissingenuousness to promise much, and perform nothing ; whilst, on the contrary, he has allowed passage and free retreat to the enemy's army, supplied them with artillery from his own arsenal, and fired on the trumpeter, who approached his capital in amicable form, in order to deliver a letter from me to him. But providence hath now indulged me with the means of prescribing those terms, which formerly I ventured only to recommend. In a word, Sir, you are like your master, and your master is like you †.*

\* Vide Chemnitz, Tom. i. p. 264, &c.

† Ibid. 258. Swedish Intelligencer, Part ii. 151, 152.

1632.

It is not difficult to conceive the astonishment of the disconcerted deputy, who continued motionless for some time like a person thunder-struck, at length withdrew, and then recovering his presence of mind, renewed his applications by the interposition of prince Augustus, who was younger brother to his master, and a sort of favourite with Gustavus. The king's answer was very short; *Give the duke of Neuburg to understand, that his future actions must prove the commentary upon his doctrines: and in the mean while, by way of a preliminary, let him dispatch to my army two hundred thousand loaves, and three hundred tuns of beer* \*. About this time the Bavarians quitted Neuburg as indefensible, having first removed their artillery, and broken down one arch of the bridge for fear of being pursued; and upon this the Swedish colonel Landsperg was ordered to take possession of it, repair the bridge, and then defend the city like a man of honour.

Thus, in three days, the king reached from the passage of the Lech to the town of Augsberg, coasting along the Bavarian banks of the said river with the main of his army; but conveying his heavy artillery on the Suabian side, for it was thought by all intelligent persons, that the new bridge could not support the combined weight of horses and ordnance.

The rich and magnificent city of Augsberg lies ten miles to the South-west of Donawert. It is situated in Suabia, and hath two bridges across the Lech. Its famous *confession* will render it illustrious throughout all ages of the Christian church; and it is probable the king, in the idea, that *the law first proceeded from Sion*, considered it as the Jerusalem of his German Palestine; sparing no pains, and omitting no attempts to make himself master of this respectable sanctuary; and so much the rather, as the Augustan profession had been totally interdicted therein, the whole body of Lutherans disarmed, and the protestant magistrates replaced by fresh ones of the catholic persuasion. Colonel Breda, at that time, commanded the garrison, which had been augmented by different re-inforcements to the amount of 4500 men. Yet still there was great

\* Soldat Suedois, 485, &c.



reason to fear an insurrection from the numerous protestants within the walls. 1632.

When the royal army had advanced to Lechausen, a small town within two miles of Augsburg, the Imperial governor broke down the bridge; but the Swedes erected two fresh ones, the former above the city, and the latter below it. Gustavus then brought on his approaches on either side of the river, whilst Tortstenson gave new proofs of his uncommon skill in the management of his artillery: but the king, grieved to see the havoc he intended to make amongst the fine edifices, dispatched a letter to the magistrates, requesting them to dismiss the garrison, and preserve so magnificent a city from the destruction of a furious cannonade. The answer returned him was alike polite and amicable; since it was there remarked, that the troops, which possessed the town, had been obtruded on them, and that if the Swedes had first presented themselves, they should have been received with preference.—That to bid the Imperialists depart, amounted in effect to saying nothing; of course it appeared to them most expedient for his majesty, to introduce some negotiation with the commander of the garrison.

Upon this Horn, as it is supposed, with his master's privity, wrote a very friendly letter to Breda the governor, and having represented the imprudence, and other unavoidable ill consequences, of an unprofitable resistance, proposed himself as an amicable mediator between his Swedish majesty and the garrison. Breda foreseeing no relief, as Tilly was dying, and Aldringer disabled, at length capitulated. Five hundred of his soldiers took service under the king, and the rest were conveyed to Landsberg. Count Holloch, a Palatin nobleman, was appointed governor, at the head of 3000 cavalry and infantry; and young Oxenstiern, out of respect to his father the reichs-chancellor, was declared commander of the militia.

In the capitulation the king gave Breda to understand, that at Augsburg no exceptions must be proposed in regard to popery; and then, at the request of the inhabitants, who besought him to honour them with a visit, made a triumphal entrance, attended by all the princes, generals, and foreign ambassadors then in his camp, but escorted

1632. only by a few chosen troops, in order to prevent confusion and plunder; so that the residue of the army was not allowed to pass the barrier of the city-gates.

In this town, the birth-place, if one may so speak, of the evangelical religion \*, his majesty thought it incumbent on him, to behave with all possible humility, sweetness, and moderation: yet, at the same time, without injuring or discrediting the Roman catholics in any respect, restored the Augustan confession to its original lustre (which greatly piqued the elector of Saxony, who considered himself as first protestant prince in Germany †) and consigned the whole government of the town into the hands of the Lutherans and the reformed ‡. On his entering the city-gate, he dismounted and walked directly to St. Agnes-church, where the Lutheran service was performed with great decency; the ciii. Psalm sung, accompanied by a peal of organs; and Fabritius, the king's own chaplain, delivered a sermon on the following text, Psalm xii. verse 5, 6. *Now for the comfortless troubles sake of the needy, and because of the deep sighing of the poor, I will up, saith the Lord, and will help every one from him that swelleth against him, and will set him at rest.* From the church the procession advanced on horseback to a large square called the wine-market, where he commanded the inhabitants (which was thought to be a very extraordinary step, not only at Vienna and Munich, but at Dresden, Paris, Copenhagen, Whitehall, and the Hague) to take the oaths || of allegiance and fidelity to the crown of Sweden, without mention made of its allies and associates §: confirming afterwards the charter of the citizens to them, without inserting or

\* The *confession* was presented here to well as the votes in public council; where Charles V. in the year 1530, and is commonly called the *Augsburg* or *Augustan* confession: to which we may add the *Pacificatorium* concluded here in 1555. The town depends not in any shape upon the bishop, though he has a palace therein. The differences reigning between the papists and protestants were greatly harmonized at the peace of Munster; for by a partition-settlement the employs of government were equally divided, as

twenty-two magistrates are of the Romish persuasion, and a like number of the evangelical and reformed.

† Heylmanni Leo Arctous, 4°. p. 55.

‡ Historical or Authentic Relation in Low Dutch, Tom. ii. p. 64—66.

|| Histoire Politique du Siècle, 4°. Lond. 1757.

§ The express oath is to be seen in the Swedish Intelligencer, Part ii. p. 158.



expunging any thing. And here, amongst acknowledgments from the 1632.  
magistrates and civilities on the part of the king, one of that venerable body took the liberty to tell him, "That the Swedish troops appeared  
"to him irresistible." The king, forasmuch as the compliment seemed to carry no immediate connexion with the conversation then subsisting, requested him to explain the reasons, whereon he grounded that opinion: *Is it, said he, on account of the number, or the valour, or the good fortune of my soldiers?* "No, Sire, replied the magistrate, but pointing to a company of guards drawn up before the apartment destined for the king's reception \*, "Who could have imagined, that a set of men so  
"decent and well behaved in times of capitulation could have been  
"those very persons, whom we have seen so determined and intrepid in  
"the field of action †?"

During two days residence here, an uncommon adventure happened to Gassion; for a rich citizen, with whom he lodged, was so much affected with his courtesy and politeness, that he made him an offer of a beautiful daughter in marriage with a very considerable dowry. His majesty, midst all the cares and tumults of war, allowed not such a trifling circumstance to escape his notice, and gave the young Frenchman several hints, by way of inducement, to a compliance: but Gassion was too much of a military enthusiast to embrace the proposal; and it is probable Gustavus liked him never the worse for making a sacrifice of love to glory; since not many days afterwards he offered him any command in his own guards, saying aloud in German to the officers round him, *That his corps should be surnamed the regiment of the pillow, because when that was near him, he could sleep in security ‡.*

His majesty having now received great advantages from the submission of the Augsburgers, performed an action worthy of himself on leaving their city; for considering the merit, as well as long services, of old

\* In the palace of Fugger. This family, originally of Augsborg, is perhaps the most considerable; that ever was raised by merchandize. The emperor, Maximilian I. ennobled it, and made the Fuggers counts, who immediately purchased large estates between Augsborg and Ulm.

Not many years ago, there were fifteen counts of this family, who all possessed distinct signories.

† Hist. du maréchal Gassion, [par Mich. le Pure.] Tom. i. p. 63.

‡ Ibid.

1632. Ruthven, (who defended Ulm, the royal magazin, as well as intended place of retreat, in case of accidents) he gave him a grant of the earldom of Kirchberg, which was supposed to be worth at least eighteen hundred pounds a year, clear of contribution to the service of the war \*, and belonged, if I mistake not, to a count Fugger, who was governor of the town, but acted subordinately to Breda, when that officer threw himself into it by Tilly's orders some days before the king arrived ; who now retracing the footsteps of his former march, advanced to Aicha †, where duke Albert of Bavaria met him, second brother of the elector, and begged a neutrality for himself, his family, and estate, under pretence, that he had never concerned himself in the present wars. No discussion was made of the truth of these allegations, for the contrary was well understood to be true : but the answer returned was neither ill-applied nor devoid of spirit ; namely, *that Louisa Juliana, the dowager electress Palatin, and Elizabeth, then lawful queen of Bohemia, and her children, had not interfered in the affairs of the Palatinat ; yet their possessions had been confiscated, and they compelled, under the disgrace of a proscription, to petition a subsistence in foreign countries ‡*. Upon this duke Albert retired to Saltsburg, and joined the electress of Bavaria, who had withdrawn herself thither.

It was hoped by the Imperialists, that Augsbourg would hurt the Swedish troops as much as Capua injured the army of Hannibal ; but the king wisely obviated these inconveniencies, by staying there only two days, and encamping his soldiers without the walls : he had moreover two great enterprizes to execute on returning from Augsbourg §, having his eyes fixed not only upon Ingoldstadt, but on Ratisbon ; both which schemes he proposed to effect by breaking down one of the two bridges across the Danube. But Tilly had parts enough to foresee, what so great a genius, in the art of war, would attempt to execute, and entreated the elector almost with his dying breath to spare no precautions with respect to the

\* Monro, Expedition ii. p. 120.

† Some authors and map-makers call this place Waho. It must not be confounded with Aichstadt.

‡ Swedish Intelligencer, Part ii. p. 159.

§ Brachellii Hist. nostror. temp. p. 280.



preservation of Ratisbon and Ingoldstadt \*. And thus the king's project, however well conceived, was rendered abortive. 1362.

Far from being dismayed with such disappointment, his majesty directed his whole thoughts against Ingoldstadt singly. This town, then considered as one of the strongest places in the empire, was of course esteemed the principal bulwark of Bavaria, and had formerly, during the reign of Charles V. rendered fruitless all the efforts of the Smalcaldic party. It lies half-way between Donawert and Ratisbon, and young Tilly †, whom the old man recommended to be governor, had three large chosen regiments under his command. It was one of those fortifications, which the warriors surname *la pucelle*, and maintained that character in respect to *sieges* (for Farenbach only betrayed it afterwards) till the Austrians took it by capitulation in the year 1742.

This town belongs to the elector, though it standeth not on the Bavarian side of the Danube. It was protected on that quarter where the Swedes approached it by two or three slanting rivulets (whose bridges by some accident had been neglected to be broken down) as likewise by a very troublesome morass. One large bridge crosses the Danube, and another passes athwart the town: at the foot of the former, (called, if my accounts deceive me not, the gallows-bridge) were two outworks, extremely well fortified, and hardly possible to be taken by storm; so that it is probable the king expected some concurrence from a part of the garrison (and the rather, as the seeds of Farenbach's and Cratz's conspiracy were then supposed to be sown) though at that time nothing discovered itself to the advantage of the Swedes. Nevertheless the king made his troops approach the walls more nearly than appeared otherwise reconcileable to a judgment expert like his in the art of investing a well-defended town. Nay, what was still more, the elector of Bavaria lay encamped with all his troops on the opposite banks of the Danube; so that each army could discover the other's motions by the assistance only of the naked eye.

\* Bertius de Bellis German.

† Many historians, as Le Vassor, de Serres, &c. call this young man Tilly's son, but that general lived and died unmarried; and it was remarked

of him, as well by enemies as friends, that he never indulged in any unlawful amour. He was probably his nephew: what became of him after this period, no where appears.

1532. The lines being now finished, and the batteries erected, a sudden and alarming accident befel the king; for as he was riding about on his favourite palfrey, to make observations, (and the shortness of his eye-sight always carried him too near the danger) a cannon-ball, well aimed, and weighing at least fourteen pounds, struck the mare full in the flank, (so near the king's leg, that the flesh was ruffled) and overturned her more times than one. The same ball, in the rapidity of its passage, knocked down Gassion without touching him, who stood partly on a line just before his master. It was the opinion of all the bystanders, that the king was crushed with the fury of the stroke, for he lay covered in dirt and blood, and rolled over twice or thrice after he received the blow. Gassion, half recovering his senses, ran to him, but one of the king's equerries had raised him from his trance; *How*, said he, *was it possible for the enemy to hit me? I conceived myself to be out of danger.* In an instant all his generals crowded round him, and conjured him earnestly to retire; but he mounted a fresh steed, and kept the field.

By this escape, his majesty had the good fortune still to verify his old observation, that no king had ever been killed by a cannon-ball; yet this destiny was reserved afterwards for one of his successors\*.

I have read somewhere, (but cannot at present recollect in what author) a different account of this accident; namely, that there was an old culverin, in Ingoldstadt, of immeasurable length, which rarely missed its object at a great distance, and had performed wonders against the protestants in the Smalcaldic wars. Now it is supposed by this relator, that the king tasted of its unerring qualities; and the rather, as he rode a little white † mare, which rendered his person more distinguishable.

\* Charles XII.

† It is surprising to me, that historians should differ so much about the colour of this quadruped. One says she was milk white, another avers her to be dark-grey, and a third variegates her with white and black spots like a tyger; whereas the said animal was dug up and stuffed just after the accident, and preserved in the arsenal of

Ingoldstadt, for the edification of all travellers, memoir-writers, and historiographers. For my own part, I never saw her; and must leave this important doubt in the same state, that I find it. But be the matter as it will, it was certainly ill judged in the king, to ride a creature of so particular a colour.



In the evening, when he returned to his tent, all his generals, assembled in a body, besought him, in the most earnest terms, to take another sort of care of a life so valuable. As he had often received representations upon this subject, he returned them an answer, which I suppose to be in part premeditated; and for that reason chuse to insert it, having recited in the course of my history so many replies of his, which arose incidentally and extemporaneously from the incidents before him. The answer therefore, that he gave them, was to this effect; *That the cannon-ball, which had approached him so nearly, (not to mention various accidents of a similar, though less dangerous nature, and thirteen wounds he had received besides,) admonished him plainly of his mortality; and that he had no more title to plead exemption from death, than the meanest soldier, that served under him; since neither crowns nor victories could secure any human being from this general law of nature. That he had no part to take, except resigning himself to God's providence; and nothing to bequeath his comrades in war, but a firm assurance, that the justice of the cause, wherein they were engaged, had other assistances in store, besides the precarious existence of ONE GUSTAVUS\*. Indeed, added he, there is a circumstance, that afflicts me greatly: some have given a sinister interpretation to all my actions, and others have attempted to tarnish my reputation, by basely insinuating, that the only objects of his Swedish majesty are fresh acquisitions of wealth, and power. But the Supreme Being knows, in that respect, the sincerity of my soul; and my hope is, that he will inspire me with grace to confound the envy and calumny of the public.—The sums advanced by me, the debts discharged by me, my past conduct and future intentions, may, in the long run, convince the most perverse and blind, that the only object of my expedition was the re-establishment of Germanic liberty†.*

Either Tilly made an inexpressible fire from the redoubts next the bridge, or the events of that day were of an inauspicious cast; for soon after the king's disaster, another cannon-ball carried off half the head of Christopher, the young margrave of Baden-Dourlach, as he was dis-

\* Soldat Suedois, p. 498. Merc, Franc. en l'an 1632, p. 229.

† Hist. de Louis XIII. par le Vaisor. Tom. VII. 175, 176.

1632. courting with some officers in his tent. The whole body of Swedish generals was rendered inconsolable by this misfortune, for his courage was of the clearest and most distinguishing sort. But his aged father's \* answer, upon receiving the news a few minutes after the accident happened, hath something in it highly worthy to be remembered; *I am a father*, (said he to those, who came to condole with him) *but am a Christian likewise.—My son belonged to God, by a prior right than he belonged to me: happy! that he died like a prince and like a soldier.—Complaints are only to be employed about those children, who live with infamy, and expire in cowardice. I have loved nothing, but with a firm resolution to resign it up on demand, except it be my conscience, and my liberty.—As the first stroke of cannon proved favourable to the only support of the protestant cause, I have reason to digest the ill effects of the second, and (upon extended views,) rather rejoice, than lament, at the eventual conclusion of this extraordinary day †.* When the king considered both the old man, and the young man, it is reported, that he shed tears on the occasion ‡.

At almost the same instant, that the prince was killed, the unfortunate Tilly expired in Ingoldstadt: and as the son and father (for reasons needless to be recited) hated that general, and were reciprocally hated by him, his majesty could not help remarking, *how fatal one place and minute had proved to two such inveterate enemies §.* The king likewise had no personal affection to Tilly, disliking him much on account of the cruelties he exercised at Magdeburg, and never truly forgetting, that in one of his applications to him, he had styled him *cavalier* instead of king. Yet on this occasion, justice and nature gained the ascendant over disgust and pique; *Alas*, said he, *the HONOURABLE old Tilly is now no more ||.*

\* In 1622, this brave old man fought the battle of Wimsen, against Tilly and Gonsalvo di Cordoua; being then lieutenant general to the princes of the union. He then served his Danish majesty, and being obliged to leave his troops in 1626, made his escape in a small boat. Afterward he lived, with variety of fortune, the life of an

exile, having been proscribed by the emperor.

† *Mercure François* en l'an 1632, p. 230. Hist. or Auth. Relat. fol. Tom. ii. 67.

‡ Heylmanni *Leo Arctous*, p. 56.

§ Swedish *Intelligencer*, Part ii. p. 161.

|| *Monro's Second Expedition*, p. 118, *Adelzreiter Ann. Bav.* Part iii. p. 257.



No foldier ever died in greater torture. The elector of Bavaria fate constantly by his bed-side, and it is reported, that Tilly spoke to him in the following manner: "Your highness may remember, that in the middle and advanced stages of life, I have had enough of reputation, and glory in abundance. Oh, that instead of surviving my fame, I had expired in the great decision of Leipzig! It had been for your advantage, and my honour.----Two things I must leave on your highness's mind, by way of dying advice: never break your alliance with the emperor; and make Cratz commander of your army. That officer has courage to serve you, fidelity to content you, and parts to assist you. He will conduct your troops with reputation, and, as he knows Wallstein, will traverse his designs. Necessity requires you should act the dissembler, and submit to the extravagancies of that insolent man: for except you can allure him to join you with the Imperial army, Gustavus will enter Bavaria; and when he will relinquish it, heaven only knows.—Not being conscious I have ever used your highness ill in the command of your armies, I shall ask no forgiveness; contented and thankful to die, as you honour me with your attention in my last moments, of which very few now remain upon my hands. ---Let me beseech you, therefore, out of pure compassion, to leave me; and as I have an account to render for human failings, transgressions, and errors, permit me, after having justified myself in your opinion, to make my peace with God\*." He then kissed the elector's hand, who retired with tears.

Thus died John Tschzerclas, count de Tilly, of whom we have spoken so much, not only through the course of the wars, but in a distinct note, that it may suffice to observe, he had passed through every stage of military life, from a foot soldier to the post of generalissimo. It is observed by some, that he blamed Pappenheim in his last moments†; and it is remarked by all writers, that he never indulged himself in wine or women. Yet still, beyond all contradiction, he was over zealous in his own religion: and the cruelties exercised at Magdeburg, considering the

\* Bertius de bellis Germanicis.

† Heylmanni Leo Arctois, 4°. p. 54.

1632. temperate and virtuous life he led, seem to me resolvable only into downright bigotry. So that one is at little loss to assign a motive for *what* no reasonable being can produce a justification ! The court of Wallstein (as the language then ran) received the news of his death with visible marks of satisfaction. He was born of Walloon parents, and not very nobly descended : but created count by the emperor, with the title of *illustrious*. He bequeathed the rich diamond-ring, which the infant Isabella gave him, to the holy virgin of Oettingen, and left 10,000 l. to the veteran bands, that had served under him, especially the four regiments of infantry, which had made such great efforts in the wood, after the battle of Leipzig was lost. And thus this illustrious chieftain experienced his own prophecy concerning war, which he had uttered formerly at Ratisbon.

His majesty employed eight days in beleaguering and attacking Ingoldstadt, which, in respect to sieges, may be considered as the sharpest service during the whole course of the thirty years wars. Though wounded in making the first dispositions for possessing two redoubts sword in hand, yet nothing abated the keenness of his ardour, notwithstanding the defendants had the command of re-inforcements in abundance ; for the elector of Bavaria lay with his army under the town-walls, on the other side of the Danube ; so that the king was obliged to leave a body of troops all night, (for fear of a sally, which he had reason to expect) drawn up in fair battaglia, within reach not only of the enemies great guns, but of their musquetry. Yet never soldiers supported a cool massacre with more patience, or in better order ; though the valiant Monro confesses, in the honesty of his heart, “ That it was “ the longest night (for an eighteenth of April) that he ever saw \* ;” and, what was more disagreeable, the Swedes thought it meer waste of ball and powder to fire a gun. Monro lost twelve men in one company by a single cannon-shot : and more than three hundred brave fellows were left dead upon the ground, which they had occupied whilst alive.

Next evening a thousand commanded musqueteers were ordered to attack the principal of the two redoubts sword in hand ; his majesty at-

\* Expedit. ii. p. 120.



tending the enterprize in person. The Swedes having made incredible efforts, cleared the ditch, and entered the half-moon: but as young Tilly wanted no supply of hands (for by means of the bridge he could have marched not only the garrison, but the whole Bavarian army, against the assailants) his majesty found himself obliged, in common prudence, to sound a retreat. All perhaps, that could be wanted by him, was to gain the redoubts and destroy the bridge, for then the electoral forces had not power to enter into their own country; but this, for reasons assigned, appeared to be an undertaking too difficult, as well as too dangerous. Therefore, all on a sudden he raised the siege, (for which great stroke of self-denial, the continuator of Foresti applauds him with rapture;) leaving Banier to conduct the rear of his army, who repulsed the pursuing garrison with great coolness and judgment. Nothing now remained for the inhabitants, but to dig up the king's palfrey, which had been concealed in the earth near his tent; whose skin they curiously stuffed, and repositied in their arsenal. Nevertheless, upon the whole, the citizens of Ingoldstadt were more polite to a four-footed beast, than the people of Breda were to the boat, by which their town was surprized; for the latter, having dragged it round the streets, and scourged it severely, hung it up in their stadt-house as a public trophy.

It was during this siege, (which I could not observe without breaking my narration) that the elector of Bavaria made a fresh attempt towards a reconciliation, greatly alarmed with the apprehensions of losing Ingoldstadt, and fearing to draw the war into the bowels of his own country. This artful prince had three views in the present negotiation: he wanted to create delays; or seize some fortunate incident, which might casually present itself; or sow the seeds of perplexity, and misunderstanding, between the kings of France and Sweden: but Gustavus pierced through this thin veil of artifice with a single glance. Under the influence however of Munich-politics, St. Etienne made a visit to the royal camp; where the king, for certain reasons, chose to receive his proposals in the presence of his Bohemian majesty, and several princes and generals. There the French minister told him, with an air of confidence, " That the elector, who had the strongest inclination imaginable towards a  
" peace,

1632. “ peace, had disapproved of Tilly’s enterprize with respect to Bamberg, and employed himself that very instant in devising expedients, whereby to pave the king’s admission into Bavaria : ” —but Gustavus interrupted him point-blank in this preamble, and told him, *totidem verbis*, *That he was not a person to be amused and misled by meer sounds*. Sir, said he, *the king, your master, may have excellent intentions; and if so, they bear no conformity to the language you assume. But as to the elector of Bavaria, he seeks only to create delays and interruptions; he is a sort of prince, who keeps in his wardrobe a set of upper garments of various hues; and changes those exterior robes convertibly with his interests; wearing black one day, white a second day, variegated colours a third day; —but always concealing the Burgundian cross next his heart. If it be his sincere desire to be well received in our court, let him produce himself in one unvarying form; —let him open the gates of Ingoldstadt, disband his army, refund his extortions, restore the Palatinat, reform what is past, and give good security for all, which is to come\**.

St. Etienne stood astonished, to find the king as clear-sighted and determined in the cabinet, as in the field of action; and whilst he ransacked his brain to devise some answer, either solid or plausible, Gustavus resumed the discourse, and added, *That he had intercepted a letter, of very fresh date, wherein the emperor had promised to send Walstein into Bavaria, at the head of 50,000 men. With all my heart*, continued he, *the elector will have signal opportunities to shew his hospitality, and abundance of guests to entertain, friends as well as enemies, who want not for good appetites, and quick digestion. For my own part, I intend to prove an expensive visitant†*.

As the French negotiator had erred before in point of decorum, he now made a second false step through pure inadvertency; for he obliquely insinuated, “ That his most Christian majesty had a formidable army not far removed from the empire, and might, in all probability, greatly disrelish the rejection of proposals from the duke of Bavaria.”

\* Soldat Suedois, p. 503. Hist. or Auth. Relat. Tom. ii. 66.      † Le Vassor, Tom. vii. p. 169.



This was touching the king's temper in the only vulnerable part: his eyes assumed a fierceness in an instant, and he accosted St. Etienne, as one who did not merit to be considered as a private gentleman: *Say no more,* continued he, *I pardon thy ignorance: thou knowest neither thy master, nor me. When thou makest such advances, bring me an authority signed by the king's own hand; and when thou actest for an unfortunate prince, like the elector of Bavaria, comport thyself with humility. The familiar freedoms of thy nation are sometimes overlooked, and sometimes despised; but in the present case, they are insupportable. Know, that I am offended, and victorious\*.*

By this time the elector of Bavaria had made an irruption into the Upper Palatinat, in order to cause a diversion in favour of his own dominions, and hinder the enemy from marching on directly to Munich. Gustavus well considered this movement, and entered the heart of Bavaria notwithstanding; foreseeing wisely, that if he followed the duke, who shaped his course towards Bohemia, Wallstein and he might then be obliged to conjoin their forces; by express injunctions from the court of Vienna, and that the two combined armies might overpower him by dint of numbers. He therefore adhered inflexibly to his first idea, knowing, that he should thereby force the elector back; and fore-knowing too, that Wallstein, from a principle of private animosity, would make no digression to a point so far removed from him, as the capital of the electorate.

Leaving Ingoldstadt therefore, he marched to Gyfenfelt, where the whole army paid the honours of sepulture to the young margrave, making two discharges of all their musquetry and artillery. Next day he conducted his troops to Mosberg, a long stretch of twenty miles; and thence detached Horn and Hepburn, at the head of 8000 horse and foot, to besiege Landshut, a small beautiful town, situated on the conflux of the Iser and Ampter, and usually styled the *pupil* of Bavaria's eye. When these officers arrived, their prospect of success appeared unpromising; for 1300 Bavarian dragoons threw themselves unexpectedly into

\* Le Vassor, Tom. vii. 169.

1632. the place, having made a march that day of six and thirty miles; but when they beheld a large column of Swedish infantry advance, they changed countenance, crossed the Iser, and broke down the bridge. Next morning Horn sent a messenger into the town, first by way of spy, and secondly, with the power of performing the part of a negotiator with the inhabitants: but the fellow found all the houses locked and barricaded, nor could he procure an interview with any human being, even through a casement. Upon this, Horn commanded all his troops to advance, and raised a sharp contribution of 15,000 l. by his master's orders; for this place had undertaken to levy and maintain six troops of horse, at its own expence, during the whole course of the wars. Hence it was, that the sum demanded was paid with cheerfulness, and a reconciling fee of 300 l. \* was advanced gratuitously to the general.

Next morning arrived his majesty. And when the citizens presented him the town keys upon their knees, he said to them, *Rise, it is your duty to worship God, and not me* †. He then made a visit to the palace, or as some call it, the castle, which he surveyed with equal pleasure and attention, as it had been considered (at least by the Germans) in the lights of a master-piece in Italian architecture: when on a sudden, being seized with a sort of fainting fit, he was obliged to repose himself on a neighbouring seat for some time. He then mounted on horseback, in order to leave the town; but on his arrival at the Jewish-gate, found himself constrained to take shelter there, for a tempest of thunder and lightning arose, whose violence cannot well be described. That being once passed over, he said to Horn, *Go back, and free the inhabitants from their incertitude* ‡; for as yet he had given them no assurances of pardon.

May. His majesty then returned to Mosberg, and advancing from thence to Freysingen, laid the city and diocese under contribution, hastening onwards with great dispatch to Munich, upon receiving intelligence (which was not afterwards verified) that Wallstein began to move towards the

\* One account says 3000 l. but the additional cypher appears to me a typographical error.

† Heylmani Leo Arctous, 4°. p. 58.

‡ Ibid. 58, 59.



Upper Palatinat, and chusing therefore to secure the capital of Bavaria before any other notable diversion could be effected elsewhere. Here St. Etienne interfered again, and requested leave to negotiate a good capitulation with the inhabitants of Munich, but wasted so much time in frivolous proposals and delays, that the king suspected him, and marched on. Alarmed a little at such compendious proceedings, St. Etienne besought his majesty to stifle the resentments of himself and his army, and not lay the town in ruins: to which it was answered with an air of frankness, *That if the magistracy submitted promptly, and with a good grace, care should be taken, that no man should suffer with respect to life, liberty, or religion.* The French minister soon conveyed this intelligence to the inhabitants, who, correspondently to his majesty's gracious proposition, paid their court to him on the road; but, in imitation of their master, endeavoured to amuse him with long and artful preliminaries, which had the fate to be rejected almost as soon as proposed. At length it was agreed to make him an offer of 36,000 l. by way of exempting the town from plunder: but the king insisted upon receiving one third more; under which demand it was thought prudent to acquiesce. He next day entered the town at the head of three regiments only, accompanied by the king of Bohemia and several other great personages. The two kings took up their residence in the electoral palace. The garrison received very generous usage; for though the Swedish horse occupied all the passes throughout the country, yet it was allowed them to retire in safety without the ceremony of a capitulation.

Munich is a large and beautiful city, surrounded with vast plains, extremely fertile, and as finely watered as any in Europe. Maximilian, the then elector, had erected there a magnificent palace, adorned with pictures, which proceeded from the hands of the greatest Flemish and Italian masters. Gustavus removed not a single piece, which is more than can be said of some succeeding conquerors. Charles I. of England, as we observed before, had an inclination to perform, what a great warrior effected afterwards\*; but the strictness of Gustavus's morals, would

\* Geographie Universelle, Tom. v. 192,

1632. not allow a depredation, though sanctified with the excuses of *con gusto et con l'amore*. Indeed there was a chimney-piece, of rich marble, which struck the king's fancy; infomuch, that he declared, between jest and earnest, that he had a sort of inclination to transport it to Stockholm: be that as it will, it did not answer my expectations, when I had the opportunity to examine it, and made me conclude, that our hero's excellence lay more in *military* architecture than the *civil*. He was likewise greatly pleased with the good taste and modesty of the monument, erected to the memory of William V. which, instead of being decorated with full bodied weeping angels, scythes, hour-glasses, shanks, and skulls, consisted only of a well-proportioned tomb, with a crucifix a-top.

As to plate, jewels, and other valuable moveables, the Swedes found the palace entirely disfurnished; every thing portable and precious, paintings excepted, being previously removed to Saltzburg, to which city the elector and electress had retired, with duke Albert their brother. And thus the family, that had disturbed the peace of Germany for twelve years, proscribed the persons, or confiscated the possessions, of half the protestant princes, and made almost every village the seat of devastation, at the expence of the lives of more than a million of people, was now obliged to relinquish its own abode, and (labouring under a necessity, almost as disagreeable as lying beneath the ban of the empire) compelled to seek food and refuge in another prince's territories like wanderers and exiles.

When Gustavus entered the town, many of his principal officers persuaded him to plunder this palace, appertaining to the grand fomentor of all disturbances, and commit it to the flames; to which his answer was, *My good friends, let us not imitate our ancestors of confusion, the Goths and Vandals, who, by destroying every thing that belonged to the fine arts, have delivered down to posterity their barbarity and want of taste, as a sort of proverb and by-word of contempt* \*. And here (whatever some authors may assert to the contrary) it appears, from the least disputable authorities, that the elector Palatin discovered a very manly and Christian spirit;

\* Le Vassor; Hist. de Louis XIII. Tom. vii. p. 177.

† Singolarità, &c. di Paganino Gaudenzio, 4º. 128.



for though his Bavarian kinsman had plundered and depopulated all his dominions, stormed Heidelberg, ranfacked the palace, and transported the famous library to Rome, he discovered no joy upon contemplating this reverse of fortune, nor touched a single cabinet, bronze, or picture ; and at dinner Gustavus told him, with a view questionless to his future re-establishment, *that he might soon expect to eat at Heidelberg, as he could now make a repast at Munich.* 1632.

As the king entered this city without bloodshed, he made a present of about five shillings English to all the soldiers then in his army ; and as the inhabitants received him with a chearful countenance, remitted them that third part of the contribution, which he had lately demanded. No attempts were spared by him of the ingratiating kind : he shook one man by the hand, called a second by his name, and ordered a third to be covered ; and with a view to familiarize himself to the eyesight of the populace, it was his custom to marshal his soldiers every morning with the assiduity of a simple colonel ; nor was it unusual with him to dismount various times in one review, take a musquet from the hands of the lowest probationer, and teach him the several postures and motions. And here he shewed the Bavarians, by way of unusual spectacle, the art of firing in platoons, (which we have observed elsewhere to be his own invention) as also another method he had of giving fire upon a new principle in ambuscades.

On the festival of Holy-Thursday, his majesty ordered (for the first time at Munich) the protestant service to be performed in the castle, as likewise a sermon to be delivered on account of his late prosperous enterprize, and made choice of the singing Psalms himself. In the afternoon he went to see the popish manner of celebrating the ascension. Thence attended by two companions, he paid a visit to the Jesuits college, where the rector pronounced to him a very magnificent piece of oratory, to which the king replied extempore, in a manner less turgid, and more laconic ; and as he had been witness, that day, to the celebration of mass, took occasion from thence to enter into a syllogistical discussion of transubstantiation and communion *sub unâ* ; which dispute, say some, concluded with more good manners than utility.

1632. Others again maintain, that he took Gaffion, and another officer with him, purely to entertain the major part of the Jesuits in discourse, and made a digression from the theological parts of the conversation, till at length the reverend fathers gave him some intimations with reference to the train of artillery, which the elector had caused to be concealed. On neither point is it in my power to pronounce with certainty. All we know is, he behaved with great friendliness to the Romish ecclesiastics in general, and, amongst others, treated the Capuchins with visible marks of distinction: which was supposed to be done out of compliment to father Joseph, who kept a private correspondence with him and the other protestant princes. It is moreover thoroughly well known, that he allowed mass to be publicly celebrated during his whole residence in this city; and when a zealous Capuchin exhorted him to embrace the religion of Rome, he heard him with patience, and by his countenance appeared to be in no degree offended, making allowances for the probable goodness of his intentions. He then distributed money to the populace, and ordered alms to be given to the sick and indigent. Yet all this humanity, conjoined with politeness, could not secure to him what he greatly wished to possess; namely, some secreted manuscripts, that had been unjustly taken from the library at Heidelberg.

It was now that the Danish ambassador, whom we have lately mentioned, made a second offer of his master's services in the character of a mediator between Gustavus and the emperor: but the former saw through the artifice, (having some reasons to doubt his northern neighbour's sincerity) and observing at the first glance, that such a proposal served only to gain time, roundly told him, that he could take no step of such extraordinary consequence, without consulting and procuring the assent of those powers, who had called him from the depths of the north into Germany.

St. Etienne took this opportunity to renew his solicitations in behalf of Bavaria, but the king continued immovable upon that subject, and gave him no answers but what consisted of sharp invectives, conceived in general and indistinct terms.

It was matter of surprize with his majesty to find the arsenal of Munich entirely dis-garnished of cannon, which some months before

was



was well known to be the best furnished of any in Germany. It is true 1642.  
 he found the carriages, but they were all dismounted of their artillery.  
 At length, having received some private intelligence concerning the matter, he set himself, the next day, (according to his own phrase) to *unbury the dead*; and breaking up the pavement, where no marks of concealment were visible, discovered in large vaults beneath, one hundred and forty pieces of field and battering ordnance, twelve of which were very fine ones, of uncommon shape and workmanship, which the elector used to style (if the profaneness of the expression may be pardoned) the twelve apostles. Three other pieces were found, so very large, that it was not possible to remove them to any considerable distance; and on many of them were to be seen the arms of Brunswic, Denmark, and the Palatinat: and in the undermost of them all, sur-  
 named *die sau* \*, was discovered a cartridge more efficacious in war than those generally approved of, for it contained 15000 Hungarian ducats. Abundance of regimentals were likewise found, wherewith the king clothed a considerable part of his army. And now he made a short excursion from Munich, in order to chastise the Bavarian peasants, who had massacred his soldiers, and mangled and tortured them in the cruelest manner; to which, it must not be dissembled, the licentiousness of the Swedes had administered no small provocation, much to their master's displeasure; for the best disciplined troops are apt to grow insolent and barbarous, when it is their fortune to over-run a rich country without opposition.

Whilst the king repressed the insurrection of the peasants, Cratz in his absence attacked Munich without success †: he then made a detachment of 2000 infantry and Cronenberg's regiment of horse, and rendered himself master of Weisseburg, where through some misapprehension, supposed to be intentional, the articles of capitulation were violated by the Bavarian: and 800 Swedish infantry, and 200 horse put to the sword. The king wrote a sharp letter to the elector on the con-

\* In English, the female wild swine, an emblem of fury, the torrent of that ravaging river the *Isar* signifies *die sau*, and is so called by the natives.

† Historical or Authentic Relation, in Low Dutch, Tom. ii. p. 72.

1632. duct of his general; he threatened a retaliation at Munich (but it was only a threat, for he never performed it,) and demanded Cratz in person to be delivered up to his justice.

Flushed with this slight success at Weiffenburg, the elector of Bavaria returned from Saltzburg to Ratisbon †, and prevailed on the magistracy, as well as Salis the governor, to admit some companies of infantry, by way of garrison, who, under pretence of being reviewed, marched out of town on Sunday morning during the time of divine service, discharging a certain number of musquet-shots as a sort of signal.---The general Cratz ‡ (that partly replaced Tilly,) who lay in ambush hard by, rushed into the city at the head of 2000 foot, and 500 cavalry; and, what

† A most agreeable city with a magnificent bridge across the Danube, which in the Gothic taste may be pronounced to be an extremely fine one. The diet of the empire hath been usually held here, having received no interruption from 1662 to 1742: when Charles VII. being chosen emperor, and making war against the house of Austria, convened the diet at Francfort upon the Mayn, which on the election of Francis I. was referred to Ratisbon.

And here perhaps it may be allowed me to remark incidentally, that few places can be more instructive to a traveller, who goes abroad more to improve his mind, than his eyes or ears. For here he may have access to men of chosen understandings, deputed not only from every state and principality in Germany, but from courts of great consequence beyond the limits of the empire: and thus within a circle of considerable circumference may learn from the best instructors the maxims, policy, forms of government, military force, commerce, &c. of various nations; the northern especially: advantages, not to be procured so easily either in a great metropolis, or even at the Hague, where the more curious stranger must depend not only on an affluence of fortune, but on the peculiar gifts of address, and recommendations of the strongest nature from people of distinguished rank and knowledge.

‡ John Philip, count de Scharpfenstein. I

cannot pass by this strange phenomenon of a warrior without subjoining a note, whose history extends beyond the death of the king of Sweden: for Cratz's life was a series of bravery, misfortune, and ill-management. He was an officer of long service, and gave the favourable turn to the battle of Prague in 1618, for which reason he was created a count by the emperor. It was his maxim never to quit the field of action; and thus it was his unhappiness to be taken prisoner at the battle of Leipzig. It was not in the elector of Bavaria's power to make him generalissimo over the army of the league conformably to Tilly's dying advice; for upon that promotion Walstein threatened to abandon him to the resentments of the Swedes without remorse. Upon this Cratz retired, but his master conjured him to return, made him governor of Ingoldstadt, and promised him the post of captain-general in three months. Walstein and he had quarreled originally (many years before this period) about a lady. When Cratz came back to his duty, he gave the former a piece of intelligence relating to the enemy, formed upon his own ocular observation. Walstein called an aid de camp, and bid him mount on horse-back, and see if the circumstances were truly related: upon which Cratz challenged him without ceremony, and told him he would make his sword speak plainer than his tongue.



what was still more imprudent, allowed his soldiers to commit most outrageous 1632.

The duke de Weymar, or, as some say, Gustavus Horn \*, thought this a sufficient reason to tempt the Bavarian commander into the Swedish service, and upon an exchange of prisoners sent an officer of parts to try his virtue, disguised in the habit of a trumpeter. This negotiator soon found an opportunity of looking, as if he had something to impart in private. Cratz complied, and having heard his proposal unconcernedly, asked him with a smile, *if the duke would make him bishop of Aichstadt?* Nothing more passed, the officer took the innuendo, and retired.

Some days afterwards, having waited a little for fear of suspicion, the same person returned in the same dress, making Cratz an offer of the post of camp master-general in the Swedish army. In return Cratz agreed to give duke Bernard an opportunity of seizing Ingoldstadt by night, (the key of admision into Bavaria, for Gustavus's successors had not the vanity of aspiring to cross the Lech a second time) and to this purpose dispatched the better part of his garrison on some chimerical errand, giving out likewise, that a body of Aldringer's men had orders to replace these soldiers at Ingoldstadt; for the Swedes were to come at midnight, and personate this little army. But as stratagems and disappointments are often convertible terms in the military profession, duke Bernard and his detachment missed their way, and arrived under the walls a few minutes after day-break. Cratz boldly pronounced this body of troops to be Aldringer's regiments, and ordered the town-gates to be opened; but an officer discovered the Swedish colours (which the troops had brought with them, being sure of entering Ingoldstadt in profound darkness) and perceiving a trumpeter in the first rank, whom Cratz had dispatched that night to Aldringer upon other business, and whom the Swedes had taken prisoner, and made use of as a guide, he immediately comprehended something, and gave the alarm of treachery. Upon this the Swedes returned thoroughly dis-

appointed, and the governor apprehended it was high time to shift the scene. Wallstein soon discovered this perfidy, and dispatched a courier to advertise the elector to arrest Cratz, and ordered Aldringer likewise to seize him, if by chance he passed through Ratisbon. Cratz (who told the officers of his garrison he was going to Vienna in order to lay his commission at the emperor's feet) reached Ratisbon just before the second mentioned express arrived, and had paid a visit to Aldringer, if an officer had not informed him, that that general had devoted the evening to a banquet of festivity, and for certain reasons would be better pleased not to be interrupted. At that instant Cratz's steward informed him by letter, that five companies of infantry had taken up their quarters upon his estate, which tempted him to mount on horseback immediately in order to dispossess them; but an express from a friend at Ratisbon overtook him on the road, and told him Aldringer had seized his equipage and baggage, and dispatched fifty cavaliers to bring him back dead or alive. Uncertain what to do, he pushed on for Poland, through the northern parts of Bohemia, those parts being less crowded with Wallstein's soldiers. In the prosecution of this journey he met an Imperial commander (and they both knew each other very well) returning from making enquiries after him by Wallstein's orders. The officer applied immediately to a Polish nobleman to lend him some vassals in order to pursue and take the offender; but the Polander told him, "It did not become a prince like himself to act the part of a sbirro or a constable." Cratz then reached Cracow, but to his great mortification the king was absent. He then sent an explanation of his conduct to Vienna, and made proposals of reconciliation; but Wallstein was all-powerful in the cabinet there, and no answer was vouchsafed him. After many wanderings from place to place, he at length found his way to the Swedish army, and conformed to the Lutheran religion; joining duke Bernard

\* Galeazzo Gualdo,

1632. outrageous disorders. The elector then joined the garrison with all his forces, and gave directions for new fortifications in various parts. As Ratisbon hath always been considered in the Germanic system as a sort of sacred peculiar, many people looked upon this enterprize as a very

the night before the fatal battle of Nordlingen : which gave that prince so much joy, that he embraced him, and thanked him in the presence of all his officers. Nevertheless, he joined with Horn in the council of war, and pronounced the dispositions of the ensuing day to be rash and hazardous.

In that transaction he repelled the Imperialists in their very first fortunate impression, and killed Aldobrandini, grand prior of Malta, with his own hand, and to his infinite regret, for he was the nearest and dearest to him of all his friends ; but in the hurry of the action he did not recollect him. Duke Bernard stayed on the field as long as he could, without incurring the suspicion of being thought a madman, and at length consented with tears in his eyes to a retreat ; and as Cratz had fought all day with 1600 Swedes against 4000 Imperialists, he implored him by an aid de camp to consult his safety, and retire immediately. His answer was, that he would secure the retreat of the army, and have the honour to follow him by and by. There he fought on till not a single soldier was left at his elbow, and mixing with the enemy's troops, walked up and down the field (being unhorsed long before) with his sword and pistols in his hand, intermixing with a few inferior officers and soldiers ; their language and his being the same. At length he was left almost alone, and one Fontana, a Croatian captain, contemplating him for some moments, (for he was a fine figure, and a person unknown to him) whispered him in the ear, with an oath, that he would make an excellent prisoner. This man had certain reasons to suspect something ; for whilst all the troops a few minutes before had expressed a transport of joy for the victory, the person in question appeared remarkably grave and thoughtful. Cratz, who supposed Fontana by his air to be a French officer, told him instantly in that language, he would give him

5000 l. to effectuate his escape, and a colonel's commission in the enemy's army. The Croatian took him at his word, and demanded his pistols and sword by way of military submission. Cratz delivered the former, but insisted that a gentleman should never resign his sword ; which puncto of delicacy in all probability cost him his head. For as they moved along, in order to recover the rear of the Swedish army, a thought struck Fontana, that his own colonel had been killed by a prisoner, who had promised him a large recompence. Upon this he shaped his way to the Imperial camp, and meeting a flying party of Swedes, who knew their general, and made an attempt to rescue him, he cried out aloud for help, and a squadron of Lorrainers flew to his assistance, who recollected Cratz at first sight. His friends thought fit to desert him upon this fresh onset, and thus he became an easy prisoner : for the horse Fontana had given him was so fatigued, that it could hardly move.

Being carried to the duke of Lorraine's tent, that prince told him peevishly and hastily enough, that he would teach such commanders as he how to traduce a duke of Lorraine to the French king. To which Cratz answered, That his highness laboured under some mistake ; for since he did not own the accusation, it was plain he had not deserved it, it being his custom to say more to men's faces than in their absence.

The king of Hungary had the curiosity to make him a visit incognito, and ordered his sword to be restored him, which the duke of Lorraine had taken away. Bernard of Sax-Weymar offered the payment of any sum to discharge his ransom, or proposed to exchange the bishop of Wurtzburg against him, a prelate and prince of far greater consequence than the prisoner. But the court of Vienna, or rather Walstein, persisted inflexible, and brought him to death, as he justly merited, on a public scaffold.

bold



bold and hazardous one. The court of Vienna was startled at it, and the magistracy preferred a complaint of the violation of systematical rights to the emperor, who, as he feared to irritate the elector at this juncture, besought him, by means of the most lively representations, to behave himself with great caution and lenity upon the occasion. 1632.

During this interval, Offa, the Imperial commissary, newly created general, who had the superintendency of affairs in Alsatia, Tyrol, and the circle of Suabia, besieged Biberach with an army of 7000 men, composed out of the arch-duke's old corps, the Lorraine-troops, and those, that had served against Mantua. His majesty soon determined to raise the siege, and dispatching 8000 men to that effect, overtook them himself near the river Iser, having thrown a bridge over it, and appointed, before his departure, the valiant Hepburn to be governor of Munich. Offa, on the king's approach, retired to Lindau and the lake of Constance. He lost many troops before the town, and, to his particular mortification, was repulsed chiefly by the women, who not only exhorted their husbands to behave courageously, but carried ammunition from place to place, and threw down fragments of stone from the walls on the assailants.

By this time the resentments of Walstein, who stood before the elector of Bavaria in the military commission, began to exasperate, as well as endanger affairs overmuch; for the court of Vienna did not care to see that prince humbled to the dust, and yet dreaded the consequences of receiving an impression from Gustavus in the central parts of the hereditary dominions. At length the generalissimo, who affected to be without a master, and above direction, found himself obliged, through common decency, though with infinite reluctance, to take the field in the beginning of April, and leaving the elector and Tilly (which latter was then living) to become a prey to the conqueror, employed himself upon more easy operations against the Saxons; namely, the reduction of Bohemia. The elector of Saxony, flushed with the success gained at the battle of Leipzig, had a fine army on foot with respect to numbers, and external show: but as that prince was both indolent and insincere: and as Arnheim was always prepared to negotiate with Wal-

1632. stein, upon condition he could distress the Swedes, whom he hated, extract some advantage for his master, and, above all, make a good separate bargain for himself;—so never was a conquest deserted with more remissness, and less preservation of appearances, than that of Bohemia was. Nevertheless, Walsstein, who was an adept in artifice and dissimulation, felt the elector's pulse first by way of negotiating, and made him considerable offers: yet they were not great enough to counterbalance the danger of relinquishing Gustavus: and perhaps the Saxon ministers, who were no way deficient in point of cunning, concluded likewise, that the emperor had not power enough at that time to realize his promises. Supposing both, or either to be the case, Walsstein in part carried the point he aimed at, which was, to render the Saxons suspected to the Swedes. Some historians assign other reasons, which appear to me not quite demonstrative; as that Walsstein made these advances out of gratitude, because the elector had spared his fine palace at Prague, and moreover had been alarmed a little by Battista Seni his astrologer, who predicted in that month the culmination of a planet very unpropitious and adverse to his fortunes. Be these things as they will, the treaty at that time vanished into nothing, though colonel Spar, by Walsstein's orders, had gained over most of the Saxon officers by the mediation of such generosities, as always came from Walsstein, who little dismayed with this disappointment, repaired to Pilsen, and reviewed his army, where, by his bounty and dexterity, he had collected together all the disbanded veteran troops, that had ever served under the Imperial ensigns, and took care to attract to himself each commander of note, who had declined the service out of ill humour against the court of Vienna, or from attachment or personal friendship to himself. Nor omitted he to solicit any officer of note (of which sort there were then many) whose swords and consciences were equally vendible. For though he punished with more than Roman rigidity, yet he rewarded with more than Roman profusion; and for this reason men, who knew they had military merit, delighted to act under his directions. Nor was the court of Vienna idle in her co-operations. Orders were given to supply the army with every necessary, that could be imagined. The provinces  
were



were all implored to make generous contributions, and upwards of 1632. 30000 pounds were sent to Aldringer to put the troops in motion, which he commanded in Suabia. At the same time a considerable re-inforcement was expected from Poland, as the diet had been convened at Warsaw the month before, and as the emperor formerly had sent 10,000 men under Arnheim to the assistance of the Poles in consequence of a treaty of alliance concluded in 1621: but Sigismund (who died soon afterwards) had an incurable aversion to engage himself in any further conflicts with Gustavus, and pleaded, by way of excuse, the intractable nature of his form of government, and the apprehensions he had of new disturbances from the side of Tartary and Muscovy. It is true this prince loved the house of Austria cordially and unfeignedly, but the states maintained a sort of intelligence with Gustavus. So to content the king for this undutifulness of theirs, they made a very decent provision for a couple of his sons, at the expence of two considerable bishopricks.

At Pilsen Walsstein received a deputation from the senate of Nuremberg. The gentlemen, who composed it, represented to him, that the honours and civilities paid the king of Sweden were things of indispensable necessity at that time, and in that conjuncture of affairs. Walsstein knew their errand before they spoke, and, with an air of politeness and indifference, put their memorial into his pocket without reading it. Nevertheless, he entertained them with a magnificent repast, and ordered an escort of troops to conduct them home.

He then, at the head of 40,000 men invested Prague, which was defended by 2000 regular Saxons, and about 5000 militia. The garrison made good shew of resistance at first, and after a considerable breach was opened, repulsed the enemy in two several attacks, which enraged Walsstein to such a degree, that having commanded his infantry to make a third attempt, he ordered two regiments of horse to push them on with drawn swords, and by these means compelled them to mount the breach.

Thus Lesser Prague was taken: the garrison retired to the castle, where they and the rest of the Saxon troops agreed to surrender at the

1632. expence of their artillery, ammunition, and colours, reserving nothing to themselves except their swords, and seventy baggage-waggons, which were granted them; upon which the emperor sent Wallstein a patent to create him duke of Great Glogau in Silesia.

It was about this time, that the elector of Bavaria, who found himself standing on the brink of a precipice, determined to make the bold adventure once for all freely and openly, without reserving to himself the possibility of playing an after-game either with France or with Gustavus. Of course he consigned his life and fortunes to the emperor's protection, hoping perchance by such an implicit act of generosity to extort compassion; and published a manifesto \* (which may be considered as no mean effort of political ability) wherein having taken care not once to mention Wallstein, whom he hated, or the king of Sweden, whom he dreaded, and touching gently on his *thrice-dear* cousin, the elector Palatin, whose patrimony had been devoured by him, he paints in the warmest colouring his indispensable allegiance to the emperor, as well as his obligations of gratitude, and supposes none could suspect him of concluding a separate bargain with a great western monarch, (with whom he had signed and ratified the eighth of May 1631 †) but such as were either professed enemies to his prosperity, or detractors from his virtue. He then pays France in the same breath no small tribute of adulation, but obliquely insinuates, in the words of the prophet, (alluding to that crying sin of co-operating with heretics) *That thou, meaning France, stoodest that day on the other side, in the day, that the strangers carried away captive our forces, and foreigners entered into our gates, and cast lots upon Jerusalem; even thou wast as one of them ‡.*

There is a certain circumstance very peculiar in this manifesto: for though it mentions abundance of facts, yet they are so cautiously collected, and alledged in such general terms, that it is not possible to ascertain the chronology of this extraordinary composition; since all we know thereof is purely this, that it was dispersed here and there in various courts, about the spring of the year 1632.

\* Swedish Intelligencer, Part ii. p. 182, & seqq.

† See the treaty in the APPENDIX.

‡ Obadiah, verse 11.



As it is not my intention to describe the war in full detail, (with exception only of those parts where Gustavus was present) it may suffice to observe, in regard to Walsstein, that in six weeks, after his acceptance of the dictatorship, and just as long before the death of Tilly, he had good sense and foresight enough, to dispatch Don Baltazar di Maradas \*, at the head of 8000 men, into Bohemia, with a view to distress and harass the Saxons. The vigilant Spaniard (though in truth a better courtier than a general, for he had three or four civil employments, equally lucrative and honourable, *his armis illa quoque tutus in aula*;) made a shift however to take Satz, the capital of a circle, by some called Zadeck; and having utterly ruined Bindhauf's regiment, which composed the garrison, gave the first check to the cause of the protestants. Indeed the elector of Saxony's conduct was quite inexplicable, in an upright sense, for (besides some omissions, already mentioned, not wholly reconcileable to a sincere alliance) he had left Bohemia, not many weeks after the reduction of Prague, at a time when he was victorious without opposition, and carried Arnheim his general with him, under pretence, that no one else was capable of negotiating with Oxenstiern at the diet of Torgau, which was held in February, 1631, and to which the emperor dispatched a deputy, who proposed some indistinct advantages; but the Swedish chancellor soon cut the matter short, by telling him roundly, (whether with sincerity or otherwise one cannot say,) that the king, his master, and his protestant allies, expected first, by way of preliminary, to see the expences of two campaigns refunded to them.

What still rendered matters more suspicious, was, that previously to this, the elector of Saxony, in his own person, received proposals from a duke of Sax-Lauenberg †, who had reconciled himself to the catholic religion, and acted the part of an Imperial agent. Nor was it less extraordinary, that a prince, uninterrupted in his conquests, should relinquish a country, at least in effect, three better parts whereof he had entirely

\* To this commander a pretended Low Country captain alludes, in one of Dryden's plays; Allusions are made to him likewise in some of Johnson's latter comedies.

† Henry Julius.

*Brave men at arms! but weak to Baltazar.*

1632. subdued, at a time when hardly any opposition could be made against him ; and when his own troops, not to mention the addition of count Thurn's army, amounted, in case he had chosen to collect them, to 10,000 cavalry, and 27,000 infantry. I am sensible, it is true, that this number may appear to many readers over-charged ; but then the Saxons must make themselves responsible to posterity for the mistake, since the lists stood thus, according to the accounts, which they themselves published. Dewbatel likewise lay in Lusatia at the elector's elbow, and with his own Swedes, Germans, and Hamilton's English, had expelled Goëtz and Tieffenbach out of that province ; and besides this, the elector of Brandenburg had 8000 men, all prepared to unite themselves with Dewbatel, which junction was afterwards effected.

Nor must we here pass by another piece of equivocal conduct in the elector of Saxony, for though, on the reduction of Prague, most of the late proscribed and exiled protestants returned home, after a migration of twelve years, yet they found their new friends so very vigilant and clear-sighted, in the article of levying contributions, that the difference appeared to them only *nominal*, between an *evangelic* or *papistical* government : so, of course, the greater part withdrew themselves, as voluntary exiles, to the very places, which they had lately quitted.

But before we permit the king to leave Munich entirely, it may be highly necessary, to lay open a very extraordinary conversation betwixt him and the English ambassador, which has created me more perplexities, than any single incident through the whole progress of my work ; and so much the rather, since, though I have strong reasons to conjecture, that his majesty's conduct might be justified, if any accounts could be obtained besides this of Vane, (who hated Gustavus, and had neither parts nor inclination to interfere on the continent) yet the misfortune is, that no professed historian, on the subject of this period, mentions a single circumstance relative to the present affair. Notwithstanding all which, the love of truth, joined with a disapprobation of mean partiality, forces me to lay the transaction before the eyes of the public, and leave it to work its own way upon the reader's mind. It had been easy for me to have suppressed the whole story, as being the first producer thereof,

after



after it had slept in undisturbed security for the space of one hundred and twenty five years : but it is not my principle to serve even an heroe under such conditions. All men have, more or less, some failings of human nature ; nor pretend I to engage myself in delineating a faultless character \* : yet, by a singular turn of good fortune, which a person more superstitious than myself might be apt to magnify, it may perhaps atlength lie in my power to throw some little light upon Vane's perplexing darkness, and extenuate, if not entirely disculpate, his majesty's conduct. In the first place, therefore, I shall present the reader with Vane's letter, or memorial, transmitted by him to the court of Whitehall, which (from an affectation impossible to be accounted for) is drawn up in French : a language then, and now, better known in Germany than English, in case his packet had been intercepted ; which appears to me no small degree of imprudence. Nor was he so far skilled in the Gallic idiom, as to have pretensions for abjuring his maternal tongue, in order to make a figure in some foreign language. Be that as it will, the account, translated, runs as follows.

“ The lieutenant-colonel Duglas †, being thrown into a common  
 “ prison, by his majesty's orders, for making a journey to Munich  
 “ without his master's permission, it was my fortune the next morning,  
 “ the sixteenth instant ‡, (the king being then upon the point of leav-  
 “ ing the said city) as I was going to take my leave of the king of  
 “ Bohemia, to meet his Swedish majesty, by pure accident, in the great  
 “ salon, when it appeared to me neither impertinent nor unseasonable  
 “ to solicit him in favour of the said Duglas, and make an attempt to  
 “ procure his liberty ; remonstrating in his behalf, that though he had  
 “ taken this step without his majesty's concurrence or consent, yet that ne-  
 “ vertheless he had obtained permission and leave to go from the Swedish

\* One or two voluminous German compilers assert, that Gustavus had a natural son, supposed to be born about two years before he espoused the princess of Brandenburg : but I have never yet received lights enough, to say any thing in support of the allegation. And for the same reason, have passed by an Italian story, of the love-

dispute between him and the duke of Sax-Lauenberg.

† This officer, afterwards Sir George Duglas, betook himself to a civil employment ; see p. 187.

‡ May, 1632.

“ chancellor,

1032. “ chancellor. Upon which the king kindling into some warmth, *swore*  
 “ *he would take care to see the chancellor hanged.* As his majesty went  
 “ down stairs, in order to step into his coach, I renewed my applica-  
 “ tions, and besought him, once more, to receive Douglas into favour :  
 “ upon which, turning short, he replied with vehemence, *By heaven !*  
 “ *if you speak one syllable more on that subject, I will order the man to be*  
 “ *hanged before your eyes :* to which my reply was, *that I hoped his ma-*  
 “ *jesty would never commit such a sort of action.* And why so ? answered  
 “ the king ; *by heavens ! if your master was present, I would do the same ;*  
 “ *and if the man, who has affronted me in this manner, were held in*  
 “ *the arms of his Britannic majesty, I would tear him thence, although obliged*  
 “ *to go to England for that purpose, and commence a war of an hundred*  
 “ *years duration : but sure I am, the king of England will never support a*  
 “ *subject in a cause, where I am affronted.* To which my answer was, *Your*  
 “ *majesty may say at Munich whatsoever pleaseth you, but will never persist*  
 “ *in such an opinion after mature reflexion.* Upon which he replied, *Do*  
 “ *not tempt me into a passion.* Sire, said I, *you cannot be offended, when an*  
 “ *ambassador of Britain interferes for one of his master’s subjects.* Well then,  
 “ rejoined the king, *I at length release him upon your parole only, but will*  
 “ *not be affronted a second time\*.* To which my answer was, *Sire, it*  
 “ *never appeared to me in the light of an affront, to interpose in behalf of*  
 “ *a cavalier, who had served your majesty with so much fidelity.* Yes, re-  
 “ plied the king, *to seek to quit my service, after I had released him, was*  
 “ *not only an affront, but a contravention of my military edicts†.* Sire,  
 “ added I, *I acknowledge the favour, which your majesty hath formerly*  
 “ *granted to my solicitations ; and it will still be a fresh act of clemency, if*  
 “ *you condescend to pardon him, even after a second transgression.* To which  
 “ the king added once more, *Do not provoke me into a passion.* Adieu, sire,  
 “ replied I ; and being on the point of departing from him, *By hea-*  
 “ *vens !* cried the king, *the fellow is a rascal, and I do not chuse to be*

\* The king meant Douglas, but Vane artfully enough takes it upon himself.

† By this time it appears, that Sir Henry

Vane had interceded formerly for Douglas, on some other offence, and obtained his pardon.

“ served



“ served by such sort of animals. May it please your majesty, answered I, 1632.  
 “ I have always understood, that the subjects of the king, my master, have  
 “ rendered you the most excellent and faithful services. Yes, said the king,  
 “ I acknowledge the people of your nation have served me well, and  
 “ far better than any others; but this dog, concerning whom we are talking,  
 “ hath affronted me, and I am resolved to chastise him. It was my purpose  
 “ then to have resumed the conversation, but the king cut me short,  
 “ by saying, Sir, I request you not to take exception at what hath lately passed  
 “ from my lips; it was the effect of a warm and hasty temper. I am at  
 “ present entirely cool, and beseech you to pardon me\*.”

It is now high time to make some observations on this extraordinary dialogue, concerning which I shall briefly premise, (though the remark hath been made by me more times than one) that Gustavus's frailty was an undue warmth of temper, which, at the same time, manifested the goodness of his heart; for the people, that served under him, did not dislike an harsh expression from him, inasmuch as his anger was momentary only, and the amends he made those, whom he had chagrined, more than repaid them for the transitory uneasiness of a slight mortification. Perhaps one cannot defend him better, upon this occasion, than by inserting the very words of his own apology, to his generals, at a council of war; *I am thought by many of you, said he, to speak hastily, and angrily, on certain conjunctures: but alas, consider, my fellow soldiers, what a weight lies upon my mind. I am to perform all, and be present every where; and when the human thoughts are on the stretch, obstacles and interruptions of the grand pursuit make men peevish. You must bear with my infirmities, in the same manner as I submit to yours: one general has a tendency to avarice, another hath a passion for wine, a third wishes to wage war with the cruelty of a Croatian: yet, without going further than admonishing and advising you, I have discarded no man, but, on the contrary, have kept you all about my person, and, more or less, esteemed you all †.*

Thus far with regard to the sudden breakings out of a great and high spirit, like that of Gustavus. As to Vane's narration, much may be

\* Sir Henry Vane's letters in the Paper-office.

† See Soldat Suedois, p. 865, &c.

1632. remarked; it is certain he disliked the king, neither had the king a favourable opinion either of his abilities, or of his intentions. It appears, by the notes on his memorial, and from what shall be remarked before we leave the subject, that he sets forth just so much as serves to gratify his own spleen, namely, that Douglas came to Munich by Oxenstiern's constrained consent, without the king's permission. But from the face of his own recital, it appears highly suspicious, that a passion, so fierce and violent, as he describes the king's to be, must have been kindled and exasperated by something more offensive, and more provoking, than Sir Henry chuses to discover; for Gustavus alludes to ingratitude, (having pardoned Douglas once before, at the ambassador's intercession) as likewise to disobedience, personal affront, and a thought conceived of passing over perhaps into the enemy's service.

It appears, in the next place, that Vane was answerable, in a great degree, for that very anger, in the representation of which he labours afterwards to traduce the king's character: for his solicitation was of the teizing kind; and when he had gained his point, he still wanted *more last words*. With the petulance and peevishness of an angry woman, he caught at those circumstances, where he knew the king's temper was inflammable, and dwelt upon them: and when he received a rough answer, laid the foundation of producing a second, that was still harsher. His sincerity likewise is much to be doubted; he knew Gustavus better, than to suppose him in earnest about hanging Douglas; yet makes a reply with the gravity of a school-divine, or a casuist; and when the king speaks of Douglas's second affront, passes that by, and supposes the affront to proceed from himself. Nor stands he quite clear in point of politeness, and common good manners; for when Gustavus felt the infirmity of passion coming upon him, (as Vane still administered fresh fuel to it) and besought him twice to drop the conversation, and not push matters to greater extremities; yet he still persists, even after he had obtained the object of his wishes. Under this class of incivility I rank likewise, the telling a passionate person, that he threatens more than he ever could expect to realize upon mature reflection. Whoever knows the human mind, knows, that such a reflection carries its own poignancy



gnancy along with it; and sure it was highly rude and indecent to assure the king, that he might perform at Munich what he durst not presume to command in England. 1632.

It is my good fortune to know enough of the chronology of the history before me, to subjoin a further remark. Vane was either resolved to exasperate Gustavus, or ill understood the better half of his ambassadorial trade, which consists in seizing the *moments of address*; since, by the *diary* of the king's actions, it appears, that he was *then* stepping into his coach, in a great hurry, in order to raise the siege of Biberach, and give Ossa battle. Now on such an occasion, it may well be supposed, that his majesty's spirits were all on a flame, and his mind wholly occupied on a subject, where interruption only (without impropriety, teizing, or ill manners) would naturally excite some hasty and unguarded answers.

Nevertheless, after various perplexities and difficulties under this head, it may be possible, at last, to obtain some knowledge of the groundwork of his Swedish majesty's resentments, and that from a person no less instructed than Fowler\*, secretary to Douglas, afterwards created a baronet, who, in consequence of this embroilment, exchanged the laurel for the olive, and passed from England to Poland in the character of ambassador extraordinary, with instructions to administer his mediatorial assistances at the treaty of Stumbsdorf, in Prussia, 1635. As Fowler loved and honoured his master extremely, it is highly natural to expect no great partiality on the Swedish side; yet enough is said, whereby one may be enabled to annex some vindication to the character of Gustavus.

Once for all therefore we will make an abstract of the author's narrative †.

Douglas transported a company of Scottish infantry into Sweden, in the year 1623; and was afterwards advanced to be lieutenant-colonel in

\* History of the troubles of Suethland, and Poland, &c. Relation of the treaty of pacification, between Poland and Suethen, concluded at Stumbsdorf, in 1635. Brief commemoration of the life and death of Sir Geo. Douglas,

knight, lord ambassador extraordinary from England, fol. Lond. 1656, inscribed to the lord-protector.

† Fowler's History, 216—219.

1632. Sir James \* Ramsey's regiment of foot ; and as that officer happened to receive a disagreeable wound, (as we have mentioned before in its proper place) he commanded the corps at the siege of Wurtzburg-castle, if my relation *fail* not ; and † at the taking of Creütz-nach, he, by the king's commands, repressed the insolencies of the soldiery, in so satisfactory a manner, that his majesty destined him to be the governor of that most important place.

But before this commission could be signed, a reverse of fortune, from a commander, rendered him a prisoner ; for on account of some strange expressions, in an address, or letter, to the king, his master, (who was naturally warm, and very jealous, in points of honour) sent orders to confine him ; but on re-considering the whole affair more coolly, forthwith commanded him to be set at liberty, and directed, that his commission of governor should be delivered to him.

“ And here it may be thought, faith Fowler, that our lieutenant-colonel had cause to rest contented, having received ample satisfaction, “ by a preferment so honourable ‡:” but the Scottish gentleman was more irritable and irascible than the Swedish monarch, protesting he had received an affront, which he would bear from *no hand whatsoever* ; and therefore when Oxenstiern tendered him the commission, he demanded a pass for Munich, in order to controvert the matter with his sovereign. This, the chancellor told him, he could not, and dared not grant ; but upon over-persuasions, (as he personally loved the man) he at length, with reluctance, granted him a short furlo, that he might, if he pleased, attend the king, and demand his dismissal.

What made Douglas the more peremptory and importunate, was the hope of sheltering himself under Vane's wing, the British ambassador then going to Munich ; who never in his heart loved Gustavus, and therefore, it is probable, encouraged Douglas to embroil the misunderstanding afresh. And this greatly exasperated the king, who thought the am-

\* Some say Alexander Ramsey. See p. 115.

† Here Fowler suspecteth a mistake : we will subjoin, that he ought to have said Marienberg-castle.

‡ Such it certainly was, for the king endangered his life in taking this fortress, which he considered as the strongest place he had ever besieged.



bassador and soldier had both conspired to give him the bravado in the name of the British nation. 1632.

Nor did Duglas use any address, or management, upon this occasion ; but, instead of employing his friends to seize the *mollia tempora* of applying to Gustavus, presented himself abruptly before him, in a public tennis-court, where the kings of Sweden and Bohemia were amusing themselves.

This want of respectful duty, and common good breeding, soon struck a mind like the king's, naturally warm on receiving affronts : Sir, said he, *why are not you at your post of command ?* Sire, replied Duglas, *I have none.* Commit him to prison then, rejoined the king, and spoke no more \*.

This spirited act of authority, which the ambassador mistakenly considered as an insult on the prince he served, and the whole British nation, made both him and the king alike peevish before hand, and equally inflammable.

Thus have we given a slight re-capitulation of all that Fowler says in behalf of his patron, which seems (according to the best of our judgment) to encline the turn of the scale in favour of the northern monarch. Fowler declares too †, that he knew all the dialogue, which passed between the king and the ambassador, and yet, for certain reasons, thought convenient to suppress it. For my own part, I have ventured to recover it from darkness, and hope (as it was my business to conceal no one considerable fact in history) that I have thereby done no injury to the manes of Gustavus, who, to shew his humanity, and forgiving temper, after a short recollection, released Duglas a second time. The former part Vane himself acknowledges, in a subsequent

\* It was certainly Duglas's duty, to have asked his dismissal by letter or memorial, (staying on his post till a proper substitute could be found to replace him) and not have left so important a charge in the midst of war, and the royal army so far removed from him. By all military laws, he merited death for disobedience ; nor could he say to the king, he had *no employ*, (as

he did with vivacity and impertinence) till he had first petitioned to be discharged, and had beheld his successor. For if the commander of a town, upon any disgust, not represented, is at full liberty to leave his charge, what prince, or general, can be safe with such a servant, or who can be secure from treachery, or desertion ?

† Page 219.

1632. letter \* to secretary Coke, dated from Augsburg, nine days after the first mentioned dispatch : “ the king of Sweden, saith he, (three or four  
 “ days subsecutive from this embroilment †) sent my lord Spense to my  
 “ lodging, professing to be exceeding sorry for the discourse he had held,  
 “ especially wherein it touched the king, my master, which, if it were  
 “ possible, he would redcem at the dearest rate. That he was his ma-  
 “ jesty’s brother, and servant, whose friendship he valued more than any  
 “ others, having none but him, on whom he could rely : that though  
 “ his satisfaction had been public, as well as his offence, yet, not con-  
 “ tent therewith, he would have written to his majesty, by an express,  
 “ to excuse the heat of his passion ; but either he must have accused  
 “ himself, or cast the burthen upon me, as if my sollicitations had pro-  
 “ voked him to that passion, which he willing to avoid, desired me to  
 “ make a favourable report to his majesty.”

But to return to the affairs of Germany : within a few days after this embroilment with Douglas, an embarrassment of a very different nature presented itself to Gustavus ; for his old rival in war, Sigismund, king of Poland, died of an apoplexy ‡, after a wearisome and turbulent reign of forty five years duration. On this event, the Poles were divided in their affections, between Vladislaus (who was the elder son of Sigismund) and Casimir ; and during the interregnum, prince Radzivil §, who loved Gustavus, and had made him a visit in the late king’s decline, (for Sigismund had many warnings of his approaching fate) received orders from the senate, to command the army, then prepared to act against the Muscovites. Some very sensible historians, and Le Vassor ||, amongst the rest, seem disposed to think, that Gustavus had an eye to this kingdom in his own person, which they ground on no other proof, than that Radzivil held a correspondence with him, and that he dispatched ambassadors into Poland, to watch the motions of the future

\* Letters of Sir Henry Vane in the Paper-office.

† His majesty could not make the acknowledgment sooner, for he was absent, in order to raise the siege of Biberach.

‡ April 29, 1632 : and Vladislaus was elected, if I mistake not, the October following. See

more of this negotiation below

§ He had been mortified, because Sapieha, palatin of Vilna, had been preferred to him, as supreme commander in Lithuania. Kobierziski Hist. Vladisl. p. 920.

|| Tom. vii. 179, &c.



election. But his Swedish majesty, at that time, had building enough to erect, without enlarging (and that greatly too) the ichnography of his plan; nor was he a prince to amuse himself, at such a conjuncture, with a prospect so remote from him in point of distance, and so chimerical in its own nature, if one rightly considers the perverseness, as well as changeable dispositions, of the Polanders. Had he not engaged himself in this German expedition, true it is, he had pretensions to urge, and an head and hand capable to support them; but at present it appears to me, that he laboured only to form a party in the diet, sufficient in strength to prolong the *truce* between him and the Polanders, which ended otherwise in three years; a circumstance of great consequence to a warrior, who had his hands full, and wanted no collateral business by way of *succedaneum*. All other steps taken by him, seem conformable to this first idea: and if he preferred Casimir to Vladisläus, it was because the former seemed less attached to the court of Madrid, as well as that of Vienna.

We have related before, that Cratz made himself master of Weissemberg, whilst the king marched from Munich, (where, amongst other things, as we ought to have observed, he seized 8000 new regimentals) in order to give Ossa battle, who had invested Biberach, and crush the insurrection of the Bavarian peasants: but the former, having lost the best part of his artillery, retreated towards Lindau, and the lake of Constance; and the latter submitted without resistance. Upon which occasion, it was observed of Gustavus, that his enemies could never project an undertaking, which he did not counterwork, by devising a remedy the first moment he attained the knowledge of their intentions. So that, upon the whole, it is difficult for us, which to admire most, the inventive powers of his genius, or the celerity, wherewith he executed any design, fresh conceived\*; for it was a maxim with him, that the grand science of war consisted in seizing incidents, or keeping always in a state of preparation against such strokes, as may be unforeseen. He then committed the army to duke Bernard's care, who pursued Ossa almost to the threshold of the Alps, and cut to pieces one of his finest

\* Monro's Second Expedition.

regiments,

1632. regiments, that of Annibal count Hohen-Ems, though the commander had thrown himself into a walled village. Eight ensigns were lost, but the count, and 400 soldiers that survived, were sent prisoners to Ulm.

Mean while the king, attended by a few followers, flew to Augsburg, and taking with him from thence, and the country adjacent, a strong detachment, conceived great hopes of relieving Weiffenberg, a place of great importance to him, as it secured the retreat from Augsburg to Nuremberg; but the Bavarian general had performed his business, before it was possible for the Swedish army to arrive, and dreading the approach of Gustavus, evacuated the town almost as soon as he possessed it; which may be considered as no small omission.

It was during the prelude, in Bohemia, towards a more serious and general campaign, but at what period we cannot precisely say, that a party of Imperial troops took Torstenson prisoner, after a sharp rencounter, who was then known to be the best officer of artillery in Europe, and useful to the king, his master, beyond expression. But such singular pieces of good fortune served only to supply Wallstein with fresh opportunities, of exerting that generosity, and magnificence, which were peculiar to him; for he paid Torstenson's ransom to the Croats out of his own purse, and restored him to Gustavus without delay\*.

He then finished the reduction of Bohemia, by investing Egra, where something happened alike heroical and extraordinary, with regard to himself: for the magistrates knowing there was a young lady in the town, whom he passionately esteemed, arrested her, without ceremony or previous notice, and ordered her, upon pain of death, to command the general to desist from his enterprize. This woman, cast by nature in no common mold, made a semblance of complying, with great frankness, and sealing up the following billet, addressed him thus; *Regard not my life; I am prepared to die, upon condition your excellence can obtain true glory, and serve your master with fidelity and success* †. But the females of that age aspired to vie with the men in acts of fortitude: Banier's wife ‡, following her husband, in his expedition into Saxony, was brought

\* Riccius de Bell. Germ. 4°. 412.

† The countess of Lovenstein.

‡ Memoires de l'Electrice Palatin, 4°, 197.



to bed of a male-child in her coach ; which resembles an accident of the same sort, which happened to Agrippina, the wife of Germanicus \*: and at the battle of Rhinfeld, in particular, several ladies stayed in the field during the stress of the action ; nor did they retreat, when the troops of their husbands (who were Imperiallists) appeared to be unsuccessful. So that some were killed, some despoiled, and the remaining few escaped with difficulty †.

By this time Walstein began to edge round towards the eastern sides of the Upper Palatinat, on whose southernmost skirts lay the elector of Bavaria, with all his forces. And now it behoved Gustavus to make an exertion of those great talents, which Providence had bestowed on him ; for he had a conquest to secure behind him of seven or eight hundred miles length, and half the breadth, and two armies to confront, the one equal to his own, and the other doubly superior. Yet, far from being puzzled or dismayed, he maintained a presence of mind, that astonished even his own generals ; and without calling in a single army to his assistance, (of which he had no less than five small ones in the parts adjacent) he rather advised them to pursue their separate operations ; and instead of thinning them by detachments, augmented them rather from his own corps. With the composed coolness therefore of a man victorious, he even divested himself of many commanders, whom he wanted most, if that can be supposed ; for he detached Horn towards the Upper Palatinat, and permitted duke Bernard to pursue Ossa, (whom indeed his brother William replaced in a short space) and left Hepburn commander in chief at Munich, and over the whole duchy of Bavaria ; whilst Oxenstiern, Banier, duke Julius, administrator of Wirtemberg ‡, and Sir Patrick Ruthven, all commanded separate bodies, in or near the circles of Suabia and Franconia. He then made a treaty of accommodation with the city of Strasburg, through whose territory Haracour had lately marched a detachment of Lorrainers, to the assistance of Ossa and

\* Memoires d'Electrice Palatin, 4°, 196.

† Ibid. 198.

‡ The king had some suspicions of this prince, and having confirmed the alliance with him, re-

solved to station an army near him, to enforce the observation of articles, that had been agreed upon *de novo*.

1632. Montecuculi the elder, a circumstance not extremely agreeable to the king's system; and therefore, for these reasons, he spared no pains to bring the Straßburgers into terms of friendship; and the rather, because he thereby secured his chancellor from a like disagreeableness in his government of Mentz, and in the protection of the Lower Palatinat, which department was also consigned him. He had an apprehension too, that a reinforcement of Spanish troops might pass the Valteline from the Milanese, and unite themselves with Ossa; and on this account, wrote a letter, with his own hand, to the cantons of Switzerland, who had lately assembled at Lucerne, and were now adjourning themselves to Baden. Its tenour ran to this effect; and as I have an old translation thereof now before me, I shall content myself with correcting a few inaccuracies of language, and faults of connection, here and there.

“ Gentlemen,

“ Being informed, that the king of Spain attempts, by all possible  
 “ methods, to persuade you to grant free passage to his troops, out  
 “ of Italy, into the parts of Germany now near me, in opposition to  
 “ the progress and prosperity of my arms, and to the advancement of  
 “ his own pernicious and unjust designs, as well as the support and  
 “ assistance of my enemies, and their proceedings; I have thought good  
 “ to exhort and admonish you, in the most affectionate terms, to recollect  
 “ within yourselves, that the republic of Switzerland hath ever hitherto  
 “ flourished in high reputation, and gloriously maintained its liberties,  
 “ against all encroachers and invaders whomsoever, in opposition  
 “ principally to the two houses of Burgundy and Austria, each of  
 “ whom hath made frequent attempts to divest you of those invaluable  
 “ blessings; particularly that liberty, which exceedeth all other sorts;  
 “ namely, the free exercise of conscience; not to mention various efforts  
 “ tending to the destruction of your civil rights and freedom.

“ Therefore, gentlemen, let me beseech you to remember, *that* good  
 “ correspondence, which I have always maintained with your common-  
 “ wealth, and for these reasons, permit me to advise you, to stand vigilantly  
 “ upon your guard from hence forward, persevering firm and  
 “ constant



“ constant within the bounds of an exact neutrality, conformably to  
 “ that right understanding, that still subsisteth between us; neither  
 “ commanding nor allowing passage to the enemy, nor granting him  
 “ assistance or favour under any shape. Otherwise, I shall find myself  
 “ obliged to begin first, and declare hostilities against you; and then (in  
 “ case an event so disastrous should take place) you yourselves would  
 “ draw down the war upon your own heads, and all that ruin, desola-  
 “ tion, and calamity, that usually attend it. But I have conceived  
 “ much better hopes of you, my friends; and, for my own part, here-  
 “ by assure you all in general, and each in particular, of my best love  
 “ and affection towards you \*.”

GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS.

This letter was accompanied by a couple of Scottish colonels, with instructions to solicit leave for levying two regiments of Switzers.

The answer † returned thereto was very polite and cautious, containing a fair assertion, that no demand had been made hitherto on the subject in question, by the court of Madrid: nor should a representation of that nature be listened to, whenever it should happen to be presented. That the neutrality, so generously proposed, was embraced at the same time with the utmost thankfulness, upon supposition, that it interfered not with any pre-existing obligations: and lastly, it was acknowledged, that as the progress of the Swedish army seemed to approach the Alps, it was hoped the Cantons should enjoy their proportionable share of royal favour, and suffer no diminution of rights and revenues in such possessions of theirs, as lay in adjacent provinces, then made, or thereafter to be made, the seat of war.

His majesty, by this time, being returned to Augsburg, and having conquered in two years, or brought over to his interest, near three hundred cities, fortresses, and walled towns, collected together his own little army, which consisted of about eighteen or twenty thousand men, and marched to Donawert.

\* See more of this negotiation, and letter, in Tom. ii. p. 55,

the Hist. or Auth. Relation, in High Dutch, fol. † Mercure François, Tom. xviii. p. 359.

1632. He then took the two episcopal cities of Aichstadt and Dillingen, as likewise Pappenheim-castle, which lies eight miles to the west of Aichstadt, removing the best ordnance in all three places to his grand magazine at Augsbürg. By the seventh of June he arrived in his old encampment at Furt, near Nuremberg, where duke Bernard joined him, who had pursued the Imperialists to the lake of Constance. What his intentions then were, soon appeared to the public, by the answer he made the magistrates, who requested him to honour their city with a visit; *Gentlemen*, said he, *I shall not deny myself the pleasure; but at present, I had much rather see Walstein than Nuremberg* \*. The truth was, the king intended to have passed through the Upper Palatinat, (where Horn then lay) and given Walstein battle, before the elector of Bavaria could have joined him; but the country was so ravaged and wasted, partly by war, and partly by express order from the Imperial general, that the enterprize was rejected, because it was thought impossible to realize it. So that the king, who had actually began his march towards the Walsteiners, returned to his ancient lines, and entrenched himself conformably to the great abilities he possessed in that then-unknown branch of the military science. And here his subsisting himself, in this hazardous situation, for the space of sixty one days, and his resistance of the efforts of 60,000 men with only 20,000, (not to mention, that he had the confidence, upon receiving some small re-inforcements, to attack his adversary sword in hand, though entrenched up to the eyes, and protected with interlaced trees, and battering artillery, beyond number) will be always esteemed, by such generals as are masters of the finer parts of their business, as the highest pitch of ability, which the human mind can attain, in the profession of arms.

Indeed this conduct of his majesty appears nothing near so wonderful in our days, as it certainly was in the last century, forasmuch as the practice has been copied, more or less, by all experienced commanders ever since: yet the exertion of the idea, in its masterly manner of execution, is first due to the great Gustavus. The thing, it must be allowed, ever has and will be a real and equal truth in all ages; but then

\* Swed. Intell, Part ii. 181.



the person, who makes the experiment, must be like the man, whom I have lately mentioned. When a genius, like Gustavus, hath once adjusted certain previous circumstances, he may safely face a treble number of troops for a long duration ; a duration, that may almost depend on his own free choice, and may aspire at the performance of things seemingly impossible, upon very slight foundations, provided they are just ; in resemblance of the great master of mechanics, who used to say, that if certain postulata could be granted him, he would undertake to move the world with a single thread : *Δὲς πρῶτον, καὶ τὸν κόσμον κινήσω.* 1632.

In these encampments against forces sometimes doubly, and sometimes trebly superior, (as was the case partly at Werben, and more particularly here) it is impossible for me, either to analyze the king's abilities, or explain the various principles upon which he proceeded. It may suffice to remark, that in military fortifications, of all sorts, he had then no equal, and particularly in the management of his artillery : it was he, that first garnished the more assailable parts of his camp with those sort of redoubts, the carrying of which resembles storming so many separate towns sword in hand.

Under this article of ordnance I shall just mention a slight circumstance, having touched upon the point, in other parts of my history, more than once. In the former part of the last century, cannons were made much longer than they are at present ; concerning which something was said in the siege of Ingoldstadt, with reference to the piece of artillery, which struck the king's horse ; till at length it was conjectured by some, that a cannon formed two feet and a half shorter than even those in common use might convince mankind, that a ball moves with greater force through a less space, than a larger. This Gustavus proved by repeated experiments, in the year 1624, when an iron ball, of forty eight pounds weight, was found to go farther, from a new short cannon, than another ball of ninety six pounds weight out of a larger piece ; whereas, in other respects it is certain, the larger the bore and ball, the greater the range \*.

\* As to the king's leather-cannon, one Braunius, a German, hath published a dissertation on the subject.

1632. By this time the duke of Bavaria invaded the Upper Palatinat with all his forces, and whilst he reduced Amberg, the principal city of the country, dispatched a part of his army to invest Sultzbach, which belonged to prince Palatin Augustus, whom we have often mentioned. This place, after some resistance, capitulated ; but Schomberg, who commanded the detachment, violated every article of the agreement ; for he enlarged the garrison contrary to the terms stipulated, despoiled the citizens, plundered the prince's castle, and raised one thousand pounds by way of contribution. This scene of perfidy sharpened Gustavus's resentments, and determined him (as we observed above) to enter the said Palatinat, and give the elector battle before he could form his junction with Wallstein : but the country was so wasted and ruined, that it was impossible to subsist a second army therein, and the Imperial generalissimo (who longed to see the duke destroyed, and yet found himself obliged to preserve appearances) had commanded a body of 3600 cavalry to advance to the assistance of the Bavarians.

Mean while, Wallstein, elevated with his late successes in Bohemia, dispatched colonel Spar to the elector of Saxony with fresh proposals of accommodation, who, as things now began to take a less favourable turn with regard to himself, condescended to cast his eyes obliquely upon them. But how great was his astonishment, when he perceived, that Wallstein raised his tone to an immeasurable height, and declared, that the losses the elector had sustained at Leipzig, when Tilly ravaged it, were more than counterbalanced by the reprisals made by the Saxons on the town of Prague : that to re-instate himself into the Imperial favour, he should advance two months pay to the army, freely and speedily resign the bona ecclesiastica he had impropriated, and join in the common cause of expelling Gustavus out of the empire : and then, by way of acknowledgment for all these compliances and advances, the Bohemians were to enjoy the free exercise of the evangelical religion.

In truth, Wallstein underneath these appearances determined to make Saxony an example of terror, and therefore requested concessions impossible to be granted, or extremely dishonourable. He besides had a great number of pensioners in the electoral army (the titular prime-minister



minister was one, though Arnheim indeed was every thing) and always expected some advantage either from mutiny or defection. Some letters too had been discovered, previously to this period, between him and the general, which gave the Swedes no small suspicions \*. But matters were not yet ripe for defection on the Saxon side. 1632.

It was therefore Walftein's design to intercept the retreat of Arnheim's army, in the noted pass and defilé between Auffig and Leütmeritz, concerning which we have spoken amply elsewhere. To this purpose he approached his enemies as near as he could without alarming them, and ordered some troops (under pretence of taking in an inconsiderable town or two) to file off privately towards Saxony. He then made new proposals, and not disadvantageous ones to Arnheim, and sent an officer of great experience, whose person was unknown to the Saxons, to deliver their conditions to him, being disguised in the habit of a trumpeter. Thus he learned the posture and situation of the enemy's camp. It was unlucky for Walftein, that Arnheim had been in former days his pupil, his confident, and his favourite. The scholar soon penetrated into the designs of the master, but profoundly disssembled all sort of suspicion, and affected to exhibit an ignorance of the march of any troops, whose business it was to intercept him : and wrote back by the trumpeter, that he had authority and orders to treat, and was ready to do so at a minute's warning, and then dispatched couriers every hour with fresh expresses, growing each moment more compliable. That night he passed his cannon and army over the bridge at Leütmeritz, which he broke down immediately after him, having previously detached a chosen body of troops to secure Auffig, and consequently both sides of the Elb : and by preventing the Walfteiners in this single circumstance, entirely ruined all their scheme. At Pirna he crossed the Elb on a bridge of boats, and entrenched himself strongly, waiting for his master and Banier, who had promised to re-inforce him with 10,000 men. Though this retreat depended more on political than military genius, and though it cannot be compared in all points with that of Banier in the year 1630, and many others during the course of the

\* Chemnitzius de Bello Sueco-Germanico, Tom. i.

1632. thirty years war ; yet it must be acknowledged to be a very fine one, and may be considered as the master-piece of Arnheim's performances in the capacity of a general. Thus in half a campaign the emperor recovered Bohemia with the same ease, that he lost it in a preceding one.

During this interval, Pappenheim, general of the catholic league in Lower Saxony, had several rencounters of various nature and fortune against the Swedes, availing himself of the misunderstanding, that subsisted amongst their commanders. The magistrates of Hildesheim sent him a message of accommodation, to which he returned for answer, that he would make them a visit very soon, and save them the trouble and expence of a formal deputation ; notwithstanding which, he never had the power to keep his word. Amongst others, the landgrave of Hesse-Cassel set himself to oppose his conquests, and met with several disagreeable checks here and there ; about which time an event broke out, which had like to have done the Swedish cause considerable mischief : some Danish soldiers had been cut to pieces in the town of Friedberg, by the troops of the archbishop of Bremen, who was an ally of the crown of Sweden. The courts of Vienna and Bruxelles took care to aggrandize the breach of faith to the utmost : and Pappenheim dextrously laid hold of an expedient, which missed little of detaching the Danish king from the Swedish, and throwing the former into the arms of the emperor : for possessing many towns in the diocese of Bremen, (where the prince of Denmark was co-adjutor) and finding it expensive, and perhaps hardly possible to keep them, he offered to sell them at a price convenient to his Danish majesty, thereby hoping to produce a misunderstanding between Sweden, Denmark, and Bremen. But when the states of the second of these countries were convened to take the proposal into consideration, the prudence of the sage and moderate soon got the better of a few impetuous and turbulent spirits, who gave heedlessly into the snare. And thus the misconduct of Friedberg being entirely placed to the archbishop's account, an embassy was decreed to Gustavus in order to reconcile these reciprocal grievances, and place matters for the future on a solid and amicable footing. In a word, there



there was something peculiarly gallant and heroical in the demeanor of all his Swedish majesty's enemies during the invasion, which he made into Germany; for no arts, intrigues or promises could ever induce Denmark, Poland, or Muscovy to distress or perplex him. Or supposing this not to be the case, and that they took no secret pleasure to see the house of Austria reduced to a state of humiliation, then it is plain, they dreaded lest Gustavus should conclude a sudden peace with the emperor, and destroy them without the possibility of being succoured or supported by the latter.

The Swedish general Todt invested Staden; but Pappenheim gave him battle, and compelled him to raise the siege by throwing three regiments into the town, who crossed the river Schwinga upon portable bridges. Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged, that the Swedes retreated in good order; and as the Bavarian colonel Boninghausen, a principal commander under Pappenheim, was dispatched after them with a large body of cavalry to harass the rear, they prepared an ambuscade for him, and cut to pieces two thirds of his detachment. Enlivened with this lucky reverse of fortune, Todt returned to his point, and had the honour to beleaguer Pappenheim in the town, who, according to his custom, made a furious sally, and carried his troops through the Swedish army; which he effected the more easily, as Todt and the duke of Lunenburg hated each other, and performed nothing in concert. Upon which the former was recalled to the king, and replaced by Bauditzen.

As Pappenheim's presence was deemed highly necessary in other places, and as it was thought impossible to maintain his conquests in the archbishopric of Bremen, he restored the keys of Staden to the magistrates, and having exhorted them to continue their allegiance to the house of Austria, recommended his sick and wounded soldiers to their humanity and protection. By this voluntary cession the Swedes became masters of the Elb on either side from Hamburg to the Baltic.

He then passed into the territory of Brunswic, and the bishopric of Verden, and extracted no small advantages from the new misunderstandings, that arose between the duke of Lunenburg and the archbishop

1632. of Bremen; and having made a general destruction of forage and provisions in the country round him, left a part of his troops under the command of count Gronsfield, and advanced with others into the territory of Hesse-Cassel; and then dispatched orders to the states assembled at Zell to enter into no measures prejudicial to the Imperial interests, since that would oblige him to march over the ruins he had already made. But the states of Lower Saxony perceiving plainly he was on the wing of departure, conferred the supreme command on the duke of Lumenberg, and constituted Bauditzen lieutenant-general under him. It was thought by some, that Pappenheim meditated this retreat in order to consult his friends, and attempt to succeed Tilly in the employment of generalissimo to the princes of the league: but that appears to me highly improbable; for (besides a dislike to be near Walstein) he loved no superior, especially one of so interfering a temper as the elector of Bavaria; and therefore preferred a separate command in a station less distinguished.

When he dislodged from Lower Saxony, the Swedish generals reviewed their army there, which amounted to 9000 foot, 5000 horse and 700 dragoons. During his absence they re-possessed so many places, that he found himself obliged to return to Brunswick, and ordered Gronsfield to join him. He then made Bauditzen an offer of selling Nienburg to him for 9000*l*. but the latter sent him word, "that he hoped to possess the place as a foldier, and not as a merchant." The landgrave of Hesse-Cassel defeated four regiments under Boninghausen, and took that officer prisoner.

Thus was almost every town in Lower Saxony, Westphalia, and Hesse, taken and retaken half a dozen times in the space of a twelve-month, at the expence and woe of the poor inhabitants, and with little advantage to the contending parties; for those, who conquered in the field, soon became masters of the rivers and the towns.

War was carried on with like success, and upon the same principles, in the circle of the Rhine, where William margrave of Baden-Baden, Ossa, Montecuculi, and Haracour with his Lorrainers supported the part of the emperor; whilst Oxenstiern and the Rhingrave, with one  
small



small army, and the dukes of Birkenfeld and Weymar with another, 1632. sustained the cause of Sweden. To the relief of the former parties the count of Embden made a very dextrous march at the head of 8000 Spaniards through the bishopric of Liege, and crossed the Moselle about the middle of April with little or no molestation; though the inhabitants mortally hated the nation, which his troops belonged to, and that for reasons of the freshest date. Oxenstiern formed a resolution to intercept one half of his army in its progress; and for that purpose dispatched the Rhingrave at the head of the very chosen part of his cavalry, who lodged that night at a village called Nieder-Ulm. Of this Luca Cagno, commissary general of the Spanish forces, procured intelligence, and dislodged at midnight with 1200 horse to give the Rhingrave a *camisado*; but the latter being apprised by his spies of the Spaniards intentions, posted himself in an advantageous pass mid-way, and gave them so rude a reception, that they soon betook themselves to flight and overturned 1000 horsemen, who had advanced out of the lines to support their retreat. The Swedes took eight colours, and pursued the enemy so far, till the cannon of the camp compelled them to retire. To restore matters after this signal affront, don Philip de Sylva joined the count with 3000 infantry, and ten pieces of artillery; in consequence whereof the town of Spires \* was besieged and taken by capitulation; for which Horneck the governor was immediately arrested by Oxenstiern's order, and condemned to death by a court-martial; nevertheless his majesty was pleased to pardon him at the queen's intercession. The Spanish general extorted 10,000 l. by way of composition out of the poor inhabitants, which he refused to apply to the emperor's use; and discovered a coffin in the house of the knights of the Teutonic order, where Horneck had secreted the greatest part of his wealth.

This unfortunate panic, which seized Horneck, made Oxenstiern extremely vigilant in strengthening the fortifications of Mentz and Wormes; and at the same time care was taken to re-inforce the garrison of Manheim. The chancellor then erected two bridges across the

\* The Imperial chamber here, which we have mentioned more than once in the course of our history, was removed to Wetzlar in 1693.

1632. Rhine and the Mayne; and when the French ambassador complained to him, that the governor of Mentz had ordered all the ecclesiastics to retire upon the approach of the Spaniards, he immediately cancelled the said governor's decree, and assured the ambassador, that what had been done was contrary to his master's intentions, and his own orders.

Some days afterwards her Swedish majesty signified an inclination of taking up her residence at Mentz; upon which the grave statesman, with the politeness and gallantry of a young courtier, accompanied with all the nobility and princes, that served in his army, paid his attentions to her at Costheim on the other side of the Rhine, at the head of the flower of his cavalry; and ranged two bodies of infantry, each consisting of 4000 men, on the opposite banks of the river, who made the queen and court-ladies an unaccustomed compliment in one general discharge of their fire-arms. Her majesty, attended by her own guards, entered the city with a train of twenty coaches, and lodged in the archiepiscopal palace.

About this time the margrave of Baden-Baden received orders from Vienna to demand the town of Spires in the emperor's name; but count Embden told him, that every subject was to serve his respective sovereign, and that he could not order the garrison to dislodge, till conformable instructions arrived from the court of Bruxelles. Nevertheless, he began now to find himself greatly straitened in the neighbourhood of Spires, and Oxenstiern pressed him more and more, having surprized a courier with some of his dispatches, by which he became informed of the enemy's wants and distresses. It is true the Infanta Isabella took all possible care of this general's safety, and don Gonsalvo di Cordoua received commands to march to his support with 8000 fresh troops; but the vigilance of the Swedish chancellor was so great, that it was difficult to form this junction, and of course Cordoua advanced to Triers, and then desisted.

Embden was much disconcerted at this disappointment, and having left a garrison of 1000 men in Spires, filled the magazines of Frankendale, and furnished it with a defence of 1500 infantry, and 250 horse, owed his safety to a feigned march, and a well-managed retreat. To effect this, he ordered his troops to ascend the Rhine, and join Ossa, but at mid-  
night



night turned his course short, and made all imaginable expedition to 1632. Triers. Oxenstiern (whose army was now enlarged) watched his motions with 18000 effective men, but Embden hastened with such extraordinary diligence, that it was next to impossible to overtake him. Nevertheless the chancellor continued to pursue him with the gros of his army, and dispatched the Rhingrave with all the cavalry, to embarrass his retreat, and force him to halt, (if that could be) and involve himself in a general action. In the valley of Steinbach the Rhingrave at length reached him, and obliged him to turn round and defend his rear, which he did with great firmness, but cautiously avoided a full and decisive engagement, refusing to seize little advantages and skirmishing only, till the artillery and baggage had gained a place of safety. Cordoua joined him at Triers, and Merodé at the head of some Imperial troops encreased their numbers.

As the elector of Triers had made a separate treaty \* with Louïs XIII, and as France had engaged to become the guaranty of his dominions (for we have made it manifest, that she always loved to have a finger of interference in the affairs of Germany) so now, as that prelate, who had lost Coblentz, Philipsburg †, and all his strong places, except Ehrenbreitsstein or Hermanstein, found himself invested, tormented, and devoured on every side, it was thought necessary to march 24000 men to his assistance under the command of the marechals D'Effiat and La Force. The Imperialists were chagrined above measure (nor was Gustavus thoroughly pleased) when the elector made a consignation of fort Hermanstein to the French; which indeed that prince did not greatly affect to do, but the two generals told him, “ that in proportion as he became safe, he became forgetful likewise,” and that they expected realities from him, as well as promises. This fort had the good fortune to command the Rhine, and was rendered next to impregnable by situation and art. As to Coblentz, the elector appeared very willing to resign it into the hands of the French. It is a town of no small importance, as it stands on the conflux of the Rhine and

\* It was signed at Ehrenbreitsstein, April 9, 1632, and is preserved in the APPENDIX.

† This town belonged to Philip Christopher, elector of Triers, as bishop of Spire.

1632. Moselle in such a manner, as that nothing but the first mentioned river separated the subjects of Triers from the Spaniards. Nevertheless the latter contrived to throw a sufficient garrison into it, which piqued the two *maréchals* of France not a little, for no nations hate one another more cordially than the French and Spaniards. But Gustavus soon made his allies happy in this respect, for he dispatched Horn from Mentz, with an army of 14000 fresh troops, in order to disperse the Imperialists, chastise the chapter of Triers, and repossess Trarbach and Coblentz : which latter place, by a convention between the two kings, was delivered up to the French, and the inhabitants re-imburshed the Swedes for the charges of the expedition, as well as the siege.

Horn afterwards made himself master of Graffenberg and Trarbach, a strong fort on the Moselle about thirty miles from Triers, both which places were garrisoned by Spanish soldiers. He then entered Spire, for the Castilian governor dislodged at his first approach ; and lastly, possessed Strasburg, which had long fluctuated between the then-contending powers, and at length made a formal declaration in favour of Sweden.

Mean while the elector of Triers had not power to consign his own metropolis into the hands of France, for the chapter (which was in the Imperialists interests, as more attached to the catholic religion) had rebelled against him, and ventured, (titularly at least,) to degrade him ; insomuch that a count Isenberg, who served the emperor, had taken care to secure the city for his master. The elector then sent a trumpeter to his own commander at Philipsburg, but this man's loyalty had received a taint from his Spanish neighbours at Frankendale, and all the answer he returned his sovereign was, that he acknowledged no authority but what came from Vienna, nor could afford him any other admission than such as could be procured by the point of the sword : and, to manifest the sincerity of his intentions yet further, he burnt all the houses, that stood near to the fortifications, and having manned his walls, placed his artillery in a posture of disputing the event.

The two *marechals* not caring to waste time on an officer of so singular an humour, advanced with their troops into the duchy of Deux-ponts,



ponts, and paid their compliments to the duke, who received them in a manner, that was almost peculiar to himself. This prince had uncommon talents of wisdom, politeness, dexterity, and persuasion. During a civil war of twelve years continuance, he had aided none, and offended none: and though the several marches of Imperial, Lorrain, and French troops had produced some inconveniences to his subjects, yet every general, upon the first conversation with him, found himself so struck with his eloquence and address, that far from emburthening the inhabitants, he sought to ease them. La Force was soon recalled, upon advice, that monsieur had entered France. D'Effiat crossed the mountains of Voghesi \* with all his cannon, and raised contributions from Strasburg, not in money (for that Gustavus might have opposed) but in necessaries for the support of his army. He had instructions from the cardinal to behave politely and humanely to all people, and of course always asked for quarters even in neutral, or friendly countries. Having advanced to Lutzelstein, he there died of a camp-fever. Upon this event, the marechal D'Etrée received the brevet of command in chief, which the viscount Arpajou, general pro tempore, resigned unto him.

It was D'Effiat's purpose to have crossed the Rhine at Germerheim or Spires, and besiege Philipsburg; but De Charnacé, the French ambassador to Gustavus, told him, that (besides the difficulty of the attempt) his Swedish majesty, who already possessed the greater part of the bishopric of Spires, would never allow the French to fix their footsteps in that diocese. Upon which the resolution was formed to invest Triers.

During this period the contending generals were not inactive in the circle of Suabia and the territories adjoining, where Ossa, Furstenburg † and Montecuculi acted against Banier, duke William of Weymar, Scharaliski, Ruthven, and the administrator of Wirtemberg, concerning whom we have spoken already. Nor was the circle of Franconia less quiet, for the duke of Saxe-Coburg, and

\* This chain of mountains, which Claudian, if I remember right expressly, mentions, takes its rise near Daun in the Sungau, and stretches on to the duchy of Deux-ponts, and a part of the Lower Palatinat. From the Voghesi-moun-

tains arise the Maese, the Moselle, the Marne, and the Saon.

† This was not the person, who commanded the main body at the battle of Leipzig.

1632. the margrave of Culmbach, commanded the Imperial party, and the colonels Haftver, and Muffel, conducted the Swedish. But to describe the various rencounters, conflicts, and little battles, that happened here and in the several departments above mentioned, would swell my account to such a size, that though it might astonish my readers, yet it would bear too hard upon their patience at the same time. It may suffice therefore to conclude this delineation of the face of the war, in parts separate and remote from Gustavus, with observing only, that if he had not recalled duke Bernard to Nurenberg, on the expectation of Walstein and Maximilian's junction, it is probable, that spirited and fiery young warrior would have carried the Swedish arms through the Tyroleze, and expelled the arch-duke from Inspruck, his own metropolis.

It appears, by this time, that the stream of the war ran entirely against the emperor; yet nothing embarrassed or afflicted him so much as the forlorn condition, to which he saw the elector of Bavaria reduced. He not only pitied this unfortunate prince, but knew him to be capable of deserting the cause; and feared also, lest Gustavus should push the war into Upper Austria. Couriers upon the heels of couriers were dispatched to Walstein day and night, to dissuade him from invading Saxony, (which was then his intention) and implore him to carry his assistance into Bavaria. At length the splenetic general complied, merely because it was indecent and dangerous to refuse any longer. But, in all probability, what mostly determined him was, that some of his personal enemies, or some, who wished well to the house of Austria, had spread a report, that he feared to confront the king of Sweden. The surest way to animate or exasperate the heroes of the sword, is to throw a suspicion on their conduct, or their courage; for then reason, philosophy, and even presence of mind, (the most shining of all their qualifications) take their flight from them, and reside in other breasts. It was under these circumstances, that Tilly lost the battle of Leipzig, and the valiant Hepburn, favourite of Gustavus, resigned his commission, and refused to pardon the king, when he requested his forgiveness. In a word, a thorough enthusiastical warrior can support any thing but an impeachment



of his military character ; and from my knowledge of history, such as 1632. it is, it appears probable to me, that more generals in proportion have died of chagrin, and a broken heart, than poets, and enamoratos. In the wars we are now speaking of, the amiable duke of Feria paid his life a sacrifice to the perverseness of Aldringer ; for Aldringer, it is well known, was ordered by Walstein to contradict that general in every point, which he had at heart ; and Spinola, whitened with the service of forty campaigns, whom fortune courted many years after she is accustomed to desert others, retired at last to a little niche in the terrestrial system hardly known \*, crying out, *m' hanno levato l'honore, m' hanno levato l'honore* ; and grasping in his hand on death-bed his catholic majesty's letter, which authorized him to act according to the very manner, in which he had acted †.

But to return to my narration: Walstein having reduced Egra, Elnbogen, and Leütmeritz, left Don Baltazar near the last place, and Holk in the neighbourhood of the second, with two separate armies, and then joined the elector of Bavaria at Luditz, near Egra. Perceiving therefore it was now high time to draw Gustavus towards the Baltic, he judged it proper to advance towards the centre of the Swedish conquests, and made more than a semblance of possessing Nuremberg, a town, whose interests his majesty had greatly at heart, for the sake of the inhabitants and himself. No man could be more eager to form this junction, than the elector ; inasmuch that he mounted his musqueteers behind his horsemen, to perform the march with greater expedition. Nor could the king impede the union of the two armies ; for his scheme of entering the Upper Palatinat, and posting himself between them, proved impracticable on the first attempt ; and of course the pass of Rhinsberg lay free and open to the admission of the Bavarians ‡. Yet still it was necessary to possess Nuremberg, even at the expence of making a long circuit in marching ; for if that town (sincerely attached to the king from inclination as well as religion) had been pre-occupied by the enemy, it was highly probable, that the armies in Suabia, under duke William of Weymar, Banier, and Ruthven, had been intercepted, and

\* The fort of Scrivia. . . . . † Monro, Second Expedition, 129.

† Galeazzo Gualdo. Vita di Mazarini.

1632. cut to pieces, in their advancing to support their master. By this position likewise Gustavus secured to himself the diocese of Wurtzburg, and lay open to receive the separate corps under Oxenstiern, and others, then stationed in the circle of Franconia, and the Lower Rhine. As Walstein was now advancing, and the service threatened to become extremely warm, the king, like a sensible and prudent prince, took care to discharge the arrears of his officers and soldiers.

When the Imperial general left Egra, he brought up the rear of his army himself, count Gallas conducted the main body, and Aldringer led the van. As he crossed a wood, a musquet-ball passed through his coach, and missed both him and Tertski, his brother-in-law, very narrowly. Whether this was done by accident, or design, cannot well be ascertained; however Walstein, for political reasons, resolved to take it in a serious acceptation. When he and Maximilian met, though each of them were masters of the most profound dissimulation, yet their personal resentments ran so high, that neither one nor the other had the power of concealing them; but the elector had the mortification to be obliged to make the first advances. The number of the two combined armies amounted to 60,000 effective men, and upwards; though Walstein (who loved to rhodomontade like a true Austrian) gave out a list, on approaching Nuremberg, of 59,000 infantry, and 24,600 cavalry, besides Croatsians\*. Be that as it will, this was the largest army, that had appeared in Europe since the days of Charlemagne: but it was a maxim with its leader, *Que la fortune favorise toujours le gros escadrons*: Nor spared he any pains, by false reports, fictitious declarations, and pretended movements, to draw the king off from Nuremberg; but the latter knew his business, and remained immovable, at the head of 18,000 or 20,000 men, at most. It being a maxim likewise with him, in his turn, *That a great general, with a small army, can hardly ever be obliged to fight*. Upon this account he had, for some days, formed a resolution to encamp himself near Nuremberg, and on that spot justify his theory, and exhibit to the

\* In other words, the list ran to this effect; 197 companies of foot, at 300 men in each company; and 246 troops of horse, (besides some irregulars) at 100 in each troop; the Bavarian army included, consisting of 58 foot-companies, and 124 troops of horse.



world, one of the most shining efforts in the art of war, that hath or can be found in history. Yet being, to a certain degree, in an hostile country, he had three great difficulties to contend with ; namely, how to support his army ; how to prevent an enemy, of strength trebly superior, from forcing his lines ; and how direct the re-inforcements, that were to join him, to advance their marches in such a manner, as not to be intercepted and cut to pieces. As to the *first*, he had penetration enough to see, that the Nurenbergers loved him, and that the town had sufficient provisions, as well as bills of exchange, to support his army, till he should have strength to march abroad and confront his enemies in open field : besides being inferior in numbers, it was not in his power to subsist his camp by convoys and remote magazines. As to the *second*, he displayed the full perfection of one of those talents he particularly valued himself upon ; for never ground was better chosen, and, if the times be considered, no camp had ever been fortified in such a manner, and upon such principles of art. Nor had outworks, and redoubts, of three miles circumference only, ever been protected with 300 pieces of artillery. And lastly, as to the *third point*, there alone lay all his diffidence ; for though Horn, Banier, duke Bernard, and others, were each of them, as it were, a second Gustavus, yet he felt the sharpest anxieties, when he reflected, that these generals might miscarry in their attempts to join him, and then his ruin was next to inevitable.

The town of Nurenberg had behaved more generously towards the king, than any one free Imperial city in the empire ; for it had declared in his favour, as long before as the November preceding. Nor was his majesty of a temper to see himself outdone in acts of shining and more distinguished friendship.

Here, round the suburbs of the town, he fixed his camp ; and as Walstein was supposed to be in full march to attack it before it was completed, (than which the king expected nothing with greater degree of probability) one half of the army performed the duty of pioneers, day by day interchangeably, assisted by a considerable number of peasants, as well as citizens ; to whom the king allotted a portion of work

1632. distinct from the Swedes, in order to excite an emulation between the two parties. But Wallstein saw the plan, and dreaded to assault the work, even in its infancy. For eight distinct forts were erected, one particularly furnished the royal, all guarded with abundance of cannon, not to mention batteries, bastions, half-moons, and every other sort of fortification. The ditch of circumvallation was in all places twelve feet wide, and eight deep; and in critical situations, its width was eighteen feet, and its depth twelve. Advantage likewise was taken of the river Pagnitz, and of all troublesome and irregular ground. So that the whole camp, (not comprehending space allowed for irregular angles, and out-lines of defence, intrenchments, and redoubts, of various shapes, all conformable to the genius of the spot of earth,) contained, as nearly as I can calculate, (and the account came from Hepburn) about 219 clear square acres; and thus the king, by this grand masterpiece of contracting his boundaries, reserved to himself the full power of bringing more hands to act than Wallstein could overcome. Persons of less abilities would have wanted proportionably greater space to move in. The common demands for food and forage must have spread the troops at greater distances, (as appeareth evidently to have been Wallstein's case) and the providing magazines, and escorting them to the head quarters, must have separated the army too much, and weakened it by daily rencounters, however fortunate and successful. But the king, taking previous care to see Nuremberg excellently provided, made it, at one and the same time, his granary, his stable, and his shambles, for the space of eight weeks and five days: and one thing is very remarkable, that though the town fed the royal army, (which afterwards encreased) and maintained at least 20,000 mouths besides, for many gentry and peasants flocked into it; yet corn, at last, arose not to a much higher price than it then sold for in London.

The mind is lost in astonishment, when one considers, the wonderful foresight made use of on this extraordinary occasion. Indeed it may be asked, how the king, with so small an army, could furnish and protect his camp with such a number of cannon as 300 pieces? But the question solves itself, when we reflect, that part of the artillery along the ram-  
parts



parts was at his disposal, and that the arsenal of Nuremberg, both then and now, was as well furnished as most in the empire. And here one may subjoin another remark, namely, that when I make his majesty's troops amount to the number of 20,000 men, the garrison of the place, a sort of city militia, is supposed to be comprehended within the calculation. This body of troops consisted of twenty four companies, and carried for arms, on their ensigns, the twenty four letters of the alphabet.

Yet notwithstanding all these conveniences, (though it must be acknowledged one half of them was created by the dint of parts and genius) it hath been thought by many \*, not without some appearance of reason, that the king fixed on Nuremberg, more from a principle of generosity and gratitude, than from any local advantages: for had he, say they, withdrawn first to Mentz, and then returned and encamped beneath the walls of Bamberg, he might have eaten out the territories of a prelate, who had used him basely, and joined his own armies, a point then of the highest consequence to him, with one third part of the danger and difficulty. Yet still, (setting apart the obligations of gratitude, and ties of reciprocal affection) Nuremberg seems to me, upon all accounts, to be the place preferable; it had both provisions and money in great abundance; it had a district round it, of about sixteen English miles square, all subjected to the king's good pleasure; it was connected with a considerable number of free towns, and little protestant adjoining states; and had artillery in abundance, which the king wanted above all things: whereas at Bamberg, the diocese had been devoured interchangeably by each contending party; the ordnance would have been removed, or rendered useless; magazines within the town there were none; and the inhabitants were all zealous Romanists, and professed enemies. And as to the arrival of the Swedish armies, the king had planned that measure with cool reflection, and had great reasons to hope he should effect that junction under the walls of Nuremberg, and within the eyesight of Walsstein.

\* Le Vassor, &c.

1632. As a proof whereof, in this his worst situation, he dispatched a person he valued\*, to the elector of Saxony, exhorting him to behave like a man of spirit, and shew no symptoms of despondency; *Tell him, said he, whatever appearance things may carry, I will make him a visit soon, attended by my valiant and faithful army.* His majesty had still a further view in this embassy; for he charged his negotiator with a secret commission, and that was, to pacify an unaccountable jealousy and aversion, which subsisted, on the Saxon side, against the king of Bohemia. He then informed the French king very composedly by letter, *That he was not distressed to such a degree as the enemy set forth; but, on the contrary, had troops sufficient to oppose against him; and that the bravery of his soldiers was never to be extinguished, except by death. We perform our exercises, continued he, every day in the field of Mars, and will give Walstein to understand, what, and how much, men are capable of performing, who fight the cause of public liberty, and defend princes and nations, who groan under tyranny and persecution*†. He had presence of mind, at the same juncture, to dispatch an ambassador to Ragotzki, prince of Transylvania, under pretence of accommodating some differences between him and the fair Catharina of Brandenburg, relict of the late Gabriel Bethlem; but in reality, to induce him to attack the emperor in his Hungarian dominions. From Transylvania, the said minister had orders to hasten on to Constantinople, in order to learn the sentiments of the divan, in reference to the Germanic wars: but in the latter place he obtained nothing, except fair words and an obliging reception.

By this time the Imperial general arrived, and having viewed the king's entrenchments, determined at once (contrary to his intentions on the road) not to assault him, but attempt to starve him: and it was upon

\* Augustus, count Palatin of the Rhine, who passed on from Dreiden to Berlin, and finished a second negotiation there; but returning to join his master at Nuremberg, died at Weinheim in Franconia. He was a young man, from whom the king had great expectancies, both as a soldier and a politician.

† Le Vaisor, Tom. vii. 345. Whatever the

king might write, yet Richelieu was so terrified with his majesty's situation, that, fearing Walstein might totally destroy him, and of course render the courts of Vienna and Madrid too powerful for that of Versailles, he immediately made proposals of an accommodation with the duke of Orleans.



this principle he pronounced, vain-gloriously enough, “ That Europe 1632.  
 “ should see, in a few weeks, who was master of Germany, whether Gus-  
 “ tavus or himself.” In truth, this extraordinary personage (putting fear  
 out of the question) did not chuse to bring his dictatorship to so short  
 a conclusion ; upon which the elector of Bavaria, who disliked both his  
 phlegm and his vanity, pressed him earnestly to force the Swedish lines,  
 sword in hand ; “ Sir, said Walsstein, assuming an air of coldness, be-  
 “ gin the attack with your whole army, and I will support you with all  
 “ my forces.”

Mean while Walsstein contemplated the new entrenchments made by  
 Gustavus, with the same attention, as a geometrician could be supposed  
 to study a fresh work of Euclid's, just recovered from obscurity ; being  
 resolved to force it, if the attempt was practicable, confiding more than  
 a little in the superiority of his numbers : but upon examining the for-  
 tifications erected, and precautions taken, he changed his resolution, for  
 he was thoroughly astonished ; having chanced to forget, that a few  
 troops judiciously posted, and entrenched up to the eyes, were at least  
 a match for whole Imperial legions, who were to act in a state of expo-  
 sure above ground. He then coolly traced out a camp, almost within  
 sight of the king, yet three miles distant from him. Its defence was  
 very slight and insubstantial, consisting only of a small ditch, protected  
 in various parts by interlaced forest-trees, baggage waggons, and ga-  
 bions. He then caused his troops to lodge in eight different divisions,  
 and covered such an extent of ground, that the whole appeared more  
 like a populous country than like a camp.

As to subsisting an army, there indeed lay his chief excellence ; for  
 in the management of his artillery, (of which he had enough) he was  
 no great genius, and had few good hands ; nor was he, as an honest  
 Briton said bluntly of him, *in any degree a notable spade-man* \*. But in  
 respect to provisions and forage, he shewed himself a purveyor of the  
 first class. Amongst other things, his proviant-bread was admirable ;  
 which in hard times makes half the standing diet of a soldier, and an-

\* Swedish Intelligencer, Part iii. p. 9.

1632. fwers all purposes very well, when nothing better can be obtained. As he had troops to spare in great abundance, it was his intention to check the Swedes in all little excursions for the support of their camp ; and this he partly effected, having more men every day at leisure, than the king could bring to act upon the most trying emergency.

The country behind him, and on each side, lay all open to his devotion, and provisions and ammunition were conveyed to him even from Vienna and Munich ; the first by water-carriage, as near to him as Ratisbon. He possessed all the towns and passes in the circle of territories, which surrounded him, excepting only beyond that little segment, which the king occupied. He then stationed two large bodies of troops in the diocese of Bamberg and the Upper Palatinat, and caused his Croatians, like beasts of prey, to scour the whole country night and day, in a line cross-wise from Munich to Bamberg ; a tract of excursion, which measures at least one hundred miles.

Having, as we remarked before, slightly sketched out the ground-plot of a camp, he drew up seventeen regiments at the head of his intended lines, by way of bravado, a practice extremely common in those days, being a fine *pens asinum* for those hot-brained fighting warriors, who mistake animal vivacity for true courage. Be that as it will, the king humoured Wallstein in this sort of interlude, (though determined in his own mind not to hazard an engagement at that juncture) and drew out his cavalry in line of battle, just under the enemy's nose ; for he well knew, that a small river divided the two armies, and served both for a barrier and an excuse. This river, called the Pegnitz, having traversed Nuremberg from east to west, passeth between the two camps, and supplied both armies ; but as the weather was extremely dry, and the season of the Dog-star began to approach, the Swedes and Imperialists suffered much from the scantiness of water, and from its being corrupted, so that petechial fevers multiplied exceedingly \*.

It soon became manifest to all men, that Gustavus's conduct not only puzzled Wallstein, but created serious apprehensions in the mind of

\* Brachelii Hist. nostror. Temp. p. 282.

that



that general ; for it made a visible change all at once in his way of thinking, and speaking. He altered that decisive tone, which he had formerly used in matters of war ; from confident, he became distrustful ; and what was once haughtiness and obstinacy, began now to soften itself into something, which carried the appearance of deference and docility. He found himself obliged to make his military motions step by step, having to do with one, who was capable of ruining him from the inattention of a single moment. So that his greatest chance consisted in the hope of compelling the king to listen to some necessary accommodation, occasioned partly by hunger, and partly by the interception of his re-inforcements. And perhaps he had some expectancies too of corrupting the fidelity of the town of Nuremberg ; but that was an airy and insubstantial expectation. Therefore as one single stroke (if the comparison may be allowed) oftentimes determines the character of a general, as much as a painter ; he saw, with grief, that Gustavus had but one place to encamp in, and *that* he chose. No town but Nuremberg could support him ; and in any other spot, Wallstein might have starved him in a fortnight's space, and hunted him, like a fugitive, from one extremity of the empire to another.

It was something astonishing to all mankind, that two armies, on whose conduct the fate of Germany depended, should lie gazing on each other for eight weeks, without striking more than one single blow, if we except (and that indeed was unavoidable) the little onsets, ambuscades, and conflicts betwixt partizans, who roamed here and there to procure forage, and intercept convoys : yet in all the space of time above-mentioned, it is not certain, that a musquet-ball was exchanged in earnest, or one considerable alarm given, by either party, from the two encampments. Of all which the truth was this : Wallstein durst not attack, and the king, for prudent reasons, declined engaging ; yet such was the vivacity of his high spirit, that he declared himself, more than once, to be quite out of temper with Wallstein's shiness ; who, though he well knew the weakness of the Swedes, yet knew likewise their valour and discipline ; and of course, as Gassion tells us\*, resolved to

\* Memoires, Tom. i. p. 68.

1632. make it "a campaign of starving." And hence it was he declared so confidently, "That the mystery of re-establishing his master's affairs did not consist in giving frequent battles; that his predecessors had played this game many years, without obtaining the object of their wishes; therefore, said he, I shall take the liberty to wage war upon different principles."

This plan was not unworthy of a great general, and Wallstein had parts to comprehend the idea in its full advantage; yet it is plain, he proceeded upon selfish and ambitious motives besides: his grand object was to protract the war; he served his Imperial master sparingly and grudgingly; and had no desire to remove hostilities from the threshold of the Bavarian territories, whose elector he considered as the principal cause of his late disgrace.

Mean while the king dispatched couriers to the several generals he intended should join him, and subjoined to each letter a delineation of their respective marches. He then amused himself, at intervals from more immediate business, with reviewing his troops every day, and seeing some ideas in exercise realized, which his inventive genius had lately brought to light. As the trial of skill consisted in starving with good grace, he resolved to fight the first moment he could encrease his handful of men to a moderate number, knowing precisely, how long and in what manner to ward the blow, or when return it; and in the interim employed all his thoughts how to procure a mouthful of bread, when Wallstein had none. And, indeed, the effects of this foresight and œconomy soon made their appearance; for by this time, he reduced that magnificent person (who affected a table spread with princely profusion) to six dishes at dinner, for himself and officers, and two bottles of wine, both which reductions he was obliged afterwards to diminish farther and farther. For the king, with his small body of troops, harassed his convoys, and destroyed his magazines; not to mention, that Wallstein's supplies came by land-carriage from Ratisbon, having no navigable stream to befriend him. For as to the Radnitz, which ran through his camp, notwithstanding it came from the country of his firm ally, the bishop of Bamberg, yet it was too narrow, and too shallow, to admit boats of any  
size;



size ; and, to augment the inconvenience, the stream was against him. 1632.  
 So that Gustavus, upon the whole, was the best purveyor ; though indeed it is hard to comprehend, how an inland town, like Nuremberg, could be supplied in the manner it was ; for neither meat, nor ammunition, nor bread, were wanting ; and the quantity of oats was beyond description. Amongst other things, the city furnished his army, each day, with 8,000 loaves. And thus, though Walstein took care to post his troops on every road, that approached to Nuremberg, and by the same methods, that he deprived his enemy supplied himself, being master of all the passes, and having a communication open with Forcheim, where the Germans gravely tell you Pontius Pilate was born \*, as likewise with Wurtzburg, Cronach, and all Bavaria ; yet still the king lived better than he ; not that he could dispute every inch of superiority with him, (being four degrees inferior to him in respect of cavalry †) but by procuring better intelligence, and watching the critical moments of advantage and surprize.

Yet still Gustavus, though blessed with a superiority, that appeared miraculous, felt some misgivings in his own breast, in spite of all his magnanimity and resolution, with reference to the dangers, that attended his little armies, which were now in full march towards him from various quarters. Far from discovering the least external symptoms of dismay, he asked the separate opinion of every general, and condescending even to send for Gassion ‡, (then not arrived to the rank of a lieutenant-colonel) explained to him the critical and perillous situation of his army, with familiarity and confidence ; expressing no kind of diffidence with respect to his own conduct, but manifesting some apprehensions with regard to the fate of his re-inforcements. From whence it appears, that the bravest of men (and such Gustavus truly was) can be alarmed with danger, though not dejected. Such pre-sentiments make the great general to be

\* The verses on the occasion are so classical, both in style and quantity, that one cannot abstain from citing them.

*Forchemii natus est Pontius ille Pilatus,  
 Teutoniæ gentis, crucifixor Omnipotentis.*

† See Le Blanc. Hist. de Baviere, Tom. iv. p. 393.

‡ Vie du Maréchal Gassion, par Michael Le Pure, Tom. i. p. 69.

1632. what he is, upon supposition that they disturb not his presence of mind, or, in other words, the free exertion of the powers of his understanding.

Mean while Gustavus depended as much upon the want of good agreement between Wallstein and Maximilian, as Hannibal ever expected advantage from the misunderstandings, that subsisted betwixt the Roman consuls and the generals under them. But the Bavarian elector, being a person equally well skilled in penetration and dissembling, soon found, that opposition, far from humbling Wallstein, only served to enflame and exasperate him ; and submitting therefore with the best grace he could, had the mortification to see his new and well-beloved acquisition, the Upper Palatinat, laid waste and devoured by his own allies. Nay Wallstein went so far, as to refine upon the passions of resentment and malice ; for perceiving, that his rival hated Gustavus with a mortal hatred, he affected a thousand politenesses and civilities towards him, and spoke of him in the style of something more than human. And one circumstance, about this period seems highly probable and generous in Gustavus ; for when he sent a route of the roads, planned out by himself with uncommon judgment, to every commander, who was to march to his assistance ; *Gentlemen*, added he, in the conclusion of his letters, *your king, and military protector, can only direct his absent disciples, in general terms : incidents will arise, which no human foresight can pre-determine : seize the moments ; snatch the proffered opportunities, which take birth and flight in one instant. I resign into your hands full discretionary power ;—use it worthily both of me and yourselves \**.

We have kept silence for some time, with respect to the situation of affairs between Gustavus and Charles I. but something happened to present itself here, which co-incides almost to a day with the due chronological order of history. Vane, piqued (as the party offending usually is) with the late conversation betwixt him and Gustavus, had withdrawn himself, by way of resentment, from Munich to Ulm, and renewed his solicitations about the restitution of the Lower Palatinat,

\* Vide Chemnitz, Tom. i. p. 311.

(most



(most of which the Swedes had then conquered) according to his old custom, or, in other words, with impropriety and teizing; and what enclines us the more to form this conjecture, is, that the king of Bohemia neither co-operated with him, nor imparted his designs to him, as Vane himself confesseth. 1632.

In a few words, the stress of the difficulty lay here. Gustavus had a full design to conquer and restore the Lower Palatinat: but as he knew the Spaniards, then very powerful at sea, might interrupt his commerce, (a point, if he had leisure, very near and dear to him) and perhaps send a fleet to give laws to the Baltic, he made it a preliminary *sine quo non*, that England should declare a naval war against Spain; than which, as with great judgment he foresaw, nothing could be easier to her, or more agreeable to the bent of the nation, if the king had wished in earnest to see his brother re-instated. But Charles hung like a dead weight upon this topic, and refused to comply.

To the present part of the question Vane says nothing; but an extract from his letter \*, with reference to the preceding paragraph, may be worth transcribing.

“ The king of Sweden, within these few days, hath plainly told the king of Bohemia, that he would neither conclude with him, nor myself, until he had spoken with the elector of Saxe.

“ This I have certain information of, though not from the king of Bohemia. Whereupon I thought fit to write him the enclosed letter.  
 “ \*\*\* Thus you see the hard game I have to play; and which is so much the more difficult, in regard of the great intelligence there is between the king of Sweden and some of his majesty's subjects, by intercourse of letters out of England into the army. But this is a tender point, and tenderly to be dealt in; and therefore no notice to be taken of it at present. What issue the present conjuncture may produce, is not to be foreseen; but I conceive it worthy of his majesty's great wisdom, and the state's, seriously and timely to take into their consideration the true balancing the estates of Christendom, for they are now upon a crisis.”

\* Dated from Ulm, June 23, 1632, *MS. Paper-office*.

1632. He then adds, that the king of Sweden, “ though he had raised him-  
 “ self, by contributions and otherwise, yet did not pay his troops a  
 “ farthing, but suffered them to plunder \*; and if he shall be obliged  
 “ to retreat, and pay them no better, they may possibly disband of them-  
 “ selves †: therefore he (Sir Henry) hopes, that he shall have orders to  
 “ put the king to a point, for what he holds in the Lower Palatinat, and  
 “ to return to England.”

As to occasional rencounters in the field, (for nothing passed between the main armies) never troops were kept in better breath than the Swedes, and Imperialists: but this sort of war *in retail*, or *la petite guerre*, as the French call it, merits not to be recorded, as it decideth nothing; excepting here and there in a particular instance, which shall be just mentioned as I pass along. Yet one thing highly deserves to be transmitted down to posterity; the king, in frequent conflicts with the Croats, (a set of beings he mortally hated, as way-layers, robbers, and murderers) devised a new practice in the art military, for mixing dragoons, (who then carried a shorter musquet, and not carabines) with his own light cavalry, they either served on foot, as occasion required, or did great mischief on horseback, as their pieces discharged a heavier weight of ball.

Amongst these lesser actions of a significant cast, the valiant colonel Dewbatel, at the head of his own regiment, supported by some few of Sperreüter's ‡ men, for having defeated a party of Croats, fell in unawares with 6000 Walsteiners; upon which event, he led his soldiers on four or five times to the charge, and made incredible efforts to cut his way through the enemy, till at length, having lost one half of his

\* For the confutation of this unchristian and infamous report, in every branch, (which Vane hath dwelt upon in other letters, and we have replied to occasionally *in loco*) compare particularly the pages 228—230, 234, &c.

† This is a suspicion highly tinged with malice; for in the whole course of the king's wars, I find no desertion, which, besides other things, proves incidentally, that his pay was punctual. But Vane remembered well the old rule, *Calum-*

*niari fortiter, ut aliquid remaneat.*

‡ What this officer's real name was, I know not; for the king one day in Poland, returning over the field of battle, saw a soldier pierced through with a pike, and the instrument remaining in his body, without discovering any symptoms of pain or uneasiness; which struck his majesty so much, that he surnamed him on the spot Sperreüter or *knight of the spear*.



little army, he found himself unhorsed in the engagement, and conducted 1632.  
prisoner to the Imperial general. His majesty having received intelligence of this rude and unexpected shock, posted away full trot, with a select body of cavalry, in order to disengage his brave commander, but unfortunately found the field of battle covered with the dead bodies of his soldiers, and nothing else; for the Imperialists very wisely retired the very moment after they had performed their business.

Walftein received Dewbatel with uncommon marks of esteem, and commanded Peroni, steward of his household, immediately to discharge his ransom, which in those days, for an officer of that rank, ran sometimes to the amount of one thousand pounds. More reasons perhaps than one induced him to perform this act of politeness: he knew the man to be a favourite with Gustavus, and hoped probably, by such an instance of generosity, (which indeed was congenial to his natural temperament) to open an honest warrior's heart, and extract some useful intelligence from him. And therefore from these motives, and under pretence of admiring his turn of mind and disposition, he created occasions of holding several private conversations, which ran chiefly upon encomiums with regard to Gustavus, and on the earnest desire he had to give peace to Germany, and produce a reconciliation between the emperor and his majesty of Sweden.

Not many days afterwards, some Swedish partizans, with Gassion amongst them, had the good fortune to seize Darnius, an officer of Walfstein's, in whom that general placed a peculiar confidence, who was hastening without a sufficient guard from one quarter to another. Him his majesty examined strictly *upon oath* (such was his usual custom with prisoners of condition) and finding, that Walfstein intended to remove to his camp, the next day, a large magazine from Freystadt, which contained all, that could be amassed in Bavaria, the Higher Palatinat, and the bishoprics of Ratisbon and Aichstadt, he conceived an idea of intercepting or destroying the convoy, and put the execution thereof into Dewbatel's hands, who by this time was returned from the Imperial army\*. This officer, impatient to justify his majesty's choice, left

\* Hist. or Auth. Relation, in Low Dut ch, fol. Tom, ii. 81, 82.

1632. him towards the close of the evening, (having received his private orders) and mounted on horseback, at the head of three regiments of cavalry, (his own dragoons being one) which the king allowed him to select from all the army. Gassion had a private order from his majesty, some minutes before, and had the honour to assist in this expedition with his own shattered regiment, which consisted only of 300 horse. They arrived at Freystadt, a small town near Neumarck, about sixteen miles from Nurenberg, about two hours after midnight; secured the corps de guard unperceived, and fixed three petards to the town-gate, the last of which succeeded. Dewbatel shaped his entrance one way, and Gassion the other; so that in two hours the whole garrison, being oppressed on either side, was either killed or disarmed. Then the Swedes had leisure to load 200 waggons with military stores, and burnt more than 1000 loads of corn and hay; after which they began their retreat, composedly and in good order, driving with them an incredible number of cattle. For who could have imagined, that the Swedes, with so small an army, would have undertaken an enterprize, which befitted the persons only, who had a superiority of forces? Mean while the king, who knew what Walstein would do on this occasion, as well as Walstein himself, advanced with a body of 2000 cavalry, to secure the return of his men. Eventually as he concluded, the Imperial general took the alarm in an instant, and dispatched Spar, serjeant-major of battaglia, with his own regiment of musqueteers, and some other infantry, eight select troops of Gonzaga's and Colorado's horse, and twenty squadrons of Croatians, to make an example of these adventurers. But as his majesty lighted accidentally on Spar, without seeing his own troops, or being seen by them, they retired without any molestation, and knew nothing of all that happened, till the fortune of the day had been decided. The Imperial general, who outnumbered the king doubly, (for his majesty thought by joining his own troops to preserve an equality in proportion) felt himself animated with the glory of fighting a battle, in miniature, with the great Gustavus; and, of course, gave him so desperate a charge, that colonel Reiss was shot through the body, and a gentleman of the bed-chamber, and

Cratz-



Cratzenstein, one of the pages, were both killed at their master's side. 1632. As Reifs led the commanded musqueteers, the king was obliged to dismount and conduct them himself: there he persevered with incredible patience, knowing well, that his men would never desert him. At length the Croatians began to disappear, by little and little; the regular horse behaved well in part, but the Imperial-Irish regiments, of Gordon and Lesly, performed wonders; for having gained the covert of a small wood, they fought on till they had not a single charge of powder remaining; and then, by mutual consent, filed off among the trees, but the ground behind perplexed them in their escape. Gonzaga's horse ran away, for which Walstein convened him before a court-martial, though he had the honour to be cousin to the empress, and though it appeared, on his trial, that he kept the field after every man of his regiment had deserted it. This rude rencounter happened in the neighbourhood of a village, called Burgtham, about three miles from Altdorf\*. The king, during the conflict, was so pleased with the behaviour of Lesly and Gordon, who proved afterwards the two assassins of Walstein, that he declared publickly, if he took them prisoners, he would discharge them without delay, and pay their ransom himself. And this he did; but some obstructions deferred the execution of his promise, for the space of five weeks. When the confusion of the action was partly dissipated, some Swedes saw an horse richly caparisoned, fastened to a thorn-tree, and asking an Imperial horse-boy †, if he knew the owner, received for answer, that it was his general's; and amidst some osiers and rushes just by, (for the ground there was very morassy, and the cavalry could not clear it,) at length Spar was discovered, who, making some resistance, received two very rude strokes from the club-end of a musquet, and soon lost the massy gold chain, which hung round his neck. This officer was somewhat unfortunate, for he had paid one ransom the preceding year; and what perplexed him afterwards in his examination, and gave the king some advantage over him, was, that he had passed his parole not to serve against the Swedes, for a certain duration of time.

\* *Invasions of Germany, cum Fig. 12°. p. 76.* Lond. 1638.

† These horse-boys, in both the services, were probationer-cavalry.

1632. But when brought to his majesty, in the field of action, the king only said, laughing heartily, *Ab, monsieur Spar, I see you love me so dearly, that you cannot possibly refrain long from my company* \*.

Besides those already mentioned, Tertzki likewise, Walstein's brother-in-law, was taken prisoner. The enemy lost 800 chosen men on this occasion ; but only two pair of colours, having taken care to tear the others into pieces. His majesty rewarded the common soldiers, who brought him these colours, very generously, gratified many officers, and complimented all, spoke to several inferior men by name, and applauded them highly. At night he returned Dewbatel public thanks before the principal commanders of his army ; and thought the advantage so considerable, as to send for his chaplain, and order mention to be made thereof in the devotions of next day.

Gallion, with his comrades, reached the camp before his majesty arrived thither ; upon which, with fifteen chosen horsemen, he remounted immediately, and went in search of his master, whom he found returning. The king embraced him with a smile, and asked his intentions : " Sire, said he, (in military Latin, for he then could not talk German) " you once promised me the honour of dying near " you, and I hastened now to take my chance." *Frenchman*, replied Gustavus, (for that was the compellation he always gave him) *take my word, I will engage in no battle, but you shall share in the blows given and received on either side.*

As Spar had violated his parole of honour given at Francfort upon the Oder of not serving against Gustavus and his allies for a certain period of time, he proved a prisoner, that might be depended upon, as he lay exposed to the rigor of the then-established military practice. Being examined by the king in person twice upon oath, he answered, on the faith of a Christian, that he knew nothing of Walstein's designs, as that general made no participants in his secrets : but the commonly received opinion (with which his own co-incided) was, that " he aimed only to compel him by hunger into a treaty." The king insisted no farther, and was perhaps the only prince or general (as the

\* Swedish Intelligencer, Part iii. p. 22.



custom then run) that would have pardoned Spar in such a situation, as 1632. that officer stood.

In this partizan-war (a sort of piracy and murder, offensive to a generous spirit, and so much the rather, as it rarely determined any thing) his majesty began to discover great uneasinesses; for many of the best generals, including the common soldiers almost to a man, began to grow cruel and rapacious. This hurt the king's mind both as a Christian and a warrior; for it was a maxim with him, that avarice was illiberal in a military man, and that barbarity usually implied cowardice. Besides, he foresaw plainly, that want of morals would soon create want of discipline; and that then his once-invincible army would be reduced to the level of the common standard. Nay, he remarked, that even Wallstein in the present campaign preserved a subordination and regularity, which were quite the reverse of that licentiousness, with which formerly he had indulged his troops. Sending therefore for every commander to his tent from the lieutenant-colonels to the lieutenant-general, the latter being the second post then in all armies; and assuming (which is very difficult) an air of affliction and firmness at the same time, he delivered his sentiments in the following words:

*Gentlemen,*

*You partly belong to those numbers, who have shewn themselves unfaithful and disloyal to their own country \*, having endeavoured to procure and complete its ruin to the utmost of your power. You, my generals, and all you, my inferior officers, I have ever esteemed you as brave cavaliers, and make this confession now to your honour; testifying at the same time, that upon all occasions of service offered, and more particularly in the hour of battle, you have given me such demonstrations of your valour, as have intirely satisfied my most ardent wishes. But when I reflect on the ravages, extortions, and cruelties lately committed †, (and believe me, my friends, the seeing you all*

\* Meaning Germany; for the German officers and soldiers were neither so moral, nor so well disciplined as the Swedish.

† In Bavaria; where uninterrupted successes first rendered them insolent.

1632. *before me enlivens my memory with the strongest recollection) and that you, persons of rank, birth, education, and competent incomes, have been guilty yourselves of those very insolencies, and companions of those, who neither observe discipline, nor see it observed ;—I even my mind is struck with astonishment and horror. Turn your eyes inward upon your own consciences ; and I ask no more. Is it not a case afflicting and deplorable ; is it not a sight odious to the Supreme Being ; that one Christian, even of the same profession in religion, should despoil another ! that brethren should render brethren miserable, and friends destroy friends ! Demons themselves, as far as can be conjectured, have more justice and less barbarity.*

*How often hath anguish cut me to the heart, when the voice of fame reports, on numberless occasions, that the Swedish soldiers are more cruel and more licentious than the Imperialists ? But here lies a mistake. All my troops are denominated Swedes, but the offence springeth from the native Germans : and had I known the cast and complexion of the nation in the same manner as I now stand informed ; and that you, Germans born, had no more natural affection for your maternal country than hath since appeared, rendering it no better services, and discovering no greater fidelity towards it ; believe me, on the honour of a soldier, I would never have saddled an horse in your behalf ; much less hazarded my life, kingdoms, and reputation for you, as also the persons of those brave and faithful men, who accompanied me hither.*

*No—since I now perceive, that you are animated with a rage for destroying your country, it had been the effects of my choice and judgment, both, to have left you precisely in the state I found you ; that is, in other words, plunged and buried in the depths of slavery, as well mental as corporeal.*

*Let your own consciences bear testimony, that it is not my usual custom to deny any of you a request, that is reasonable ; and the Supreme Being knoweth besides, that I never intended more than (by the co-operation of divine assistance) to restore every man to his own, and his own to every man ; and for the acquisitions proposed to be made in Franconia and Bavaria, it was my first intention to distribute them impartially to the nobility and gentry of the German nation, and leave no man's good services unrewarded. But this diabolical practice of ravaging and destroying lays a dead weight, I must confess, on my best purposes, and checks the vigour of my Christian resolutions.*

*But*



*But answer me, my fellow soldiers, have you not the spirit and dignity of sentiment to reflect a little, what kind of idea posterity will form concerning you in future histories!—Remember likewise, I conjure you, what perplexities you are creating to your honour and consciences, and what visitations and punishments you are now drawing down, not only on your own persons, but on your country and successors, by these outrageous acts of oppression and inhumanity. Oh, that you could once reflect what an account you have to settle at the great tribunal! Happy, thrice happy had been my condition, if I had still remained in my own kingdoms, and not travelled so far to behold such enormities as I have beheld!*

*You will say, perhaps, that you want money; and yet it is evident to all mankind, that I pay you and the whole army punctually, to the full extent of my power: but by your depredations, extortions and ravages, you bring the honour of my credit in question, and deprive me of the very means to support my forces. And whence, I demand a second time, proceeds it, that you are not satisfied? What share have I received in any instance from all your plunder?—Just nothing. Here therefore I protest, in the presence of the Supreme Being (for what I say is religiously veracious) that in all this war I have not enriched myself to the amount of six German dollars\*. Nay I can make it appear to demonstration, if any doubtful person amongst you desireth to be satisfied under this article, that I have drawn from my own patrimonial treasures, since I left Stockholm, at two and thirty several remittances, the full and complete sum of three hundred and sixty thousand pounds; all which I have expended for your advantage, and for the re-establishment of such princes, as are united with me in the same truth of religion. This, it is true—(for there may be some tincture of vanity in the recital) I ought perhaps to have cast in shades: but one thing there is, which I can never allow to be buried in oblivion, and that is, the loss of so many brave and excellent officers, whose virtues indeed surpass all estimation. Here gratitude and human nature must break forth: for I valued such persons beyond all my riches.—And*

\* About one guinea English. In the original pair of boots, which I now wear. See Schefferi: he pointed, it is said, to the boots he had then Memorab. 149.  
on: I have not gained, observed he, this single.

1632. *to proceed still further, what have you, gentlemen, from the first to the meanest, ever contributed towards the expences of the war?*

*Henceforth therefore I request and command you to despoil no man of his goods or possessions. As you have spirit and intrepidity, leave the marks of them on the breasts of your enemies; but distain not the honour of a warrior by committing outrages on the unarmed and the innocent.*

*BE CONTENT WITH YOUR WAGES\**, as a soldier ought; and subsist not by pilfering and plunder, like banditti and Croats. Otherwise you, from the highest to the lowest, will be always infamous; and I, with such assistants, shall never become victorious\*.

Thus spoke the king, and the speech produced by me, almost verbatim, carries its own marks of authenticity with it, being of such a cast, that few historians will have the vanity to say they could pretend to invent it. The effect was, it soon melted the rugged audience into tears, and produced afterwards a thorough reformation. Nor was a syllable returned by way of justification or excuse. Nevertheless, his majesty pursued the blow with a general proclamation, to which it was annexed by way of penalty, that thenceforwards he would pardon no man, of what rank soever, either by birth or station military, in case he appeared to be a delinquent. *And if*, added he to some German officers, *you dare pretend to desert or mutiny, I have enough left of my faithful and valiant Swedes to cut you all to pieces even in Walstein's presence: for having reason and Christianity on my side, I will be obeyed.* He then caused a lieutenant to be hanged, whose ill stars conducted him to be the first offender; and when a poor peasant complained of a common soldier, who had stolen the support of his family, a single cow, he seized the fellow with his own hands, and calling for the regimental executioner, commanded him that instant to perform his office: *Friend*, said he to the criminal, *every soldier is my child: yet it is better for thee to die, than that the wrath of God should descend, on account of this transgression, upon me, I thee, and the whole army assembled round us*†.

\* North's Intelligencer, Part iii. p. 24, 25, 26. See also Chemnitz, Tom. i. p. 317: and, The Historical but Authentic Relation, fol. Low 1223, Tom. iii. p. 80, &c.

† Chemnitzius de Bello Sueco-Germanico, Tom. i. 316.



Walstein still continued his politeness and deference towards Gustavus, 1632. and restoring to him a captain, Reischel, after having entertained him at his own table, and discharged his ransom to the Croatians, besought that officer to assure his majesty, "That he considered him as the first general in the world, and should die contented, if he could only have the honour of concluding a peace between him and the emperor." His majesty received this message at table with a smile, and answered, *That Walstein, it must be confessed, was a person of magnificence; and as he was always ready to do him justice, so he was too honest a man to wish his death, especially till he could once have the pleasure of giving him a good shake by the collar in open field* \*.

By this time maladies began to be extremely rife in either army; for the water of the Pegnitz, which supplied them both, grew scanty and disturbed, and the putrefaction of dead horses was such, that petechial fevers raged to a degree, which can hardly be credited. His majesty suffered most from want of green forage, and was master only of a strip of meadow-ground to that purpose. It was now reported not only at Vienna, but throughout all Europe, that Gustavus had humbly sued for peace. True it is, the pacificator general of the empire † made a tender of his services; the Danish ambassador renewed his late attack, and interposed a little; Christian-William, late administrator of Magdeburg, and cousin to the queen of Sweden, had private permission, (being before a prisoner) to leave Vienna, in order to sound the king's dispositions; and Spar proposed to make terms with Walstein from his own free motion: but his majesty continued coy, and desired to be excused from hearing the bare mention of any single preliminary. And as a proof of the sincerity of his declarations in this respect, he wrote to Oxenstiern, commanding him to join him; but, said he, *conceive not your master in such a situation, as to suppose yourself obliged to run such bold and hazardous risks, as men usually do in affairs of desperation: proceed coolly and solidly;*

\* Mercure Franç. à l'an 1632, p. 388.

† So the king always styled, in a ludicrous manner, the landgrave of Hesse-Darmstadt, who

was supposed to be a secret pensioner to the emperor.

1632. *let no apprehensions hurry you from the free exertion of your understanding: I can look the enemy in the face for a longer continuance.*

It may be worth while now to consider this great master-stroke in the art of war, the conduct of Gustavus; who lay begirt with numbers treble superior to his own forces, from the beginning of June till the 21st of August; for that day his several armies reached him. Their first conjunction with themselves was operose and difficult, and their combined march, in order to join their sovereign, was long, tedious, and dangerous. The chancellor Oxenstiern then lay in the electorates of Mentz, Triers, and Cologne, where he had the Spanish troops upon his hands, whom Horn held in play with a small army during his absence. He had a junction likewise to form with the landgrave of Hesse-Cassel, who was to steer his course through Pappenheim's troops; but fortunately for him, that vigilant general was then making his romantic journey to the relief of Mastricht. When it was, that the king wrote first to Oxenstiern with directions to advance, I once knew, but the memorandum is mislaid; nevertheless, it was, if I mistake not, about the middle of June; but the chancellor could not possibly move till the eleventh of July.

Duke William of Weymar, his younger brother Bernard being recalled to Nurenberg, lay then near the lake of Constance, so that Milan first, and all Italy afterwards, began to tremble. But this perhaps is only a figurative manner of expression in the author I am now perusing\*, and took its rise probably from the zeal of the honest Finlanders, who being no great geographers, asked the peasants about Lindaw, how many day's march it might be from thence to Rome!

This general, about the time that Walstein *invested* the king, (for that indeed is the properest expression, which can be used on the occasion) received orders to hasten from the foot of the Alps almost to the Baltic; namely, to the duchy of Magdeburg, and the bishopric of Halberstadt, in order to glean up the English and Scottish remains of Hamilton's army, who were now reduced to two regiments, the first commanded by Ballandine, and the latter by Alexander Hamilton.

\* Loccenii Hist. rerum Suecicarum, p. 596.



But our vigilant and industrious countrymen saved their future general a part of his labour ; for venturing forwards of themselves with generous resolution, they reached Halle in Saxony, where they found the blue and green brigades, four companies of Mitzval's infantry, and two regiments of cavalry. Thence passing through Lutzen and Zeitz, they found their commander, who had few forces with him, except his own guards, that attended him from Suabia ; and then crossing the forest of Thuringia, reached Franconia, where five Saxon regiments joined them, of which two were horse. At length they pieced in with the chancellor at Wurtzburg about the tenth of August. 1632.

The general Banier, who led the third army, lay then near Augsburg, where he commanded against Cratz, late Bavarian velt-maréchal under Tilly \*. On receiving his instructions he crossed the Danube, nor durst his enemy pursue him ; and gliding by the western side of his master's camp, (so far was the king from wanting his assistance) advanced to Weinsheim in the margraviate of Anspach, with a view to facilitate the approach of Oxenstiern and duke William of Weymar. But how vast was his surprize, and how greatly did he admire the king's judgment and intrepidity, when he found his brother Bernard posted there with a strong detachment from the royal camp ! Hence it is plain, that Gustavus with his handful of men despised all the efforts of Walstein ; and felt no pain but how to enable his combined armies to reach him with safety, blending and consolidating them together in one point from the greatest distances, overlooking the loss of days and weeks, with respect to his own distresses, and exposing himself to all sorts of dangers, upon condition only, that he could once make them strong enough to confront Walstein, in case he marched from his lines to intercept their approach ; which he knew to be both possible and practicable with proviso, that the Imperial general had spirit enough to undertake the enterprize.

\* It may be worth while to remark here once for all, that the post of velt-maréchal was beneath that of the lieutenant-general ; which the French historians are ignorant of in their accounts of these wars : for they talk of

a velt-maréchal as commander in chief ; whereas it appears from history, that Francis Albert, duke of Sax-Lauenberg, after the king's death, was appointed velt-maréchal of the Saxon army under lieutenant-general Arnheim.

1632. The Swedish troops being thus surprizingly assembled together advanced slowly and cautiously (for such were their directions) to Hertzog-Aurach, which, as it was a walled town, protected with a strong castle, the king took, (in spite of Walsstein) for their conveniency, a few days before. From this place they proceeded gently to Bruck, which lieth ten miles to the north of Nurenberg, where the river Aurach falls into the Pegnitz : and on the western side (the town and castle standing to the eastward, which shews what an excellent defence the king's prudence secured for them,) they fortified and encamped themselves for three days. There Gustavus made them a visit, and led them triumphantly to his camp under Walsstein's nose. They amounted to 26,000 hardy veterans, who desired nothing more than to come to blows. His majesty acknowledged their zeal and diligence, their affection and fidelity, with a transport of joy ; and soon availing himself of their spirit and ardour, determined to bring this contention of gazing and starving to a short conclusion.

Walsstein began to change countenance at this conjunction ; and as he had not adventured to attack the Swedish re-inforcements in their approach, people from thence formed favourable presages in behalf of the protestant cause. The king burnt with impatience to talk to the Imperial general in an higher style. For when he had troops to act, it was never in his humour to allow them to sit with their arms folded : and he, whose eyes penetrated into every thing, and whose ears were open to every thing, had chanced to maintain a correspondence with a couple of sutlers in the Imperial army ; but one of them, who happened to be detected in stealing Cronenberg's service of plate, confessed the treason, and impeached his accomplice. They were both broken on the wheel the same day ; and thus the king's correspondence was entirely ruined.

The king having set aside a day of public thanksgiving for the arrival of his armies, and borrowed money of the Nurenbergers at six *per cent.* in order to advance a month's pay to his forces, balanced immediately in his own mind, whether he might not have recourse to forcible means, inasmuch as artifice had failed him, and his intelligence  
been



1632.

been destroyed at the very source. At length he formed the heroical resolution, (to which an unlucky circumstance afterwards contributed) of besieging and attacking Walftein in his own lines, determined either to enter his camp, or compel him to dislodge. This general, as well as the elector of Bavaria, astonished at the sight of such extraordinary preparations, sent exprefs upon exprefs to Pappenheim, beseeching him to assist in rescuing them from their dangerous situation : but that commander, who loved neither of them, and who made the sacrifice of his plain-dealing to no man, affecting independency, and having his own particular ambition and humours, made them no return but ceremonious excuses, and well studied delays ; for he considered himself as the only antagonist worthy to oppose Gustavus, in the character of generalissimo of the Imperial armies. The reason he was so ardently sought for appears to be the following one : Walftein, for fear of starving, had sent Holk into Misnia with ten thousand men ; so that he only exceeded the Swedes by fourteen thousand, and such troops, as he could draft from out-posts and neighbouring garrisons ; which might make about half an equivalent for those he had detached.

His majesty, with little ceremony, thundered upon Walftein from three vast batteries of cannon ; and that general, who by this time had learned to copy Gustavus in expecting great things from the force of artillery, erected his batteries in all convenient places, and gave his officers charge, under pain of his highest displeasure, (which with him was but another phrase for disgrace, degradation, or death) never to be transported by any heat of passion, or any seeming fitness of opportunity into an engagement, that was more than barely defensive and repulsive. As this attack was undertaken, discontinued, and re-assumed for several days, it so happened, that whenever the king's troops advanced too near, or exposed their flanks, the Walfteiner's treated them very rudely, but always contented themselves with the first advantage, and never once gave a momentary opening (which Gustavus watched for, and allured them to ; ) whereby things might be drawn on to a general action ; so implicitly was Walftein obeyed. And indeed never was a commander better calculated, to break the spirit of that danger-

1632. ous sort of officers, who do great mischief merely by possessing animal courage, without coolness and conduct. In one of these engagements Banier received a musquet-shot in his arm, just above the elbow-joint, which remaining there, gave him inexpressible torment.

The king then dismantling his batteries, employed two days in passing the greater part of his forces over the Rednitz, at a small distance above the town in Furt; in crossing which little river, William Harvey, only son of the earl of Bristol, was unfortunately drowned. He was a young man, endued with all amiable good qualities, and served that day with the curiosity of a stranger, being then returning home from a tour of three years duration over France, Italy, and Germany.

In making this motion, the king proposed to dislodge Wallstein from a part of his encampment; for by seizing a certain eminence, he had then full power (which he wanted before) to bring three new-erected batteries to perform their duty. The Imperial general foreseeing the consequence, retired backwards to the old castle of Altenberg, (which name implied an high situation) and there took care to intrench himself afresh. The forest of Altenberg spread itself round him; the ascent of the hill was steep and craggy. There he immured himself behind a three-fold barrier of trees, each rising in a semi-circle one above the other; and in short possessed a lodgment hardly possible to be penetrated, provided the defendants acquitted themselves like men of honour.

It is thought, that Aldringer, who was a person of sharp and ready parts, induced the king by an artifice to assail a post, which upon cool examination, if left to himself, he would certainly have declined. For at nine o'clock, just after morning-prayers were finished, (which were longer than usual, as the day was a festival \*) a valet de chambre of Aldringer (who had himself been a valet de chambre, and rising by his dexterity and courage knew how to chuse an enterprizing genius) was brought prisoner into the king's presence. This adventurer, who threw himself purposely into the way of the Swedes, told his majesty, with an air of confident firmness, that the Imperial commander was then

\* St. Bartholemew, August 24<sup>th</sup>



actually decamping, in order to comply with the remonstrances of his troops, who declared they were ready to die as soldiers ought, but that they had no inclination to perish by famine. The king from his eminence soon discovered the enemy in great motion, and ordering his men to advance, learned at length this fatal truth, that they were only hastening to seize a post \*, which, if Aldringer's servant had not misled his judgment, he had surely pre-occupied. Piqued therefore to see himself over-reached by a suborned dissembler (concerning whose future fate or punishment we know nothing) he saw the desperate nature of the undertaking, yet resolved to proceed ; stung to the heart with the phlegm of Walstein and the artifice of Aldringer. Thus when the passions are thoroughly disturbed, there appear to be certain moments in war, where the parts of a finite being are hardly sufficient ; since something of human infirmity will ever adhere to the most perfect man.

The king forming his resolution in an instant, and ordering the dragoons and a part of his cavalry to dismount, advanced sword in hand at the head of the van-guard of the left wing †, having ordered each post to be relieved every two hours ; but the main attack against the ruinous castle of Altenberg was supported wholly by commanded musqueteers, all drafted from the several brigades, who left their colours below the mountain with their companions ‡. There was an arched projection on one side of the hill over-hung with trees ; and in this hollow the king lodged his body of reserve. Many other desperate attacks were made, and one particularly on the posts, where Aldringer

\* An old fortress called The Burgstal.

† The curious may like to know, how the posts of honour were distributed on this important day's service. Duke William of Weymar was lieutenant-general ; and his business was to take the command in case of accident : his brother Bernard conducted the cavalry, and general Srief, an old Mansfelder, served under him. Some substituted person acted for Banier as commander of the infantry, and Torstenfon directed the artillery. Hence it appears, that

Oxenstiern had risen to no great employment as a soldier ; nor had the landgrave of Hesse-Cassel (both then present) any distinguished command. Gustavus never made compliments of rank or seniority in a battle.

‡ These assailants were all subdivided into little bodies, consisting of 500 men ; and an experienced colonel (for the king had sometimes five in a brigade) a lieutenant-colonel, with other proper officers, were assigned to each body.

1632. and Caraffa were lodged, and where Walstein, Gallas, and Aldringer stood during the course of the engagement. The first disappointment seemed rather to sharpen his majesty's courage, than rebate its keenness; for all the batteries being now mounted, he thundered upon the enemy continually with more than two hundred pieces of cannon, to which Walstein replied with unwearied diligence. The king, though ever fixed in one place, formed the disposition of each attack, and dispatched his orders accordingly; and the whole combined operation proceeded only upon one principle, which was, to possess the summit of the mountain; a task rendered difficult by nature, and more so by the intervention of art, and the obstinate resistance of the Imperial troops; for Walstein's army was a piece of machinery, which he forced to operate almost as long as he pleased. On the contrary, Gustavus's men loved and adored him on a principle of honour, and sought death out of free choice and pure magnanimity. Yet the height of the mountain was unattainable, though not a single Swede behaved amiss. The reader may form some idea of its strength from the following circumstance: word was brought Walstein by an aid de camp, that *the king had mounted the hill*; to whom he answered hastily, with a mixture of profaneness and surprize (for he was extravagant in his language beyond all imagination) *That he would not believe there was a Supreme Being in heaven, if that castle could possibly be taken from him* \*. Now, if a man reflects coolly on this monstrous expression (which nothing but the fidelity of an historian would have allowed me to repeat) I think it is pretty plain it arose more from disconcertment than impiety; and I mention it partly to shew, that Walstein wanted presence of mind upon great emergencies, and being highly persuaded, that the place was not to be conquered by human means, broke out into a profusion of downright nonsense, as well as profaneness.

And now began the sharpest service, that had been seen during the course of the thirty years wars; so that the old officers on either side all agreed, that the battles of Prague and Leipzig were but a sort of holiday-reviews, when compared with the severe work of this day.

\* Swedish Intelligencer, Part iii. p. 50.



The Swedes were exposed and naked from head to foot : the Wal- 1632.  
steiners, on the contrary, lay buried in their entrenchments, not to mention parapets of felled oaks disposed in treble and fourfold rows, insomuch that it was impossible for the Swedish cavalry to act, or even sustain their infantry. The conflict lasted ten hours without intermission, which probably never happened in the same degree of violence, either before that time, or since ; and the fire of the cannon and musquetry was so fierce and unremitting, that the whole mountain appeared to be on flame \*, as if the king purposed to perform something eminent in the way of artillery near Nurenberg, where, according to most accounts, the invention of cannon made its first appearance. Walstein wanted no advantage, that could be wished for : and though 6000 men filled the principal post, yet he had the power to replace them from his camp every half hour ; and besides, within the walls of the castle, he had the opportunity to lodge one thousand soldiers, who, removed from the reach of cannon-ball, stood prepared to rush forth upon the least emergency. Many Swedish regiments returned six, seven, and eight times to the attack, for the king never left the front-line, since it was a service of so desperate a nature, that a commander in chief was obliged to put himself upon a worse footing than the meanest soldier, that served under him. In a word, it was thought, both parties engaged (we are speaking of infantry and dragoons) almost to a man, some in one place and some in another ; for the desperation of the Swedes, and the obstinacy of the Imperialists, were not to be paralleled.

Amongst the several attempts upon Walstein's camp, duke Bernard's attack appeared upon trial to be more practicable than that of the king ; and when the report thereof was communicated to his majesty by an aid de camp, colonel Hepburn was dispatched immediately to survey the ground, and bringing word, that the account was just, the king flew thither and examined the situation himself. *Sir*, said he

\* By the account of the military store-keepers, the king fired that day almost 200,000 cannon-shots. Chemnitz, Vol. i. 313. But this seems to be a mistake, for each piece of ordnance must have been discharged near 1000 times.

1632. to Hepburn, *you have made a true and faithful narration ; yet I must not aim to make my principal impression here : it demands at least my whole body of infantry, and then the artillery and cavalry are left naked to the enemy's mercy, who may chuse where to make their capital effort, or assault me, if they please, in two places at once.* This account hath been delivered down to us by Hepburn himself, a person at that juncture not greatly prepossessed in his master's favour, and confutes a rumour, which then passed currently over the empire ; namely, that Gustavus might have carried his point, and dislodged Wallstein, if he could have departed from his obstinacy, and following duke Bernard's advice, resigned an ill chosen post in exchange for a second, that was better circumstanced. But so far was this assertion from being a true one, that on the contrary, all the generals testified their approbation of the king's sedateness of judgment, as well as quickness of decision.

Having mentioned something relative to Hepburn, it may be worth while to observe here, that one or two sharp expressions had passed between him and the king a few days before, upon which the former angrily declared, that he would never more unsheath his sword in the Swedish quarrel \*. Therefore in the present action he attended the king as a simple spectator, who, when duke Bernard's important information arrived, turned round and cried out with some eagerness, where is any able officer to hasten away and survey the ground †? But the confusion and slaughter being so great, that none could be found (for each commander had full employment in his respective post) the brave Scottish warrior made a tender of his best services ; *Go*, said the king, *I am much obliged to you.* Having returned to Gustavus, and made his report, and accompanied him a second time to the spot of ground in question, he returned his sword into the scabbard ; “ And

\* Part of this account is taken from P. Bougéant's *Histoire des guerres, &c. qui précédèrent la paix de Westfalie*, and it is the only passage, wherein I have derived the least assistance from him : for though his work is a clear piece of prose, well methodized, yet his materials are few and hungry, nor are his three

original authors, whom he copies, judiciously chosen.

† Others say, that colonel Erpach being mortally wounded, Hepburn, at the king's request, supplied his place, and maintained the post.



“ now, fire, cried he, I shall never draw it more in your behalf.” To 1632.  
which his late master made no answer at that time, either because his affairs were in such a situation, that he had not a moment to spare ; or more probably, because he thought the usage so harsh and abrupt, that he rather disdained to make a suitable reply to it, and therefore considered silence as the only answer, which carried with it most expression, and the greatest degree of dignity.

His majesty, as the afternoon began now to decline, perceived plainly, that nothing could ensue that day, but fruitless attempts and inevitable slaughter ; and therefore leaving (for the honour of his troops) the musqueteers, employed in attacking the hill, to maintain their ground, commanded the gross of the army to form itself on the plain below. But before these orders could be completely executed, a large part of Walstein’s cuirassiers issued out of their lines, and fell with all the fury and insolence of conquerors on a body of Swedish infantry, conducted by Torstenson, who, with musqueteers and pikemen, faced a four-fold number of assailants with incredible firmness ; till at length, half overpowered by numbers, he saved the remains of his men (keeping still next the enemy) at the expence of his liberty, which he soon regained in exchange against Spar. Mean while Cronenberg, with his own regiment of 1500 horse, furnished the invincible, flew like lightening upon Stalhaufe \*, who commanded 200 Finland cavalry ; but the latter had the courage and fortune to repel the Imperialists, and pursued them, till the cannon of Altenberg-castle restrained him from advancing farther.

And now night, the most expeditious as well as most effectual of all truce-makers, introduced a breathing space at least, after a day’s work of most desperate service. The honour of the action remained equally distributed between either party ; the Imperialists kept their entrenchments, and the Swedes slept all night in plain ground, just in the front of the enemies lines ; so that nothing saved the former, (as they themselves confessed) but the great advantage of situation. And thus ended

\* This colonel, a Finlander by nation, rose a footman to Sir Patrick Ruthven. He was remarkably on account of his merit, being originally remarkable for speaking excellent English.

1632. the unparalleled conflict of Altenberg, which, in the sense of some, was a sort of victory, for Gustavus missed his aim, and Walstein maintained his ground: so that, according to the example of Marcellus, and the other Romans, who repelled Hannibal to the gates of Nola, he and his generals all concluded, that they had obtained some very signal advantage; and flattered themselves with the expectation of future victories, having once beheld the day, when they had *ceased to be beaten* by a conqueror, equally redoubtable with the great Carthaginian.

In addition to the misfortunes of the Swedes, there fell most violent rains, which lasted till morning, so that the king sat till day-break in his coach, and his domestics lay round a nominal fire, for it was hardly possible to make it burn.

Walstein, who mounted not on horse-back till news was brought him, that Gustavus had stormed the castle of Altenberg, had his horse killed under him by a musquet-ball; and by another shot, the king lost a part of the sole of his boot, next the toe; and a domestic was killed at his elbow by a stroke of cannon. Duke Bernard, that day, gave specimens of conduct and courage, which no ways misbecame the successor of Gustavus. He gained an eminence, that was almost upon a level with the old castle, and by the king's orders erected a battery thereon; but in the interim, the Imperialists retired to a second distance, and having intrenched themselves afresh, clogged the new ascent with the downfall of so many trees, that it was impossible for the troops to mount without exposing their whole body to inevitable destruction.

Though historians make the losses to be nearly equal on either side, (that is to say, about one thousand killed, and fifteen hundred wounded, in each army) yet sure it is, that the Swedes must have suffered most considerably, as appeareth from the very nature of the description. Among the latter fell general Boetius, count Erpach; Crailsham, a British officer of good repute\*, and many others: and the Imperialists lost Maria de Caraffa, a young nobleman of great hopes, Chiesà, and Fug-

\* *Invasions of Germany, Lond. 1638, 12°.*



ger, all colonels; which latter died bravely in the opinion of some, 1632. though not in the character of a man of honour; for being examined by the Swedes, in his last moments, (and the king, if I mistake not, stood by) he called for a bumper of wine, and said, "Gentlemen, it is now no time to dissemble; my general, in his turn, will assault you;" and having thus drank, he expired immediately. As to what the Imperialists suffered, we know nothing with precision; but the list of the wounded, on the Swedish side, was very great; for as many officers were disabled for a season, as were thought sufficient to conduct 6000 men.

Next morning his majesty, after having passed a wet, cold, and tedious night, reflecting, during the whole continuance of it, with great compassion, on the fate of the commanded musqueteers, who lay directly under Altenberg-castle; and asking his domestics anxiously, at break of day, if any officer of the field was near him, received for answer, that none but Hepburn was there, who, as we observed before, acted only in the capacity of a volunteer. Him the king requested earnestly, to make a visit to the poor soldiers above mentioned, and remark likewise, if any place could be discovered, from whence the ordnance might be brought to act against the old castle. He then desired him to call, in his return, upon duke Bernard, and command his troops whilst the said general came to receive fresh instructions. And here, I think, all these circumstances, in conjunction with some, that have preceded, may serve to shew, that though the king was warm and hasty; yet, when the transport of his resentment was over, he subsided always into the friendly and condescending character; and asked favours, very often, on purpose to give an opening to a reconciliation. When Hepburn returned, he made report to his majesty, that the musqueteers were almost buried in dirt and water, but that he had explored a spot of ground, from whence, if the earth was raised a little, four pieces of battering artillery might be brought to bear against Altenberg-fortress, at the distance only of fifty paces: *I had rather*, said the king with great emotion, *you had found me a place at ten times that distance; I cannot*

1632. *bear the thoughts of seeing my men torn to pieces a second time\**: and therefore, having held a short consultation in his own coach, (to which duke Bernard had been lately summoned) he gave orders for one general retreat; which was performed with that sedateness, regularity, and firmness, that Wallstein durst not uncouple one single band of Croats, to harass his rear. Indeed good part of the stress of the difficulty turned upon bringing off the commanded musqueteers with reputation and safety, for they lay more advanced towards the enemy, than any other Swedish troops: and his majesty felt so much uneasiness in this particular, that though duke William of Weymar had undertaken to see the business performed, and had sent Monro (then the first time acting as colonel, which made his general destine him to some distinguishing service) to conduct the retreat, at the head of 500 chosen musqueteers; yet Gustavus, still impatient concerning the event, resolved to see with his own eyes, how that officer and his soldiers acquitted themselves; and overtaking Monro, whom he observed to be wounded, (having received, the day before, a musquet-shot in his side) had the generosity, and humanity, to bid him return to his tent, lest his health might be endangered; and taking the partizan courteously out of his hand, performed the duty of a simple colonel himself, and brought his men back with such composure and resolution, that the enemy, far from pressing on his heels, durst not discharge a single musquet. It is true, many may think this office, humane and compassionate as it was in itself, to be beneath the dignity of a crowned head; but it was the king's *humour*, (as Tilly said on a less important occasion concerning himself) and that must suffice for a general answer; for it was a maxim with his majesty, (and perhaps the only dangerous one, which he ever embraced) *That no duty misbecame the greatest commander, which was compatible with the honour of a simple colonel* †.

And now, whoever shall consider the whole together of the transaction at Altenberg, dispassionately and sensibly, will perhaps admire Gus-

\* Monro; Second Exped.

† Character of Gustavus Adolphus, Lond. 4°. 1633.



tavus more, in this instance of disappointment, than in all his shining and most prosperous victories. 1632. Misled by false intelligence, and warped a little in his judgment by the warmth of his temper, and an impatient sensibility of disgrace, it is certain he took the step too precipitately; and thus much some of his generals modestly suggested: but then in what manner did he retrieve an error, whose ill consequences in another commander had been unavoidable?---He seized his opportunities, and shifted, and resumed his hold, with such acumen of judgment, inducing the army, by his own example, to act with a resolution not to be paralleled; that though the chances against him were at least sevenfold to his disadvantage, yet he brought the amount of loss, on either side, to be nearly equal; formed his retreat, the next day, with such boldness and gallantry, as gave his enemies the option of a second battle; and then entrenched himself afresh under their beards, where he remained unmolested, from the twenty-fifth of August till the eighth of September.---All military engagements, of equivocal success, are best judged of by their consequences; but this action was attended by no consequences, either good, bad, or of a mixt complexion. For it occasioned no single variation in the king's future motions; nor did it influence his decampment, which took place a fortnight afterwards, as care shall be taken to shew in its proper place.

The king, after this bold but unavailing attempt, changed his plan undismayed; and removing to some little distance from his last lines, sketched out a new camp, still nearer to Wallstein's than the former one; for a cannon-ball could do execution, from one to the other, at its greatest range. And now matters being reduced, for a time, to a state of pause and quiet, the English ambassador made a farther attempt, without being furnished with a fresh degree of power, and of course received a repulse more strongly worded than the last had been. And for this, we have his own authority against himself, his master, and the ministry \*. “ The king of Sweden *complained*, said he, that he had “ been *amused and led on with subtilty and finesse* by the ambassador, and

\* Letter, dated Aug., ... 1632, MS. Paper-office.

1632. " said publickly, *That this was a RIGHT ENGLISH TREATY*, for they  
 " used to be *eternally in treaty*, but *never concluded*".

What piqued the king, was the perseverance and shuffling of the English court. He wanted an *offensive* treaty of *definite* duration, but could not gain it; he requested a naval war against Spain, but could not procure it: and knowing Charles's mutable and timorous temper, resolved to chain the Proteus, or else leave him at full liberty. He had conceived likewise a disapprobation of Vane's errand, from the first moment he saw his instructions, at Mentz, under the great seal of England, which were never altered afterwards in any material circumstance; and the tenor of them ran irreversibly, that the ambassador should engage in no league, but such as was purely of a defensive nature. From whence it appears to demonstration, that the re-conquering and restitution of the Palatinats, (points wherein the honour and religion of England ought deeply to have been concerned) were never thought of sincerely, consistently, or in good earnest. And this the elector and electress Palatin both knew, who despised their professing and protesting brother accordingly. Sorry I am, that such truths as these should pass from my pen, at so great a distance of time; I know the reverence that is due to the ashes of a crowned person, and touch them with a cautious and unwilling hand: for, as a man of private virtue, and an encourager of the fine arts, I respect the memory of Charles I. and make some allowances for the untoward circumstances of the period, into which Providence was pleased to throw him.

But to return to the negotiations before us, concerning which some farther informations may be given the curious, by producing an extract from a third letter \* of Vane's to secretary Coke, which seems to me to precede the last cited in order of time; but the date of the day being either omitted in the original, or overlooked by the person, who had the goodness to transmit the copy to me, I can only say, that they both came from Nurenberg, or the king's camp, in the same month, namely, August, 1632. " Having been in treaty, saith Vane, in conformity



“ to your last directions, with the king of Sweden, we not agreeing *de* 1632.  
 “ *genere fæderis*, nor upon the *indefiniteness* of the time,---he pressing  
 “ a league defensive, (*offensive* quere) and *time certain*; I, going accord-  
 “ ing to my instructions, from which your honour knoweth I am not  
 “ to depart; on the nineteenth of the present, after four hours con-  
 “ sultation, with some of his council, on this affair, he sent his secre-  
 “ tary Camerarius \* to me, with this declaration, that he had so long  
 “ been in agitation between himself and me, that he gave his majesty  
 “ many thanks for the honour he had done him, in sending his ambaf-  
 “ sador to offer him an alliance; and gave me thanks for the pains I had  
 “ taken therein. The conclusion was, *That he would not accept of the*  
 “ *auxiliary treaty, nor of the condition proposed by me; and for the inde-*  
 “ *finiteness of the time, it was against all form of proceeding in alliances.*  
 “ *That he should write to his majesty, to give him thanks for the continuance*  
 “ *of his good offices towards him.*”

From all which it appears, upon the whole, that Gustavus knowing well his Britannic majesty's timidity, insisted upon a public declaration of a sea-war against Spain; and being well apprized of that prince's equivocal shiftings, (which arose from fear too) demanded a time specified for the duration of the alliance; paying little regard, either to British subsidies, or the transportation of British forces, having well digested in his mind, what had formerly been done, in that respect, for the elector Palatin, and more lately with reference to himself. Therefore not being able to possess Charles wholly, he disdained to compound for the tythes of his friendship, the payment of which he foresaw to be precarious; and thus the matter ended, with honour to the penetration and magnanimity of Gustavus.

Walsstein and he lay gazing at one another in a second state of inaction, if we except only rencounters, surprizes, and the interception of convoys. The latter, for want of more important employment, cut to pieces a regiment of Croats, near Eubach, a set of warriors he mortally hated, being of somebody's opinion in that age, (I forget now who the person was) that defined a Croatian, *to be a sort of Christian, who did not acknowledge the eighth commandment*: and then remarking,

\* A politician of great abilities, as appears formerly the elector Palatin in England. from some letters I have seen. He had served

1632. that Walstein derived all his provisions either from Bavaria, or the Upper Palatinat, (which latter road lay through the town of Neumarck) placed Sperreüter on the Bavarian side, with 5000 men, near the pass of Wilfburg and Weissenburg; and lodged 3000 chosen horse on the Neumarck side, (from whence an Imperial convoy was expected hourly) who missed little of seizing the generalissimo himself, who, being advertised of the Swedish designs, ventured forth in person to secure the arrival of his troops. A page belonging to him was taken prisoner, who reported, that his master escaped by gliding through the labyrinths of a thick wood. But still I have some doubts concerning the fact; for Walstein rarely placed himself in the way of danger; which, whether it proceeded from prudence, or timidity, (some extolling him for such practices, and some depreciating him,) cannot well be ascertained at this distance.

During this interval, a body of Croats, who had placed themselves in ambuscade to intercept another party of Swedes, lighted by meer chance on a band of gown-men, that belonged to the university of Altdorf, and made them all prisoners of war, without any respect to the *jus publicum*, or the German muses. Thus the professors Agricola, Nessler, and Bruno, had the misfortune to lose all they possessed, except their learning. But a detachment from the king's army made reprisals on the town and rich monastery of Castel, about thirteen miles to the east of Altdorf, where they found two Jesuits, one of whom, attempting to escape through a window, missed his footing on the ladder, and broke his neck; but the other, being carefully secured, served for an exchange against the Literati.

Mean while the king grew impatient to see moments of importance wasted upon depredations and skirmishes, that determined nothing. He therefore, once for all, formed the resolution of posting Horn (now returned from the electorate of Mentz \*) and Banier †, then recovered from

\* Others say duke Bernard, of Saxe-Weymar; which, upon recollection, appears to me most probable.

† We will here, once for all, say something

of this excellent officer, who, when he was between a child and a youth, fell from a window four or five stories high, without groaning or shedding a tear; which, when Gustavus heard of, he



from his late wound) at the head of two small armies; near the town of Lichtenau, a strong fort in the burgraviate of Nuremberg, not far distant from Anspach: thereby proposing to make this body of troops superior in force to all flying parties, and alluring Walstein, at the same time, to march out with his whole army in order to dislodge them; and then the king expected a fair opportunity to give him battle upon equal ground. As things thus stood, no military scheme ever appeared to be better concerted, for he left his adversary but three choices, without any subterfuge or succedaneum, namely, fighting, starving, or decamping; since an army, posted at Lichtenau, had the power of cutting off the chanel of intercourse with Bavaria and Suabia. But an unforeseen accident destroyed all this sublime plan, in one moment, and gave his majesty the keenest mortification.

Scheverlin, a patrician of Nuremberg, defended the fortrefs, which

he pronounced him born for great events, and made him a soldier. He was descended from one of the best families in Sweden, and resembled his master extremely in person, with which the king was not displeased. It was computed he had killed eighty thousand men, in the several pitched battles where he had commanded, and taken six hundred colours. As a soldier, his retreat from Bohemia may be looked upon as a master-piece; for in this branch of science, he excelled all officers before or since. As a politician, his reconciliation of the protestants, after the battle of Nuremberg, and the peace of Prague, to the Swedish interests, may be looked upon as an act of prudence and firmness worthy of Oxenstiern himself. His letters to the *maréchal* Guebriant, and others, shew him to be very great and very determined. Nevertheless there was something of a levity in his second marriage. He buried his wife, who was a countess of Lovenstein, whilst he laboured under the chronic illness, which occasioned his death: no husband appeared to be more inconsolable; but in his return from the funeral, chancing to meet the margraves of Dourlach on the road, he was so astonished with

her charms, that he made his applications to her, and married her in a few days.

In his last testament, he bequeathed Torsten-son, then in Sweden, to the army as his successor; and requested his consort, in the strongest terms, never to allow his body to be un-bowelled and embalmed, 1640-1.

He had received an excellent education, which made the king call him one of his *learned* generals.

One slight circumstance more shall be mentioned concerning him. His retreat, when environed by the enemy and the Elb, at Torgau, at a time when all Germany gave him over for lost, and by which he preserved a very fine army with little or no loss, hath ever been considered as a masterly performance in the military art, and an *emblematical* print was published thereof, from whence came the well-known expression of *cul de sac*. [*Memorab. Suec. Gent.* 46.] The emblem took its rise from Banier's own words on the occasion: "The Imperialists, said he, enclosed me in a bag, and though they tied the mouth of it with great strength and diligence, yet they forgot to darn up a trifling hole, which lay at the bottom."

1632. the king (who always destined it to a great use, though not for the purposes now related,) took care to see well provided in every respect. The governor, till then, was a man of character, and had behaved reputationably, when Wallstein's troops besieged him some weeks before. But now, his fortress being invested a second time, (as Wallstein either knew the importance of the place, or gained some intelligence of the king's designs) he made a sacrifice of his honour and good fame all at once, and entered into a capitulation without any one urgent necessity. Some suppose him to be corrupted, but that no where appears; it was an act of meer timorousness, and despondency; for as the Swedes had faced the Imperialists so long without subduing them, he became firmly persuaded, that Wallstein would destroy Gustavus; and such indeed was the opinion of the public, from the beginning of their trial of skill to the conclusion. And thus the king understood the crime; for he ordered the magistrates of Nuremberg to secure his person, and prepare his process: but as the man did not belong to him, and as the punishment of him became not an example to his own troops, he despised all resentments against a base spirit, and gave himself no concern, whether he was condemned, or acquitted. Thus was a plan of extraordinary consequence destroyed by the misbehaviour of a single person, whom no one doubted; and what doubly sharpened the king's affliction was, he had an ulterior view in possessing Lichtenau. It was a strong post, capable of securing his dislodgment, concerning which he now began to meditate; and was equally necessary to him, upon supposition, that Wallstein should defeat him. He had now his whole system to reform afresh, and passed two or three days in meditation, walking to and fro, by himself, in his tent or the fields, as was his usual custom upon such occasions. At length he determined not to push a puncto of honour into an act of cruelty; and as Wallstein, who had no compassion, was resolved to see, which army should starve last, the king, for the sake of his brave followers, took the apparent disgrace (though indeed it was an example of solid glory) to dislodge first, his grand scheme being now destroyed, with regard to Lichtenau. Which shews us, how  
inventive



inventive the parts of a great commander ought to be, and how abundant likewise in resources; since otherwise the fruits of a whole campaign may be blasted at once, by the misconduct or baseness of an officer, to all appearance inconsiderable. And indeed it was high time for the one or other party to decamp, since perseverance was nothing better than cool murder. The king, though warm and hasty, was inclined naturally to be compassionate; nor could he bear to see brave men perish piece-meal like felons in a prison. The season of the Dog-star had been uncommonly hot, the waters of the Pegnitz were foul and corrupted, the stench of the dead horses (there being hardly room to bury them) was insupportably noisome, and petechial fevers raged to the degree of a pestilence. Walstein had more room, yet suffered more; for his numbers were greater, and his management less circumspect.

His majesty being now on the wing of departure, and the grand trial of skill supposed to be concluded, the marquis of Hamilton, who by this time had neither men nor command, took his final leave at Neustadt upon the Aisch, where he was dismissed by the king with distinguishing marks of esteem and affection \*, and all the British officers had leave to attend him an half day's journey. The inflexible Hepburn took this opportunity of quitting the Swedish ensigns, proposing, as it is thought, to make a tender of his services to France, but had the misfortune in that kingdom to be killed in a duel. And thus fell the truest soldier, that Scotland (not unfruitful in men of that stamp) ever produced. The king loved him, and confided in him, above any colonel, that acted under him; and, some days before their disagreement, ap-

\* Besides what appears to us from Vane's papers, Chemnitz, the king's historiographer, who wrote upon excellent materials, gives us a short but sensible account, of all that passed, with respect to the British ambassador and British general. Venius primum cum campiductore Horniq Herbipolim, mox cum regni cancellario Moguntiae, regis jussu, inchoata re, sed neutrum consummata, ad regem Monachium Bavariae se contulerat, & conventum sane illic de plerisque: nec obscura de *indecis*, (promissa utrinque moderatione) spes apparebat, conclusionem

fœderis ea propter haud dilatum iri. Resumpta igitur ad Noribergam tela. Sed a Britannico legato conditiones propositae omnino novae, & faciem rei mutantes: adjectis nonnullorum articulorum appendiculis; è quibus nil serio agi, nec fœderis quæri perfectionem rex suspicabatur. Marchioni ergo Hamiltonio delectum habendorum in Magnam Britanniam, ut diximus, eunti, *latentes hujus processus causas indagare, regem Magnae Britanniae, semotis arbitris, de eo edocere, aliorumve non proba consilia illuc turbare*, una in mandatis datum. Tom. i. p. 316.

1632. pointed him commander of half the infantry in the camp of Nuremberg : but his just and noble spirit had not the power of making greater condescensions than those we have formerly repeated.

Mean while the Austrians made unwearied applications for assistance to the diet at Warsaw ; but the Polanders had a king to chuse ; and perceiving likewise, that affairs took a serious turn in the empire, more and more, had not much inclination to embark in a system of difficulties, which appeared to be of no short duration. Besides, national contests in Poland, like rebellions at Naples, are a sort of political holiday ; the inhabitants rejoice in them, as much as ever the Spaniards took delight in the *Juego des toros & cannas* ; nay, the very ladies are all cabinet-counsellors and politicians ; and the husband frequently recites to the senate the lecture he has first received in his wife's dressing-room \*. Besides all which, at this very juncture, as well as at most others, each man thought of advancing his own interests, and gratifying his own resentments, and bestowed only a few empty wishes on the emperor and his cause : and as to a supply of forces, it was alledged, that all they could collect were hardly sufficient to maintain the public peace at home, as they were upon the eve of a great event, the election of a sovereign.

Passing by every circumstance of this litigious cabal †, except such as relate immediately to my present subject, it was debated in the diet, under the third head of enquiry, whether the treaty, projected with Sweden, should not be confirmed and closed ; and the nobility, almost to a man, were for the affirmative. Gustavus, amongst all the tumults of war, had a watchful eye to these transactions, (not chusing however to engage in them over-deeply) and dispatched a gentleman, vested with full powers, to make the Poles an offer of securing their kingdom from the Muscovites and Tartars, and procure a good understanding betwixt the government of Poland and the neighbouring states.

Fame reports Gustavus to have insinuated dextrously, that deputies on his part, for the future, had pretensions to demand free entrance, and

\* Mem. communicated.

† † Le Soldat Suedois de Fr. Spanheim, 711—717.



vote in this assembly, by virtue of the territories he held in Prussia 1632. and elsewhere, which were feudatory to the crown of Poland. But the senators were full as cautious as the king was enterprising : they made him protestations and excuses in abundance ; but referred the grand decision to the eventual circumstances of things.

The elector of Brandenburg's request was attended to with more alacrity ; but the senators eluded the article of allowing him a deliberative vote in elections, alledging, that such a concession was inconsistent with their oaths, and the allegiance, which they owed their country ; yet besought him to employ his best offices with Gustavus, in order to bring about a more lasting and more effectual accommodation ; beseeching him likewise to name a place where the respective deputies should meet, and (to shew their sincerity) recommending some town in Prussia, or the neighbouring provinces, for that purpose.

Secretary Arnoldin and count Morfpurg took care of the Imperial affairs at this diet ; but perceiving the Swedish party to be over-powerful, they passed on to Muscovy, by their master's orders, to conclude some sort of treaty with the great duke. Mean while Gustavus gave a final audience to the ambassadors of Russia and Tartary, who made him an offer of breaking into Poland, Silesia, or Hungary. The king received their proposals with courtesy and thankfulness, but waved the acceptance of their services ; partly because he found embroilments sufficient already on his hands, and partly because he detested a war, that must be carried on with barbarian ferocity.

And at or near this period (as far as may be conjectured) his majesty received a deputation from the peasants of Upper Austria, who had the spirit (for the sake of the evangelical religion) to form a revolt under the emperor's eye, and complain in unpolished, but animated expressions, of the violations committed on their fortunes and consciences \*. These uneasinesses had blazed forth in the very beginning of the thirty years wars, and though the fire seemed extinguished to outward appearances, yet the embers were perceived to glow at bottom. Upon the present

\* Soldat Suedois, 723—730.

1632. occasion they acted with so much secrecy and judgment, that the court of Vienna suspected, and not groundlessly, that some clandestine intelligence had been carried on betwixt them and the Swedes. Oppressions, confiscations, decimations, and tortures only seemed to harden these resolute protestants. This civil contagion made its first appearance at or near Mühl \*, and overspread the Higher Austria with great rapidity. The emperor no ways liked a distemper, that approached so near his vital parts : he found also, that his revenues diminished, and the passage of the Danube was intercepted between him and Walstein.

These revoltors, say some, made an army of 18,000 men, and being rendered wise by the experience of passed errors, seized most of the frontier towns by way of security, and in order to facilitate their retreat in the hour of need ; and by making themselves masters of the river on either side, they allowed none to pass or repass but friends and allies, and issued out their protections like commanders in form. It was greatly feared, lest the infection should spread itself through the other parts of the hereditary dominions, and as a proof of this, the court thought fit to proceed upon moderate terms. Count Kevenhüller (the great historian, if I mistake not) was dispatched to treat with them, attended by several barons, protestant as well as catholic, and his orders were to proceed with great temper and equanimity : nevertheless, with a view to be prepared for all events, it was decreed to raise a body of recruits, and Tieffenbach, now recalled from Silesia, coasted up the side of the Danube with some regular forces, expecting the issue of the negotiation. Colonel John de Wert attended him with his regulars of cavalry, a warrior of the most singular character, that is to be found in the seventeenth century.

Kevenhüller discharged his commission with the utmost exactness; but the insurgents placed no confidence in rhetorical promises. They had advanced too far to cast their eyes back on eventual resources, and had no security but in the change of their masters ; and though they were

\* I suspect, that my relator, F. Spanheim, misleads me here : there is no town called Mühl, in Upper Austria ; but the district of Mühl is well known. If any place of that name be alluded to, it must be Muhldorf, a strong castle near the Danube.



1632.

plain country persons, yet they had sense enough to foresee, that one cannon-ball would tear to pieces all Imperial patents and letters of amnesty \*. For these reasons, they first pillaged the monastery of Lambach, and seized the passage of the river Trawn; by which means they kept a correspondence open with the protestants about Cremsmünster, famous for its rich monastery of Benedictins, missing little of seizing two brothers of the great duke of Tuscany, who were making a tour to Walstein's camp. But on the approach of Tieffenbach and John de Wert, they broke off the negotiation in an instant, and perceiving they wanted both military directors, and a foreign protection, sent deputies to Gustavus, beseeching him to remember, that he entered Germany in defence of the civil and religious liberties of the oppressed and persecuted. The king received these rural ambassadors with great courtesy, making them handsome presents, and giving them ample assurances of protection and assistance. He likewise (as it is asserted by many) sent several officers to them in disguised dresses, with orders to direct their warlike operations upon better principles.

But to return from this slight digression; during the interval of inaction, which preceded the two decampments, we will leave the two superior commanders for a few minutes, and cast our eyes incidentally over the other parts of the empire, where the war was carried on with all imaginable keenness and obstinacy. Nay, so great were the terrors conceived with respect to Gustavus, that Strozzi, Piccolomini, Annibal, and Louis Gonzaga were all employed to protect the western frontiers of Austria. The court of Vienna laboured also under some uneasiness on the eastern side; for Ragotzki, the successor of Gabriel Bethlem, found pretty much the same pretensions, and expected the same gratifications from the emperor. He had actually requested permission from the Porte to commence hostilities, and the Turks had sent him by way of approbation a scymitar, a standard, and a quantity of arms: but what gave greater umbrage to the Imperialists was, that Gustavus had dispatched the sieur Straßburg with a private commission to this

1632. prince of Transylvania, with orders to proceed to the Ottoman court, and carry on a second intrigue there. David Salomon, Ragotzki's lieutenant-general, collected some troops, and his master demanded from the house of Austria to be installed in form. It was reported also, that the prince of Moldavia and the basha of Buda had orders to support the Transylvanians; yet matters kept quiet in that quarter.

As to Saxony, Holk had entered Misnia by the 30th of August, and committed outrages, that can hardly be credited. It is true, he left his generalissimo near Nurenberg as long before as the 20th of July; but his instructions were to intercept, as he passed along, the army of duke William of Weymar, who then marched to the king's assistance: but in his attempt he succeeded not, inasmuch as he wanted either abilities or good fortune. During this irruption the elector and Arnheim were making conquests elsewhere, otherwise Holk might have been repulsed with ease; for the Saxon army amounted to seven and twenty thousand fine troops to all appearance, and the Imperial commander boasted no more than of half that number: but Arnheim had a violent inclination to reduce Silesia, (contrary to Gustavus's opinion) where Dewbatel conducted the Swedes, who were all fresh men new raised, and colonel Burgsdorf \* led the Brandenburgers in the absence of their elector, who had made a journey into Prussia in order to exert some influence in the diet then held at Warsaw: but in this excursion he had a great escape, for during his abode in the castle of Neuenhoven, his bed chamber began to sink so suddenly, that he had but just time to seize the iron bars of the window, and support himself there by main force till people came to his assistance.

\* This officer had been sent to the camp of Nurenberg, that his master might know to what purposes Gustavus destined the Brandenburg-troops. The king opposed this conjunction with the Saxons in Silesia to the utmost of his eloquence (though the thing was done before his advice could be put in practice) and besought

the electoral troops (as he foresaw an invasion from Wallstein's army or Pappenheim's) to continue in their quarters till he, or Oxenstiern arrived: *But, said he, if in the interim it be the elector of Saxony's fate to be attacked at home, leave him not with his throat exposed to the enemy's knife.* Chemnitz. Tom. i. p. 316.



As this expedition into Silesia was of too extensive and grasping a nature, so some circumstances conspired to render it disagreeable likewise; for Arnheim and Dewbatel \* had two never-failing topics of contention, the one concerning superiority of command, and the other about the division of their conquests. The former, according to custom, performed but little; for he always made war give place to his private politics, and changed all of a sudden from the ambitious to the moderate: but the latter gave good content to the king his master, and more especially in the following instance.

The inhabitants of Great Glogau, though their duchy and town were reputed unalienable, had been obliged to take their oaths of fealty to Walstein, newly created their master: but the Swedes soon freed them from these obligations, and general Goëtz (not being able to escape with his garrison) found himself obliged to surrender on disadvantageous terms.

Arnheim's presence became now necessary in Saxony, which gave Dewbatel greater means of extending his conquests. As the Imperial army lay encamped under the walls of Steinau, he contrived to seize a fort, which commanded the bridge, that leads into the town, and seized a quantity of boats, whose lading amounted to eighteen hundred pounds. He then cannonaded both town and trenches, and attacking the enemies lines sword in hand, killed two thousand men, forced four thousand into the city, and pursued the rest to a considerable distance. Prince Ulric of Denmark made this campaign with the Swedes and Saxons in the capacity of a volunteer.

\* As I have expressed in a former note some doubts concerning this officer's real name, for historians had then given him no less than four: so Chemnitz in his relation of this expedition, p. 319, helps to embarrass me still more, for he calls him *Mac Dussallius*, or, in plain Scotch, Mac-Doughal. Yet this may be a mistake, for Monro, who often mentions him, must have known him to be a countryman. This man rose purely by merit, being five years before only a serjeant in the blue regiment. But the taking of Hanau advanced him in a month's

time from the post of lieutenant-colonel to the colonelship over one regiment of cavalry, and another of infantry. He proved at last a fatal, though uncommon instance, that bravery and ingratitude may go together. To conclude this note, I find a colonel Mac-Doughal landed with Gustavus, but meet with him no where afterwards, except on this occasion. Yet as other historians assign the present transaction in Silesia to Dewbatel, I acknowledge my difficulty to be more and more inexplicable.

1632. Next day the Imperial commanders halted \*, and having rallied their troops near Breslau, entrenched themselves to the number of 20,000 men in an advantageous post, protected by woods and marshes, and approachable only by one entrance. There Dewbatel penetrated at the head of 6000 chosen infantry and dragoons, and forced them after an obstinate resistance of two hours to throw themselves into a forest, through which they formed their retreat. The Oder now parted the two armies, and by its depth and breadth saved the Imperial troops, who by this time had suffered exceedingly. Dewbatel made all possible efforts to repair the bridge, but as the enemy's safety depended upon counterworking him in this intention, he at length found himself compelled to desist, and crossing the river at a favourable fording-place, under the direction of some fishermen, invested Lignitz †, whose duke, by a timely surrender, saved his capital and country from ruin, and declared himself a good Swede. Then turning short, he invested Breslau, where the townsmen soon formed a mutiny in favour of the protestant armies, so that general Dhona, who had thrown himself into that city, escaped with great difficulty to his own castle of Warthenberg.

Mean while Holk availed himself of Arnheim's absence, who trifled away much good time before he returned from Silesia. There must always have been great unsteadiness, and some duplicity in the conduct both

\* Don Baltazar di Marradas, Goëtz, Dhona and Illo.

† The dukes of Lignitz in 1537 entered into a treaty of confraternity with Joachim II. elector of Brandenburg, which they ratified by oath: but the states of Bohemia complained to Ferdinand I. that this compact aimed directly against the rights of the crown of Bohemia, to which the duchies of Lignitz, Brieg, and Wolau ought to devolve upon the extinction of the families then possessing them. This emperor therefore declared in 1546, that the confraternity of 1537 was null and void in such wise, as if it had never existed; so that the dukes of Lignitz were obliged to retract it, and promise, that the three duchies should fall to the

kingdom of Bohemia in case their own family became extinct. The elector of Brandenburg entered his protest against the Imperial decision, and the duke of Lignitz dying without successor capable, in the year 1675, Frederic William, surnamed The Great, then elector of Brandenburg, presented himself as heir; but the emperor took possession of the territories, and George William could not obstruct him.

The like happened not after the death of Charles VI. in 1740. His present majesty of Prussia revived his rights upon these duchies, and rendered himself master of them by force of arms. This is a fair representation of the pretensions on either side.



of this general and his master, as care hath been taken to point out in 1632. various places. Therefore once for all, it may be worth while to give my reader occasionally a true picture of the elector of Saxony, delineated in such a manner as carries the marks of originality with it. “ The duke of Saxony, faith Feuquières, ambassador of France, in a letter to his own court, “ is a warm and bigotted Lutheran, disdainful, haughty, “ extravagant in drinking, hated and despised not only by his subjects, “ but by his own children, whom he treats as prisoners; passionate admirer of pleasure or inactivity; incapable of great affairs, dependant “ on the king of Denmark, concealed enemy to the crown of Sweden, “ partly for its interference in Germany, and partly on account of its “ pretensions to Magdeburg and Halberstadt; jealous of the house of “ Weymar, and extremely attached to the prerogatives and dignity of “ the empire. When *that* is concerned, all foreign powers are suspected “ by him; and it is his private inclination, as well as his opinion, that “ a true German may dispense with himself from transmitting any “ systematical intelligence to such, as live not within the limits of the “ system. His original prepossession to the house of Austria subsisteth “ always: nevertheless, it appears expedient to him to manage that “ family with dexterity upon principles of advantage; first, because it “ is his opinion, that the proximity of situation renders him more “ necessary to the emperor than any other prince; and secondly, as he “ is jealous beyond imagination of the Palatin, Brandenburg and “ Weymar families. The pre-eminence of the *first* was insupportable to “ him. The aggrandizement of the *second* gave him umbrage; and the “ pretensions of the *third*, from *which* the electorate had been forcibly “ wrested, filled his mind with suspicious apprehensions. The general “ Arnheim, and one of his ministers, govern him absolutely; which he “ believes not, as he reserves to himself the power of snarling and “ blustering wherever he pleases. The landgrave of Hesse Darmstadt (who “ married his daughter) and Francis Albert, duke of Sax-Lauenberg\*, “ still

\* Supposed by some to have killed Gustavus at Lutzen; or rather to have conspired against his treacherously and dishonourably in the battle of life, by giving some secret signal to the Imperialists.

1632. " still preserve great credit with him. At their instigation he always maintains a secret correspondence with the emperor and Walstein \*."

Holk, from whose irruption into Saxony we have made a small digression, in order to give the finishing touches to the elector's character, poured first into Vogtland with all the impetuosity of a raging inundation, imagining like a true Barbarian, that a country could never be thoroughly conquered, till it was utterly destroyed †. Having reduced many villages, as well as the fair town of Olsnitz, to ashes, without assigning any reason, he took Zwicka ‡ by composition, and blockaded Pläien. He then stripped the electoral palace, called Augusta, of all its rich and magnificent furniture, and having reduced Chemnitz by a regular siege, pushed on to the gates of Dresden, where one circumstance intervening gave a momentary sort of stability to the mutable temper of the elector : for in a random skirmish some papers were found on one of Holk's quarter-masters, which shewed the Imperialists kept a fair countenance, and made liberal promises to the court of Dresden, but concealed very malignant intentions underneath the disguise.

Nor were the French idle at another extremity of the empire ; for the *maréchal d'Estrées* and count *la Suze* besieged *Triers* with an army of 24000 men, and reduced the town and chapter to episcopal obedience, who some time before had admitted a Spanish garrison, and colonel *Isenburg* as governor in behalf of the emperor. This commander not caring to immure himself in a place where no honour was

perialists during the heat of the action. True it is, that this circumstance of maintaining intelligence with the emperor and Walstein seems to be of an untoward and suspicious nature, and bears hard against him to all outward appearance.

\* If I mistake not, there is a second, just delineation of this prince in *Daniel Eremita's* beautiful book of Travels ; but not having the original by me, I express myself with diffidence.

† *Swedish Intelligencer*, Part iii. p. 92.

‡ An elegant little town, called in Latin *Cyanea*, romantically situated at the foot of mount *Schneeberg* (or the snowy mountain) on the banks of the *Mulda*. It stands in *Misnia*, but the church-yard lies in *Vogtland* : whence arises the common saying in the neighbourhood, that an inhabitant of *Zwicka* is a *Misnian* in his life-time, and a *Vogtlander* after he is dead.



to be gained, appointed eight hundred men to defend the town, and when the French approached it in good earnest, made an attempt to supply its want of provisions by means of a large convoy. The troops, which conducted it, namely, twelve hundred infantry, and three hundred horse, had private orders to continue in Triers, and reinforce the garrison. 1632.

The *maréchal* secretly informed of this attempt gave instructions to count la Suze and Arpajou to intercept the enemy. Having forded the Moselle, their advanced guard (which consisted only of twenty men, commanded by a lieutenant) soon came to blows with some squadrons of Imperial horse, but four companies of infantry (one of which was cardinal Richelieu's) supported them immediately. These skirmishings naturally drew on a general engagement, and at length Isenburg was obliged to retire. In consequence of this disappointment, the town was taken forthwith, and the electorate cleared of Spanish garrisons. Many strong places were consigned to their lawful master, but the French kept some by way of deposits, till proper instructions arrived from Paris with reference to the disposal of them.

At the same time Henry, prince of Orange, besieged Mastricht with so much vigour, that the infantina had great apprehensions of losing this master-key to several provinces, notwithstanding she reposed the highest confidence in the bravery of the marquis De Leda, who, though deputy-governor, had then the supreme command. As the Spanish army had been sensibly weakened by the revolt of Berg and Egmond, the infantina, by way of a last resource, cast a wishful eye towards Pappenheim, as one of the most valorous and enterprising generals then in Europe; and, to tempt him more, offered him great pecuniary recompences\*, as likewise the order of The Golden Fleece. As this enterprize, march, and attack have been seldom paralleled in military history, I shall venture for once to speak of them more circumstantially and diffusely than hath hitherto been done.

There is reason to think, that the money and honour had no great weight with Pappenheim; but the nature, difficulty, and danger of the

\* About 16000 l. sterling.

1632. attempt delighted him. He fancied he saw a path opening to glory, by pursuing which he might at length advance himself beyond Tilly and Wallstein in point of reputation, and make pretensions to rival even the great Gustavus. Therefore, without hesitating a moment, he accepted the proposal; he, who before had neglected the commands of Wallstein, turned a deaf ear to the requests of the elector of Bavaria, and had evaded the very orders he received from his master concerning his march to Nuremberg. Nor does it appear, that any previous application was made by the infant to the court of Vienna, since indeed there was hardly time or opportunity to effect it; but the great generals in those days acted principally from their own discretion, and *that* made them perform such wonders as they then performed; whereas, on the contrary, as somebody has said lively enough, *A prime minister, with a map in a closet, is almost more than a match for any commander's good fortune.* There, said a statesman to Turenne, (laying his hand on a map,) *you may cross the river.* Yes, Sir, replied the general, *but your finger is not a bridge.*

Pappenheim lay then near Hanover. He had a long and difficult march to make, partly through hostile, and partly through neutral and uncertain countries, all long ago devoured by war. He had the drought and heats of summer to struggle against, and was obliged likewise to throw a passage for himself over the Weser, the Rhine, and the Meuse. Having therefore first taken care to place good garrisons in all those towns, that had been reduced to his devotion, and leaving Gronsfeld with a part of his army to preserve the circles of Lower Saxony and Westphalia in their obedience, he began his journey when Bauditzen and Lunenberg, who acted against him, least expected it; and forcing the Imperial towns of Dortmund and Essen, raised from thence sufficient contributions to defray the expences of himself and his followers for some days. As to the convent near the latter town, whether he compelled the princess abbess and her fair votaries to subscribe to his undertaking; or whether they contributed their contingent out of pure catholic zeal and gallantry to so brave a man, is to me uncertain. He then crossed the Rhine with great vivacity, and though the states of  
Holland



Holland both advised and threatened the elector of Cologne not to allow him a passage through his territories, (a treaty of neutrality then subsisting on his part \*) yet that prince ever secretly favouring the cause of his own religion, returned them only protestations instead of realities, and connived at Pappenheim's admission into his capital at the head of 500 dragoons ; resigning covertly to him the forts of Stein and Himmelstein, which gave him a passage cross the Rhine. From Cologne the general of the league drew refreshments and subsistence for his whole army, which amounted to 12,000 foot, and 3000 horse ; every man of whom was in high ardor for combat, and possessed with the same enthusiasm, that animated the master. The refugee bishops of Mentz, Wurtzburg and Osnaburg all flocked to him as their great deliverer, and loaded him with their benedictions : for they had such a confidence in his conduct, that they concluded first on the preservation of Mastricht, and on their own restoration next, as points certain and uncontrovertible.

Pappenheim then, after a march, whose rapidity can hardly be paralleled, passed through the city of Aix la Chapelle, and coasting along the Meuse, made himself master of Sittart, where he threw a bridge over the river, and protected the head of it with a strong fort. He then purposed to erect a second fort between Mastricht and Liege, in order to give laws to one, that the prince of Orange had raised, and allow the Spanish army (having cut off such provisions as came to the Dutch camp) full power and opportunity to join him : which junction, by the way, the two generals of the Spaniards, Don Gonsalvo di Cordoua, and the marquis de Santa Croce, never intended to realize. Be that as it will, the enemy rendered all these fine projects abortive, having pre-occupied the spot of ground in question, and disposed troops in such a manner, that the Imperial pioneers durst not venture to break the ground.

It was death to the old Castilian pride, to see an hero raised into life from the depths of Germany, and advancing like an enthusiast into the

\* He had also passed his word of honour to the Swedes and Imperialists for two months. Oxenstiern to continue truly neutral between Chemnitz. Tom. i. p. 300.

1632. Low Countries, fully determinated to fight the battles, and vindicate the glory of the Spanish nation. As he testified such an appetite for danger, it was resolved to give him a plentiful surfeit : and therefore (with a degree of insolence not to be paralleled) these two solemn and punctilious grandes postponed their master's honour to their own personal gratification ; declaring coldly, with an air of irony, " That " their catholic master had expended only four hundred thousand " patagons to pave the fossés of Mastricht with reiters and lansque- " nets \*."

Pappenheim saw the snare, that was spread for him, when it was too late ; nor had he ever conceived, that such malice and envy could possess the hearts of men, who made profession of arms. He long knew the vigilance and bravery of the prince of Orange, but now perceived (surprised indeed, yet undismayed) that the Spaniards were seriously resolved to leave their deliverer and his army to perish. No history affordeth a similar example in all its circumstances ! But as he had entailed a debt of demand upon his glory, he still determined, if possible, to force the enemies lines, and raise the siege. At least he was resolved to do something, in order to shew there was no case, wherein he had not the ability of performing something. For though this general was as wary, as he was intrepid, yet in cases of extreme dangers it was always his maxim to proceed forward. He first attempted to seize a bridge, that belonged to the Hollanders ; but that design miscarrying, he spread his troops on the side of the Wyck near Stirum's quarters, determined to pierce through them sword in hand, if the situation of ground, or the fluctuation of changes produced him any opening, that could be deemed an advantage. But the prince of Orange soon comprehended the precise points, on which he relied, and re-inforced that part of his camp with a strong body of dragoons, commanded by the duke of Bouillon. Upon which Pappenheim made a revision of his first design, and having well examined the enemies trenches, determined to attack them the day succeeding, which was the 7th of August ;

\* Two old words for German cavalry and infantry.



making first a short oration to his officers and soldiers; the nature and drift of which every reader may comprehend, who knows the man.——As he saw the affair would be obstinate and bloody beyond example, he thought it needless to attempt to make an impression by surprize, in order to gain a momentary advantage, which would determine nothing. Therefore, early in the morning, having thundered upon the Hollanders with all his artillery, he drew up his army in full array, ordering the drums to beat, and the trumpets to sound with all the gallantry of a fair opponent. One hundred chosen soldiers, armed with swords and carabines slung behind them, and carrying in their hands fascines and ladders, attended by several companies of pioneers, composed the forlorn hope;——two regiments of veteran infantry formed the point;——the rest of the foot flanked, supported, and succeeded these two regiments;——two wings of horse slowly advancing, closed the sides, and a third body encircled all the infantry behind, partly to sustain them, and partly to press them on, and prevent them from retreating. No general ever made a finer disposition than Pappenheim did on that day; and it was remarked by all men, that no army ever advanced with more silence, and greater composure.

When the Imperial troops approached the trenches, the fire of the Dutch artillery and concealed musquetry was such, as most soldiers might pronounce to be insupportable. Yet Pappenheim's two regiments, sustained by the infantry, and protected by the cavalry, performed the service they intended to execute; he himself fighting on foot within a pace or two of the foremost man, insomuch that the defendants were obliged to abandon an important out-work to him. But when the prince of Orange flew to this place, attended by all the volunteers, and the flower of this army, the conflict re-commenced with redoubled obstinacy, and as the Dutch cannon charged with cartridges at little more than the distance of musquet-shot were brought to bear on Pappenheim's flanks, it was impossible for him to continue where he was without making a sacrifice of all his army. Coolly therefore, all of a sudden, he

1632. left the trenches, choaked with dead bodies and streaming with blood, and ordered his trumpets to sound a retreat, which was effected with so much temper and command of mind, that not a single Hollander passed the lines to pursue him.

Returning to his encampment, which lay about 500 yards from the enemies works, he comforted and complimented all his soldiers, and having allowed them a short repast for meer refreshment, (as it was now about eleven o'clock in the forenoon) led forth his brave Walloons to a second engagement; and to push matters yet farther, (inasmuch as he had sufficiently experienced the bravery of his infantry, and saw plainly, that they neither wanted to be pushed on, nor had any inclinations to quit the field) he commanded not only the dragoons, but all the cavalry, to serve on foot. And this was more practicable in those days, as the horsemen's boots were not so stubborn, and unwieldly, as we find them since. Notwithstanding four hours desperate service in the morning, the Imperial troops performed this subsequent duty to admiration: some filled up the trenches by spade-work, some threw in barrels of earth, gabions and rolling mantelets; others ascended by scaling ladders; so that, in a word, the conflict lasted from *one* in the afternoon till *seven* in the evening, without a moment's intermission. And this we pronounce the more extraordinary, as Pappenheim, with 15,000 men, assaulted an army, which consisted of 24,000 soldiers, entrenched in the strongest manner then known, and protected with artillery of the heaviest size, and in such quantities as scarce to be numbered. The prince of Orange opposed this general in person, and there the fury of the action is not to be described. Mean while the latter, fearing no troops could support so desperate a service, ordered some gibbets to be erected, *in terrorem*, near his camp; and, to prevent his followers, in another sense, from retiring, gave them an example rarely to be paralleled; for serving sometimes on foot, and riding sometimes from post to post, (as the afternoon's attack was made in two places at once) he always, by preference, took care to place himself (and that for ten entire hours) in the most dangerous situations. All which time, if posterity can be induced



induced to believe what we write \*, the Spanish generals, at the head of 26,000 men, kept close to their intrenchments, though within the distance that a cannon ball might range ; never once detaching a single soldier to his assistance, though perhaps a regiment or two only might have turned the fortunes of the day. Nor had they the complaisance to order a drum to beat, or make a fictitious attack, which hazarded nothing. It is true, the marquis de Leda had spirit enough to undertake a sally, and as in the fervor of the action the garrison marched out undiscovered, some small havoc was caused in the English quarter ; but the assailants were soon handled with so much roughness, that it was thought convenient to regain the town with all decent precipitation. So that at length Pappenheim, after eight or ten desperate attacks, (not to mention the various charges, to which he led the men in their morning approaches) found himself compelled to found a retreat, pitying the brave and faithful Germans, and pouring forth the sharpest and bitterest invectives against the malevolent and fastidious Spaniards. In this afternoon's service only, he left 2000 of his best soldiers dead on the spot. Many of his officers were killed or maimed. Lintelo, his favorite lieutenant-colonel, fell amongst the foremost ; Comargo received a musquet-ball in the shoulder, and Palant in the leg. Pappenheim was saluted with a third shot of the same denomination, discharged only a few paces from him ; and a ball from a falconet carried away the pommel of his saddle, and ruffled the skin of his belly : but this was nothing to a man who bore, at that time, on his face and body, the disfigurement of more than ninety wounds ; and hence he acquired the surname of BALAFRE †.

Nine

\* Multi existimabant dejici tum Hollandos obfidione ea potuisse, si idem animus Hispano duci fuisset. Qui suos intra castra quiete continens, ne quidem eo induci potuit, ut commotis tympanis, aut subitario saltem tumultu, aggressionem simularet. *Brachelii Hist. nostr. temporum*, p. 286.

† As this general's temperament was an equal mixture of the *prudent* and *courageous*, most historians imagine him to be a man advanced in years, and speak of him in the style of an old, wary,

and long-experienced commander. [Much experienced he really was ; for in the twenty-fourth year of his age, he performed wonders at the battle of Prague.]—The many scars likewise, and contusions, which he carried in his person, confirmed writers more and more in this opinion ;—though, in truth, at the period we are now speaking, he was just advancing into his eight and-thirtieth year, being of the same age with Gustavus, whom he affected to resemble in all things ; as in a similitude of nativity and horoscope ;

1632. Nine hundred disabled soldiers were sent to the neighbouring hospitals, and more particularly to that of Aix la Chapelle. Prince Henry thought it unsafe to pursue him a single step; so that he returned unmolested into Westphalia, where, in an absence of six weeks, he allowed the Swedish generals to perform all, that lay in their power; being, as was said on him with great justice on the occasion, *Omnibus par, singulis superior*. Santa Croce, and Don Gonsalvo, hurt him less by their treachery and malice, than by the solemn ceremony of returning him their compliments of thanks, after the attempt was over: nor did they stop here, but declared publickly, with a mixture of gravity and irony, "That the renowned Pappenheim was not a man of puncto, having "passed his word to raise the siege or perish in the undertaking, when "in truth he had performed neither." Yet others, equally ill intentioned towards him, acknowledged, that he had abundantly disengaged both his honour and promise, being answerable only for his own conduct, and not for the eventual conclusion of the enterprize. In a word, the march, the action, and the retreat, may be considered as one of the finest performances in the military art\*.

By this time the elector of Cologne began to be terrified at his own imprudent violation of the late neutrality; and dispatched a minister to the Hague, in order to explain his conduct with regard to Pappenheim, and protect his dominions from the resentments of the Dutch; offering to recall some few regiments of his, that then served under the Spani-

roscope; in the manner of adjusting his hair; in riding a white palfrey, &c. &c. and (what was still more difficult) in good morals and piety. He was very nobly descended; served his first campaigns in the Valteline, and performed wonders at the siege of Chiavenna. The chamber wherein he expired is still shewn at Leipzig with great respect; it is a small apartment in the castle of Pleissenberg. It is reported of him, (though most historians seem to me, to take that for serious, which appears to others mere matter of pleasantry) that he always maintained, in conversation with his friends, that, conformably to a prediction, found in the archives

of his family, a certain Pappenheim *balafri*, mounted on a white steed, should kill, hand to hand, in field of battle, a great monarch, who came out of the north. Had this been spoken in sincere good-earnest, the temper of Gustavus was such he would certainly have despised him, as a vain-glorious boaster, and a credulous enthusiast: whereas, on the contrary, he always shewed him acts of politeness, and honoured him extremely, not only for his personal intrepidity, but for his inventive genius in marches, attacks, and stratagems.

\* Life of Henry Prince of Orange, in High Dutch, fol. cum fig. ex Officina C. Dankaers.



ards. But the Hollanders, saith an historian\*, who drew his accounts from good materials, had a *local* memory of the depredations committed in the late irruption by means of his connivance, and returned him no answer, that appeared sufficient to compose his uneasinesses. 1632.

During Pappenheim's absence, the Swedish generals, Bauditzen and Lunenberg, made considerable acquisitions in the circles of Westphalia and Lower Saxony; for Gronsfeld had neither forces, nor abilities, sufficient to oppose them. They first besieged Duderstadt †, a place of no small importance to their late conquests, which Pappenheim had strengthened with good bastions, and consigned to the protection of 1200 infantry, and 400 dragoons; so that the success, at first sight, appeared to be doubtful on the Swedish side; but the besieged, who had lost all spirit when their generalissimo was absent, soon began to mutiny for want of pay, which compelled the governor to make an offer of capitulating; but it was his misfortune to procure no better terms, than such as are usually granted upon surrendering at discretion: for the duke, and Bauditzen, knew the condition of the garrison by their spies. Abundance of artillery and military stores were found within the place; the Imperial troops enrolled themselves into the Swedish service, and the fortifications were dismantled.

Bauditzen next rendered himself master of Eimbeck ‡; for colonel Holtz, the commander, soon surrendered, having lost the flower of his garrison in an unfortunate sally. The taking this city destroyed the levying of six new regiments, which Pappenheim had ordered to be raised in his absence; for most of the recruits, following the laws of arms, and fortune of the country, took pay from the Swedes. But the garrison of Wolfenbüttele still maintained its ground, and spread nothing but ravage and depredation through the district round it. Upon this,

\* Frederic Spanheim.

† It stands in the electorate of Mentz.

‡ This town is the capital of the principality of Grubenhagen, in the Hanover-dominions. It is famous for good beer, which gave Mart. Luther great satisfaction at the diet of Wormes. There are historians who tell us, that Eric duke of Brunswic, a bigotted catholic, and furious

persecutor of the protestants, owed his conversion, twenty years afterwards, to the lucky incident of having presented a flaggon of this liquor to Luther, when he was heated in a long disputation. Upon which the reformer is reported to say, "that as duke Eric had remembered him on that day, God would also remember duke Eric in his last hours."

1632. the duke of Lunenburg \*, from particular as well as general motives, obliged himself to blockade it; for this town was an inveterate thorn, which still persevered to grow among the Swedish laurels, being the only remaining place, in that duchy, which obstructed the advancing prosperity of the king's arms. Yet, though all possible means were employed to straiten the garrison, and though the course of the river Ocker was diverted, which passes through the city and supplies its mills, the governor still made so resolute and obstinate a resistance, that Pappenheim returned from Mastricht time enough to relieve him. Gronsfeld, Pappenheim's vice-gerent, was very desirous to throw troops into the town, but Bauditzen took him off from that design, by making a diversion in Westphalia: where, advancing first into the diocese of Paderborn, he took Warburg by composition, (formerly an Imperial and Hanse-town,) reduced Volkmarsen to ashes, and invested the capital, at the head of 7000 foot, 4000 horse, and 1000 dragoons; but colonel Westphali, who had conveyed himself into the city with 1500 men, made so many gallant sallies, ambitious to acquit himself like a man of honour, and obtain the good opinion of the general he served, that this attempt of the Swedes was rendered ineffectual; for Pappenheim not only raised the siege, but pushed on to Hildesheim, which place he mastered, and then forced the Swedish troops to cross the Elb. Nothing more happened in the parts adjacent, except that the peasants made an insurrection in the abbacy of Fulda, in opposition to the Hessian officers, who commanded there: but the landgrave soon attacked them, and constrained them to become obedient.

During this period, the Imperial generals, Ossa, Montecuculi, and William margrave of Baden-Baden, were not inactive in Alsatia, having an

† The house of Brunswic-Lunenburg was erected into a duchy in 1235.

It afterwards spread itself into four branches, Zell, Brunswic, Calenberg, and Grubenhagen.

The same division of the country still subsists; and hence it is, that this ducal-house has four votes in the diet of the college of princes.

In 1682, the branch of the dukes of Hanover was raised to the electoral dignity, and enjoyeth

in this country, Zell, Calenberg, and Grubenhagen; and the first named branch possesses the principality of Wolfenbuttle.

The library of this place merits notice, being supposed to contain 116,000 printed volumes, and 2000 MSS. not to mention 100 other MSS. relating purely to public acts, negotiations, treaties, &c. one of the greatest historical treasures now in the world.



army of 20,000 men under their command, not to mention three regi- 1632.  
ments, then conducted by colonel Metternich, which had been raised in the county of Mark, and duchy of Juliers, where Metternich was a man of quality and a native. These troops having crossed a part of Lorraine, were just upon the point of arriving in Upper Alsatia, in order to afford assistance to the town of Coblentz; but that attempt not succeeding, they united themselves to the army above mentioned.

The Austrian commanders sent a trumpeter to the town of Straßburg, and demanded quarters and magazines for their troops, in the signories that belonged unto it. This request the magistrates denied peremptorily; but the Imperialists considered the message, and the refusal, as meer matters of form. They then made an irruption, by way of revenge, into the territories of the margrave of Baden-Dourlach, a prince they mortally hated, and extorted all the money, that could possibly be squeezed from the poor inhabitants. Afterwards they took Bretten, or Bretheim, (the birth-place of Philip Melancthon) a town dependant on the Lower Palatinat, and having forced the garrison to enlist amongst their troops, carried away nine of the principal inhabitants by way of hostages.

These enterprizes served to alarm the administrator of Wirtemberg, especially as the Imperial army began to point its course towards his dominions. Amassing therefore a body of 8000 men, and over-reaching Montecuculi by a feigned march, he passed by that general, and threw some troops into the large town of Knitlingin, as much renowned for the birth of Faustus, as Bretten had been for that of Melancthon. But as the inhabitants were mostly inclined to the Austrian party, Montecuculi conveyed a regiment into one of the gates, who cut 400 Wirtembergers to pieces, and set fire to the town at the four opposite corners. Mean while Metternich, then governor of Heidelberg, being inspired by the proximity of so considerable an army, made a draught from his own garrison, as well as those of Frankendale and Oppenheim, and laid siege to Wisloch, a little city in the Lower Palatinat, famous for the battle between Tilly and Mansfeld, in the year 1622: but the inhabitants being re-inforced by several troops of dragoons, and one troop of horse,

1632. horse, soon convinced him, that they were not to be terrified at a slight siege. Piqued with this disappointment, Metternich found means to fall on colonel Straßburger, near Heidelberg, and destroyed him and his small escort. He then took care to see his body embalmed, and made a compliment of it very politely to the governor of Mentz, requesting the persons of several living officers by way of exchange for the dead; and remarking in his letter, that as spices were dear, and surgeons rare, he expected some acknowledgment in money besides.

Horn, enraged at these proceedings, flew immediately to the support of Alsatia, and the adjacent countries; and having made select detachments from the garrisons of the Lower Palatinat, and the electorate of Mentz, joined the rhingrave Otho Lewis; and coasting along the Neckar, passed his cavalry over the Rhine at the last mentioned city, and his infantry at Wormes. Arriving at Mannheim, without opposition, he there encamped, partly to observe the countenance of the enemy, and partly to wait the arrival of the administrator with his little army; but being informed, by a courier, that some of Montecuculi's troops had filed off to sustain Metternich in the affair of Wisloch, which town was pressed almost to the last extremity, he made such extraordinary marches, (an effort in those days not uncommon) that in the first place he raised the siege, and in the second place missed little of surprising the besiegers in their retreat to Heidelberg.

Some of Horn's partizans, who patrolled the country, seized an inferior officer, escorted by six horsemen, who had been dispatched from Metternich to Ossa and Montecuculi, with instructions to solicit a reinforcement, in order to advance the siege. It was this man's misfortune to fall into the hands of the Swedes, on his return; when being severely and closely examined, he confessed at length, that a body of the enemy's cavalry had received orders to succour Metternich the next day. Horn thus learning their route, disposed an ambuscade accordingly; for the Imperial generals had only blind and uncircumstantial reports, with reference to the approach of the Swedish army. Of course the colonels Montbaillon and Vitzdum were employed, on this destination, with a chosen detachment, and approached Wisloch in great security, neither



1632.

neither examining the country, nor suspecting an assailant. Horn had once a design to let them pass, till they had advanced between his cavalry and his infantry, for then their ruin had been inevitable; but perceiving they shaped their course, by pure chance, too much on one side, and fearing by those means they might escape from his hands, he ordered the Rhingrave to attack them in the rear, at the head of a few troops of horse. Montbaillon faced about undismayed, and being seconded by Haracour's cuirassiers, and the rest of his cavalry, gave the Rhingrave a very desperate reception; but Horn ordered other squadrons to advance, and charged the enemy on all sides. Upon this, the Imperial commander, who saw the effects of an ill-grounded security too late, provided for his safety by the most prudential method, that then occurred to him, which was, in other words, a precipitate retreat: but the Swedish dragoons pursuing briskly, brought him from his horse with a carabine-ball, and took him prisoner, as also the chevalier de Treilly, his lieutenant-colonel. In a word, one way or other, this body of troops was almost entirely ruined.

As many foldiers, after a defeat, are the most expeditious couriers in the world; so of course Montecuculi and Ossa were soon advertised of this disgrace; and making an expeditious march to Oppenheim, passed the Rhine there, and lodged themselves in a situation less exposed than that they formerly occupied. The Swedish general pursued them fruitlessly; if we except the gleanings up a few sick and wounded men, from whom he learnt, that the enemy had formed a design on Spire, which report was confirmed by the number of boats he saw collected together. This determined him to ascend the coast of the Rhine, and pass into Alsatia, by way of reprisal; and the rather, as the town of Strasburg stood much in need of his assistance: for the enemy's forces had ravaged its little territory, more like an host of Tartars, than a body of well-disciplined foldiers. During this interim, the Imperial generals assembled their troops near Hagenau, and drafted every garrison, that was capable to afford them a small re-inforcement, being resolved to support Schellstadt, Colmar, Benfelden, and Brisac, and finish the contest with Horn by a general engagement.

1632. Mean while Horn demanded a passage over Strasburg-bridge \*, which favour was granted him after short consultation; and then, to shew his confidence in the inhabitants, and avoid creating suspicions in them, he and the Rhingrave, (for the generals in those days gained money and loved pomp) made their entrance in six coaches drawn by six horses each; but attended only by two troops of cavalry, one of which was Horn's own company of cuirassier guards. The magistracy received them with all possible honour, and the rather, as his Swedish majesty always maintained a minister in the town, by way of resident. Next morning Horn, at the head of the better part of his cavalry, passed the bridge, and being attended by one or two regiments of infantry, formed the blockade of Benfelden, whilst the gross of the army, re-inforced by a body of Württembergers, laid siege to Stollhofen †, whose governor at length hung out a white flag of capitulation, and demanded a conference. Hostages being reciprocally exchanged, the Swedish troops approached the gates, relying on the good faith of the agreement, when, on a sudden, a general discharge of artillery and musquetry made an inconceivable slaughter. Schevaliski, a Bohemian colonel of great repute and a favourite of the king's, had his horse shot under him; and several officers of consequence were maimed and disabled. Enraged at which perfidy, the Swedish commander recalled his hostages, and sent the governor word, "to do his worst, and die sword in hand; for "quarter should be neither given, nor taken." But the cries of the women and children on the walls, and their supplicating attitudes, soon melted the heart even of this inhabitant of the north; who, for the honour of the master he served, sent the commander word, he would receive him and the garrison prisoners, but under no restrictions; which proposal, all circumstances duly considered, carried with it no appearance of harshness, but on the contrary, soon found a submissive and thankful compliance on the part of the Imperialists.

\* Historical or Authent. Relat. in Low Dutch, fol. Tom. ii. p. 91.

by morasses. The French army dismantled and razed it in the year 1689.

† A strong fortress in Suabia, protected

During



1632.

During these transactions, Montecuculi and Ossa kept themselves inactive under the walls of Philipsburg; in marching to which place, they lost a considerable part of their army, merely from the apprehensions that Horn might overtake them\*; who, finding it impossible to tread on their heels, determined to secure to himself the better parts on the eastern side of the Rhine, and then exert his utmost efforts towards the reduction of Alsatia; well foreseeing, that if he could render himself master either of Benfelden, Schellstadt, or Colmar, he should of course give laws to the river Ill, which traverses and commands the country. In order therefore to pave his ground with greater security, he reduced Upper Ehenheim to obedience, and the fortress of Ortenburg, before which place a ball passed through the body of one of his officers, and wounded him in the side. He then rendered himself master of Offenbourg; and thus, by one uninterrupted series of valorous, prudent, and successful actions, displayed all the abilities of a disciple, who entailed no disgrace on the school of Gustavus; since at one and the same time, he opened to his countrymen the rich valley of Kitzingen, and the county of Hanau; and found means to restore the Upper Margraviate of Baden-Dourlach to its ancient and lawful owner, after an exclusion of ten years duration and something more.

But as there is a certain point, in all judicious and well-conducted campaigns, first in intention, (as the schoolmen affect to speak) and last in execution, namely, the giving the whole together a prosperous cast at the conclusion of the year; so Horn never once let his eye swerve from this primary and ultimate object of military operations, and determined, from the beginning to the end, to close the scene of his annual labours with the reduction of the town of Benfelden: which acquisition (for good reasons already assigned) transferred to his master the means of subduing Alsatia, and opened to him a new ichnography of conquest on the western banks of the Rhine; which, by the way, was intended

\* Hostis majore adhuc celeritate usus, diesque & noctes, nulla intermissa quiete, iter continuans, nec jactura ulla militum, qui nimio labore fracti inter viam magno numero remanebant, (*deserti potius, quam desertores signorum,*) &c. &c. Chem. Tom. i. 330.

1632. by Horn, as a collateral check to France, and a direct diminution of the Austrian power at the same time. As to the former, history affordeth us proofs abundant; and with respect to the latter, certain it is, that some days afterwards, Leopold \* archduke of Inspruch, the emperor's brother, died of chagrin and a broken heart; for he could not bear to see his territories ruined, and most of his future expectances destroyed.

At length Horn invested Benfelden, a place of small extent, and of course more easily defended. It was rendered strong by art and nature; for the marshes round it were next to impassible, and the fortifications had been newly erected, according to the best principles, that were then known. It was surrounded by three deep fosses, two of which were filled with water. The garrison consisted of one thousand men, and part of the artillery on the walls (of which there was great abundance) carried balls of forty-eight pounds weight. Ossa, and the margrave of Baden-Baden, then general of the Imperial forces on the Upper Rhine, made several attempts to raise the siege, which, (as it was an enterprize attended with extraordinary difficulty) continued, without intermission, from September till November. At length the course of the Ila, which supplied the town-ditches, being diverted, a fair and honourable capitulation was proposed by the governor, and accepted with thankfulness on the part of the Swedes. Towns of less importance submitted of course. Schellstadt endured some sharp attacks, and at length surrendered. So that the circles of Suabia and the Upper Rhine, were cleared of their enemies; and two parts of Alsatia entirely reduced to obedience, in the space of four months. And thus stood matters when the king fought the battle of Lutzen. So that, in a word, this collateral campaign of Horn's may be considered as a master-piece in the art of war.

Having thus given a general idea of the state of the king's several armies in various parts, it may be worth while just to remark, that two other bodies of troops, by no means to be deemed inconsiderable,

\* He was forty-six years old, and left Ferdinand Charles, his eldest son, for successor.

passed



passed the campaign in a style of waging war then little known, and which Gustavus did not greatly affect to practise, namely, in the character of armies of observation ; for Ruthven, by the meer presentation of his forces had maintained in obedience the whole district, that lay round Ulm ; and Wrangel (under whom Sir George Fleetwood served with his English regiment) did little more in Pomerania, than watch the countenance of the Poles. In a word, the Swedish troops prevailed every where, except in those places where Pappenheim commanded. There, upon the whole, they rather lost than gained, yet passed the whole summer without suffering one single defeat. 1632.

As Walstein continued reserved and cautious, and had determined within himself not to run the risk of a general engagement ; his majesty, for various reasons, which have formerly been specified, put in practice a resolution he had long conceived, and that was, to *dislodge first*. And thus making a sacrifice of military vanity to solid good sense, he had but one affliction remaining upon his mind, and that was, his desertion of the faithful and affectionate town of Nuremberg : for Walstein had given the public to understand, that his intention was to sack this commercial and opulent city on the king's departure, partly to terrify the allies of Sweden, and partly to remunerate the emperor for the great expences of the present campaign. Kniphausen soon perceived this struggle of honour in his master's breast, and told him frankly, that on the peril of suffering ignominiously on a scaffold, he would undertake to defend Nuremberg, with 4000 men, against all the attempts of the Imperial forces. Gustavus knew the man, and relished the proposal ; and having convened the patricians in one body, explained the whole matter to them with great delicacy and precision : *Gentlemen*, said he, *this officer has defended a village, protected only by a single wall, against all the efforts of Tilly*. No sooner were these words pronounced, than the Nurembergers acquiesced with great complacency, and agreeing to maintain the Swedish garrison at their own expence, and unite with them their own troops, commanded by Schlammerdorf, who had formerly distinguished himself in the Palatin service, consented likewise to the contraction.

1632. contraction of a part of the king's first entrenchments, and the demolition of the rest. But all this could not content a person of such punctual good faith, and tender honour, as Gustavus was: he therefore first assured them, by a deduction of the clearest arguments, that Wallstein would not undertake the siege of a town, like Nurenberg, on the approach of winter; declaring likewise, that if the Imperial general should have the spirit and resolution to invest them, he would march in person to their relief, at all hazards;—*and moreover*, added he, *I will leave Oxenstiern with you, as a royal pledge of my sincere intentions*. Here the chancellor hung up his votive armour, and never afterwards appeared in the field clothed in iron. The king then celebrated the anniversary of the battle of Leipzig, and dislodged the next morning, September the eighth.

As he had a great passion for military gallantry, when consistent with prudence, he abhorred the thoughts of decamping by stealth and artifice, but on the contrary drew up his whole army in fair array; and having lain under Wallstein's eye for four continued hours, at length pursued his course composedly and slowly. But the Imperial commander, far from disturbing his passage, called in all his advanced guards and out-centries, insomuch that a single ball was not discharged on either side. Next evening the Swedish army reached Newstadt on the Aisch\*, a small town in the margraviate of Anspach, about twenty miles to the north-west of Nurenberg. Here the king reposed his troops one entire day, and then turned fourteen miles southwards to the city of Winheim. Mean while he borrowed a large sum from the merchants of Francfort, by virtue of empawning the demesnes belonging to the Teutonic order, at and near the town of Mergentheim; and gave a fresh audience to the Muscovite and Tartarian ambassadors†, who made proposals, as it is conjectured, to secure to him the kingdom of Poland, whose intestine divisions, occasioned by the late death of Sigismund,

\* There is another Newstadt in the same circle of Franconia, standing upon the river Stray, near Koënishofen.

† Hist. or Auth. Relat. Low Dutch, Tom. ii. 162.



seemed to give fair openings for no inconsiderable interposition. But 1632.  
our hero wanted not a succedaneum of employment, and advanced only just so far as gratitude allowed him.

Walsstein had great apprehensions, that Gustavus would over-reach him by a feigned march, and for these reasons ventured not to unearth himself, till his spies brought him certain assurances, that his majesty had decamped in good earnest. Though some conjectures may be formed, it seems difficult to ascertain, what numbers of men this general lost without fighting, especially by dysenteries of the worst kind; for the Austrian army then, and almost a century afterwards, had only a few medicaments, and here and there a surgeon of very moderate abilities; it being in those days, and in part of ours, a sort of maxim with the Imperialists, that it costs more to cure a soldier, than levy a recruit. Nor was the ravage less destructive amongst the cavalry, where, as a sensible author observeth, lay both their strength and pride: for it is computed they lost 14,000 horses during the time they had remained in camp.

Walsstein had no real intentions to besiege Nuremberg, since he knew the king, when once at liberty to range the empire, might soon remount his cavalry, and compel him to dislodge. For the same reasons he judged it impossible to continue longer in his old lines, for his enemy being master of the country round, had full power to reduce him by hunger. There was an insurrection likewise in one of the Austrias; so that, having well weighed all circumstances in his own breast, he decamped, as some say, with such extraordinary caution, that he began his march at the close of the evening; keeping the river Rednitz between him and the king, who lay to the westward, and leaving behind him, for want of draught-horses, as most people imagined, innumerable quantities of stores and baggage, and a great number of sick and wounded soldiers; whilst the Croats, in the course of their march, laid the farm-houses and villages all in ashes.

At Winsheim the king first suspected, that Walsstein and the elector of Bavaria proposed, (for both their armies still continued to be united)

to

1632. to point their course to the banks of the Mayne: and as he was particularly jealous of any attempt on his late conquests in Franconia, (a part of the empire he had destined, in his own mind, to some particular uses, into which I have not insight enough to express myself distinctly) he conceived a thought how to divide the fury of this combined storm; and turning short all of a sudden, gave duke Bernard half his army \*, wherewith to dispute the passage of the Mayne against Walstein; and then pursued his old and well-known track into Bavaria; concluding safely enough, that the elector must hasten to the support of his own capital and country; and sagaciously foreseeing, that if the Imperial general should pass by the Weymarian troops without attacking them, and point his course towards Saxony, (a circumstance, which highly merited his utmost attention) yet still he reserved to himself the power of placing his army between the Bavarian and Austrian forces: nor was it probable to imagine, that the elector would presume to cope singly with one, whom he and Walstein, with their united abilities, had declined to undertake.—And in case he had an inclination to engage the Imperial general hand to hand, it then was not difficult to call duke Bernard out of Franconia into Misnia, and command some detachments to join him from the several corps, that acted under Bauditzen and Lunenberg in the circle of Lower Saxony, and under Banier and the landgrave of Hesse-Cassel in parts adjacent.

These, and other considerations of a similar nature, determined Gustavus to march half his army into Bavaria, taking with him about seven regiments of cavalry, and as many of infantry; and placing

\* At that time the king and duke de Weymar had about 24,000 men between them: Walstein's corps might amount to 18,000, and it may be ascertained, that the duke of Bavaria's consisted of 13,000; so that the combined armies lost in nine weeks encampment, by sickness, desertion, hunger, and a little fighting, something more than 15,000 soldiers, being full 60,000 men when they first entrenched themselves; and this, with allowance for a body of

8000 sent with Holk into Misnia, and 4000 dispatched to his assistance under Gallas, not to mention two regiments commanded into Austria to repress the insurrection of the peasants; supposing too, which is not very probable, that no re-inforcements had been conveyed to the headquarters of the Imperial and Bavarian armies: —That concession granted, Walstein's losses were still greater.

himself



himself (as he chose to be present every where, and observe all things with his own eyes) at the head of three hundred of Steinboch's dragoons in preference to his own guards ; as being a body of troops less cumbersome, and better prepared for sudden adventures, inasmuch as they supplied, in a good degree, the place of infantry. 1632.

It was partly by the over-persuasion of Oxenstiern \*, that Gustavus undertook this expedition into Bavaria and Upper Austria ; for the statesman alledged, upon the present occasion, that his Imperial majesty valued one hereditary province more than all the other dominions in Germany.——Yet the king afterwards had reasons to consider this measure as neither a very prudent one, nor a very injudicious one, but rather of a mixt and uncertain nature ; for Wallstein continued inflexible in the resolution of not pursuing him, and afforded the elector of Bavaria, at parting, no further assistance, than permitting Aldringer to attend him with his own regiment and that of Colorado.

No sooner had Gustavus begun to march at the head of this diminutive army, but the chancellor recalled him by an express from Nuremberg, informing him, that Gallas had invested Lauf with a party of 2000 infantry, and four pieces of cannon. It was a town of more consequence than strength ; and of course the king flew to its assistance with 2000 horse, and 1500 *commanded* musqueteers ; but on his approach to Nuremberg, the chancellor and Knipphausen met him, and gave him information, that Gallas had carried his point, and advanced towards Vogtland and Misnia. Upon receiving this intelligence, the king just refreshed his troops one hour in Nuremberg, and leaving fresh occasional directions with Oxenstiern, and the commander thereof, hastened with all possible expedition to Anspach, and thence to Dunkelspiel, where, on the sixth day consecutive from his absence, he overtook his army in its march to Donawert. By next evening he advanced twenty miles, and reached Nordlingen, where Tilly had established the year before his winter-quarters : and here he was joined by 5000 Switzers, (such were the effects of the chevalier de Rache's embassy to

\* Puffendorf de Rebus Suecicis, fol. p. 79.

1632. the protestant cantons) which said body of troops colonel Wormbrandt had safely conducted from the foot of the Alps to Schaffhausen, and then along the banks of the Danube in despite of Ossa, who commanded thrice the number of Imperial forces in the circle of Suabia. But the king was so excellent a geographer, that though he gave his commanders occasional liberties, in case of unforeseen events, yet in all marches of length and consequence, he sent them a rout sketched out on paper, assigning the journey of each day, and the place of station every night or evening.——And perhaps one inducement to Gustavus for marching into Bavaria, which hitherto hath been passed by without notice, was to preserve (in case he could not by such a step separate the elector from Walftein) this valuable body of infantry from being intercepted by the Imperial armies; for Montecuculi, who then commanded the remnant of the electoral troops in Bavaria (with which two reinforcements were joined, partly Tuscan and partly Imperial) might with great ease have united himself with Ossa, and hindered Ruthven and the administrator of Wirtemberg from facilitating the advance of the Switzers. But Gustavus had an eye to all events, and gave the same proportionable attention to small occurrences, as well as greater ones.

Montecuculi therefore not daring to advance one single step beyond his new district \*, thought proper to create his majesty some trouble (famous as he was for passing rivers) in crossing the Lech a second time; and of course dextrously and sagaciously enough invested Rayn †, which gave the king no great uneasiness, for the town was excellently, though not sufficiently fortified, since colonel Mitzval, who commanded therein, had neglected to cast up some works, which his master had ordered when he left Bavaria. Mitzval had victuals, artillery and ammunition in abundance, and likewise his own complete regiment of infantry, and five troops of horse, under his directions; so that the king supposed he might have repulsed the Imperialists till his arrival,

\* Hitherto had he commanded in Suabia, partly in Pomerania, and partly in Silesia, &c. Alsatia and the parts adjacent, with this exception, that he served one half in 1630 and 1631, † Historical or Authentic Relation in Low Dutch, fol. Tom, ii. p. 163.



even without exposing himself to serious fighting. But the panic apprehensions, to which commanders are sometimes liable, surpass all conjectures upon the subject. This unfortunate man had risen to command by the force of a military character, hitherto untainted, in case we make one single exception ; for he indulged immoderately in the pleasures of the table : he had performed some actions of a shining and more distinguished nature. He was an officer of long standing, having served in Poland, and commanded a regiment when the king landed in Germany ; and now all at once (to evince the fatal truth, that courage itself may be periodical) surrendered this important place, without alledging one circumstance in his defence, except that an ensign had threatened him with the mutiny of the garrison, and that his officers in a council of war had agreed with him in their opinion. To which Gustavus replied coolly and justly ; *A man of service should have punished the ensign, and that Mitzval never attempted.* But what still rendered the case more exasperating, was, the king had written this commander a letter with his own hand, beseeching him to have some regard to his reputation for a few days, inasmuch as he was in full march to relieve him from the hands of the enemy. Great therefore was Gustavus's astonishment, when at the head of an army, that breathed nothing but glory, he received the news of Mitzval's ignominious and mean spirited capitulation : which afflicted him so much the more, as Rayn was the only convenient passage cross the Lech ; and since an Imperial garrison lodged therein might intercept all communication between his good allies, the great commercial towns of Augsburg and Nuremberg \*. But it was the character of Gustavus, whenever he was frustrated in one attempt, always to find out some second expedient. He therefore bethought himself in an instant, that there lay hard by a little bridge over the Lech, at the foot of a fortified castle called Obernsdorf, which belonged to the rich family of the Fuggers. Thither he flew with all imaginable expedition, and there found 150 men in garrison, and 250 Croats in full employment to destroy the bridge, which they took care to effect

\* Bertius de Bellis Germanicis, 4<sup>o</sup>. p. 412.

1632. before the king arrived ; yet not soon enough to secure their retreat to Rayn : for Gustavus pursued them in person at the head of Steinboch's dragoons, and having destroyed them all, returned and took the castle by storm, obtaining seven ensigns in the conflict. He then set himself to repair the bridge, and passed the river without opposition. Whether it was that Montecuculi bearing in memory Tilly's late misfortune, feared to dispute the passage of the Lech a second time, or whether he received orders to secure the cities of Ingoldstadt and Ratisbon, and form a junction with the elector, who was then marching into Bavaria, is more than I can take upon me to assert with any warrantable degree of confidence.

The king, sheltered under the obscurity of a misty morning, approached Rayn before the governor knew he had crossed the Lech, and projected his attack against *that* very place, which Metzval had neglected to fortify. Panic terrors were now become congenial to the governors of this unfortunate city, so that the Imperial commander having taken the contagion from his Swedish predecessor, consented to capitulate upon terms equally unfoldier-like and inglorious ; for though eight days were allotted by Gustavus for completing the siege, yet the governor surrendered in less space than four and twenty hours. Nor could his majesty as yet digest the disgrace, which Mitzval's late conduct had thrown on the reputation of his arms, and of course consented only, that the cavalry of the garrison should depart without horses and accoutrements, and the infantry be deprived of their pikes and musquets ; yet, as he had an innate aversion to mortify men of service overmuch, he allowed both parties to march out with their swords. Thence digressing to Landberg on the Lech, he made the garrison, consisting of 600 musqueteers, all prisoners of war, not permitting them to retire (as he still continued to be mortified with the disreputation Mitzval had cast on his troops) with any marks of **military** honour, excepting peeled osier-wands, which he allowed them to bear in their hands \*.

\* Puffendorf de Reb. Suec. p. 79.



From Rayn the king advanced to Neuburg in pursuit of Montecuculi, 1632. who retired towards Ratisbon along the banks of the Danube. At Neuburg he ordered Mitzval to be beheaded in the presence of all the army, and commanded the lieutenant-colonel, and eight captains belonging to his regiment, to stand upon the scaffold during the execution. This period of time \* may be considered as unpropitious to Mitzval and his only brother, who was likewise the colonel: for the very day before the present Mitzval suffered, his relation had the misfortune to be beaten in the principality of Wolfenbuttle, where he lost great part of his regiment, as well as his reputation, and also his liberty. And here it may be worth remarking, that during this sharp service in Germany, where battles were not unfrequent, where rencounters happened almost every day, and where attacks and defences of towns may be supposed innumerable, only two colonels, Mitzval and Horneck, should be condemned to an inglorious exit of a public scaffold. But the latter was pardoned at the queen's intercession. Her majesty likewise, conformably to the tenderness of her sex, pleaded strongly in behalf of Mitzval, and pressed incessantly for some commutation of punishment; but Gustavus represented to her, that compassion in the present instance would entirely ruin the discipline of the service. It was his intention likewise to have struck off the lieutenant-colonel's and captains heads; but the persuasive Eleonora procured their pardon upon such terms, as we have lately specified.

It was now determined in earnest, to attempt Ingolstadt a second time †, and to this purpose Gustavus made all preparations becoming the ablest and most sagacious commander; for he transported down the Danube abundance of artillery from Augsburg and Donawert; some say to the amount of fifty pieces of the largest size, and by the same chanel supplied his army with great quantities of provisions and forage. To effect this enterprize still more successfully, it was his intention to visit Augsburg in person; but an express from Oxenstiern,

\* Chemnitz. Tom. i. p. 335.

† Hist. Auth. Relat. Tom. i. 335. Merian Theatr. Eur. Part. ii. 746.

1632. giving information, that Walsstein had fallen into Vogtland and Misnia, in order to destroy the elector of Saxony at one stroke, (a prince of very fluctuating dispositions, and who did not greatly affect the Swedish cause) \* obliged the king to change his plan of operations against Bavaria: and so much the rather, as John George, the elector, had besought him, by two urgent letters, to march directly to his assistance †; and indeed there were reasons to take care of such an uncertain associate. Leaving therefore 12,000 men, (of whom the new-raised Switzers made a part) under the command of Christian prince Palatin of Birkenfeld to oppose the elector of Bavaria in that duchy, till such time as Banier should be recovered from the wound he lately received, and having taken excellent care of the towns of Augsburg, Rayn and Donawert, he marched with the residue of his army to Nurenberg, with intent to penetrate the vast Thuringian forest, and keep an eye of attention towards his Saxon confederator.

In one word, the conduct of this elector began to grow more and more mysterious every hour; for not many weeks before, the king had offered him the assistance of some Swedish regiments, which he excused himself from accepting under pretence of œconomy ‡. It appeared also, that Arnheim had made the expedition into Silesia purely to embarrass his electoral master; nor was Gustavus consulted in that undertaking. Thus Misnia and Vogtland were left defenceless. Arnheim declared too, that he would not act under Banier, or in conjunction

\* This prince verified to a tittle the prediction of Paul Grebner the astrologer, which was published many years before the period in question. “Tempore illo (nempe post Bohemiarum tumultus & strepitus bellicosos magna cum defectione &c.) *Cæsar Electoris Saxoniarum* naso Hispanica, fraudulenta, dolosa, blanda, infidiosa imponit *conspicilla*, & quorum naturam tandem ipse pernoſcit, proprioque edocetur experimento, quod hæc Austriaca *conspicilla*, poppymata, & phalerata verba, sceleratæ & proditoriaræ sint practicæ; quibus, si ultra idem habere duceret, seipsum, conjugem, natos & universos Christianissime—confederator in perniciosum præcipitaret exitum.”

In a following paragraph he likewise adds these remarkable words; “*Suecus felicissimo successu classe, & suo populo terra marique in hostem utetur.*” [This book, says the author of the *New Star in the North*, Lond. 4°. 1632. was presented by Grebner to queen Elizabeth. The original copy whereof, written by Grebner himself, was placed by Dr. Nevel in the library of Trinity-college, Cambridge; whereof he was master.]

† Chemnitz. de Bello Sueco-German, Tom. i. fol. 335.

‡ See the whole transaction at large in Chemnitz, Tom. i. p. 362—369, &c.

with



with him, but, on the contrary, would resign his commission. This man, during the summer and autumnal campaign, had acquitted himself insincerely towards the interests of Sweden. He behaved reservedly and insolently to Dubalt, who commanded the royal forces; making a thousand delays in possessing Breslau, till he wasted an entire month, and gave the Imperialists leisure to collect their army. He assigned the Swedes no quarters but the duchy of Lignitz (already exhausted by war) and the prefecture of Drachenberg; insomuch that Wallstein was heard to declare, that the Austrian cause was safe in Silesia so long as Arnheim commanded there; who indeed received his master's orders (if they were real ones) to return into Misnia, but put them into his pocket without regarding them \*, and received a gratuity from the emperor, which surpasseth all belief; (for historians make it amount to 120,000 l. sterling †) as likewise the promise of being elevated to the dignity of a prince ‡, which made him overlook the kind intentions of Gustavus, who proposed only to create him a count. And what exasperated matters still more, a letter from Arnheim to Spar, Wallstein's favourite negotiator, was shewn the king, which concluded with these remarkable words: "My dearest colonel, I beseech you in God's name, to convey me no more letters like your last; for if you continue a practice of this nature, you will bring the person of an honest man, and his very life and reputation, into question: moderate therefore your style in such a manner, that I may have the power to communicate what you write to my electoral master ||."

Spar, who, by the way, was a subject of Sweden, being over-heated one night with wine, offered the perusal of this letter to the Bohemian colonel Hoffkirch; in consequence whereof the count de Solmes either procured the original, or delivered a copy to John George, who convened a cabinet-council, and summoned Arnheim to appear; but the

\* Some say he disobeyed him by the dint of his influence, in a council of war. True it is, he went to Dresden to excuse himself, but took care to be attended by 2000 soldiers of his own selecting.

† Chemnitius de Bellis Sueco-Germ. Tom. i. 366.

‡ Puffendorff de Rebus Suecicis. fol. p. 80, &c.

|| Lotichius, Tom. ii. fol. in annum 1632.

1632. accused had the gift of natural eloquence, sufficient to confound a whole legion of jus-publicists ; and thus the affair ended without consequences. Mean while Dubalt, who partook more of the soldier than of the politician, was long blinded by this most artful man ; but Gustavus soon perceived his general to be deluded, and to avoid creating future jealousies, dispatched young Cochtitschi, a Silesian born, and a nobleman of great property, with full powers to rectify these great disorders ; sending him in the quality of *legatus ad exercitum* to ease Dubalt from all concerns, except the military.

Cochtitschi, previously enlightened by a royal preceptor, pierced with a single glance through Arnheim's intentions, and gave him an insight into his ideas concerning him (which indeed was needless) at the first conference. He then informed Gustavus, that this commander would bear no equal in the confederate army, and that therefore it was necessary to cause him to be removed, or send as many Swedes as were able to prescribe laws to him. Time, the grand expounder of all doubts, soon verified this excellent advice, which Gustavus knew, but had not then the power to realize : for Arnheim afterwards took care to absent himself from the battle of Lutzen, and when news arrived of Gustavus's death, extorted Breslau from the Swedes by main force, and told them all pretensions expired at the death of their master ; and then marching away from Dubalt, left him to the mercy of the Imperial forces, who made him a prisoner \* : but Walsstein pitied a brave man, betrayed so shamefully, and dismissed him from his captivity without a ransom, as likewise the old count Thurn, whose blood the court of Vienna longed to see spilt on a public scaffold.

Rendered cautious therefore by the insincerity of Arnheim, and the irresolute disposition of John George his electoral master, Gustavus deemed it indispensably necessary to confirm that fluctuating prince, by a personal appearance at the head of an army ; and so much the rather, as he liked not Pappenheim's return from Mastricht, of which he now received indisputable assurances. Fearing moreover, that matters

\* Puffendorff de Reb. Suec.



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might take an unprosperous turn in the circle of Westphalia, and both the Saxonys; and presaging likewise, that his conquests in Upper Germany could not be deemed truly tenable, if things proceeded unpropitiously in the Lower; he changed his resolution, all at once, of fixing Oxenstiern in one of the Saxon circles, and chose to establish him at Nuremberg, as his representative in the southern regions of the empire. It is the custom of great geniuses to decide in a moment, and not unfortunately. Of course Gustavus left Christian, count Palatin, to command in and round Bavaria, till Banier should be recovered from his late wound, and flew towards Misnia, as we shall relate hereafter.

We will now cast our eyes, for a few moments, on the count de Papenheim, who by this time (for we have before mentioned his extraordinary march to Mastricht) felt a strong desire to repass the Rhine, and regain his old quarters in Westphalia and Lower Saxony\*. Many things conspired to prompt him to carry this idea into execution. He had no great confidence in his neighbours the Dutch; and though his troops were actually encamped in the territories of another state, yet he could not absolutely depend on their geographical fidelity; no, not though Reubens had published a plan of the siege of Mastricht, and an exact ichnography of the country round it. He had likewise no great opinion of the fortune, conduct, or honour of the Spanish generals, and doubted lest Bauditzen might be tempted to copy the very march he lately made, and uniting himself with the Dutch troops, augment his dangers in a double proportion. Of course he rejected all the fresh offers, which Isabella proposed him, and that for two reasons; partly because she had never verified her late promises, and partly because the Swedish generals had made great progress in the departments of Lower Saxony and Westphalia during his absence.

Decamping therefore in the night, and setting fire to his huts, rather than tents, he shaped his course towards the Rhine, and gained the river Rôer. Next day he approached Juliers, and (to his misfortune be it mentioned) found himself obliged to indulge his soldiers in all sorts

\* Soldat Suedois, p. 71, &c.

1632. of ravage and plunder; not from any principle of cruelty, or avaricious and mercenary disposition in his nature, (for he was alike disinterested and brave) but merely because he had no money, either to subsist his foldiers, or discharge their arrears. He received many expressses on the road from Walstein and the duke of Bavaria, both then encamped near Nurenberg, which he repaid only with courtesies and excuses; alledging, that his troops were famished, and harassed, whilst the Swedes, whom he had formerly coped with, remained fresh and vigorous: that the French army, in particular, obstructed his passage over the Moselle, and the emperor's affairs, in the north-west of Germany, were all sinking into ruin by reason of his absence: nevertheless, if hereafter any great extremity should present itself, he would engage to force his way through the circles of Saxony. The man's temper was known, and his delays and excuses seen through, but there was no remedy; it being his determined resolution, to receive as few laws as possible from the generalissimo or the elector.

Dispatching therefore count Merodé before him, with a considerable detachment, he crossed the Rhine, and entered Westphalia at Kayserwerd\*; dislodged Bauditzen from the siege of Paderborn, compelled him to cross the Weser, and advance towards Hoëchst, in order to join the duke of Lunenburg, who at that moment invested the city of Wolfenbüttele. He then refreshed his men some days in the neighbourhood of Essen, and devoured afterwards the diocese of Paderborn†, under pretence of protecting it from the Swedes; for in these days, the guardian and plunderer, in the Imperial armies, often differed in name only. Pappenheim, in himself, was a man of order, generosity, and humanity; but his soldiers at this time were insatiable, and as he had no money, and feared a mutiny, he durst not chastise them.

As the noblest minds are always most inclinable to forgive neglects and injuries, Pappenheim soon forgot the golden fleece, and the pecuniary remuneration,

\* Kayserwerd, *Cæsaris Verda*, in the diocese of Cologne, a well known passage across the Rhine. It was, in Pappenheim's days, protected by a fortress of consequence, but the allies dismantled and raised the fortifications, during

the war of the succession.

† This bishopric contains about eighty miles square. The canons are obliged to have studied at some university in France or Italy.



neration, both promised him by the infanta Isabella, and still continued sincere and unshaken in her cause, inasmuch as it was connected with the service and prosperity of his Imperial sovereign. For these reasons therefore, and partly from an ambition to convince the public, that he could conduct the pen as well as the sword, he privately composed a memorial, which he took care to convey to the prince of Orange; setting forth, that as Rheinberg \*, and Orsoy, had been committed to his protection, as places belonging to the empire, he besought him, “to distinguish between towns, that wore the livery of Castile, and towns, that owed homage to the Austrian eagle †;” protesting, at the same time, that the Hollanders should have no cause of complaint, with respect to the two places in question, since they should continue disinterestedly neutral, in all present and future differences, between the United Provinces and the Infanta. But the Dutch, without the help of political glasses, soon pierced through Pappenheim’s artifice. The very punctilious Spanish honour was not supposed conscientious enough to deliver back its usurpations on the empire out of pure gallantry, and without compulsion; and the depositary, or third person, who held the stakes, was concluded to be a trustee of ambiguous faith, and as little to be relied upon as the former occupier: so that it was natural to infer, that neither the governors nor the garrisons would be changed, and no security would remain, but the promise of a person who had not power to realize his promise. However the prince returned an answer, extremely polite and full of respect, to Pappenheim, professing the great regard he had to any proposals, that came from him, and engaging to deliberate effectually on the subject, and not superficially; observing indeed, by way of conclusion, that he expected information from effects, as well as words; and hoped, by way of preliminary, to see the two places purged of Spanish garrisons, the fortifications dismantled, and no protection left but the town-walls.

The elector of Cologne, as we observed before, had sent a minister to the Hague, to explain and amplify his excuses, with regard to the per-

\* Then an important fortress on the Rhine, listhed by the allies in the war of the succession; about sixty miles from Cologne. It was demo- † Soldat Suedois, 765, &c.

1632. mission or connivance of Pappenheim's march through his territories. To which the states general made no improper reply, by forming two demands; namely, that he would furnish them with the same supplies and contributions, that he had bestowed before on the Imperial commander, and re-imburse the damages, that had been occasioned by the irruption, which made its approach through his dominions: but the prelate found this calculation amounted too high, and petitioned and remonstrated to no purpose.

Nor was the duke of Neuburg more successful, in demanding the restitution of Juliers from the infant, on the approach of the Hollanders, though this request was, in its own nature, highly justifiable; and the rather, as it was a maxim of the Spanish court, at that time, to make a present of those places, which it could not preserve.

And now Pappenheim, having refreshed and re-inforced his army, advanced farther into Lower Saxony, fully determined to attack Bauditzen. The latter being inferior in point of numbers, threw his troops into Hoëchst; but before he could amass provisions, and complete his out-works and fortifications, he found himself surrounded all of a sudden; for the rapidity of the Imperial general's march had outstripped the calculations of the Swedish commander: and the former being greatly superior in cavalry, ordered Gronselt to pass the Wefer, whilst himself and Merodé continued on the western-side. Bauditzen perceiving the course of the river to be diverted, the town-walls being thereby rendered useless, and not caring to be immured and starved, formed a sudden resolution to retreat, though the town was actually invested, and the batteries fixed against it. He first, by concealed methods, dispatched his cannon and baggage towards Munden, and forthwith all his army. Pappenheim, by the silence of the town-artillery, soon perceived the enemy's design; and as he foresaw what road it was their interest to pursue, expedited the flower of his cavalry at their heels: but the stealth of one hour's advance (other things being supposed equal) often decides the fortune of a retreat; for Bauditzen had given such excellent orders, that nothing happened but a few slight skirmishes, till the gross of his little army reached a post of safety. He obtained three colours and  
lost



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lost two ; so that, upon the whole, the retreat had merit. But this leaving the country open compelled the duke of Lunenberg, as hath been mentioned before, to raise the siege of Wolfenbottle ; and the rather, as Gronsfelt had the dexterity to throw a body of troops, and some provisions, into the town. Nor was the duke's retreat so fortunate as that of his comrade ; for he lost two pieces of cannon, four colours, and seven hundred men : nevertheless, this loss was fortunately supplied by a re-inforcement of two regiments, under the command of the duke of Sax-Lauenberg. Lohausen, who, I believe, commanded the Brunswic-troops, returned to the district of Wolfenbottle with a few regiments, and re-possest his ancient quarters, for reasons to me entirely unknown : for what success could be expected from blockading a town, that had been re-victualled some days before, and re-inforced by a garrison half equal to the number of the besiegers ; their deliverer at the same time within call, and almost within fight ? So that Lohausen soon dislodged, and gave Gronsfelt an opportunity to demand an exorbitant contribution from the town of Hanover ; but the inhabitants wisely employed that money, to invite colonel Herden's regiment, and two companies of the duke of Brunswic's men, to undertake their defence, which they effected successfully.

Mean while the good people of Hildesheim, who had scared themselves out of their senses with omens and presages, not to mention rivers streaming with blood, and armies embattelled in the air, now saw Pappenheim approaching towards them, in all the terrors of reality. The Swedes shewed them no compassion, having made late offers of removing them beyond the reach of danger : but repentance for the rejection of this proposal, and a slight breach in the town-walls, immediately frightened the besieged into a capitulation. Pappenheim thrust 2000 men into the town to preserve, as he alledged, good order, (obliging the inhabitants to maintain them) and exacted 10,000 l. by way of contribution ; and finding interpositions of this sort, much more agreeable to his soldiers than the affair of Mastricht, pushed on to Mulhausen, the largest town in Thuringia, excepting Erfurt ; and as  
the

1632. the place was of vast extent, and poorly fortified, he had only to appear and take possession, demanding and receiving the same sum, which had been exacted at Hildesheim: nor was it in the power of the Swedish generals to stop this impetuous career of the Imperial commander; so that no resource remained for them, but to spread one part of their several armies along the banks of the Elb, and repose the residue under the cannon of Magdeburg\*; permitting their opponent to advance towards Misnia, where Wallstein (on the king's approach) expected him with earnestness.

Four weeks had now elapsed, since Gustavus and Wallstein had each pursued a separate expedition; for whilst the former made his irruption into Bavaria, the latter pointed his course into Franconia, and then towards the electorate of Saxony; which was something more extraordinary, as their marches were almost as diametrically opposite, in point of geography, as the southern regions are to the northern.

It has already been mentioned, in what manner Wallstein, and the elector of Bavaria, dislodged from Nuremberg. Being arrived at Forstheim, in the bishopric of Bamberg, (from whence Wallstein detached two regiments into Upper Austria, in order to extinguish the last remains of rebellion) they reposed their troops for a fortnight in good quarters, and there first received intelligence, that Gustavus had dispatched duke Bernard to observe their motions with half the army, and conducted the other moiety into the dukedom of Bavaria. This news startled the elector not a little, insomuch that he besought the Imperial general to join forces with him, and push this enterprising monarch to the very foot of the Alps; nor was the court of Vienna much dissatisfied with a request of this nature, as the peasants of Upper Austria had presumed to revolt under the very eye of the emperor.

Yet no remonstrances, nor representations, could make the least impression on Wallstein's inflexibility: true it is, he paid the elector the external honour of attending him twenty-six miles in his return homewards, and at Bamberg they parted with all the exquisite politeness of

\* Chemnit. Tom. i. 341.



veteran dissemblers. But Walstein appeared the least supple of the two, 1632. and preserved more coldness and reservedness than the old Bavarian; who, at, and after this separation, threw out oblique hints, that some secret understanding was carried on, by the means of Dewbatel, between Walstein and Gustavus\*, which seems to me to be nothing more than an angry misapprehension: but be that as it may, he with more justice complained, that he served conjointly with a commander, who gave him no lights into any thing; and that he had expended likewise, (which was equally disgusting) more than 150,000*l.* sterling, to very little advantage, since the day he first united his forces with the Imperial army †.

Walstein's first idea seems to have been the reduction of Franconia; and to this purpose he cast his eyes, as the king conjectured, on the important town of Schweinfurt, situated upon the northern banks of the Mayne, about twenty-five miles to the west of Bamberg. But Charles Hart, the Swedish governor, took care to re-inforce himself from the garrison of Koënigshofen; and at that very instant, the vigilant Dewbatel, by duke Bernard's orders, threw himself into the town, at the head of his own regiment, which consisted of thirteen troops of dragoons. Mean while duke Bernard approached, with his whole army, to succour the besieged; and of course Walstein either changed intirely his original plan, or varied it occasionally into a second form, being determined at once to destroy the two electoral houses of Saxony and Brandenburg.

First therefore, to gratify his malice against the family last mentioned, he discharged his resentments on the margrave of Bareüth, who was likewise margrave of Culmbach, and uncle to the then young marquis of Anspach. The capital of Bareüth was soon laid under a severe contribution; but that of Culmbach, being better fortified, made a laudable resistance; so that the Imperial general advanced to Coburg, whose duke was related to the Ernestine branch of the house of Saxony, and uncle to the dukes of Saxon Weymar, which latter had furnished seven brothers, who all bore arms against the house of Austria. The town of

\* Riccius de Bellis Germanicis, 4°. 411.

† Idem ibid.

1632. Coburg soon became a sacrifice to Wallstein's indignation, (for the duke had appeared in armour in behalf of the Swedes) as likewise the rich palace and treasury; and great quantities of merchandize, from Augsburg and Nuremberg, which were then on the road to Leipzig fair. But the castle\*, which standeth on an advantageous eminence, was not to be reduced on such easy terms; for Dewbatel had thrown himself therein, at the head of his well-known regiment of dragoons. Wallstein wished impatiently to make this gallant officer his prisoner a second time, and Dewbatel laboured as much to eschew the repetition of so sensible a mortification. It may suffice to say, that a breach was made by the third of October; but Dewbatel had gallantry enough, at the time the walls were actually stormed in the defenceless part, and the service became as obstinate as most that had appeared during the course of the thirty years wars, to take the assailants in flank, at the head of his dragoons, which threw the 500 Imperialists, who formed the point, into total confusion. Wallstein's colonel, who led the attack, was killed in the fosse; as likewise a young nobleman of his name and kindred. Mean while duke Bernard had advanced from Schweinfurt to Hilperhausen, fifteen miles to the north of Coburg, having defeated forty troops of Isolani's† Croats, and seized ten colours and a part of their baggage‡, with full intentions to raise the siege; partly from his unwearied zeal for his master's service, and partly, as some conjecture, with a collateral view to his own well-being and prosperity; inasmuch as the dukedom devolved

\* Here Martin Luther lodged some months, in 1530, and the chamber is still shewn. No one can enter this fortress without express permission from the prince. In it is a vault so extremely secret, that all things of value are safely concealed there in times of war: and in the castle are preserved abundance of documents, &c. in MSS. relating to the *History of the Reformation*, which merit to be examined by the best church-historians. *Mem. Communicated.*

† Isolani, created a count by the emperor: his Christian name was *Lodovico*; and as the

French historians talk much of one Lodovico, general of the Croats at this period, it may be worth observing once for all, to the perpetual honour of that nation's accuracy, that Isolani and Lodovico are the same man. But the Croats and Carniolians, in resemblance of the Italians, whose language and forms of expression they are fond to imitate, usually designate a person by the *Christian name*. This surprising hero was remarkable for being beardless. He died at Vienna, 1640-1.

‡ Riccius de Bellis Germ. p. 411.



to him on the decease of his uncles, (of which the then reigning duke 1632. was one) who were both aged and unblest with children. Be that as it will, the glorious efforts of Dewbatel and Bernard freed their master from abundance of uneasiness; for one part of Wallstein's plan was totally defeated, his intention being to have rendered himself conqueror of this castle, whereby he secured the roads, in one of the most wild and rocky parts of Germany; and then have penetrated through the bleak and inhospitable Thuringian forest, and formed his junction with Pappenheim. But the occasional commander of the castle destroyed one branch of this scheme, and the position of the duke's army disappointed the other: of such an amazing consequence, in a campaign, is the vigilance of an officer or two, who have parts to comprehend their duty, and spirit enough to carry their projects into execution. Wallstein's scheme was enterprising and extensive, like all his other conceptions; for had he gained the castle of Coburg, and crossed the Düringer-wald without molestation, he had then (besides the conjunction of his troops with Pappenheim, a point he ardently wished for) destroyed the rich territories of a family, which he mortally hated, the once electoral house of Saxon-Weymar: And then purposing to have wintered in Misnia, his intentions were to have secured the banks of the Elb, which would greatly have impeded the king's retreat; to have devoured all the wealth and provisions in the two electorates of Saxony and Brandenburg, which had enjoyed a long repose from the late devastations of war; and thus, at the first opening of spring, having totally humbled these two powers, to have spread half his army over the adjacent parts of Lusatia and Silesia, and reconquer, with the other half, his own duchy of Mecklenburg, to which his natural ambition constantly inclined him. And thus it was his firm opinion he should encircle Gustavus in a wide-spread net, and oblige him (as he conceived it difficult for that prince ever to reach the coast of the Baltic) either to engage in a rash and desperate battle, or capitulate upon disgraceful and inglorious terms.

Chagrined to the heart at this disappointment, for 500 men were lost in three days before Coburg, (the preservation of which city saved Thuringia and the county of Henneberg to the king's service) Wallstein

1632. at length, after some mortification, picked out and extended the remaining parts of his plan, as well as circumstances could then allow him: yet doubtless he expected great things from his first scheme in its full extent; since he conceived it worth while to command Pappenheim, for that purpose, to relinquish all his conquests in so vast a tract as the circles of Westphalia and Saxony: And what more and more afflicted him, at the present conjuncture, was, that Pappenheim, on account of the disappointment at Coburg, might now find great difficulties in penetrating into Upper Saxony, in order to join the Imperial army in the marquisate of Misnia. But as that general was formed, by nature, for undertaking perilous and extraordinary marches, Wallstein preserved even some glimmerings of hope, that he would effect a conjunction by some inventive stratagem or other; though at that time it was hard to prescribe the measures, whereby such an enterprize was to be realized.

From Coburg therefore, full of disappointment, he turned short to the right, and advancing to Cronach, in the diocese of Bamberg, entered Vogtland; where, adding to the cruelties of Holk and Gallas, who had already ravaged all that country, he waged war, (if an irruption on an unarmed multitude may be named a war) more like a man possessed by the furies, than in the character of a civilized being. At length he encamped at Weida, on the banks of the Elster, about forty-eight miles to the south of Leipzig.

We will now cast our eyes towards Gustavus. Had that prince survived the November ensuing, he intended to have made a second winter campaign; for the advantages accruing from the last surpassed all conception\*; and it was hoped moreover, that so severe a season might not present itself again in a great number of years. Hard and continued frosts open a new theatre of war; marches are conducted over tracts of ground, deemed otherwise to be impassible; and approaches are made to fortified towns, across morasses and waters, which, at the common seasons of fighting, are known to be inaccessible: so that the officers, who dealt in surprize and enterprize, had on these occasions a new department to walk in.

\* Paganino Gaudenzio, Singolarità, &c. 214. Supplement de Foresti.

It was a constant saying with the king, that

he could perform greater exploits in winter than summer. Arma Suec. 78.



1632.

That the troops in Bavaria might be inspired to act with uncommon resolution for the service, his majesty gave the prince of Birkenfeld draughts on Augsburg and Nuremberg, and commanded him with earnestness to pay the soldiers punctually and honourably; expressing much concern to leave Monro's brigade behind him, (which by this time was greatly shattered, and quite unable to march to Saxony; for it had fought near the king's person almost from the first weeks after he landed \*;) and recommending the colonel particularly, and Mostyn, the lieutenant-colonel, to the protection of the general, he bade adieu to each regiment, and hastened onwards to Donawert. He there took leave of Banier, Birkenfeld and Ruthven with great tenderness, eat a short dinner with the queen, who had an interview with him in this place, and proposed like a true heroine to conclude the campaign in Saxony, and share the glory of discomfiting Walstein. That night they slept at Nordlingen, from whence the king posted to Nuremberg with some chosen cavalry, and besought the queen to do him the honour of conducting the brigades of foot, first to Dunkelspiel, and then to Rotenburg on the Tauber.

When Gustavus approached Nuremberg, Oxenstiern met him on the road, and informed him, that Knipphausen, with a part of the garrison, had invested Lauff; upon which the king advanced forwards to favour the enterprize of his general, but meeting Knipphausen, who returned successful, learned from him, that colonel Munich had appeared under the walls of Lauff, to succour the besieged, at the head of 1000 horse, and 300 dragoons; whereas the king had only 700 horse, and 300 dragoons, which then attended him †: but without drafting a single man from the Nuremberg detachment, he said to Knipphausen with an air of cheerfulness: *March you back to your charge; I cannot return till I have performed something.* Of course near two villages, called Schleuften and

\* This regiment of infantry, usually keeping company with the main army, appears from a diary kept by the colonel, to have marched two thousand one hundred and sixty miles in a year and three quarters; and if expeditions, parties, and camifados be likewise included, with which

the practice of the age then abounded, it is probable the number of steps taken by the corps here mentioned might amount to a calculation, which runs higher by near a third.

† Chemnit. de Bello Sueco. Germ. Tom. i. 335.

1632. Felden \*, he cut to pieces 300 of Munich's Croatian cavalry, and returned with several prisoners and two colours to Nuremberg ; having thus freed that loyal and affectionate city from a sort of blockade.

Leaving the town therefore, as no enemy was near it, to the protection of its own forces, he commanded Kniphausen to follow him with three Swedish regiments, that composed the garrison, which, in conjunction with the other three regiments, not yet arrived at Nuremberg from Bavaria, made a body of 6000 men complete. The cavalry amounted to 2500, including those that attended the king ; at the head of which latter party he left Nuremberg, October the 17th, in order to join duke Bernard, and expel the Walsteiners out of Saxony, leaving directions with the better half of his diminutive collection to pursue him by brisk marches in the best manner it could contrive to advance.

This young hero, duke Bernard, had been dispatched a month before with an army of 12,000 men to watch the motions of the Imperial general, and likewise secure the banks of the Mayne, protect the whole circle of Franconia, and direct his attention particularly to the conservation of the town of Schweinfurt. It may suffice to say, that no aged and most experienced commander ever discharged a duty better ; for allowing his troops no rest, he presented himself in every place, as occasion demanded ; preserved from insults the important cities of Schweinfurt and Wurtzburg (into the former of which places he threw Dewbatel with his regiment of dragoons) and executed a second enterprise, of the same nature, when Walstein removed from thence, and invested Coburg-castle ; compelling him, by the dint of vigilance and perseverance, to transfer the seat of war into Upper-Saxony.

By this time the great advances made by Gustavus renewed in men's minds more and more the prediction of Tycho Brahé, just transiently touched upon in the former part of our work ; where it was specified, on the appearance of a new star in Cassiopéa, Anno 1572, that a northern prince was expected to arise, who should greatly advance the interests of the more pure religion ; and that the precise culmination of this astral

\* Chemnitz says Alenfeld and Schupfen,



influence should be perceived by the generality of mankind in the year 1632, or thereabouts \*. And at the same time, the king being now advanced to the zenith of his glory, the speculative and curious persons of the age began to pay fresh regard to Frederic Braunborn's predictions, who had foretold the death of Antichrist in the year 1636, in an explanation of the Old and New Testament, which book he published at least eighteen years before. But the unfortunate death of our hero soon put an end to these airy conjectures.

Mean while Gustavus marched in fourteen days from Bavaria to the northern parts of Thuringia, including likewise three days, which he spent at Nurenberg. What detained him there more especially was the ensuing business: perceiving the princes and states of his allies to grow remiss in subscribing to the war, and in the conveyance of their contingent of troops to him; he formed an idea, and gave Oxenstiern full powers to convene at Ulm the principal personages of Upper Germany, in the four circles of Suabia, Franconia and the two Rhines. The plan of this confederation was bold, extensive, and magnificent, conformably to the abilities of the great inventor, whose death suppressed it in the very infancy; but it was on *this ichnography*, that Oxenstiern afterwards established the convention of Heilbrun the year ensuing, which hath been considered by all historians as the most distinguished action of his political life. Mean while Gustavus, that he might mature his conceptions more and more, commanded the chancellor to attend him in his march to Erfurt in Thuringia, discoursing with him on the subject during the whole journey, and inculcating and repeating his directions, as they occurred occasionally to him. It was his majesty's first scheme, had he continued in Bavaria, to have made this minister director-general of Lower and Upper-Saxony: but matters being now totally changed in that respect, he commanded him to return to Nurenberg with all possible expedition, and put the fresh and new ideas into actual operation. Nor must it here be forgotten, that the king before he left the last-named town, perceiving the English and Scottish regiments to be ex-

\* De Stella nova, Anno 1572. Excus. Uranoburgi. Dan. A. MD. C. X. p. 805. Heylmanni. Leo Arctæus, p. 12.

1632. tremely thinned, combined them all into one brigade, informing the leaders and foldiers, that henceforwards they should always act near his person; assuring the former, that as this select body of troops happened by the present reformation to be trebly officered, he should prefer the supernumerary commanders into other regiments, in proportion as vacancies presented themselves. There is reason to think, that this brigade was one of the finest bodies of troops, that ever appeared in the military world. And now it was, according to the best conjectures which can be made, that Gustavus, in order to encourage and remunerate his allies in Germany, made a full and sedate revision of his grand *scheme of commerce to the East and West-Indies*\*, first published by him in the year 1626, or 1627; (for my accounts vary in point of chronology.) The former part whereof may be perused at leisure in the *Appendix*; as also the subsequent additional articles extended to all his faithful assistants and friends then in the empire.

At Arnstadt the king joined duke Bernard, where they rested six days, till the royal army arrived from Nurenberg. Here Oxenstiern took his perpetual farewell of his respected sovereign, and making an excursion through Francfort and the Lower-Palatinate (being entrusted with the last letter his master ever wrote to the unfortunate elector Palatin) he then completed his journey by returning to his directorial department round Nurenberg. And indeed no plenipotentiary-character was ever greater than what the generosity of Gustavus bestowed on his chancellor: for he had a commission *unlimited* to four circles, being constituted *supreme arbitor of peace and war*: he was authorized to preside *without controll* over all generals and military expeditions; to ratify all truces, conventions and treaties *pro re nata*; being pronounced first in all things (to make use of the very words in his commission) both as VIR TOGATUS, ET SAGATUS; receiving in charge particularly to keep a strict eye to the true interests of the protestant religion: to which the king annexed this extraordinary confirmation: *Quicquid hoc ratione in sui (scil. regis) emolumentum vi susceptorum mandatorum gereret, dispo-*

\* See Vol. i. 91, 92,

*ordinaret,*



*ordinaret, ratum à se, perinde ac si ipse gessisset, disposuisset, ordinasset, habitum iri* \*.

1632.

Had not Gustavus made amazing expedition from Bavaria into the depths of the Thuringian forest, as far as Arnstadt, the vigilant and enterprising Pappenheim had certainly perplexed him in two important instances, namely, the possession of the cities of Erfurt and Naumburg†; which might have obstructed his majesty's entrance into Saxony, and facilitated the junction of the Imperial armies, which the king laboured to render difficult, as far as lay in his power, and, if possible, to counterwork. Duke Bernard, conformably to the instructions of his master, put a check to the former attempt; but as to the event of the latter, it was almost humanly impossible to out-strip Pappenheim in a long march, who, not daring to invest Erfurt whilst the king lay in Thuringia, cast a languishing eye towards that important city, having crossed the Unstrut, and approached as near it as Butstadt, a distance only of twelve miles: but then changing his plan all at once, he shaped his course through the little district of Freyburg; and passing the Sala, with the rapidity of a flash of lightning, never allowed duke Bernard to overtake him, who pressed on his heels with a large body of cavalry.

Mean while, it being now the anniversary of Simon and Jude, the king marched his two armies from Arnstadt to Erfurt, a day's journey of twenty miles, and considering such a slight effort as a kind of holiday, reviewed his troops, all drawn up in fair array, before they entered the town; and during the time of employing himself in this work, received a deputation from the magistracy, requesting him to honour their city with his royal presence; unto which he returned an indistinct, but very affectionate answer; insomuch that one of the deputies afterwards acknowledged, that it forced tears from his eyes. At night his majesty made his entrance privately; and first, so peculiar was his humanity to any general that was wounded or indisposed, made a visit to duke William of Weymar; from whom hastening to his consort's abode, her majesty, attended by her train of ladies, politely received him on

\* Chemnit. de Bello Sueco-German. Tom. i. 345.

† Nani Historia, L. ix. Puffendorf de Reb. Suec. p. 80.

1632. foot, in the square of the market, before her apartments; upon which Gustavus, dismounting at a distance, led her up stairs into her own chamber, and after a short, but tender interview, retired to military business; foreseeing plainly, that the fate of Germany was now approaching to wards its grand crisis. They supped together early in the evening, and in half an hour the king withdrew a second time, for he had letters to write of great importance to several princes, and particular expresses to dispatch unto all the troops, that could possibly reach him in ten days, or a fortnight: in a word, he had the great event full in his imagination, which afterwards made its appearance upon the glorious, but unfortunate plains of Lützen.

During the few hours Gustavus stayed at Erfurt, he received agreeable dispatches from all parts, if we except the fruitless and injudicious march of the duke of Lunenburg, who attempted to join him, but never had abilities to effect that junction. His majesty heard particularly, that the prince of Berkenfeld had re-taken Landsberg, and driven the duke of Bavaria into Munich, with notable loss: that Banier had raised the siege of Rayn, and quashed a desperate enterprize of the enemy against Augsburg, the king's magazine of arms and military stores: that a part of the Swedish and Wirtemberg troops had gathered laurels on the very banks of the lake of Constance: that Dubal had cleared Silesia, and Horn had reduced Alsatia almost miraculously; and that the Transylvanian general had caused a very signal diversion, by invading Hungary.

At break of day the king rose, and taking a slight breakfast with his beloved Eleonora, gave audience to the magistrates of the city, and then concluded an earnest and pathetic speech, with a few short sentences, to this effect: *You know, gentlemen, added he, that uncertainty and sublimary affairs are terms convertible, and that war particularly (the visitation of heaven for human depravity,) is precarious above all things: it is possible that something worse may soon arrive to this my person, and if such be the will of the Supreme Being, transfer to my dear consort that affection and obsequy you owe to me. On these conditions, I pray*  
*Providence*



*Providence to prosper you* \*. Then turning round to Eleonora, he could enuntiate no more than just to say, GOD BLESS YOU ! and thus abruptly leaving the whole assembly dissolved in tears, he mounted his horse, and vanished immediately, in order to overtake his army, which by this time was in full march towards Saxony. 1632.

In two days and one half his majesty, by easy journeys of twelve miles a day, reached Nurenberg ; and hearing, on the road, that Holk (now created deputy velt-maréchal to Walsstein, in order to make room for the velt-maréchal Pappenheim) had sent troops into the town, to demand the arrears of the last year's contribution due to Tilly, dispatched colonel Brandstein, at the head of a body of musqueteers, with strict orders to dislodge the Imperialists. This officer requested admission, at the Othmar-gate, by break of day, and on the centinel's beseeching, that time should be allowed him to inform the magistracy of his demands, burst the port-cullis to pieces with a petard, and entered the city sword in hand.

Next day, at noon, the royal army crossed the bridge over the Sala ; a part thereof entered Nurenberg, and the residue (though the winter began now to appear with a severe aspect,) found themselves obliged to take quarters in the high-roads, that lead to Zeitz and Leipfic. It was here his majesty had commanded George, duke of Lunenberg, to join him with the little army, which he commanded in Lower Saxony ; whose instructions were, either to force a passage through the enemies quarters, by the road of Halle, or shape his course to his right, through the town of Eysfelt, and then pursue much the same route, which Pappenheim had taken. But that general chose rather to follow his own imaginations, than the king's directions ; and having left his infantry at Magdeburg, (which was a great omission, and singularly affected the day's service at Lützen) took the liberty to conduct his cavalry only across the Elb to Wittemberg, where he received orders to join the king at all hazards ; but had not courage or dexterity enough to break through the enemies forces. From whence arose one signal inconveniency ; for the

\* Swedish Intelligencer, Part iii. 72.

1632. count de Pappenheim joined Wallstein, but the duke of Lunenburg never more beheld Gustavus \*!

Whilst we have thus pursued the king's progress from Bavaria to Saxony, (by which extraordinary march he outstripped even Wallstein's ideas of activity, and saved Erfurt and Naumburg †, a point of infinite importance to him, missing little, at the same time, of exceeding Pappenheim in the article of vigilance) we will, for a moment, refer ourselves to the conduct of the Imperial chieftain, whom we left encamped at Weida in Vogtland, something more than a fortnight before the present period.

This commander, having dispatched Gallas into Bohemia, to assist Don Baltazar against Dubalt and Arnheim, commanded Holk to return from his depredations and ravages, and point his course towards the town of Leipzig, which both armies besieged in form, and rendered themselves masters of in three days. And for this step the Imperial generalissimo is greatly admired by the continuator of Foresti, who applauds all bold strokes, just upon the eve of some decisive battle. The three instances he selects particularly on the occasion, are, the passage of the Lech by Gustavus, the siege of Magdeburg by Tilly, and the occupation of Leipzig by Wallstein's orders. Be that as it will, one thing is remarkable, that the commandant, who surrendered the castle this time, was the self-same man, who resigned it to Tilly the preceding campaign. If his name be worth preserving, he was called Vopelius. And this may serve to shew, that the elector of Saxony was neither over delicate, nor over solicitous, in the choice of his officers. In a word, he cared little, which of the two contending powers obtained the superiority.

Nor was Wallstein unactive during the siege of Leipzig-town and fortress: for in that interim he took possession of Weissenfels, Merseburg, Naumburg, and Halle, (the castle thereof alone excepted) where some veteran Swedes remained, who stayed there on account of the wounds they received last year, in the battle of Leipzig.

Nor was the same general void of attention in another particular; for he had once formed a design of possessing Torgau-bridge by dint of

\* Puffend. de Rebus Suec. p. 80.

† Nani Hist. L. 9.



force, by which means he proposed to himself the choice of various and distinct advantages ; such as the more easy reduction of Saxony, if that idea best pleased him ; as also, a new embarrassment of difficulties, in case the elector and Gustavus proposed to unite their forces, than which nothing appeared more probable. He had the power likewise, by this stroke of surprize, to enter Lower Lusatia, and the Marches of Brandenburg, and of course decline a battle, upon supposition he deemed such a circumstance truly eligible. But the elector of Saxony, who squared every motion by the king's directions, from whom he received expresses daily, had rendered this passage superior to insults of the impetuous and momentary kind ; nor did Walstein ever realize this ideal experiment ; for having marched his whole force to Eülenberg, half way between Leipzig and Torgau, he there received an express from Pappenheim, with information, that he was upon the wing to join him. On the receipt of which acceptable news, (for it is thought Walstein would have shunned Gustavus in the absence of his velt-maréchal) he turned back to Leipzig by the road he came, and formed the junction at Merzburg.

Here Pappenheim, who had the power of over-persuading all men in military matters, (for his bold strong sense had the appearance of irresistibility) soon induced Walstein, though in general the most reserved, fullen, and intractable commander of that age, to change his operations all at once, and embrace a project, which indeed had once occurred to him slightly, as we mentioned before, and that was, to cross the Sala without delay, and occupy the principal towns and passes of Thuringia, particularly Weymar and Erfurt ; forasmuch as in the whole country duke Bernard had only one small army, and his brother William, then indisposed, could produce no greater strength than 5000 soldiers, wherewith to garrison the two cities last mentioned. As to the arrival of Gustavus, with an army from Bavaria, that incident was foreseen by no man\*.

Whilst these matters continued in profound agitation, news arrived, that the king of Sweden was on the banks of the Sala ; which alarm in-

\* Soldat Suedois. 823.

1632. deed was premature; for the report took its rise from the approach of duke Bernard's cavalry, whom the king had dispatched to intercept the rear-guard of Pappenheim's army. But in two days his majesty's arrival at Naumburg, and his approach into Saxony, were made manifest to Walstein beyond contradiction; who, immediately summoning all his troops to join him, under pain of death, directed his course from Leipzig to Lützen and Randstadt\*, and there spread himself along the sides of the great high road, which leads into the heart of Saxony. He then sent express after express, fruitlessly, to recall Gallas, who by that time was advanced with 12,000 men into Bohemia, and procured from Leipzig a contribution of more than 8000*l.* which he had demanded from the inhabitants about a week before: which first precaution appeared to him in no degree unnecessary, though at that time he did not sincerely believe, that Gustavus, at the head of 18,000 men, would have the confidence to attack a body of troops, amounting to 40,000, who had their choice of ground to entrench themselves, and a large train of heavy artillery; which prepossession led him afterwards into a slight mistake, and that was, the detaching Pappenheim to take possession of the town of Halle. For concluding, at least during the present conjuncture, that the whole winter would be spent unactively in quarters of cantonment, he esteemed the acquisition of that town, and the districts round it, as a safe and desirable enlargement of elbow-room; giving him, in truth, a sort of elliptical range along the banks of the Sala, from the city last mentioned, to the towns of Zeitz and Altenberg†.

Next morning the Imperial generalissimo advanced to Weissenfels, when the colonels Suecis‡ and Bredarxo§, who had been sent to

† In this village, properly called Upper-Randstadt, is shewn a small passable house, where the duke of Marlborough made his applications to Charles XII. who resided therein a whole summer: and here the peace of Randstadt was formed and concluded, in the year 1707. This little mansion the author visited in 1748, in company with his ever-respected pupils,

Mr. ELLIOT, and Mr. STANHOPE, and that excellent historian, M. MASCOU.

† Spanish relation by an Imperial officer, printed at Lisbon, 1633.

‡ § The Spanish relator seems to be mistaken in these officers names. The first, I think, should be Salis, and the second, I am sure, ought to be Breda.

Naumburg,



Naumburg, to bring into the military chest the arrears of a contribution due to Tilly, (concerning which we have spoken slightly before) returned abruptly, with no small degree of precipitation, and declared the Swedish army to be in full march against the Imperialists. This was little less than a thunder-stroke to Wallstein, whose presence of mind began now to relinquish him: he had once an inclination to leave the road open to Leipzig and Dresden, and reserve to himself the power of oppressing the king's rear, and giving him battle when he saw occasion. He then (which is not uncommon, when the calmness of the understanding begins to be ruffled) flew directly into an opposite project, and conceived an idea of attacking the king's lines sword in hand; for by this time he heard, that a camp was to be strongly fortified near the walls of Naumburg, a misrepresentation easy to be accounted for, since it was Gustavus's custom to entrench his army every night, when near the enemy. To this purpose it was his determination to take the strait road from Weissenfels to Naumburg, (a distance of twelve miles, or something under) but the passage was too narrow, and too miry, to be undertaken with safety. He then sent the quarter-master-general, Julio Deodati, to examine the way, which leads through Zeitz; for it was Wallstein's custom (which proceeded more from haughtiness than the gout, which he alledged, as occasion served, for a general excuse) to examine no ground with his own eyes. On the same principle, and not from *that*, which influenced Gustavus, he disdained convening a council of war; yet on this emergency had the condescension to request Pappenheim to collect the private opinion of all the generals and colonels, who declared unanimously against attempting to force the Swedish lines.

And now a new thought occurred to him, the true cause and motive whereof hath escaped the notice of all historians without exception, nay even of the Spanish relator, who was himself a distinguished officer in the Imperial service; and that was, the dispatching Pappenheim to take possession of the town and castle of Halle, which commanded the great road, which his heart privately inclined him to pursue. All writers, of good sense,

1632. sense, appear to be puzzled \*, why Wallstein should detach Pappenheim, in whom himself and the army placed the greatest confidence, at the very moment when that commander's presence was mostly wanted ; for the Swedish forces lay then but a few miles removed from the Imperialists. But the real reason of this movement appears to me to be precisely thus : Wallstein, in his cooler hours of reflection, and at such periods when reason gets the better of misgiving apprehensions, seemed in part convinced, that Gustavus would not embark in an enterprise, where the disproportion against him then lay, as that of forty opposed to eighteen. Besides, as no general was more dextrous in procuring intelligence, it is probable his correspondents informed him, that the king (which was truly and really the case) had no intentions to engage, till the Saxon and Lunenberg army could both conjoin their forces with his own ; and therefore the Imperial general concluded, he had breathing-space enough to dispatch Pappenheim, whom he could recall in twenty hours, to secure the city and fortress of Halle ; which, in truth, commanded the only great and practicable road, at that time of the year, which lay convenient for his private purposes. What these purposes might be, shall be explained directly. Wallstein did not greatly like the decision of an engagement, hand to hand with a commander like Gustavus ; and though he thought that prince had not temerity enough to offer him battle, during Pappenheim's absence of three days, (which by the way he hoped to conceal till the stroke was completed) yet he foresaw but too plainly, that the Swedish monarch would force him into a general action, the very instant he had formed his conjunction with the elector of Saxony, and the duke of Lunenberg. For these reasons, which centered entirely in his own breast, he chose to eschew a decisive engagement, if that were possible ; and having secured the great road he privately wished for, proposed to himself, in case of emergency, to give Gustavus free passage to Leipzig and Dresden, and commanding his whole army to file off to Halle in an instant, transfer, by this unexpected movement, the seat of war towards the coasts of the Baltic, a

\* At generalissimus, *nescio qua mente*, Pappenheimium ut Hallas expugnaret, misit. *Wassenbergii Florus German.* p. 317.



point he ardently wished for, inasmuch as it had taken full possession of his mind from the very moment he dislodged at Nuremberg. Yet from this single false step of detaching Pappenheim, which took its rise from diffidence and timidity, he lost his reputation at once as a great commander, and gave birth to that very encounter, which he laboured hitherto to divert or decline. 1632.

But to return to Gustavus. On Thursday, November the first, he arrived at Naumburg, and thence dispatched messengers, on the heels of messengers, with a plan of the junction he intended to form with the elector of Saxony and duke of Lunenburg, who both then lay at Torgau, making between them a small compact army, consisting of 4000 cavalry, and 4000 infantry; though some historians suppose their number to be nearly double. The king's idea of uniting these forces to his own consisted in this: that the elector of Saxony should advance fourteen miles on the western-side \* of the Mulda, to the town of Eülenberg; and that himself, during this interim, should march to Pegau, on the river Elster, fourteen miles to the south of Leipzig, and thence to Grimma, situated on the Mulda, eighteen miles to the east of Pegau, and fourteen to the south of Eülenberg, and that the conjunction should be formed at the place afore-mentioned, namely, Grimma. Whoever knows Saxony, and comprehends the disposition and lodgements of Wallstein's army, will, at first sight, allow the present scheme to be finely concerted.

This self same day the king surveyed his encampments at Naumburg, and made a slight excursion round the country, to examine the aspect and position of the enemy; but the afternoon proved not so fortunate to some English adventurers, on the same errand, who falling into an ambush of Croats, two out of three were taken prisoners †, and conducted that night to Weissenfels, where Wallstein had then entrenched.

\* I should apprehend it ought to be on the eastern-side of the Mulda; but not having examined the ground, which hath been carefully performed in most other important scenes of action, I chuse to conform myself to the authorities before me.

† Namely, lieutenant-colonel Tyrwhit, and captain Fielding, who communicated their accounts of Wallstein's behaviour, during the battle, to their friends in England; and from whence a part, which follows, hath been copied,

himself;

632. himself; who dispatched Pappenheim forthwith to examine them strictly, concerning the king's strength, and his military designs. Wallstein then commanded them to be confined in the rear of his army, where they were spectators of the battle of Lützen.

At Naumburg the king dropped some expressions to Fabritius, his chaplain, which most historians have considered as prophetic; for in conversation he discovered great uneasiness, to behold himself, in some sense, deified as it were by the generality of mankind: *I fear, doctor, said he, some impending misfortune, either to my own person, or the prosperity of the Swedish forces: I am received every where with undue joy, and undeserved honours: the people rely too much on the probabilities of second causes: their supposed security is a deception to them: they mistake the true object of human addresses\*: I take no delight in this sort of incense;—let the event be as it pleaseth God†!—*

In addition to what hath been said, many suppose the king, about this period, to have entertained certain misgivings concerning his death. But without having recourse to such superstitious presages, sure it is, the bravest of men may have their intervals of tenderness and sensibility; and this, without supposing it to be constitutional, may be occasioned by the indisposition of a single fibre; though, for my own part, I think compassion, and sedate reflection, were always intermingled with the character of Gustavus. They ground their opinion upon part of a letter, dispatched to the chancellor Oxenstiern, which I shall venture to publish, as no ways derogatory from human nature; for never person acted with greater vivacity and presence of mind, than his majesty exhibited some days afterwards, on the plains of Lützen. Let the reader peruse the extract, and refrain from sympathizing, if that be possible.

\* \* \* \* \* *Though the cause I am embarked in is just and good, yet the event of war (propter delicta humana) must be deemed uncertain. Uncertain likewise is the duration of mortal life: therefore I beseech and require you, in the name of our blessed Redeemer, to preserve your fortitude*

\* Historical and Authentic Relation, in Low Dutch, Tom. ii. p. 175.

† Swedish Intelligencer, Part iii. 74. Memorab. Suec. Gentis, p. 144.



*of spirit, though things may not proceed in exact conformity to my wishes.—Remember likewise how I should comport myself in regard to you, if by divine permission I might live till THAT period, WHEN you should have occasion for my assistances under any shape. Consider me as a man, the guardian of a kingdom, who has conflicted with difficulties for TWENTY YEARS, and passed through them WITH REPUTATION by the protection and mercy of God; as a man, who loved and honoured his country and faithful subjects; as a man, who neglected life, riches, and happy days, for the preservation and glory of those he belonged to; expecting no remuneration, except to be pronounced the person, who fulfilled the duties of that station, which Providence assigned him.—Those, who survive me, (for I with others must expect the stroke of mortality) are, on MY account, and for many OTHER reasons, real objects of your commiseration: They are of the tender and defenceless SEX:—A helpless Mother, who wants a guide, and an innocent Daughter \*, who requires a protector!—Natural affection forces these lines from the hand of a Son and a Parent!—But I must resume myself and recommend them, together with my soul and body, to the protection of the Supreme Being, expecting better things on earth than my present melancholy now presages, and eternal life, peace, and happiness hereafter in heaven, which may God bestow on you, at his own appointed time and hour! †*

GUSTAVUS.

The next day after the conference with Fabritius his majesty examined, in person, all the approaches and passes about Naumburg, having as yet formed no resolution to give Wallstein battle ‡; but proposing rather to examine the great roads, that lay between his camp and that of the Imperialists, which passages he found upon inspection to be very deep and difficult. But the subject of this expedition being purely occasional and incidental, his grand and principal intention was, (and therefore he commanded abroad several strong parties of cavalry) to en-

\* The princess Christina was then eight years of age.

† Loccenii Hist. Suec. 4<sup>o</sup>. pag. 605, 606.

‡ Puffendorf de Rebus Suecicis, p. 80.

1632. gage his troops in some sharp skirmishes, in order to obtain from prisoners more certain intelligence of Walstein's situation, and examine carefully, during this confusion, the true nature of the road, that led to Pegau, with a view to effectuate his conjunction more dextrously with the elector of Saxony and duke of Lunenberg.

The following morning, being Sunday, a Saxon peasant came running to the king with a letter in his hand, which Colorado had engaged him to carry to an Imperial officer, then quartered at Querfurt. This letter appears to have been written the Saturday evening. Its purport was, "that he (the officer) should march to Halle, and join Pappenheim the next morning \*," at which time his excellency, the "generalissimo, had determined to remove his camp from Weissenfels to Lützen:" Both which circumstances gave Gustavus uncommon joy; for he was never known to dislike the absence of Pappenheim: and the removal of Walstein from Weissenfels in no sense displeased him; for that town lay directly in the way of his intended expedition, whereby he proposed to unite his forces to those of Saxony; and Lützen is removed about nine miles from the high road, which leads to Pegau.

Upon receiving the two articles of intelligence above-mentioned, the king, who had always a secret appetite to fighting, convened duke Bernard and Kniphausen to his own apartment, having no great opinion of tumultuous councils of war for many reasons. He there expounded

\* Le Barre, usually judicious, and on most occasions the best instructed historian I know, supposes Pappenheim to have received orders from Walstein, after the reduction of Halle, to advance to Cologne: which extraordinary digression no ways seems to square with the then pressing and urgent necessities of the Imperial generalissimo. But this difficulty is better solved by the plain narration of a participant in war, than by the refined speculations of an historian in the closet. In a word, the case stood thus. At the present period, a strong report prevailed [*Spanish Relation, printed at Lisbon, 1633.*] that count Henry Vander-Berg, at the head of an

army of Hollanders, was in full march to invest Cologne, whose elector was a faithful friend to the Imperial interests. Upon this the Austrian party *supposed*, that Pappenheim having rendered himself master of Halle, would advance thence to the banks of the Weiser, and having joined the residue of his own army under Gronsfelt, make some attempts to raise the siege; and that Walstein perhaps might be induced to follow him, in hopes to draw Gustavus still farther from the heart of the empire. Such were men's ideas for a few days; but the alarm was false, and soon vanished into air. *Spanish Relation* *et supra.*



to these two commanders the particular circumstances of Walstein's situation, and desired their opinions candidly and generously without reserve. The former, as is congenial to the temperament of youthful warriors, took flame immediately, and declared for action. The latter, brave as the youngest combatant in the army, but matured by reflection, and chastised in imagination by experience, pronounced uniformly and steadily, at the first glance, that an engagement at the present juncture was no ways reconcileable to the true science of war: "For, said he, no commander is obliged to encounter an enemy greatly superior to him in strength, except compelled by some pressing and unavoidable necessity. War is an affair of demonstration; and not an unpremeditated effusion of animal spirits. His majesty is neither circumscribed in place, nor deficient in provisions, forage, or military stores." The king submitted with complacency to good sense wherever he found it; though it is possible the first motions of his heart inclined him to undertake an action, that carried with it such a shining appearance, both of glory and difficulty; yet making no remonstrance, assured both his generals positively, with an air of calmness, that he would decline the engagement, and march to join the elector of Saxony the ensuing morning\*.

Leaving therefore the gros of his baggage, and a sufficient garrison in the town of Naumburg, he ordered his drums and trumpets to summon the army into motion at one hour after midnight; for he always disdained stealing a march, except occasions were pressing and hazardous; and, it is probable, though he declined opposing Kniphausen's arguments, that he did not privately dislike an attack from Walstein, in case that general should think fit to obstruct his journey; for the ground he well-knew was one wide-spread, unvarying plain, which gave the enemy no particular advantage. Four hours before it was day-light, the whole

\* Spanheim and Chemnitz suppose the king to have advanced directly from Naumburg to Lützen, without any intention to join the Saxons. [*Soldat Suédois*, 824, 825. *Bellum Sueco-Germ.* Tom. i. 347.] Which supposition throws some reflection on his majesty's military prudence, though nothing of that kind was originally intended by the historians.

1632. army was under march, and being now arrived half-way to Pegau, and reposing itself for the sake of a momentary refreshment, having by this time (it being now ten in the morning) advanced nine miles ; some gentry of the country and peasants came hastening towards the king with full and positive assurances, (which report was likewise confirmed by straggling prisoners gleaned up here and there) that the Imperial army, which lay then on a line to the north-west, loosely and thinly dispersed in various villages, had received no alarm, nor the least intelligence of his majesty's motions. This idea (adding thereto the absence of Pappenheim) took possession of the king's mind all at once : he thought it no ways difficult to cut the several Imperial quarters to pieces one by one, before it was possible for Wallstein to collect any considerable mass of forces together. Calling therefore all his generals round him in an instant, he, who had never yet declared his sentiments upon this occasion concerning fighting, proposed the enterprize without hesitation, and the proposal was received with the liveliest demonstrations of applause and joy.—He then asked the country gentlemen, how many miles it might be to Lützen ? They replied, *There, Sire, there, it lies directly under your eye.* And here arose a fatal mistake too well known to the cool and unprepossessed observer. For the country being (with a slight exception) one uniform level, and the buildings of the church and castle high in themselves, and standing likewise on a sort of eminence, the town of Lützen appeared to be one half nearer the Swedes than it really was ; or in other words, to be removed five miles from the army, instead of eight miles and something more. And here it must be observed further, that as the ground was an immense tract of corn-lands, fresh-ploughed to receive the grain, the passage proved to be miry and difficult beyond description. But the error of distance was not observed, and the difficulty of marching seemed to be unforeseen : which in the high and sudden ardor of generals and soldiers might be easily overlooked. At a single instant the whole army made its evolutions, and pointed its course towards Lützen. Never were troops known to advance with such amazing alacrity ; but the ground clung to the mid-leg like clay, and when they came within two miles of the desired ob-  
1
ject,



ject, there was a morassy swamp to pass, formed by a creeping half-stagnated rivulet, over which lay a paltry bridge, where only two persons could cross a-breast. In and near a nameless village \*, on the opposite side, were lodged a regiment of cuirassiers and another of Croats, who far from disputing the pass, took the alarm, and formed themselves on a little eminence beyond the water. It was now sun-set by the time the whole Swedish army had cleared the pass, and disengaged itself from this unexpected encumbrance; and, to the sensible mortification and disappointment of the whole army, the Swedes had only day-light sufficient to dislodge the two regiments from the post they had possessed. This was effected by a very sharp and spirited attack, whose success the king facilitated greatly, by fixing some field-pieces on another little eminence, which bore hard on the enemies flank. In the heat of this rencounter one standard was taken, which all men considered (conformably to the genius of that age) as a well promising and prosperous omen; for thereon was depicted the Austrian eagle displayed, and the goddess fortune; with the following inscription underneath, *Fortuna & aquila Romana* †. Some Swedes considered this as a very promising omen ‡: but the generality rested the event upon other hopes.

—— *Romano milite dignus,*

*Ensis adest augur* ——

Yet still it was remarked, that his majesty discovered no great signs of satisfaction, when this trophy was presented to him; not that he wanted dexterity to encourage any idea, which inspired his troops with vivacity and confidence, but in truth he was chagrined to the heart at the deception of distance we have lately mentioned, and perceived now, that (for the first time in his military life) he was obliged to give battle;

\* I have since learned, that this village was called Rippach.

† The particularity of this ensign was not so great, as the Swedish army seemed disposed to interpret it; for most of the Croats bore the

Austrian eagle on the front-side of their standards, and on the opposite side were the emblem and motto. I have seen the same eagle engraven on the officers partizans of that age.

‡ Soldat Suedois, 825;

1632. not absolutely against his judgment, but in a certain manner uncomfortable therewith. Nevertheless, as it was this prince's peculiar character to possess himself more and more in proportion as distress and difficulty increased upon him, he soon assumed that air of composed confidence, which men usually wear, who rely upon some resource of firmness and genius, at the very period, that their friends suppose their danger to be next to inevitable.

About this time, it is certain, some one of Gustavus's generals, not improbably Kniphausen, advised him still to meditate a retreat and repass the rivulet, which the mist next morning gave him full opportunity to effectuate. It was urged likewise, that the royal army wanted rest and provisions, and that it bordered on temerity to assail a double number of forces, protected by batteries, and secured by entrenchments. But the die was cast, and the king replied with a tone of decision, *That he could not bear to see Walstein under his beard without making some animadversions; and that no disinclination, on his part, had ever hindered him from bringing the contest to a fair experiment. I long, said he, to un-earth him once from his subterraneous hiding-places, and behold with my own eyes, how he can acquit himself in a champaign country* \*. And now the king having crossed the pass, found himself under an indispensable obligation to engage the enemy; for had he attempted to return the next morning, (at least according to his own ideas) he might have run the risque of incurring a total defeat, or sacrificing at least the very flower of his army. He determined therefore, without hesitation, to begin the action two entire hours before day-light; for Walstein's quarters lay remotely dispersed, and Pappenheim (who had taken with him twelve regiments of the league) could not be supposed to return in less space than eighteen hours.—Walstein appeared to be thunderstruck at this unexpected visit from Gustavus. He dispatched an officer immediately to Pappenheim with orders to relinquish his undertaking, however prosperous it might be; and instructions were conveyed to the chieftains in their several quarters, to repair forthwith to the general rendezvous on the

\* Soldat Suedois, p. 827, 828.



the plains of Lützen. Thus the greater part of the Imperial army 1632. began its march before midnight, and some, who lay enquartered more remotely, did not reach their generalissimo till the ensuing morning\*.

Mean while Walstein, having dispatched his orders to recall Pappenheim, and collect his forces; and recovering, by degrees, his wonted presence of mind, began at length to reflect seriously on the nature of the ground, occupied by himself, or possessed by Gustavus. To understand both which circumstances better, it must be remarked by the reader, that a large high way, from Lützen to Leipzig, bisects the plain in a line, that extends from west to east, but gently slanteth to the eastward; on the southern-side of which lay the Swedes, and the Imperialists on the northern. A great part of this road was then garnished, on each side, with middle-aged oler-trees, and, as the soil was moist, deep, and rich, a considerable trench had been cut, on either hand, to prevent travellers from making excursions along the corn-fields†. The tract of land, which Gustavus covered, was plain and uniform; but on Walstein's right, near the town of Lützen, lay a gently-rising eminence, where some windmills were erected‡. Here, about nine at night, he fixed two large batteries of heavy artillery, and secured them, in front and flank, with an entrenchment: the lower line played directly on the left-wing of the Swedes; and the uppermost threw its balls, obliquely, through the center of the right-wing. He then protected his own main-body with field-ordnance; and as it was well foreseen where the king affected to appear, he placed there (namely, against the right-wing of the Swedes) a fourth battery, composed of the heaviest

\* Chemnitz. Tom. i. 373.

† Two ditches, one on each side, ran parallel with the road, (Chemnitz. Tom. i. 73.) That next the king was rendered deepest by Walstein, and continues so to this hour.

‡ It is remarkable, that there was no material variation in the fields of Lützen, from the year 1632, to the year 1748, when the author

examined them, and compared the present ichnography of the ground, with the drafts published immediately after the battle, by Lotichius, Merian, Gabler, Sandrart, Danckaertz, &c. &c. That very day, a cuirassier's spur was ploughed up, of enormous magnitude, and the head of a pike, or partizan, very curiously engraven.

1632. and most destructive pieces. Whereas Gustavus, who valued the advantages of artillery as much as he, and understood its management far better, had only with him some few cannons of a moderate size, and a decent number of common field-pieces, (two, I think, at the head of each regiment) such as are usually transported with armies, in marches of expedition. At ten in the evening Wallstein ordered his pioneers, and soldiers, to deepen and widen the ditches on the road-side, till they had brought them to the due height of a parapet : and at this work they laboured incessantly, till the battle began next morning \*.

The royal army carried nothing with it, except such few things as were indispensably necessary. The king himself was not proprietor of a field equipage ; but passed the whole night in his coach, accompanied by Kniphausen, and duke Bernard : and as the soldiers had taken some flight entertainment before noon, and proposed to refresh themselves better the same evening at Torgau, (where dispositions had been made for their reception) it is not certain, what sort of repast was prepared for them, that night, on the plains of Lützen. Monro assures us†, they stood to their arms in perfect battaglia ; for which the reasons will appear self-evident, in the ensuing paragraph.

His majesty passed the night, partly in discourse with his generals, and partly in profound contemplation. On one point he fixed his mind, as it were intuitively ; and that was, to give the enemy battle two hours before break of day, well foreseeing, that their forces then could never be truly formed ; that a great part of the troops could not reach the station appointed ; and that the passage of the ditches could not be made so difficult, as it might be rendered in a few succeeding hours. But every circumstance, if we except undismayed valour and firmness of mind, proved unfavourable to Gustavus. The night appeared to be several degrees darker than usual ; and a mist prevailed in the skies, which, at intervals in the ensuing day, rendered the air so obscure, that it was hardly possible to discern an object truly, at the distance of two pike's length.

\* Hist. or Auth. Relat. Tom. ii, 172, in Low Dutch, fol.

† Part ii, 163.



At the moments the dawn of morning begins first to appear, he 1632.  
found it impossible to perform any exploit in the martial way \*; and therefore, sending for Fabritius, his chaplain, commanded him to celebrate divine service, and ordered prayers to be read at the head of each regiment, so far as the respective clergymen could be found, in such a sudden and unforeseen expedition. The king was then asked to take some refreshment, but declined the proposal. He was requested likewise to cloath himself in steel, according to the custom of that age; but his answer was, *The Lord is my armour*. Some † indeed say, he had lately received a contusion in one of his shoulders, from a musquet ball, which rendered the least pressure of his cuirass an insupportable torment to him. But be that as it will, he only changed his yesterday's cloaths, and wore a new plain cloth-coat, and an elk-skin buff-waistcoat, which fell afterwards into Holk's hands, and is still preserved at Vienna. About eight in the morning, the sun began to dispel the fogs, and gave the promise of a bright and un-tempestuous day; when lo, a new and unforeseen difficulty presented itself! For in the strait line, whereon the Swedish left-wing proposed to advance, lay a deep ditch, too difficult for the troops to cross; so that the king was obliged to make his whole army edge to the right, and then occupy the space, which lay between the *Flusgraben* (for so the Germans call a wet-ditch cut to drain lands ‡) and Walstein's army; leaving his ammunition-waggons, his coach, and the few conveniencies, that belonged to the army, in the village of Chursitz, as will appear more distinctly by the plan. This motion cost some trouble, and employed no small quantity of time: at length, towards the hour of nine in the morning, his majesty, riding with an air of briskness up and down the lines, and ordering two hymns § to be sung publickly, addressed himself to his

\* *Memoires communicated.* Merian Theatr. Europ. 746.

† I have given this circumstance a place in my text, (not from authority of De Prade, whose good faith I have never once depended on, but) because Spanheim, (*Soldat Sued.* 828.) and the Swedish Intelligencer, both support the assertion.

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(Part iii. 128.) All I know is, it no ways appears, where the king received this contusion; and, if I mistake not, he wore no armour at the battle of Leipzig.

‡ Others say, *Vlot Grachten*, i. e. ditches to float wood.

§ Taken from the 46th and 67th psalms.

T t

Swedish

1632. Swedish soldiers: *My companions, and my friends, shew the public, this day, what you really are. Acquit yourselves like men of service; observe your orders, and behave valiantly, for your own sakes, as well as mine. If you do this, you will find the benediction of heaven on the point of your swords, honour, and the recompence of valour. But, on the contrary, if you think of flight, and self-preservation, then your infamy is certain, as well as my disgrace, and your destruction.—And I here protest to you, on the veracity of a king, that not an atom of your bones shall ever return into Sweden*\*. Thence hastening to the German regiments, who formed chiefly the second line, he spake to them briefly thus; lowering a little the tone of authority: *Friends, officers, and soldiers, let me conjure you to act the valorous part this ensuing day.—You shall fight, not only under me, but with me.—My own blood shall point you the track, whereby to follow me.—Keep religiously within your ranks, and second your leader with resolution.—If you do this, victory is ours, and all its advantages, which you, and your posterity, will not fail to enjoy.—But if you once give ground, from that moment your lives and liberties become a sacrifice to the enemy*†.

On the conclusion of these two short harangues one universal shout of acclamation passed, from regiment to regiment, throughout the army.

The king's field-disposition ‡, proceeded upon the same principles, enlarged and improved, as had been last year exhibited at Leipzig. And here we must observe with pleasure, that Puffendorff, and the authors of the Swedish Intelligencer, and Low Dutch Relation, agree almost to a tittle in every word concerning this arrangement. The whole army was formed upon two lines; but the troops appear to me to be *no ways so good* as those produced upon the theatre last

\* Soldat Suedois, p. 829. Merc. Franç. Swedish Intell. Part iii.

† I have preferred these speeches to those recorded by Chemnitius, which, in imitation of the practice of the ancient historians, seem to favour more of the library, than of the field. Besides, the *Soldat Suedois*, the *Mercure François*, and

the *Intelligencer*, all came out at the same period, in Switzerland, France, and England; and each author relates, nearly word for word, the very passages, that I have preserved.

‡ Chemnitz. de Bello Sueco. Germanico. p. 372.

mentioned;



mentioned ; so consuming is the *wear* and *tear* of war, even on the prosperous and victorious side. Many regiments were discordant masses, composed from broken ones : that of Lowenstein, in particular, had been so lately raised, as not to be proprietor of a single standard ; and the principal generals, such as Horn, Banier, Bauditzen, and Dubalt, were all absent. His majesty, according to custom, took upon himself the conduct of the right wing, where were disposed six regiments of native Swedes, supported by five intermingled bodies of musqueteers. The left-wing was committed to duke Bernard's care, and consisted of the like number of cavalry, and intermixed infantry. The center was composed of the four invincible brigades, or columns, namely, the pretorian, or yellow guards, the first brigade, the white \*, and the blue ; supported by Henderson's reserve of Scottish infantry, and commanded by Nicholas Brahé count of Weissenburg.

The second line consisted of the same numbers with the first, in respect both to regiments and brigades, ranged precisely on like principles, excepting that the reserve consisted of cavalry instead of infantry. Bulach commanded the right wing, Kniphausen led the main-body, and Ernest, prince of Anhalt, conducted the left-wing. It was the king's custom, at this period, to make his battle-lines only four deep in cavalry, and six in infantry ; whereas Wallstein, following the ancient practice of the Low-Countries, advanced always ten deep, at the very least. The watch-word, on both sides, was the same, that had been used at Leipzig. The Swedes had twenty field-pieces, of a moderate size, disposed here and there to the best advantage ; and several portable cannons, of the king's invention, were destined to advance in the fronts of each body of intermingled musqueteers †.

It

\* Some say the *green*.

† The chevalier de Folard must make a mistake in the arrangement, and plan, which he forms of the king's forces ; and I think so the rather, because he errs in the ichnographical windings of the *Flussgraben*, and the position of the gallows : so that it appears probable to me, that he never beheld the plains of Lützen, nor rightly

knew the number of the Swedish forces. For he allows to the eight columns, on the lowest computation, many more men, than the king, at that time, could produce ; or more than he employed in the brigade, or column, then practised by him. He errs likewise, in disposing sixteen bodies of infantry behind the columns, when, in truth, the reserves of Henderson and Ohem

1632. It is hard to give the reader a distinct account of the Imperial dispositions in this day's service; for so greatly was Gustavus admired, in the character of a field-officer, that the generality of plans, which have fallen within my reach, bear an eye principally to the Swedish form of embattlement. Of Walstein's therefore we shall say the less, as we are unable to specify, by name, what colonels commanded the respective regiments; and likewise, to pronounce decisively, which of the two Imperial ground-plots, here exhibited, was realized by the commander in chief: whether, for example, *that* we have admitted into the body of the copper-plate, which is Dankaertz's; or *that* subjoined, and enclosed within a line, which rests upon the authority of the Swedish Intelligencer; for both writers were faithful collectors, and published their delineations soon after the death of Gustavus. In my own private opinion, it appeared best to give the preference to the *first*, as it is drawn up, to a certain degree, upon two lines; the only notable variation being, that in the center of the second plan stands arranged Piccolomini's regiment of cavalry amidst the infantry. We can however observe, with greater certainty, that Walstein, in imitation of Gustavus, condescended to mix some infantry amongst his cavalry, behind the windmills: that the conduct of the left-wing was committed to Holk, supreme director there till Pappenheim arrived, (who always made a point of opposing Gustavus :) the right-wing was entrusted to Colorado, and Walstein undertook the command of the main-body, making his appearance, during the whole engagement, in a sedan chair, which his friends attributed to the gout, and his enemies imputed to timidity, and dissimulation of sickness.

When the king saw the vast extent of the Imperial line of battle, he could not refrain from observing to his followers, that if Walstein was

made only one regiment of foot, and one of cavalry, marked in the plan 53, and 54. And thus Folard, by two augmentations, hath magnified the royal army *one third*, at least, beyond the truth: nevertheless, the disposition of the two reserves is neither incorrect, nor unnatural. It is probable, if his Swedish majesty had been master of 5000 supernumerary soldiers, he

might have placed them as the chevalier hath arranged them. But as we have the names by us of every distinct corps, which served that day under Gustavus, and cannot produce troops sufficient to enlarge the columns, and make good the imaginary battalions, we find ourselves obliged to pass these remarks on an author highly excellent in most other respects.

supported



supported in a manner equal to appearances, he could not produce less than 30,000 effective men; and by the way fresh regiments were then marching every moment to the Austrian army, and Pappenheim's corps was expected by noon: so that the Walssteiners in effect brought 40,000 men into the field, before the day's service was concluded; and as the town of Lützen touched the extremity of the Imperial right-wing, care was taken to set fire to the out-lying houses, and line the garden walls with strong bodies of musqueteers, which performed unspeakable mischief the next day, till duke Bernard at night cut 300 of them to pieces.

It is agreed likewise by most authors, that Walsstein arranged his army on two lines, or something nearly resembling thereto; and that the centre consisted of four square masses of infantry, posted on the angles of a larger square;---that each of these bodies contained two Imperial regiments, amounting perhaps (for war had made some havock amongst them) to 3000 men, or thereabouts;---the inner square consisting of pikemen, and the outward of musqueteers;---the whole group intirely solid:---and forasmuch as the angles of such a figure are easily disparted or struck off from the main body, each corner was garnished with a little lozenge made up of fifty musqueteers, which, like a sort of Satellites, attended the motions of these larger Jupiters. And thus, saith Folard \* very sensibly, a first error was corrected by the substitution of a second still more paradoxical.

His majesty, the best officer of infantry the world had ever seen †, placed his confidence this day, as he did at Leipzig, on the doctrine of columns,

\* *Traité de la Colonne.* p. lxiv.

† It may not be un-instructive, under this article, to subjoin a few remarks relating to the field arrangements of the king, the morality and discipline of his troops &c. made by a person of condition as early as in the month of November 1630, long before his more perfect amendments and regulations took place. The account, saith an exact historian, ran thus;

\* Dicebat se *novam & pulcherrimam* in ipsis exercitu *fermam aciei* observasse, quam

hoc loco describere nimis prolixum foret. Summa huc redit, eam munitioni similem, quæ ab omni parte, qua hosti accessus patet, eum destinatis ictibus petere queat: neque tantum machinas commode posse displodi, sed etiam quemque sclopetarium viritum jaculari, & hostem ferire: quod in magno agmine quadrato fieri nequeat, ubi duobus aut tribus ordinibus sclopetis displodentibus reliqui ictus sint inanes, adeo ut agmen illud ab irruente equitatu facile dissolvi possit: quod in acie Suecica fieri nequeat; nam priusquam

1632. columns, one of the finest pieces of military machinery (say some writers) that human wit can devise for the service of the field; since bodies of infantry thus drawn up arranged, and supported, may be pronounced with justice to be next to invincible. What this column *precisely was in detail*, even before or at the battle of Leipzig, could at this period never be known, if a minute drawing of lord Rea, one of his majesty's favourite colonels, had not been preserved, by mere good fortune. That the king in the present engagement improved or (through scarcity of forces) altered the plan delineated by lord Rea, is a circumstance highly probable; but whether the Frenchman's drawing be strictly true, either as to the configuration or arrangement of the brigade, shall be left to the decision of better judges \*. And

quam hostilis equitatus se loco movere aut impetum facere possit, sclopentarios sub præsidio non tantum hastatorum, sed etiam equitum, tanquam duorum propugnaculorum, quæ ad latera habeant, tutos esse: adhuc multos gradus inter sclopentarios esse ad receptum, ut priusquam hostilis equitatus ad ultimum agmen pervenire & illud disturbare possit, eum dissipari necesse sit. Cum igitur coherentia totius aciei, equitatus & peditatus, tormentorum majorum ac minorum, nec non sclopentariorum, maximi sit momenti: se non videre, quomodo hujusmodi acies, nisi Deo ita volente, aut si prius quam instructa sit, hostis eam ex improvviso invadat, fundi fugarique possit: in eo autem victoriam verti, ut ordines servantur, nec acies rumpatur.

Regem in conflictu (quod experientia testatur) imperturbatum, nec minus præsentis animo esse, quam si sit in convivio: periculum omne, ubi opus sit, contemnere: à metu, qui oculos excæcet, & animum deiciat, prorsus liberum esse: milites autem ipsius ita exercitatos, ut licet ordines ipsorum turbentur, eos mox restituere, & in locum suum redire possint: quod eo facilius sit, quia tertius fere pars exercitus ex præfectis & ducibus constet: quod sit robur exercitus.


Denique summopere sibi placuisse dicebat, *sed singulis diebus, præter exactam disciplinam, præter certis horis per tota castra his devote habebantur, & Deus rogetur, ut ipsis victoriam largiatur, multo diligentius monito, felices successus à Deo persequi* \*\*\*\*\*

Cum igitur tam fortes atque animosos se [Sueci milites] præbeant, Germanos & Scotos ipsorum exemplo excitari, ut mori malint quam aliquo delicto commissio honoris sui iacturam facere, aut ab aliis in officio faciendo superari. Regem autem ex hac æmulatione multum emolumentum capere: quam ita fovere & moderari norit, ne gens una alteram odio prosequatur, sed unaquaque silem & virtutem suam Regi probet.

\* Folard seems to have received his idea of the brigade from traditional accounts; for *that*, which is substituted by him, carries little or no resemblance to lord Rea's actual delineation, nor to the alteration of it into *one half, or thereabouts*, [See Plans II. Vol. I. p. 390.] as his majesty on certain occasions might be induced to practise; but *it* bears more than a small similitude to the king's division of *one* brigade into *four*; each of which *fourths* was denominated a *bataglia*, [See the same plate, annex N°. III. and IV. *ibid.*] but sure we are, that *these bataglias* could not be strong enough for the central parts in the engagement at Lützen, and therefore Folard's ichnographical representation must be defective.


It is probable the king used the *half brigade* in this day's service, for we have certain proofs he *did so* in the battle of Leipzig, since Dankwart assures us, that each corps consisted of 1200 men; and the half-brigade (or more properly the *improved brigade* of the *second size* N°. II.) contained, according to our computation, 1224 men.





H.W. delin

- A Swedish Army .
- B Imperial Army .
- C The King's Post .
- D Wahlstein's .
- E Duke Bernards .
- F Coloreds .



H.W. delin

- A Swedish Army
- B Imperial Army
- C The Army of
- D Walden
- E Duke Bernard
- F Walden

BATTLE  
of  
LUTZEN.

- G Walden
- H The Flanagan
- I High Road
- J Walden's house
- K Walden's great masses of Infantry

A.W. sculp.



And here, in addition to what hath been formerly said, it may 1632. be worth remarking, that the glory of this day's service must be attributed solely to the column of Gustavus, which, in truth, according to the opinion of several excellent judges, exceedeth all field dispositions, not only in fair campaign, but also in rough and contracted ground; so that some writers, without assuming the gift of prophecy, have ventured to predict, that posterity one time or other will adopt this idea and support it with earnestness. Let us only therefore compare the column in question with those two military dispositions, which most resemble it. It exceedeth the old Burgundian square of Walstein, not only in simplicity, velocity, and diversity of motion, but because its angles are, strictly speaking, unassailable, giving the adversary neither hold nor entrance in whatever form he proposes to attack them. And again, this very quadrangular mass of Walstein, (the properest configuration extant, whereby to oppose the column of Gustavus, except another column conformable to that prince's arrangement) surpasses that refinement upon him, which the moderns have furnished the *hollow square*, whose corners are still weaker than those of the other, and its impression or resistance less violent. But the brigade or column of Gustavus is solid upon all occasions, and versatile in every respect; its fire, without talking figuratively, may be stiled perpetual, and 'tis capable of being diversified upon every new occurrence *ad infinitum*: It can contract itself in danger, or dilate in the moment of success with equal ease; and as in the disparting of solid bodies, (if one may draw a comparison from humbler subjects) more wedges than one, of sizes different, are supposed to be necessary; thus an individual column *pro re nata*, in a single instant, can divide itself into a couple of columns differing in no respects from the parent, which gave them birth, except in the circumstances of weight and magnitude.

men. So that this brigade, N° II. was not properly *half* in such proportion as the battaglia was a *fourth*; for the numbers stood thus:

Original brigade	—	—	2016
Half, or reformed	—	—	1224
Battaglia	—	—	504

1632. It hath been asked by many, how this great tactical invention took its flight from the world *at once* after the death of Gustavus? To which question it may suffice to reply, that it expired by *swift degrees*, but not *instantaneously*. For the Swedish general Knipphausen fought and conquered upon the principle of columns at the battle of Oldendorp in 1633, and five campaigns afterwards the victory of Wittenweyr, where duke Bernard commanded, and Turenne and Guébriant served under him, was obtained by imitating the self same practice \*.

But to return from this digression, which perhaps may obtain the reader's pardon:—about nine in the morning the king drew his sword, and placed himself at the head of the right wing, attended by the duke of Sax-Lauenberg, Crailsham the grand master of his household, a body of English and Scottish gentlemen, (whom he had *reformed* at Schlenfing, and destined to be a sort of aids-de-camp) and some few domestics and grooms. But as Walstein had outspread him on that side in the mighty front, which he extended, his majesty was obliged to call in for assistance from the line of cavalry, which was posted behind him †, and when Knipphausen missed these troops from their station, and begged by message to know what was become of them, the king returned him back word by the duke of Sax-Lauenberg, that after one charge, he should find them at his service in their old position.

By this time the cannonading began to grow extremely violent; for Walstein's artillery, though not great in quantity, was exceedingly heavy, and being well arranged on proper batteries, made uncommon slaughter amongst the Swedish soldiers. This sharpened the king to bring on a general engagement as speedily as possible, having nothing with him but field-pieces, and small portable cannons. His whole army had the ditches to cross, which were well lined with musqueteers, and had been rendered by Walstein five feet deep, which incommoded the cavalry most especially; yet this important obstacle

\* Merian, Theatr. Europæum. Tom. II. † Namely N<sup>o</sup>. 19. 21. 22. commanded by Bulach.



was at length surmounted, and the commanded musqueteers, in conjunction with a Swedish brigade, cleared the whole high road, and then the conflict began in all its forms. Nevertheless, the four Swedish brigades of the first line, the finest body of infantry then in the world, found the crossing of the ditches so extremely hazardous and perplexing, that their ardor relented after an essay of some minutes, and they seemed to pause. His majesty, who was posted at some inconsiderable distance from the centre, not perceiving them to advance in such proportion as the troops he conducted, flew to them in an instant, and dismounting, snatched a partizan from one of the officers, in order to lead them himself across the obstacle : *If*, said he, with a tone of severity as he marched along, *after having passed so many rivers, scaled numberless fortresses, and fought various battles, your antient intrepidity hath at once deserted you, stand firm at least some minutes longer, and have the curiosity to see your master expire as he ought.* Upon this the soldiers all cried out, *Stop, Sire, for the sake of heaven ; spare that invaluable life of yours ; distrust us not ; the business shall be completed\*.*

Mean while Gustavus returning to the head of the right-wing, soon out-stripped the diligence of his keenest associates ; for making his horse spring cross the ditch, his companions thought themselves obliged to follow him chearfully. Having cast a glance over the Imperial wing, that opposed him, and perceiving there three single masses of Imperial cuirassiers, cloathed in iron, and Isolani's Croatian cavalry, which terminated the first line, he called colonel Stalhaus to him, an officer of great repute, though he had been originally only a footman : *Stalhaus*, said he, *charge me those black fellows soundly, for they are the men, that will*

\* Theatr. Europ. fol. 747, &c. He, that describeth a battle without well considering the ground, and having a distinct plan before his eyes (both which advantages we have the good fortune to boast) will commit errors upon errors, *ad infinitum*. Du Prade says, the king made this speech to the regiments of *La Tour* [Thurn] and *Chrestoph* ; but unfortunately for

the French historiographer, Gustavus never had such a regiment as the latter in his service. Riccio makes the reprimand address to the corps of Thurn and Anhalt (N<sup>o</sup> 28. 32.) Now these troops were placed in the rear of the centre and left-wing, nor were they moved from their station till some hours after the death of Gustavus.

1632. *undo us* \* : *as to the Croats, I mind them not.* Others, with less authority, diversify the expressions: *they are the men*, IT IS PROPHESED, *will undo us.* Stalhaus executed the royal orders with great alacrity, but the irregular cavalry, according to custom, changed their station, and attacked the baggage waggons, putting all at first into such confusion, that the king's own coach ran away in the universal disorder. And thus Bulach, whose three divisions Gustavus had commanded from Kniphausen's second line, was obliged to attend these desultory combatants, and afforded no other assistance to the first and grand impression, which his master undertook to make. Soon after, namely, about eleven a clock in the morning, the king received the stroke of death; and immediately a mist arose, which (though the day promised to be brighter than usually appears in the month of November) obscured the sky on a sudden to such a degree, that the soldiers could hardly discover their companions at twenty feet distance. But we will pass by the unpleasing event of his majesty's death for a few moments, and pursue the various changes and circumstances of the battle, which was gained upon the king's principles of arrangement; although the great Gustavus was then no more!

As the duke of Sax-Lauenberg immediately left the field, and conveyed himself to Weissenfels, supposing (as his friends gave out) that the day was lost irrecoverably; the first intelligence duke Bernard received of his master's death, was the discovery of his horse, which being wounded in the shoulder, galloped up and down the line of battle. The duke immediately imparted this fatal news to Kniphausen, and they both agreed in an instant, (from that presence of mind peculiar to great men) to spread a report, that the king of Sweden was taken prisoner, which soon produced the desired effect; for the army thenceforwards fought like enraged lions † in order to recover their leader's body; or,

\* These were Marazini's cuirassiers, &c. which former boasted the honour of having killed the king; yet it is probable, that he fell by the hands of Piccolomini's cavalry, and there-

fore Wallstein made him that extraordinary present, which we have mentioned elsewhere.

† Loccen. Hist. Suec. lib. viii. c. 4. Pietro Pomo; Guerre di Germ. 4° 128.



as Scheffer informs us \* with stronger probability, every man had an ambition to expire the same day with his royal leader. 1632.

The mist, which arose about the time the king fell, proved no ways inconvenient to the right wing, where his majesty commanded; for the Imperialists at that period had rather the advantage: but Stalhaus, to whom the command then devolved, made use of the incident, to re-instate and new-dispose his forces, and making a fresh desperate charge, recovered the royal body of his sovereign master.

At this very period the Swedish generals led on their troops to a second conflict. And here it was, that the four central brigades in front performed wonders, as hath been acknowledged even by the Imperialists themselves; for they drove their enemies to the foot of the gallows, and almost totally ruined that large invincible mass of troops, that belonged to Piccolomini. And here it was that the two regiments of elder Bruner and young Walstein made a resistance so very obstinate and unparalleled, that the Imperial generalissimo, when he retreated into Bohemia, adopted the residue of them for his own guards, round the palace of Prague, and cloathed, payed, and nourished them at his own expence.

The Swedes moreover took several standards †, and seized a battery consisting of seven large pieces of cannon, that was planted before this body of troops; which in truth was effected the more easily, as Walstein's powder-waggons in that quarter had by some accident taken fire a few minutes before. This sharp contest lasted near an hour, and, to render matters still more disagreeable to the Austrian commander, a body of 1000 German cavalry conceived a panic terror, without any assignable reason during the action, and consulted their safety in such a manner, as never more to return during that day's service. All they said was, (for an English officer, then a prisoner, was hurried away with them in the tumult;) *We know the king of Sweden very well; he always shines towards the conclusion of a battle.*

\* Memorab. Suec. Gent. 181.

† Merc. Franç. Tom. xviii. 735.

1632. And now after a short intermission, the count de Pappenheim arrived, and so highly was that officer esteemed by all parties, that notwithstanding the confusion and tumult of the late engagement, a report passed from mouth to mouth through either army, that Pappenheim was come at the head of his cavalry, and invincible infantry. Yet this rumour was not strictly true, for when Walstein's message found him at Halle, his foot-soldiers had dispersed themselves round that town and Merzburg in quest of plunder; so that he had time only to march his cuirassiers and dragoons \*, which amounted, it is probable, to about 6 or 7000 combatants. He had a post preserved for him, which he always affected, and that was the wing, which opposed Gustavus. Of this he assumed the command in an instant; but whilst he was making some fresh dispositions at the head of the line, he received a stroke from a falcon-shot. Nevertheless, as soon as the ball had reached him (the wound being given in his thigh) upon recovering his senses, he spoke cheerfully to his men, though he well-knew he had received a blow from the hand of death. A coach conveyed him out of the battle, and his chaplain, whom he had sent for, attended him therein. As he passed through the ranks, he called a particular officer to him: *Sir*, said he, *tell Walstein*, (giving him no title of highness, excellency, general, &c.) *That what I have received is enough for my purpose; but tell him too, that I have preserved the catholic religion, and made the emperor a free man †*: (for he knew at that time Gustavus was dead.) He then faced death with the same tranquillity in his bed, as he had done on innumerable occasions in the field of battle: for this brave and prudent commander, as if he had determined to rival Gustavus in every-thing, was the most moral and religious person in the Imperial army ‡. He was born the same year with Gustavus, and exceeded him in age only six months and a few days. It is remarkable, that he had triumphed over his enemies in forty-four battles and rencounters, but lived not to receive the order of the Golden Fleece, which had been promised him the pre-

\* Helvici Hist. lib. xxi. p. 231.

† Idem. 438.

‡ Riccius de Bello Germ. 437.



ceding autumn \*. The chamber in which he expired is still shewn at 1632.  
Leipfic with great respect †. It is a little mean apartment in the castle  
of Pleiffenberg.

Yet the name of Pappenheim, his death being generally unknown, was sufficient to revive the ardor of the Imperial combatants ; nor were the succours he brought, as his troops were the best seasoned of all that served under the ensigns of the league, considered by any man as a contemptible re-inforcement.

And now began a third engagement of two hours duration ; for new life was infused into the Imperial army upon the return of Pappenheim's forces. On that general's leaving the field, Holk resumed the command of the left-wing, and Stalhaus, it is conjectured, replaced Gustavus. They engaged each other with various fortune, but the combat was attended with no one decisive event.

Mean while Piccolomini, Tertsky, and others led on the Imperial centre to the charge, consisting of four great square masses of infantry, each consisting of 3000 men, or thereabouts, and flanked by two regiments of cuirassiers, all which troops seconded their leaders with extremity of resolution. Here Piccolomini was twice or thrice shot, yet never left the scene of action. The wreck fell extremely heavy on the four Swedish brigades, that confronted them ‡, the flower and glory of the royal army ; so that excepting the right-hand brigade, commanded by Charles Hart, which the Smoland cavalry protected, and the left-hand brigade, which received shelter from duke Bernard's horse, the two middlemost had five persons out of six killed or disabled ||. It was remarked

\* Relat. Espagnol de la Bataille de Lützen, Printed at Lisbon 1633. 4°.

† Di questa morte, frà le morti riputata felicissima da soldati, finì la vita nel fiore dell' età, et delle sue glorie Goffredo di Pappenheim, ornato delle più excelse dote, ch' illustrassero giamai capitano di fama ; in vita dopò Gustavo Re di Suecia, primo guerrier de suoi tempi ; e nella morte, stimata solo, dal sentimento comune de gl' huomini, condegna à bilanciare la perdita d'un tanto Re. [*Pietro Poma ; Guerre di Germ. Liber. iv. 126.*] When we mentioned

this officer to have received six or seven wounds, according to custom, at the action of Leipfic, vol. i. 416, we ought to have subjoined to the same paragraph, that he received about the like number of wounds at the battle of Prague, and lay for a considerable time undistinguished amongst the slain.

‡ N<sup>o</sup> 8, 9, 10, 11.

|| The blue brigade (Winkle's) had served under Charles IX. the king's father. Relat. Espagnol.

1632. by the assailants, that this veteran body of infantry covered the ground, when prostrate, in the same proportions as they occupied it living. In a word, the present rude and desperate encounter carried no good aspect to the Swedish cause; for the battery before taken was now regained, and eight standards lost, one of which belonged to the king's own company of royal guards. But Knipphausen, who commanded the rear of the centre, (an officer of unparalleled coolness and foresight) soon re-instated affairs by dispatching to the relief of his associates the two regiments of Thurn and Mitzval\*, and four considerable bodies of horse; namely, the prince of Anhalt's, Lowenstein's, Brandstein's, and Steinboch's †, which latter (consisting of dragoons) was a favourite corps in the estimation of their late master. This judicious re-inforcement soon restored the fortunes of the day; so that the Swedes re-took the battery lately spoken of, and another on the left-hand thereof, which contained four pieces of large artillery.

Duke Bernard in the left-wing had a piece of service to encounter with equally desperate; for the enormous battery of all, near the wind-mills, lay full in his front; and the road and ditch being nearer the enemy, rendered all approaches more difficult to him than the rest of the army. He had once conceived an idea of setting fire to Lützen, which Walstein had partly effected the same morning, and attacking the Croats at the extremity of the Imperial wing, in their flank; but for certain good reasons, as the enemy could have lined the town-walls with fresh supplies of musqueteers, he forbore to put the conception into execution. Nevertheless, in the space of two hours he led his troops on to the charge twelve several times, whilst Colorado, who commanded against him, being protected by a numerous train of artillery, which it was prudent in him upon no advantage to remove himself from, allowed the young and valiant hero, already wounded in the right-arm, to waste his strength against such extraordinary difficulties in what proportions he pleased; and in one of these attacks thundered

\* N° 38, 39. This Mitzval was a brother to the colonel, whom Gustavus beheaded in Bavaria.

† N° 35, 33, 31, 29.



against the duke with such amazing violence, that the prince thought it 1632.  
not an unfoldier-like action to shelter himself for a few moments under the miller's house marked L. Mean while Kniphausen kept the rear line composed and in excellent order, dispatching his little assistances to all places where they could be deemed needful. By this time the mist cleared off, and as all parties seemed desirous to know the fate of their companions, a kind of pause or breathing-space ensued, in the common nature of things, by a tacit desire on every side.

Upon this duke Bernard galloped up and down the lines of battle, in order to contemplate the countenance and situation of his fellow-soldiers: he soon perceived the greater part of the army to be strangely shattered, but rejoiced at the same time to behold, that Kniphausen had preserved the rear of the centre, and the reserve, in excellent order. They agreed in a moment to renew the combat. At the same time Walstein taking advantage of the clearness of the day, dispatched Piccolomini and Tertzky to observe the Swedes, who brought him back word, that they were new-forming themselves and returning to a fourth engagement. It was in this onset, that the royal army brought ten of their own field-pieces to act against the wind-mill battery, and the eleven cannons, which they had taken from the Imperialists; for the stress of the action by universal consent lay now near the town of Lützen, whose adjacent walls being lined with musqueteers, sorely galled the advancing Swedes. Here Walstein received a slight stroke from a musquet-ball, that had consumed its force, and duke Bernard and Colorado engaged till evening with a fury and obstinacy, that can hardly be described; pausing from and resuming the combat, like fatigued duellers. The fortune of the day began now to incline manifestly to the Swedish side, which acknowledged its success to be partly due to the intermingled musqueteers\*, but the fog (not unfavourably for the Imperialists) obscured the skies a second time, so that duke Bernard could not help crying out, *Gracious God! had it not been for this darkness, I had completed the affair!*

\* Chemnitz, Tom, i. 375.

1632. And now a rumour passed through either army with the rapidity of lightening, that Pappenheim's infantry was at length arrived, which, though the report proved afterwards false, might have dismayed any troops, except the Swedish ones. But the attack was still continued with great violence near the wind-mills : at length duke Bernard having rallied his cavalry, and being seconded by Kniphausen with four fresh regiments of infantry, the Imperial army was reduced to the last extremity ; and night put an end to the desperate day's service on the plains of Lützen.

Yet the Swedes, if we consider the confusion the mists had created, were no ways certain, that the battle was concluded. Duke Bernard and Kniphausen held a consultation, whether they should retire to Weissenfels or not ; at length they determined heroically, upon supposition they found the attempt barely practicable, to preserve the spot of ground they had gloriously maintained ; for they were not absolutely sure they had acquired the victory. In this interval Walstein founded a retreat, whose meaning the Swedes happened not to comprehend : but an Imperial horseman, who had orders to command Hoskirk's regiment to follow the generalissimo to Leipzig, fell by chance upon colonel Ohem's regiment of cavalry, which made in the day-time the final reserve of the army, and having kept free from action, was appointed the advanced guard at night. The cavalier being asked whom he wanted, replied naturally Hoskirk's regiment : here it is, adjoined the centinel, and conducted him immediately to his own commander.——And then it was the Swedish generals comprehended, for the first time, the great advantages they had obtained. The soldiers, without any refreshment, slept all night on the hard ground ; and a severe frost, which ensued before morning, happened to kill many of the wounded, that might otherwise have survived.

The battle lasted about nine hours. The Imperialists lost 7000 men, and the Swedes between 2 and 3000 : many more might have been destroyed by the latter, but there was *no pursuit*, which night prevented. It is the pursuit, which gives the fatal stroke in a great victory ; and therefore it may be worth while to remark here incidentally, that the Saxons,



Saxons, who fled from the plains of Leipzig, lost doubly more men than the Swedes, who remained and fought valorously many hours afterwards till the close of the evening.

Amongst the killed on one side was the king of Sweden, whom the Imperialists pronounced the bravest enemy, and the best general in Christendom \*: the counts Nils and Weissenburg, colonel Gerfsdorf, serjeant-

\* It may be worth while here, once for all, to give mankind the idea, which the more bigotted papists entertained of Gustavus, towards whom he ever comported himself with all imaginable courtesy and moderation. True it is, he disliked the Jesuits, and usually expressed himself with warmth on their intriguing, mischievous interferences, and relaxed morality. They, on the other hand, as the ministry in England furnished him the *dragoon-king*, always bestowed on him the denomination of *genuine anti-christ*.

“Acie cecidit Gustavus, inter nostræ memoriæ duces facile primus, nisi magis pugnax quam regem deceret. — Militaris disciplinæ peritia, bellicaque virtute nemo potuit cum eo componi. Erga etiam gregarios milites facilis regium supercilium demisit: quo fiebat, ut esset acceptissimus militum animis, quamvis eos a furtis & stupris poenis durioribus coaceret.

“Exercitus suos severissima disciplina continuit: cultus ei corporis nihil a vulgari abhorrens; vestes nullo auro distinctæ, aut aureis amentis insignes: nihil in amictu pretiosum nitebat. — *In suæ superstitionis impietate piissimus; summaque ei atque exacta suorum sacrorum cura, cum eos ritus, quibus a rudibus annis imbutus fuerat, exquisita religione servaret.*

“Me sane eorum miseret, qui parentum erroribus erudiuntur, & falsis hæreticorum placitis instituti, vanis religionibus, in quibus nati educatique sunt, tenacissime hæreant. Rex tamen nunquam catholicam religionem contempsit, immo maximum honorem pluribus religiosorum hominum familiis habuit: præcipue patrum Capuchinorum ætas rigidæque vitæ rationes obstupuit; de quibus

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“dicere consueverat, eos patres esse validissimum catholicæ veritatis argumentum.” —

“Fuit assentationis insensibilis hostis; nam et suos duces non ita pridem, antequam acie caderet, acribus verbis accepit, quod *pro virtuti felicitatique victoriarum laudes, non Deo tribuerent*: et sane si rerum gestarum magnitudinem, expeditionumque fortunatos eventus atque exitus intuemur, nullus Rex multis ab hinc sæculis eo felicior censeretur potest: cum veluti fulmen totam Germaniæ latitudinem a Baltico mari usque ad Carnicas rupes cuncta belli terrore evertens exiguo tempore emensus, centum & triginta urbes aut bello domuit, erit, aut in fidem & deditionem acceperit.”

*Riccias de Bellis German. 4° 433, 434.*

——“Prodotto dalla natura per vivamente rappresentar al mondo l' unica e perfetta idea d' un gran prencipe; possedeva, quasi mostro delle militari perfetioni, cumulatamente tutte le più eccelle parti, che si richiedono ad illustrare un gran capitano: la giustizia e la clemenza erano unite in lui con tempra sì forte, che mai nell' attioni sue si videro scompagnate: ne vi fù mai prencipe, ch' adun' istesso tempore, meglio di lui sapesse farsi da sudditi amare e temere; parve mentr' egli visse, suenar se medesima la fortuna, per riempier lui solo di trionfi, e di gloria, e nascondendo à bell' arte i preggi proprii, voler, che solo al valore di lui s' attribuissero gl' esiti dell' imprese felice; in tutte le fattionè del comandare, e del combattere, esemplare non meno à soldati che à capitani; epilogo in somma dell' arti tutte del dominare, e nella pace e nella guerra; visse ne' suoi riti religioso osservator delle più esquisite virtù morali; nè i buoni v' ebbero altro à

X x

“desiderare

1632. serjeant-major-general Uslar, Ernest prince of Anhalt, count Thurn, and colonel Wildefflein.

Amongst the slain on the other side may be reckoned the illustrious Pappenheim, the prince and abbot of Fulda \*, count Bertholt Walstein, serjeant-major-general Breuner, six colonels, and a prince of Ditrichstein.

The Imperialists lost only twenty-one pieces of artillery ; for Walstein, who little expected the king should attack him, was not greatly provided ; it being his firm opinion, till convinced by ocular proof to the contrary, that Gustavus would not attempt to act decisively before the Saxon and Luncenberg armies had formed their junction with him. So that this general, if I remember right, had but twenty-seven large cannons in all ; though some writers add ten pieces more. Now such a collection may be considered as a kind of defect in point of military precaution, forasmuch as it was in his power to have procured a larger store ;——and under this article we may blame him likewise for the loose and dispersed cantonment of all his forces, many of whom marched the whole night, and were half fatigued when they faced their opponents the ensuing morning †. He is censured moreover for making his appearance in a sedan-chair, and rarely, if ever, exposing his per-

“ desiderare in lui, che un vero lume di fede.  
 “ Il livore e l' invidia vi trovarono di più da  
 “ notare in lui una subita colera e un ardir  
 “ soverchio : ma quella, corretta d'un imme-  
 “ diata dolcezza, e affabilità naturale, conci-  
 “ liava in altrui più, che odio, o timore, amore,  
 “ e riverenza. Questo difetto ordinario dell'  
 “ anime grandi, che non capendo nell' an-  
 “ gustia d'un cuor humano, sgorga, e prorompe  
 “ nel desiderabile della gloria, senz' avvertire  
 “ all' orribile, che lo minaccia ; era à  
 “ ciascheduno, che lo mirava riguardevole per  
 “ la grandezza del corpo e vié più venerabile  
 “ per la venustà della faccia, in cui manifesto  
 “ scorgevasi quel raggio di Maestà, che d'ordi-  
 “ nario imprime Dio nella fronte di quelli, che  
 “ costituisce dominatori di qualche gran parte  
 “ dell' universo.” *Pietro Poma, Guerre di*  
*Germania*, 4.<sup>o</sup> libr. iv. 128, 129.

\* John Bernard Schenk, prince and abbot, chosen March 12, 1623. Curiosity led him to the battle. A cannon-ball struck him as he contemplated the action from one of the wind-mills. (*Le Barre ; Hist. D'Allemagne. Theatr. Europ. Tom. ii. 749.*) This prelate had a title to the same motto, which his late neighbour the bishop of Wurtzburg and Bamberg assumed in the beginning of the Bohemian wars 1618, who being obliged to furnish to the Imperial army a large contingent, as duke of Franconia, affixed this device to his standards : *Una manu gladium, altera Breviarium* ; nor would the self-same lemma twenty-five years afterwards have proved remarkably improper for Bernard van Galen bishop of Münster.

† Chemnitz, Tom 373.



son in such trying emergencies, as we have here recited. But Piccolomini 1632.  
made ample amends for the shyness of his generalissimo; for though he had three horses killed under him, and received ten wounds, yet he stayed till the last man on the field of battle \*. It may suffice to add, that Walstein retreated precipitately without a pursuer from Leipzig to Prague, and there held a severe court-martial, which might be considered as a forensic campaign. For most of his officers died gallantly; and a young colonel, whose scaffold was erected under our chieftain's window, began his speech in the following manner: *Gentlemen, I present myself here to die; and upon what occasion? For running away with my generalissimo.*—But Walstein, who affected to be extravagant in all things, was alike extraordinary in rewards and in punishments; for he gave many of his officers gold chains, adorned with diamonds (to which a medal of himself was affixed) that amounted each to the value of 500 l.—He presented Piccolomini with a large sum (namely 1600 l.) as we have mentioned formerly †; and when the king of Denmark reclaimed Holk (whose subject he was) under pain of confiscating his little possessions, he gave him his choice of four Bohemian signories, which contained each of them sixteen or eighteen dorps ‡ and villages.

And here it may be proper to say something more diffusely concerning the death of Gustavus, who fought sword in hand at the head of the Smoland cavalry, which closed the right-flank of the centre, and, perhaps, in his ardour out-stripped the brigades, which composed the main body, and whose business it was to advance upon the same line with himself. As his majesty's eye-sight was not the most perfect, and forasmuch as a mist began gently to obscure the sky, it is most probable to imagine ||, that, attended only by his own followers and servants, and the squadron commanded by him, he had a violent desire to conten-

\* Ottavio Piccolomini, descended from one of the best families in Sienna; created afterwards duke of Amalfi. The more curious may peruse his life at large in a quarto, entitled, *Scelta di Azioni egregie da generali e da Soldati Italiani dall' anno 1600 sino al 1700.* Venet. 1742.

† Pag. 14. ‡, vol. ii.

‡ I have perhaps made too free with this word, to which my ears were habituated by finding it occur so often in the Scottish and English accounts relative to Gustavus about the year 1632, and therefore it may be proper to apprise the reader, that it signifies an *hamlet*.

|| *Memoirs communicated.* Theatr. Europ. Tom. ii, fol. 742. Caraffa, lib. iii. 402.

1632. plate the centre of the Imperial army, towards which his own invincible brigades were now advancing, and on whose bravery and firmness he principally grounded the future success of the day's service. It is natural, I say, to conclude, that the king lost his life in some digression like this, being prompted on by an high spirit of impatience and curiosity; for most accounts agree, that he fell by the hands of Piccolomini's cuirassiers, whom some arrange in the first line of the Imperial left wing opposite the letter C, and others place it in the very central point behind letter B: but the confusion and difficulties under each of those articles are so perplexing and entangling, that I have sometimes been induced to think, that Piccolomini was a colonel both of infantry and cavalry, and that two regiments of course derived their names from him;—(that sort of honour and encouragement being not unfrequent in the Swedish service;—) where duke Bernard had a couple of regiments, a substitute-colonel being appointed; and so had Teüffel, Kniphausen, Falkenberg, and others\*.

Here therefore, that is, in the front of the troops first described, or (which is more probable) in the interval between them and the adjoining mass of infantry, Gustavus received a ball in his left-arm †, which at first he either felt not, or disregarded, still keeping foremost, and cutting and flashing with great intrepidity; yet the soldiers perceived their leader to be wounded, long before he spoke to that effect, and expressed their affliction and consternation: *Courage, my comrades*, replied he, *the affair is nothing: let us resume our point, and return to the charge* ‡. One of the equerries cried out likewise, that his majesty was wounded, for which the king reproved him harshly ||. At length perceiving his voice and strength to fail him, and fearing to dismay his brave associates, he whispered the duke of Sax-Lauenberg to this purport: *Cousin §, I perceive myself to be grievously wounded: convey me hence to some place of*

\* Arma Suecica, p. 73.

† Another account says, that he received two pistol-shots. *Memoires communicated.*

‡ Merc. Franc. Tom. xviii. p. 734.

|| *Memoires de Santa Cruz*, Tom. v. 3.

§ This compellation was not purely an expression of regal courtesy, for the wife of Gusta-

vus Vasa, and grandmother of Gustavus Adolphus, was a princess of Sax-Lauenberg; and our king's father's sister married Magnus III. duke of Sax-Lauenberg, who was brother to the father of Francis Albert, concerning whom we are now speaking. *Mem. Communicat.*



*safety* \*. In that instant, as the king's followers were preparing to retreat, an Imperial cavalier advanced unobserved in this momentary confusion of turning, and having cried out, *Long have I sought thee* †, transpierced his majesty with a pistol-ball through the body; but he lived not to glory in this inhumanity; for the master of the horse to the duke of Sax-Lauenberg shot him dead with the words recent on his lips. Upon this Piccolomini's cuirassiers gave the king's companions a most desperate attack. His majesty was for some moments held upon his saddle, but the horse being at that very instant shot in the shoulder, made a desperate plunge, and flung the rider to the earth. His few personal attendants stayed with him; but the troops, that accompanied him, were soon dispersed. One of the gentlemen of the bed-chamber, who lay likewise on the ground, cried out aloud, in order to save his master's life, that he was the king of Sweden. Upon which an Imperial cuirassier, who had alighted to strip the bodies, ran him through with his sword: Gustavus afterwards being asked, who he was, replied boldly, *I am the king of Sweden, and seal with my blood the protestant religion, and the liberties of Germany*: adding likewise, *Alas my poor queen! Alas my poor queen!* The Imperialists gave him five dreadful and inhuman wounds; and though one shot him through the head, he had strength to pronounce, *My God, my God!* His body was stripped in an instant (the shirt excepted) for every enemy was desirous to possess some spoil, that belonged to him. His buff-waistcoat was consigned to the arsenal at Vienna ‡, but fell first into Piccolomini's hands ||. A common soldier seized that magical sword §, concerning which the German professors have published more dissertations than one; and Holk obtained by purchase the possession of his ring and spurs. One Schneberg, a lieutenant in Goetz's cavalry, seized his gold chain, which

\* Santa Cruz. *ibid.*

† We have at length discovered, that this person was one *Maurice Falkenberg*, a lieutenant of cavalry in Goetz's regiment. He knew the king, having been lately his prisoner, and received many courtesies from him on account of his surname or kindred: for if the reader remembers, there was a baron *Falkenberg*, a German

born, who bravely defended Magdeburg against Tilly. *Memoirs Communicated. Vide Monumenta Paderbornensia*, 216.

‡ Patin. *Relat. Hist.* p. 11.

|| Burgi *Mars Sueco-Germ.* p. 230. 12°.

§ *Relat. Espagnol. de la bataille de Lützen.* imprimée a Lisbon. 1633. 4°.

1632. is still preserved in the Schneberg family ; namely, at the time the *Monumenta Paderbornensia* were made public \*.

Having mentioned this work, we must beg leave to remark transiently, that it was composed by Ferdinand de Furstenberg bishop of Paderborn : and as the present part is purely digressional, it may be wondered, why this person was so extremely anxious to make such minute enquiries concerning the authors of the king's death ? But his own words under this article shall solve the difficulty ; for the good prelate had a mind, that the natives of his diocese should claim the honour of destroying antichrist :

*Placuit hoc recens Paderbonensium militum facinus, dum vetera monumenta perconsuemus, hic subnectere.*——NE QUI ALII, UT POST VICTORIAM IGNAVI ETIAM GLORIANTUR, HANC SIBI LAUDEM PRAECERPANT. Nevertheless it may be worth while to remark here, that though Schneberg took the chain ; yet from the period in question to the present moment, we know nothing concerning a famous *Turquoise* enchased therein, and hanging at the bottom thereof, of size and beauty extraordinary, and belonging from time immemorial to the crown of Sweden. *Cyano*s (saith a most veracious and candid historian ‡,) *quam aurea catenula appensam collo gestabat, singularis magnitudinis gemma, atque antiquum Sueciæ regum munus, nusquam inventa est, quamvis rex omnino spoliatus in campo deinceps repertus sit.* Now that this remarkable stone should never make its appearance since in Europe is a difficulty hard to be accounted for ; since Schneberg might have shewn the *Turquoise* in the same manner he produced the *chain*.

Mean while, one Innocentio Bucela, *camerado* (as the language then ran) to colonel Piccolomini, informed his friend, that the king of Sweden, whom he well knew, lay naked and dead hard by them. Piccolomini flew immediately to the place mentioned, accom-

\* Anno 1669. In Heristallo Saxon. p. 216. et seqq. See more in *Struve*, under the article of Ferdinand II. § 39.

‡ Burgi Mars Sueco-Germanicus, p. 230.

It was of the true oriental sort, which comes out of the *old rock* in the mountains of Piruskua about eighty miles from the town of Moscheda. *Memoirs communicated.*



panied only by ten cavaliers, and found Gustavus in his last convulsive agonies. He proposed that moment to have carried off the deceased, but Stalhaus charged with such fury, that the Imperialists were obliged to relinquish their prize; and, what may be worth remarking, the king's two faithful grooms, though mortally wounded, had thrown themselves over their master's body \*.

Many have supposed Francis Albert, duke of Sax-Lauenberg, (concerning whom we have spoken amply in various places, in order to elucidate what hereafter may follow) to have had some hand in the king's death, not by open force and an act of murder, but by concealed indications agreed on betwixt him and the Imperial party.—It is not our custom to disturb the ashes of an illustrious personage, merely because he belonged to another nation, and hath slept in tranquillity more than a century.—That there is a probability existing to this prince's disfavour, must ever be allowed; but truly cogent and irresistible proofs, I think, there are none. The reader shall peruse candidly and impartially, the whole that we know †.

This officer, who was four years younger than Gustavus, had served in Italy, as a colonel, under Aldringer and Gallas, in the Mantuan war. And by the account, which Sirot gives of him in that campaign, was a person of a very high and impetuous temper. Upon some disgust, (whether real or fictitious we will not take upon us to pronounce) he demanded his dismissal from the court of Vienna, and made a tender of his services to the king of Sweden. After the battle of Lützen, being looked upon with eyes of coldness by the royal army, he repaired first to the Saxon, and then a second time to the Imperial standards, and took a fresh commission under Wallstein; passed between him and duke Bernard, in the supposed conspiracy, and was committed to prison upon the assassination of the Austrian generalissimo. We find him afterwards one of the chamberlains extraordinary to the emperor. Being taken

\* Le Barre; Hist. d'Allemagne, Theatr. Europ. Tom. ii. 749.

† The author expected considerable helps

from professor Menke's Dissertation *de dubio Gust. Adolphi mortis genere*; but on perusing that piece, found himself to be greatly disappointed.

1632. prisoner at the battle of Sweidnitz, (for then he had been restored a second time to favour, and declared commander in chief of that town and district) he was protected generously by Torstenson from the resentment of the Swedish soldiers, and died, partly by his wounds, and partly with vexation, in a few days after the engagement\*.

Some say he bore a mortal hatred to the king of Sweden, forasmuch as that prince had once given a blow to one of his brothers, who made a visit to Stockholm, about the period when Gustavus first arrived to the throne. The narrative runs to this effect: That at a certain lady's house, (whom each prince had an esteem for) the king, having lost all the money he carried with him, desired the mistress of the mansion to lend him a part of her winnings; which she declined, by saying, it was beneath the dignity of a monarch to borrow from a poor subject. In the course of the evening the duke of Sax-Lauenberg became a bankrupt also, and then the lady of the house made him a tender of her purse, without being solicited; adding, in terms of courtesy and politeness, "Sir, the king my master has money at hand, and in  
" great abundance; but you are a stranger, far removed from home,  
" and must of course depend on the chance of remittances." Upon this Gustavus took fire, and making some sharp expostulations, (the duke interfering in behalf of his patroness) gave the blow we lately mentioned. This story, it must be confessed, reads no ways amiss, when delivered from the pen of an Italian novelist, or French memoir-writer: *si non e vera, e ben trovata*; but as we know not precisely, that the prince in question was ever in Sweden, (not but that there is a probability why a duke of Sax-Lauenberg should make a journey to Stockholm, on account of the consanguinity, that subsisted between the regal and princely families †) we of course shall presume to pronounce nothing confidently, except more solid accounts could be procured from Germany, in reference to an affair so long removed from knowledge, and which seemeth to me to have taken its

\* 1642.

† Genealogia Ritterhusii. fol. Tubing, 1668. See also Hubner's Genealogies in German. 4°.



first rise on the southern side of the Alps \*, and not from Germany or 1632, Sweden.

But to return from this digression : the circumstances, which plead strongest against duke Francis Albert, are these that follow. When he made a tender of his services, the preceding August, to his majesty, near Nuremberg, Oxenstiern conceived an untoward suspicion of him, at the first glance †. For as he had great interest with the elector of Saxony, it was thought Wallstein, whose creature he was, connived at his secession from the Imperial service, in order to seduce the said elector from the Swedish interests. Of course therefore, the chancellor ceased not to lay open all his apprehensions to the king, his master ; but Gustavus replied, *That a prince, and protestant, could neither be a villain, nor an assassin.* On his first arrival, many military employs, of considerable honour, were offered him ; but he declined them all, and chose rather to serve near the king's person, in the capacity of a volunteer. It is remarkable, he wore a green scarf in the day's service at Lützen, which was not customary amongst the Swedish officers. He received no wound, upon supposition he attempted to disengage the king, though the master of the household, the pages, and very grooms, that attended him, were all killed, if we except one, who lay transpierced, stripped, and senseless, and expired so soon after the engagement, that traditional accounts from him can hardly be depended on, with any tolerable degree of certainty. He often shewed the royal blood, that had fallen on his cloaths. Indeed it makes not much against him, that the king received a pistol-shot in the hinder part of one of his elbows ; for in such a confusion his majesty might naturally turn himself round more times than once. True it is, he conveyed himself out of the battle precipitately, and never advertised duke Bernard, and Kniphausen, the king's successors in command, of this doleful and disastrous event ; but, on the contra-

\* It is related at large, by *Riccio de Bellis German.* 4°. 434, &c. but he, though a bold lively historian, and peculiarly fond of all anecdotes,

scruples not to pronounce the present narrative, *anilem fabellam, muliercularum deliramentum.*

† Puffendorf de Rebus Suecicis, fol. p. 83.

1632. ry, fled to Weissenfels, about eight miles from the scene of action; and returned next morning to the Swedish camp, when he heard the royal army had become victorious. He there found but a very cold and discourteous reception; for the universally received opinion in Sweden, to the present moment, is, that Gustavus fell by signs agreed and treachery; and this is confirmed by the tradition of officers to their friends and relations, from the very day when the battle of Lützen was fought\*.

Yet to the best of my unbiaſſed judgment there appears one circumstance in duke Francis's favour, namely, that his master of the horse, who was a gentleman, should kill the cavalier, who shot Gustavus; for had the prince been engaged in any connivance, or conspiracy, it is natural to think, that this person might have borne his share therein. We can say no more, and the truth must be left to the great Knower of all secrets†.

Thus fell the king of Sweden; the news of whose death destroyed the unfortunate elector Palatin, in about six days‡; nor did the gratitude of the Saxons erect the slightest cenotaph to the deliverer of their country. In a word, this illustrious potentate hath no monument on the plains of Lützen, (except this imperfect history can be called a *monument*;) save only, a few large and misshapen stones, which the piety of the peasants hath piled together, in order to perpetuate his memory. He died, aged thirty-seven years, ten months, and twenty-seven days, having received thirteen wounds before the battle of Lützen commenced.—He finished his course, saith a spirited historian, as an hero ought to do, *with his sword in his hand, the word of command betwixt his lips, and victory in expectation*; concluding all with this religious ejaculation, *My God! My God!*

\* Memoirs communicated.

† There is a defence of this prince, by the author of the *Schaubühne*; but I never had the good fortune to procure a copy of that work: which consists of four volumes in folio, *cum fig.* Francfort 1699---1718. It was written, if I mistake not, by Job Ludolphus.

‡ He died Nov. 19, at Francfort on the Mayne, and we must allow a certain space for conveying the melancholy tidings to him. The princess Sophia, who married Ernest Augustus, elector of Brunswic Lunenberg, was his twelfth child.



Nor was this death unconformable with his majesty's constant practice; for his great amusement, at leisure hours, consisted in perusing the Holy Scriptures. It was his custom to retire much to his apartment, and keep the doors anxiously closed; considering the sacred writings attentively, whilst the army concluded he was delineating plans of sieges and battles, or enditing letters to foreign potentates. Which puts me in mind of one circumstance, at the camp of Werben; when the whole Imperial army was preparing to force his lines, Steinberg, a privy-councillor, had some extraordinary intelligence to report to his master; and as he half opened the curtain of his tent gently, and perceived Gustavus very intent on reading the Bible, he retired softly, and, as he hoped, unobserved; but the king recalled him: *Steinberg, said he, I find great consolation in perusing the word of God: princes themselves must acknowledge, that the evil demon spreads the most artful snares for those, who fancy they lie under no obligation to render an account to their own consciences, and their fellow-creatures* \*.

Few courtiers were better received, than those, who conveyed the account of the king's death to declared enemies, or concealed ill-wishers: nor did the report greatly displease the court of White-hall; where the ministry, as it usually happens in cases of timidity, had its degree of apprehensions, for fear the event should not be true; and, as I have been informed from good authority, imposed silence on the news-writers, and intimated the same to the pulpit, in case any funeral entertainment might proceed from that quarter. The ungrateful Richelieu looked upon Gustavus's death as a sort of triumph. The emperor was more modest, contenting himself only with the explosion of a few rockets: but the Spaniards exhibited a mock-tragedy, which consisted of twenty-four acts, and took up twelve nights in its representation, entitled, *The Death of the King of Sweden*: and, as an author of great authority † declares, kindled up so many bonfires on the

\* Heylmanni Leo Arct. 76, 77.

† Vide *Schaubeburs*.

1632. occasion, that the court interposed, lest fewel should become too scarce the approaching winter. In a word, of all the catholic princes, the pope alone lamented the death of Gustavus. On the other hand, funeral sermons were pronounced in honour of him, throughout all the protestant churches in Germany; and, what was very extraordinary, almost every preacher, by tacit consent, *drew a parallel between him and king Josiah* \*.

Having thus finished the battle of Lützen, it may suffice to observe, that the Swedes, by a strange antithesis of fortune, obtained a triumph, but lost their hero: the Imperialists relinquished the field of battle abruptly, yet, in truth, acquired a complete victory; for they out-lived Gustavus! Yet the effects of the king's operative spirit never left intirely the military body, that had breathed and moved under his influence. The French repassed the Rhine upon Turenne's death; but the Swedes, after the decease of their master, extended their victorious arms, not only over Lower Saxony, but to the very threshold of the Alps. The principle of acting continued the same; the proportion only of the *vis vivida* was lessened.—Nothing but a large fire could be capable of so prodigal remains: and of course, in a few words, it may be remarked of Gustavus, that he was equally great, living, dying, and even after death; fulfilling and completing the idea of a character, CUIUS GLORIAE NEQUE PROFUIT QUISQUAM LAVDANDO, NEQUE VITUPERANDO QUISQUAM NOCUIT.

And here it may be natural to observe, before we conclude, That as Alexander consigned to posterity the Ptolomy's, the Antigonus's, the Seleucus's, and the Antipaters, who, after his death, founded kingdoms in Egypt, Syria, Asia Minor, and Macedonia: so Gustavus (*from whose tomb, saith a lively historian, the laurels sprung forth*) bequeathed to mankind the Sax-Weymars, the Horns, the Baniers, and the Torstenfons; who, if fair scope had been allowed them, would have given the finishing stroke to that great monarchy, whose very foundations

\* Chemnitz. Tom. i. 376. Mem. d'Electrice Palatine, 4°. 310.



their master had shaken, in the operations of nine-and-twenty months. 1632. These valiant chieftains, formed in the school of so excellent an instructor, gave signs neither of distress nor dismay, when their allies partly proved insincere to them, and partly forsook them, at the conclusion of the peace of Prague, two years after Gustavus's death. On the contrary, they retired step by step, gloomily, and unwillingly, from the heart of the empire\*; and kept the war alive, with an obstinacy unspeakable, for the space of sixteen consecutive years; and far from being squeezed into the Baltic ocean, (as men formerly, and at that time, vainly prophesied) completed their eighteenth campaign, with making a fortunate *camisado* on one of the towns of Prague.

In which circumstance there is something extremely remarkable, namely, that the amazing, obstinate, and extensive war, which I have here described in part, after a duration of thirty years, should conclude itself upon the *very spot of ground where it first began*.

And thus, with more labour than one can expect thanks, I have at length finished the life of Gustavus; a prince perhaps, with whom few heroes may be compared in the several distinguishing characters of soldier, statesman, the father of his people, and a sincere Christian. And had it pleased God to have made a less infirm state of health my portion, I might have been tempted, in a second work, (making use of a manner less circumstantial and diffused, than matters of biography usually require) to have carried on the *history of Germany down to the conclusion of the peace of Münster*: the most important, as well as most decisive era, that is to be found in the annals of Europe! But the greatness of the undertaking partly dismayed me; not to mention the expence and difficulty of consulting, in person, the archives and libraries of various countries†. Yet numbers, it is certain, are to be found, amongst my countrymen, who, in every respect, are infinitely

\* *Singularita delle Guerre di Germania*, 4°. 183, Venet.

† The author hath by him, already finished, in one volume, quarto, *The History of THE*

THIRTY YEARS WARS, from the breaking out of the troubles in Bohemia, in 1618, till the death of Gustavus. 1632; so that only sixteen years remain to be completed.

1632. better qualified for such an undertaking, than I can pretend to : and indeed it would be no inconsiderable satisfaction to me, to see our nation derive its knowledge of affairs on the continent from any historians, except the French ; whose method, it must be acknowledged, is well conceived, and their stile usually such, as hardly allows the reader to be inattentive ; but the writers themselves are alike negligent and romantic, insincere and partial.

F I N I S.





*Table of Reference to the Battle of LUTZEN.*

SWEDISH FORM OF BATTLE.

I. LINE.

1. Finlanders, Stalhaus.
2. Musqueteers.
3. Westergothians.
4. Musqueteers.
5. Ingermanians.
6. Musqueteers.
7. Uplanders.
8. Musqueteers.
9. Ostrogoths.
10. Musqueteers.
11. Smolanders.
12. First brigade, Harte.
13. Pretorian brigade, (guards,) yellow ; count Wrangelberg.
14. Blue brigade, (guards) Wincle.
15. Green brigade, Wildeffeln.
16. Duke Bernard's regiment.
17. Musqueteers.
18. Duke Bernard's second regiment.
19. Musqueteers.
20. Carberg.
21. Musqueteers.
22. Livonians ; Wrangel.
23. Musqueteers.
24. Tisenhausen.
25. Musqueteers.
26. Courville.

II. LINE.

27. Steichnitz ; French.
28. Musqueteers.
29. Steinboch's dragoons.
30. Musqueteers.
31. Brandstein.
32. Musqueteers.
33. Lowenstein.
34. Musqueteers.
35. Prince of Anhalt.
36. Musqueteers.
37. Hofkirch ; Saxon.
38. Brigade, Mitzval.
39. Brigade ; Thurn.
40. Brigade ; Kniphatsfen.
41. Brigade, Bosen ; Saxon.
42. Uflar.
43. Musqueteers.
44. Dalwick : Hessian.
45. Musqueteers.
46. Beckerman.
47. Musqueteers.
48. Bulach.
49. Musqueteers.
50. Goldstein.
51. Musqueteers.
52. William of Weymar.

RESERVE I.

53. Henderson : Scottish-infantry.

RESERVE II.

54. Ohem : Palatin-cavalry.





SCHEME and DIARY of the WAR, &c.

FROM THE

KING's Entering GERMANY

TILL THE

BATTLE of LÜTZEN.

COMPOSED FOR

The better Understanding the Three GREAT CAMPAIGNS

Of 1630, 1631, 1632.

## ADVERTISEMENT.

**T**HIS performance, the only one of the kind I ever remember to have seen, notwithstanding it be indispensably necessary in military history, was begun from September, 1631, and carried on till November 6, 1632, by an English or Scottish officer who served under Gustavus. I have supplied it by an addition of thirteen months, corrected the names of places, &c. throughout, and added the third and fourth columns all along, in order to render the whole complete; making various additions likewise to columns the first and second.



GUSTAVUS	TORQUATO DE CONTI.	SWEDISH ARMIES in other Parts, &c.	IMPERIAL ARMIES in other Parts, &c.
<p>[N. B. Gustavus landed June 24; and the intervening days, between that time and July, were employed in disembarking and reviewing his army, and examining the country.]</p> <p>Publishest his manifesto.</p> <p>4. Goes to reconnoitre the island of Usedom, with 4000 men.</p> <p>5, 6. Gives audience to the deputies of the dukes of Pomerania and Mechlenberg, and the town of Stralsund.</p> <p>7. Takes one fort at Wolgast.</p> <p>8. Advances to the cloister and pass of Pudegla.</p> <p>9. Makes himself master of Swein.</p> <p>10. Signs articles of confederation with the duke of Pomerania.</p> <p>14. The duke of Pomerania writes to the emperor.</p> <p>10—25. Remains in the islands of Usedom and Wollin.</p> <p>23. Appoints a solemn fast.</p> <p>26. Transports his army over the Frish-hof, and invests Stetin.</p> <p>— Takes it by dexterity.</p> <p>27. Orders Banier to give a camisado to Dam.</p> <p>— Stargard taken and Camin.</p> <p>— Negotiates with the administrator of Magdeburg, who places himself under the protection of Sweden.</p>	<p>Makes weak efforts against the king, with an army of equal numbers; the duchies of Pomerania and Mechlenberg being well-garrisoned throughout.</p> <p>Extorts Gartz and Griffenhagen from the duke of Pomerania.</p> <p>Incamps half his army at Gartz, and half at Anclam.</p> <p>Retreats to Anclam, and there forms a large camp.</p>	<p>The chancellor Oxenstiern commandeth a separate body in Polish Prussia, to watch the countenance of the Poles, and the king's new friends in those parts; whilst Lesley and Ruthven form a second camp near Stralsund, casting an eye of observation alternately towards the islands of Rugen and Usedom on the one side, and the duchy of Mechlenberg on the other.</p> <p>The administrator of Magdeburg sent to oppose Tilly in that duchy.</p> <p>Bauditz and Hepburn aft in Outer Pomerania with 8000 men.</p>	<p>Walstein, then expecting his revocation, lived privately at Memmingen, near Ratibon, to watch the motions of the dyet, and divert the disgrace that impended over him.</p> <p>Tilly employed in reducing the landgraviate of Hesse, and securing his own grants of possessions in Westphalia and Lower Saxony.</p> <p>Torquato de Conti had the care of Pomerania, and the duke Savelli of the duchy of Mechlenberg.</p> <p>30,000 veteran imperial troops were employed at this time in the siege of Mantua, under the command of Colalfo, Aldringer, and Galas.</p> <p>The dyet of Ratibon.</p> <p>8000 men stationed at Dessau-bridge, to prevent the king from marching to Magdeburg.</p>

# AUGUST 1630.

GUSTAVUS.	TORQUATO DE CONTI.	SWEDISH ARMIES in other Parts, &c.	IMPERIAL ARMIES in other Parts, &c.
<p>1—8. Commanded parties abroad.</p> <p>6. Pass of Stolp secured.</p> <p>9. Publishes a second manifesto.</p> <p>Fortifies Stetin, and fixes a camp there under Gustavus Horn.</p> <p>Offers Torquato battle.</p> <p>17. Conceives some designs against Gartz and Griefenhagen. Sends Horn to blockade Landisberg.</p> <p>Resolves first to clear Pomerania and the duchy of Mecklenberg.</p> <p>The plague rages at Stetin.</p> <p>Takes Wolgast town and castle.</p> <p>20. Appoints a solemn fast.</p> <p>Receives a reinforcement of 8000 men from Livonia.</p> <p>Fits up Wolgast castle for his queen.</p> <p>Prepares an invasion into Mecklenberg, by taking the important passes of Tribesee, Griepnitz, and Trepto.</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;">It was in this month that the king fell into Aligheri's ambuscade.</p> <p>Anstruther, as some conjecture, pronounces his harangue at Vienna.</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">} Remains inactive.</p> <p>Quits his last camp and retires to Gartz : Then to Stolp.</p> <p>Marches at the head of 3000 men, to throw succours into the town of Wolgast, but is defeated.</p> <p>31. Breaks up his camp at Stolp, and intrenches once more near Anclam.</p>	<p>Oxenstiern commands in Prussia, near Brunsberg.</p> <p>Lesley and Ruthven take preparatory measures to facilitate the king's irruption into Mecklenberg.</p> <p>Christian-William, administrator of Magdeburg, opposes Tilly.</p> <p>15. The Swedes attempt to surprize Landisberg in vain.</p> <p>18. Marvellous escape of 700 Scots, who take Rugenwald by surprize.</p>	<p>Walstein remains inactive in Suabia, near Ratibon.</p> <p>Tilly continues to attempt the reduction of Lower Saxony.</p> <p>The Duke de Savell defends the duchy of Mecklenberg.</p> <p>Pappenheim blockades Magdeburg.</p> <p>10. The Electors write to Gustavus.</p> <p>18. The Emperor writes to him.</p> <p>Tieffenbach and Goëtz conduct two separate armies in Silesia and Lusatia, and Balthazar di Mairadas commands a third in Bohemia.</p> <p>The dyet of Ratibon continues.</p>



# S E P T E M B E R 1630.

GUSTAVUS.	TORQUATO DE CONTI.	SWEDISH ARMIES in other Parts, &c.	IMPERIAL ARMIES in other Parts, &c.
<p>1. The king observes a solemn fast, it being Friday.</p> <p>— Reviews his troops, and pays those lately arrived.</p> <p>Takes Griffenberg and Gelnau.</p> <p>6. Leaves Stetin, and prepares to invade Mechlenberg.</p> <p>Sends assistances into Lower Saxony, which land the 25th near Lubec, and join Francis-Charles, Duke of Saxe-Lawenberg.</p> <p>13. Writes to the Catholic electors.</p> <p>14. Embarks with 12,000 men to reduce the duchy of Mechlenberg.</p> <p>— Reaches Stralsund, and takes Bart and Damgarten.</p> <p>17. Writes to Lewis XIII. and Richelieu.</p> <p>— Appoints a solemn fast.</p> <p>26. Advances to Ribnitz and forms a camp there, having taken the town.</p> <p>28. Dissolves the allegiance of Wallstein's new subjects by two proclamations.</p> <p>Detaches Banier to the frontiers of Mechlenberg near Pomerania, and orders Bauditzen to invest Colbergen.</p> <p>Returns to Stralsund to indite proper letters to all his friends and enemies.</p>	<p>1. Aligheri, a deserter from the Swedes, attacks the king's lines.</p> <p>2. Makes another attempt.</p> <p>4. Imperialists ruin Passevalk and Uckermund, and then leave them.</p> <p>7. Retake them, and commit great outrage.</p> <p>14. circa. Lose 1000 men near Gartz.</p> <p>Torquato observes the motions of Horn at Stetin.</p>	<p>Oxenstiern continues in his old situation near Brunsberg.</p> <p>The Duke of Saxe-Lawenberg [Francis-Charles] and the Swedish reinforcements act in Lower Saxony, and take Boitzenburg, Lawenberg, and Nyehausen.</p> <p>4. Bauditzen and Kniphausen form the blockade of Colbergen.</p> <p>Bauditzen reinforces him, having taken Piritz.</p> <p>Banier commands an army on the frontiers of Mechlenberg next to Pomerania.</p>	<p>Aldringer, Galas, and Colalto recalled, with an army of 30,000 men from Mantua.</p> <p>Colonel Reynacher opposes Saxe-Lawenberg.</p> <p>Perpetual rencounters in the duchy of Magdeburg, between the Imperialists and administrator.</p> <p>Tilly still continues in Lower Saxony, and on the frontiers of Hesse.</p> <p>The duke de Savelli commands Wallstein's troops in the duchy of Mechlenberg.</p> <p>Pappenheim takes Francis-Charles, duke of Saxe-Lawenburg prisoner at Ratzburg-castle.</p> <p>— Reduces Allersleben to capitulate.</p>

# OCTOBER 1630.

GUSTAVUS.	TORQUATO DE CONTI.	SWEDISH ARMIES in other Parts, &c.	IMPERIAL ARMIES in other Parts, &c.
<p>Besieges Rostoch, but converts the siege into a blockade.</p> <p>— Clears the whole sea-coast with his fleet.</p> <p>— Advances towards Wismar.</p> <p>— Beats the duke de Savelli.</p> <p>[Here, say some, he first exhibited the brigade or column.]</p> <p>King writes to Charles I. the letter not extant.</p> <p>11. Returns to Stralsund.</p> <p>Camerarius pronounces a speech of the King's dictating at the Hague.</p> <p>Gustavus remains at Stralsund.</p> <p>— Makes a short digression into Mechlenberg; returns again to Stralsund.</p>	<p>Imperialists convey 4000 fresh troops into Rostoch, with considerable loss.</p> <p>Torquato sends Holk's and Butler's regiments to reinforce Savelli.</p> <p>A convoy of four regiments of Waltheiners defeated.</p>	<p>Bauditz and Hepburn form an army of 8000 men near Rugenwald, in Back Pomerania: take Scheifelbein, and enter the Marche.</p> <p>4. Knipphausen carries on the blockade of Colbergen.</p> <p>Oxenstiern continues in the neighbourhood of Elbingen to watch the Poles.</p> <p>Banier succeeds the king in the duchy of Mechlenberg, as commander in chief. — Publishes an edict.</p> <p>The administrator of Magdeburg acts in that duchy.</p> <p>The administrator of Wirtemberg in Suabia.</p>	<p>The duke de Savelli opposes Gustavus in the duchy of Mechlenberg.</p> <p>3. Col. Denhoff defeated near Stetin by the Imperialists.</p> <p>Ossa and Montecuculi command in Suabia.</p> <p>Göetz and Tieffenbach in Silesia and Lusatia. —</p> <p>— Don Baltazar in Bohemia.</p> <p>— Pappenheim in Lower Saxony.</p>
<p>31. Writes to the emperor.</p>			



# N O V E M B E R 1630.

GUSTAVUS.	TORQUATO DE CONTI.	SWEDISH ARMIES in other Parts, &c.	IMPERIAL ARMIES in other Parts, &c.
	<p>Attempts fruitlessly to throw a reinforcement into Colberg.</p> <p>— Detaches 10,000 men to raise the siege.</p> <p>5. Imperial mandate published against Gustavus.</p>	<p>6 or 8. Monro takes Scheiffelbein.</p> <p>Knipphausen turns the blockade of Colberg into a siege.</p> <p>Rostoch still blockaded by Todt.</p> <p>13. The strange battle of Colbergen between Kniphau- sen and Montecuculi.</p> <p>A great fire at Colbergen.</p> <p>Stations of troops in distant provinces, as in last month.</p> <p>26. A dreadful tempest at Magdeburg.</p>	<p>3. The dyet at Ratibon con- cludes.</p> <p>9. The emperor publishes his edict concerning con- tributions and regulating the army.</p> <p>— The same on the Imperial side, only that Montecuculi served in Prussia.</p>
<p>12. Sends Falkenberg to de- fend Magdeburg.</p> <p>— Marches as far as Griffen- berg to join Horn, and fight the Imperialists.</p> <p>20. Returns to Stetin.</p> <p>— Continues there.</p>			

# D E C E M B E R 1630.

GUSTAVUS.	TORQUATO DE CONTI.	SWEDISH ARMIES in other Parts, &c.	IMPERIAL ARMIES in other Parts, &c.
<p>1. Continues still at Stetin.</p> <p>Writes to the magistracy of Lubec.</p> <p>— Makes a short excursion into the duchy of Mechlenberg.</p> <p>— Summons all his troops for some great expedition; reviews them, and pays off all arrears.</p> <p>12. Finishes the fortifications of Stetin.</p>	<p>— Remains on the defensive, beseeching Tilly to send him supplies.</p> <p>— Recalled.</p>	<p>A sea-fight between the Swedes and the Imperialists. — 15 large ships under Gabriel le Roy, and 9 Swedish men of war. — Swedes victorious.</p> <p>The elector of Brandenburg publishes a manifesto against the cruelties and depopulations of the Imperialists.</p>	<p>The Duke de Savelli opposes the Swedes in the duchy of Mechlenberg.</p> <p>The Imperialists ravage and destroy all Pomerania.</p> <p>Tilly writes to the administrator of Magdeburg.</p>
<p>23. Invests Griffenhagen.</p> <p>24. Takes it by storm.</p> <p>27. Marches to besiege Gartz.</p> <p>28. Takes Fort Morwitz.</p> <p>29. Gartz evacuated: And the Imperial army decamps.</p>	<p><b>ANNIBAL COUNT DE SCHOMBERG</b> commands.</p> <p>— Incamps under Gartz and Griffenhagen.</p> <p>The Imperialists fly to Custrin, and thence to Francfort, burning the bridge over the Oder; their whole army saved by the elector of Brandenburg's giving it entrance into Custrin.</p>		



# J A N U A R Y 1630-1.

GUSTAVUS.	SCHOMBERG.	SWEDISH ARMIES in other Parts, &c.	IMPERIAL ARMIES in other Parts, &c.
<p>The king denied entrance into Cultrin; and thereby lost the power of saving Magdeburg.</p>	<p>— By the means of Cultrin, preserves Spar's, young Walstein's, Goetz's, and the old Saxon regiment.</p>	<p>Horn's blockade of Landsberg goes on.</p>	<p>Don Baltazar commands in Bohemia; Göetz, and Tiefenbach in Silesia; Savelli, in the duchy of Mecklenberg; Olla in Suabia and Alfatia; and Pappenheim in Lower-Saxony.</p>
<p>— Takes Köeningsberg.</p>			
<p>8. Advances to Lubus, within four miles of Francfort.</p>			
<p>— Takes Legnitz-castle and Piritz, and secures all except Landsberg between the Warta and the Oder.</p>			
<p>The winter extremely severe.</p>			
<p>13. Treaty of Bernwalt signed between Sweden and France.</p>	<p>— Represents his bad situation to Tilly.</p>		
<p>The king publishes twenty-two new prayers.</p>	<p>T I L L Y.</p>		
<p>18. Reviews his army at Dam, which consisted of 16,000 men.</p>			
<p>26. Posts Horn at Köeningsberg to observe Tilly's motions.</p>	<p>24. Advances to Francfort on the Oder.</p>		
<p>— Grants kind protection to the inhabitants of the New Marche.</p>			
<p>— Gives over all thoughts against Landsberg: And taking the advantage of a severe frost, enters Mecklenberg.</p>			
<p>— Gives over all thoughts against Landsberg: And taking the advantage of a severe frost, enters Mecklenberg.</p>		<p>15. Horn, with a separate army, observes Tilly near the frontiers of Silesia.</p>	<p>Count de Schomberg made governor of Francfort.</p>
		<p>— Recalled towards the end of the month, and posted in the New Marche.</p>	<p>Colonel Hatzfield murdered.</p>

# F E B R U A R Y 1630-1.

GUSTAVUS.	TILLY.	SWEDISH ARMIES in other Parts, &c.	IMPERIAL ARMIES in other Parts, &c.
<p>1. Sets out at the head of 15,000 men, on a second expedition into Mecklenberg.</p> <p>Takes New Brandenburg, and Clempno.</p> <p>— Proposes terms to the inhabitants of the district round Stargard.</p> <p>Garrison of Trepto dislodged.</p> <p>14. Damin besieged.</p> <p>Loitch taken. Kniphausen's army joins the king.</p> <p>The king detaches Banier to take Loczin.</p> <p>— Incamps his troops between that and Trepto.</p> <p>Malchin surprized.</p> <p>Fridland and Westrow taken.</p> <p>[Gustavus in eight months renders himself master of eighty cities, castles, and fortresses in Pomerania and Mecklenberg.]</p> <p>His Majesty receives some succours from Scotland; withdraws his garrisons from the isle of Rugen; is reinforced by some of Oxenstiern's army, and by the troops that invested Colberg.</p> <p>— Being in expectation of Tilly, he places Banier at Damin, Kniphausen at New Brandenburg, Count Ortenberg at Trepto, Horn at Fridland, and himself at the pass of Passevelk, to guard the Oder and Pomerania.</p> <p>— Incamps himself between New Angermund and Freyenwald.</p>	<p>The duke de Savelli, governor of Damin, accused by Tilly</p> <p>Tilly proposes to stop the king's journey into Mecklenberg, but desists.</p> <p>— Advances from Francfort upon the Oder towards Mecklenberg.</p> <p>— Passes by the king's lines but dares not attack them.</p> <p>Bernstein makes an unsuccessful camifado on Templin.</p>	<p>The rhingrave commands in Mecklenberg.</p> <p>Oxenstiern in Prussia.</p> <p>8. Dyet at Leipsic begins.</p> <p>All Back-Pomerania conquered.</p>	<p>Pappenheim acts in Lower Saxony.</p> <p>Other Imperial armies stationed as before.</p>



# M A R C H 1630-1.

GUSTAVUS.	TILLY.	SWEDISH ARMIES in other Parts, &c.	IMPERIAL ARMIES in other Parts, &c.
1. Articles signed with the Marquis of Hamilton.	—Puts the garrison of Feldsberg to the sword.		Don Baltazar, Montecuculi, Goëtz, Tieffenbach, command in Bohemia and the annexed provinces. Ossa, in Suabia and Alsatia.
		2. Colbergen surrenders, after five months siege, to Colonel Todt.	
Gustavus adds twenty new edicts, concerning plunder, and extortion, &c. to his military code.	9. Takes New Brandenburg by storm, with an army of 22,000 men.	9. Horn retires to his master near Schwet.	
— Arrests the garrison of Colberg, by way of reprisal.	— His great cruelty.	New Brandenburg is taken.	
— Incamps between Trepto and Damin.	— Dismantles it.	The Swedes defeat a body of Croations near Munchenberg.	Coloredo attempts in vain to burn the king's bridge at Schwet.
— Invents brigades in his camp at Schwet. Monro, part II. 25.	— Enters Fridland, and attempts Trepto in vain.		Schomberg appointed to defend Francfort.
	— Advances to Damin, and despairs of taking it.		
18. Crosses the Warta to observe Landsberg.	— Returns to Repnin.		
— Constructs a famous bridge over the Oder at Schwet.	— Attempts fruitlessly to destroy the king's fine bridge across the Oder.	18. Remonstrance and conclusions sent to the emperor from the dyet of Leipzig.	Pappenheim employed in the duchy of Magdeburg.
Zednick taken.	— Retires beyond Francfort on the Oder, from whence he came, say some; others allege, he went back to Repnin.	24. — And to the Catholic electors.	
	— Orders a garrison of 7000 men into Francfort.	A convention of the states of Pomerania.	
25. The king determines to besiege Francfort.	— And 5000 into Landsberg.	25. Horn ordered to watch the Imperialists on the side of Silesia.	
27. Crosses the Oder, and continues his march.	— Draws the garrisons from Trewen-Brietzen and Munchenberg.		
	— Fears to invest Damin.		
	— Forms designs against Magdeburg.		

# A P R I L 1631.

GUSTAVUS	TILLY.	SWEDISH ARMIES in other Parts, &c.	IMPERIAL ARMIES in other Parts, &c.
<p>1. Arrives at Lubus.</p> <p>2. Formally approaches round Francfort.</p> <p>— Takes the town by storm, and kills 1000 men.—Old Lesley made governor.</p> <p>— Sends 4000 men towards Landberg.</p> <p>4. Gustavus writes to the confederators at Leipzig, and the elector of Saxony appoints a thanksgiving.</p> <p>5. Follows the Landberg detachment with the gros of his army.</p> <p>— Sends the rhingrave and Bauditzen into Silesia.</p> <p>The town of Landberg surrenders after eight days siege; and thus Pomerania and Mechlenberg are cleared, and a passage opened into Silesia.</p> <p>18. The garrison marches away. The king returns to Francfort upon the Oder, negotiating, by means of couriers, about Spandau, which he obtains afterwards.</p> <p>The States-general subscribe to Gustavus about 5000 l per month.</p> <p>The king garrisons Francfort, Crossen, and Landberg.</p>	<p>The Francfort garrison, consisting of 7000 men, escape, part of them into Silesia.</p> <p>12. Tilly invests Magdeburg in form.</p> <p>21. Takes a strong fortress.</p> <p>— Alarmed needlessly at Gustavus's coming.</p> <p>29. Farenbach, an Imperial colonel and engineer, performs wonders.</p>	<p>The rhingrave and Bauditzen command in Silesia. Take Crossen the 16th.</p> <p>9. Treaty between France and the elector of Tryers.</p> <p>15. A detachment of Swedes beaten between Landberg and Schieffelbein.</p> <p>16. The dyet of Leipzig breaks up, it being Palm-Sunday.</p>	<p>The administrator of Wirtemberg, [Duke Julius] and the Protestant, form an union in Suabia, and levy troops.</p> <p>Don Baltazar, Tieffenbach, Montecuculi, and Dhona act in Silesia, &amp;c. against Bauditzen and the rhingrave.</p> <p>18. Landberg evacuated.</p> <p>The Imperialists attempt Crossen in Silesia.</p> <p>The emperor publishes an edict for raising new taxes.—Excises meat.</p>



GUSTAVUS.	TILLY.	SWEDISH ARMIES in other Parts, &c.	IMPERIAL ARMIES in other Parts, &c.
<p>1. Detaches from Furstenwald near Francfort 10,000 infantry, and 80 troops of cavalry, towards Berlin.</p> <p>— Sends count Ortenburg to demand Spandau and Custrin.</p> <p>2. Dispatches Horn on the same errand.</p> <p>3. Has an interview with the elector in Copnick-grove.</p> <p>— Obtains Spandau only for a month.</p> <p>— Enters Berlin.</p> <p>A treaty of confederation between France and Bavaria.</p> <p>— The king goes to Potzdam.</p> <p>— Lies in his camp at or near Potzdam the remaining part of this month.</p> <p>6. Sollicits a confederacy with the elector of Saxony in vain.</p> <p>— Enters Berlin.</p> <p>10. Hears that Magdeburg is taken.</p> <p>— Incamps at Potzdam to intercept Tilly's retreat.</p> <p>— Takes Old Brandenburg and Ratenau.</p> <p>— Views the country near Magdeburg.</p> <p>— Retakes Werben and Borg, near Jericho-monastery.</p> <p>28. Escapes an ambush of Pappenheim.</p>	<p>10. Takes Magdeburg by storm; burns the city and destroys the inhabitants.</p> <p>— Breaks Dessau-bridge over precipitately.</p> <p>13. Makes his public entrance into Magdeburg.</p> <p>— Stays thereabouts many days.</p> <p>— Removes from Magdeburg, and crosses the forest of Hartz.</p>	<p>Oxenstiern commands in Prussia.</p> <p>Horn in Silesia, reinforced by the king.</p> <p>8. A treaty of confederation and alliance, for eight years, between France and Bavaria.</p>	<p>The Imperial commanders stationed as in the two preceding months.</p> <p>14. An Imperial ban published against the Leipzig confederators.</p> <p>Pappenheim attempts to secure Havelberg.</p>

# J U N E 1631.

GUSTAVUS.	TILLY.	SWEDISH ARMIES in other Parts, &c.	IMPERIAL ARMIES in other Parts, &c.
1. Takes Guterboch, to secure the two bridges over the Elb, namely, Dessau and Wittenberg.	— At Altleben treats with the princes of the house of Saxony.	Horn commands the Swedish army in Silesia.	The Imperial generals in their last mentioned posts.
5. Re-instates the dukes of Mecklenberg.	— Has a design on Erfurt.		
8. Re-delivers Spandau, with great reluctance.			
11. Obtains it by a new treaty of alliance.			
— Receives four regiments from his army in Prussia, and some new levies from Brandenburg.			
— Sends Oxenstiern a reinforcement of 4000 men.			The Imperialists attempt Crossen in vain.
12. Returns by water to Stettin. Gives audience to the Muscovite ambassador the 15th. Proposes to assist at the siege of Gripswald.	13. Advances to Weymar.		
— Publishes his apology concerning Magdeburg.	14. Crosses the Unstrut.		
Anstruther pronounces his harangue to the emperor.	15. At Altleben.		
	— Goes to Mulhausen; has a design on the landgrave of Hesse Cassel.	16. Gripswald capitulates to Tott, after a blockade and siege of 11 months.	
	— Sends Pappenheim to secure Havelberg; who afterwards raises contributions at Eisleben.	17. Two dukes of Mecklenberg command in their duchies.	
	— Continues in these parts all the month.		
20. Gustavus returns from Stettin to Berlin.	28. Proposes to march and attack Gustavus, but is dismayed by Pappenheim's and Mansfeld's ill successes.		
Bauditz and Dewbatel cross the Elb, by fording, with 3000 horse and dragoons, and take Tangermünde in hand.			



# J U L Y 1631.

GUSTAVUS.	TILLY.	SWEDISH ARMIES in other Parts, &c.	IMPERIAL ARMIES in other Parts, &c.
<p>— Defeats Pappenheim near Magdeburg, and takes Stendal.</p> <p>9. Banier takes Havelberg, sword in hand.</p> <p>The king incamps most judiciously at Werben.</p> <p>12. Concludes a treaty with the landgrave of Hesse Cassel.</p> <p>17. Gives Bernstein a camisado, and ruins four of Pappenheim's best regiments.</p> <p>— Incamps at Werben.</p> <p>— Receives a visit from the landgrave of Hesse and duke Bernard, with a tender of their services.</p> <p>21. Recals the garrison of Tangermond.</p> <p>— Discovers Tilly's plot, and turns it to advantage.</p> <p>23, 24. Several skirmishes.</p> <p>25. Gustavus repulses Tilly.</p> <p>26—30. Continues on the defensive in his excellent camp at Werben.</p> <p>— Writes a letter of thanks to the Magdeburgers.</p>	<p>Pappenheim sends for Tilly.</p> <p>Tilly, who had intended to make an irruption into Hesse Cassel, obliged to return.</p> <p>17. Advances to Wolmerstadt in the diocese of Magdeburg.</p> <p>19, 20. Reviews his army.</p> <p>21. Arrives at Tangermond, forms a plot to fire the king's camp and powder-waggons.</p> <p>25. Attacks the king's lines.</p> <p>26—30. Remains quiet at some distance, namely, about Mulhausen.</p>	<p>16. The Marquis of Hamilton sails from Yarmouth.</p> <p>18. Duke Bernard acts in the landgraviate of Hesse Cassel.</p> <p>31. The Marquis of Hamilton lands at Wolgast, with 6000 English forces.</p>	<p>Furstenberg, with 18,000 men (partly the Mantuan army) forces the administrator of Wirtemberg to renounce the Leipzig conclusions.</p> <p>12. Fugger and Furstenberg, with part of the Italian army, invade the landgraviate of Hesse Cassel.</p> <p>— Recalled to join Tilly.</p> <p>Tieffenbach commands in Silesia.</p>

# AUGUST 1631.

GUSTAVUS.	TILLY.	SWEDISH ARMIES in other Parts, &c.	IMPERIAL ARMIES in other Parts, &c.
— Remains at Werben.	— In the neighbourhood of Werben.		
12. Signs a treaty with the landgrave of Hesse Cassel.	10. Dislodges, and moves towards Saxony.	10. circa. The English joined by 4000 Swedes, newly landed.	
Queen of Sweden lands at Wolgast, with 8000 men.		Horn commands in Silesia, and Todt in the duchy of Mechlenberg.	
15. The king sends his forces on various destinations, and leaves Bauditzon with the standing camp at Werben.			
— Proposes to form two other camps, one at Ratenu, and another at Old Brandenburg.	16. Joined by Furstenberg, with 18,000 men near Mansfeld.	20. The elector of Saxony reviews his army.	
	— Summons the elector of Saxony to enter into new engagements, and demands a passage over Wittenberg-bridge.	The landgrave of Hesse Cassel acts in his own country.	21. Pappenheim ravages Misnia.
— Receives pressing letters from the elector of Saxony.	26. Takes Mersberg.	The elector of Saxony incamps at Torgau to defend the banks of the Elbe. His whole army amounts to 20,000 men.	
29. Advances with part of his army to Ratenu, whilst the main body reaches Old Brandenburg.	— Pillages Naumburg and Zeitz.	— Prevents Furstenberg from passing the river.	
30. Marches towards Saxony.	29. Summons Leipzig.		
31. Arrives at C. Swick, where Arnheim confers with him.			



GUSTAVUS.	TILLY.	SWEDISH ARMIES in other Parts, &c.	IMPERIAL ARMIES in other Parts, &c.
<p>1. Obliges the elector of Saxony, whom Arnheim represented, to sign a treaty.</p> <p>3. Allowed to pass the Elb at Wittenberg-bridge.</p> <p>4. Meets the Saxon army and some Brandenburg troops at Dieben.</p> <p>5. Reviews the combined army.</p> <p>6. Deliberates and halts on Tilly's taking Leipzig.</p> <p>7. Marches and fights the battle of Leipzig.</p> <p>8. Invests that city.</p> <p>9. Pursues the Imperialists to Merzburg, and takes it. — Dispatches his army in several corps to pursue the enemy.</p> <p>11. Takes Halle and Merzburg.</p> <p>13. Writes to Charles I. on the victory of Leipzig.</p> <p>14. Collects his forces.</p> <p>16. Begins his journey, and marches along the Unstrut.</p> <p>17. Lies at Great Someren.</p> <p>18. Takes Erfurt. — Settles the affairs of Thuringia. — Sends for Oxenstiern out of Pomerania.</p> <p>26. Advances to Arnstadt.</p> <p>27. Reaches Ilmenau; divides his forces.</p> <p>28. Crosses the Thuringian forest.</p> <p>29. Lies at Schleißing.</p> <p>30. Besieges Koenigshofen. — Frightens the imperial commissaries from Francfort on the Mayne.</p>	<p>1. Ravages the country about Leipzig.</p> <p>3. Invests it with 40,000 men.</p> <p>5. The town capitulates.</p> <p>6. Tilly invites the king to battle by letter.</p> <p>7. Defeated at Leipzig, and flies to Halle.</p> <p>9. — To Ascherleben, and writes to Aldringer, and thence to Halberstadt; 80 English miles. — Publishes monitorial letters to recal his dispersed troops.</p> <p>13. Leaves Halberstadt.</p> <p>17. Reaches Alvede, 15 miles.</p> <p>25. Arrives at Corvey, and crosses the Weser. Receives 5000 troops from Cologne.</p> <p>26. Lies at Warburg. — Points his course between Waldec and Hesse, and arrives near Fulda.</p> <p>30. Advances to Fritzlar in Hesse Cassel.</p>	<p>1. Elector of Saxony lies with 16,000 men near Torgau.</p> <p>2. The English troops arrive at Stetin.</p> <p>3. The landgrave of Hesse returns home from the king to carry on the war, taking duke Bernard with him. — Clears the abbacy of Hirschfeild.</p> <p>12. The elector of Saxony invests Leipzig.</p> <p>13. Receives its capitulation, and reduces Misnia. Banier sent to oppose Pappenheim in the diocese of Magdeburg — Blockades Mansfelt in that town. The landgrave of Hesse wages war fortunately in the diocese of Paderborn, and the abbacy of Fulda, &amp;c.</p> <p>15. The landgrave of Hesse takes Fritzlar.</p> <p>26. Bauditzen marches a part of the king's royal army by another road through the Thuringian forest.</p> <p>27. Horn, with another detachment, frightens the imperial armies from Eysenach. — The elector of Saxony, in conjunction with Hamilton's forces, invades Lusatia.</p> <p>29. Horn takes Gotha.</p> <p>30. — Returns to the king.</p>	<p>Gronsfelt and Boninghausen act in Westphalia and Lower Saxony, against the duke of Lunenburg, archbishop of Bremen, and the landgrave of Hesse Cassel's troops.</p> <p>Aldringer and Fugger oppose the landgrave.</p> <p>15. Hover with their troops about Erfurt; retire. The duke of Lorraine marches to join Tilly. Tieffenbach and Goëtz threaten to invade Saxony. — Quit Lusatia for private reasons.</p> <p>28. Aldringer near Eysenach.</p> <p>30. Some Croatians alarm Dresden.</p>

GUSTAVUS.	TILLY.	SWEDISH ARMIES in other Parts, &c.	IMPERIAL ARMIES in other Parts, &c.
<p>1. Takes Schweinfurt.</p> <p>2. Makes his entrance.</p> <p>3. Dispatches circular letters to the bishopric of Bamberg and parts adjacent.</p> <p>4. Forces the bishop of Wurtzburg to make his escape.</p> <p>— Inveils Wurtzburg.</p> <p>5. Makes himself master thereof.</p> <p>5—8. Besieges Marienberg-castle, and takes it by storm.</p> <p>8—14. Dispatches his army in parties to make conquests in the dioceses of Wurtzburg and Bamberg.</p> <p>15. Wertheim taken.</p> <p>16. The king gives a camifado to three regiments of Tilly.</p> <p>17—20. Visits his troops at their various stations.</p> <p>21. Commanded parties abroad, &amp;c. which surprise Rotenberg, Bischofsheim, and Mergentheim.</p> <p>26. Gustavus publishes a second manifesto.</p> <p>— Doubts whether he shall march to Nuremberg or Francfort on the Mayne.</p>	<p>2. Removes from Fritzlar.</p> <p>3. Ravages some towns in the landgraviate of Hesse Cassel.</p> <p>4. Joined by Aldringer.</p> <p>6. Reviews his army at Fulda.</p> <p>10. Reaches Aschaffenburg; confers with the duke of Lorrain.</p> <p>— Sends Aldringer to join the Lorrainers.</p> <p>16. Detaches 3000 men towards Wertheim, whom the king defeats.</p> <p>17. Joined by the Lorrain army.</p> <p>18. Advances towards the Higher Palatinate.</p> <p>20. Lies about Darmstadt.</p> <p>21. Receives a repulse near Rotenberg.</p> <p>22. Takes Babenhauseu.</p> <p>23. Sollicits the city of Francfort.</p> <p>— Marches into the Bergstrafs.</p> <p>30. Advances again towards the Higher Palatinate, and continues thereabouts.</p>	<p>The elector of Saxony hears Paradeifter's proposals of accommodation with the emperor, through the interposition of Cadretta, the Spanish ambassador.</p> <p>Horn stays with the king all this month.</p> <p>Lesley, and the English under Hamilton, act in Lusatia and Silesia.</p> <p>7. Arnheim reduces Lower Lusatia.</p> <p>The landgrave of Hesse takes Munden. — Enters the diocese of Paderborn. — Afterwards carries the war into Westphalia, and then marches to join Gustavus.</p> <p>16. Rostoch surrenders to General Todt.</p> <p>Banier besieges Magdeburg; Hamilton and the English then with him.</p> <p>18. Virmond besieges Halberstadt in vain; joins Mansfelt at Magdeburg.</p> <p>20. Arnheim reduces Upper Lusatia.</p> <p>25. The elector and Arnheim enter Bohemia; take Tetschin and Starahora, joined by old count Thurn.</p>	<p>Grenz ravages Lower Lusatia, and Tieffenbach the Upper, and conquer both provinces.</p> <p>— They retreat, by orders from Vienna.</p> <p>4. The Lorrainers pass the Rhyne.</p> <p>Gronsfelt and Leslev oppose the landgrave of Hesse.</p> <p>The elector of Bavaria puts himself at the head of 20,000 men.</p> <p>Don Baltazar di Marradas commands against Arnheim, &amp;c.</p> <p>28. The revocation of Walstein agitated at Vienna.</p> <p>Mansfelt commands in the dioceses of Halberstadt and Magdeburg.</p> <p>The Croats attack Old Dresden, but repulsed.</p>



# N O V E M B E R 1631.

GUSTAVUS.	TILLY.	SWEDISH ARMIES in other Parts, &c.	IMPERIAL ARMIES in other Parts, &c.
<p>1. Hanau taken by camifado.</p> <p>5, 6. The king paffes backwards and forwards to Oxenfurt.</p> <p>— Ill of a fever. Leaves Horn in Franconia.</p> <p>7, 8. Advances towards Francfort.</p> <p>10—13. Takes Steinheim, Proccelden, Miltenberg, &amp;c. in paffing along.</p> <p>14. Croffes the Mayne at Afchaffenberg.</p> <p>15. Enters Hanau. Obtains Rufelheim from the landgrave of Hefle Darmftadt.</p> <p>16. Lies at Offenbach.</p> <p>— Makes his public entry into Francfort.</p> <p>19. Takes Hoëchft.</p> <p>20. Returns to Francfort. Joined by the landgrave of Hefle Caffel with 10,000 men.</p> <p>22. Retires to Hoëchft to perform his thankfgivings in private for taking Francfort.</p> <p>23. Forms a league with the counts of Veteravia.</p> <p>25—27. His actions near the Rhingau and near Bingen.</p> <p>29. The army returns to Francfort.</p>	<p>2. Retires into Franconia, and ftorms Mergentheim.</p> <p>— Propofes to rejoin the Lorrainers.</p> <p>5, 6. Forms a defign of taking Oxenfurt fword in hand, but without fuccels.</p> <p>7, 8, 9. Reduces feveral towns in his way to Nurenberg.</p> <p>13. Orders Offa to take Rothenberg.</p> <p>14, 15. Makes himfelf mafter of Weinheim, Guntzenhaufen, Weißenburg, and Willsburg-castle.</p> <p>16. Ravages the margraviate of Anfpach.</p> <p>17. Advances to Schwabach.</p> <p>18. Invests Nurenberg.</p> <p>23. Raifes the fieve.</p> <p>24, 25. Lies two nights at Rott, where his powder-waggons blow up.</p> <p>26. Puts his army into garriſon and winter-cantonment; one part in Bavaria, and one in the Higher Palatinate.</p> <p>28, &amp;c. Goes to Donawert.</p>	<p>1. Arnheim ſummons Prague.</p> <p>5, 6. Horn with a ſeparate army in the dioceſe of Wurtzburg, to obſerve Tilly. — Aldringer and the duke of Lorrain continue here the whole month.</p> <p>The landgrave of Hefle ſent with his own army of 10,000 men to diſturb the ſiege of Nurenberg.</p> <p>8. The elector of Saxony makes his entrance into Prague. Count Thurn publiſhes a general protection in Guſtavus's name.</p> <p>15. Banier ſent about this time to take the command in the dioceſe of Magdeburg; with him Hamilton acts and the Engliſh. — They inveſt Magdeburg for fix weeks.</p> <p>28. Arnheim and Thurn beat four imperial generals at the battle of Limburg.</p>	<p>Don Baltazar, Tieffenbach, Galas, and Goëtz act againſt Arnheim and count Thurn.</p> <p>Offa joins Tilly, and goes with him towards Bavaria.</p> <p>The duke of Bavaria appointed in effect generaliſſimo over the army of the league.</p> <p>— The Lorrainers forced to retire acroſs the Rhyne.</p>

# D E C E M B E R 1631.

GUSTAVUS	TILLY.	SWEDISH ARMIES in other Parts, &c.	IMPERIAL ARMIES in other Parts, &c.
<p>1. Marches in order to invest Heidelberg.</p> <p>2, 3. Takes several towns in the Berg-Strafs.</p> <p>4. Besieges Oppenheim fort, changing his design against Heidelberg.</p> <p>7. Posses the Rhync, and engages the Spaniards.</p> <p>8. Oppenheim town and fort surrender.</p> <p>9. The winter begins to be extremely severe.</p> <p>10. The king besieges Mentz.</p> <p>13. Mentz capitulates.</p> <p>14. Gustavus makes his public entrance, it being his birth day: [say some.]</p> <p>16. A public thanksgiving.</p> <p>18. The king surprizes Fridberg.</p> <p>22—28. The Spaniards evacuate several towns in the Palatinate.</p> <p>The city of Spire accords with the king, following the example of Wormes.</p> <p>Gustavus hears proposals from the Bavarian minister.</p> <p>— Erects a column on passing the Rhync.</p>	<p>2. Meets the elector of Bavaria, having reposed his army in winter-quarters.</p> <p>4. Takes Kitzingen.</p> <p>— Goes to Nordlingen, and there remains inactive.</p> <p>— Appoints Cratz to be velt-marchal in the Upper Palatinate.</p> <p>12. The elector of Bavaria summons a dyet at Ingolstadt.</p> <p>— Sends an ambassador to the emperor, and another to the king of Sweden.</p>	<p>3. Arnheim and Thurn take Egra; invest Budweis fruitlessly.</p> <p>4. Horn takes Kitzingen.</p> <p>10. and Weinsheim; keeping the field all the month, and making advantage of Tilly's retiring into quarters.</p> <p>12. Takes Gebfate.</p> <p>13. Arnheim and the elector return to Dresden, which displeases Gustavus, who wanted them to keep the field.</p> <p>16. Horn takes Mergentheim; he blockades Rotenberg and takes it.</p> <p>— Marches into Suabia.</p> <p>20. Besieges Hailbron and takes it.</p> <p>21. The landgrave of Hesse besieges and takes Koenigstein castle; then retires with his army into his own territories.</p> <p>— Enters the abbacy of Fulda.</p> <p>24. Magdeburg proposes to capitulate.</p> <p>Banier and Hamilton disagree about retreating.</p> <p>26. The rhingrave commands on the Moselle, and defeats the Spaniards in various rencounters, particularly near Frankendale.</p> <p>Horn returns into Franconia.</p> <p>30. Takes Guntzenhausen.</p> <p>Col. Lohauion, after a long siege, takes Doemitz in Lower Saxony.</p> <p>The dukes of Mechlenberg clear their country.</p> <p>The Swedes take Mergentheim, [i. e. Mariendal] Friedberg, Koenigstein, Hailbrun, Germerstheim, Landau, and Bingen.</p>	<p>Aldringer takes the field to relieve Rotenberg, but comes too late; he retires to Augsburg.</p> <p>Pappenheim acts in Lower Saxony.</p> <p>13. The Imperialists attempt Prague in vain.</p> <p>Wallstein accepts the generalship.</p> <p>Galas and Baltazar command in Bohemia.</p> <p>Boninghausen and Mansfelt act in Mechlenberg against the dukes, Banier, Todt, &amp;c.</p> <p>The Spaniards forsake many towns in the Palatinate.</p> <p>Pappenheim raises the siege of Magdeburg.</p>



# J A N U A R Y 1631-2.

GUSTAVUS.	TILLY.	SWEDISH ARMIES in other Parts, &c.	IMPERIAL ARMIES in other Parts, &c.
<p>Manheim taken by surprize.</p> <p>3, 4, 5. Heidelberg and Frankendale blockaded.</p> <p>Gustavus negociates with England, France, Holland, the electors Palatine and of Cologn, and the duke of Neuburg.</p> <p>10. An armistice concluded for 14 days; the king writes to Horn on the subject.</p> <p>11. Advances in the interim to Gelenhausen, to give Pappenheim battle, who had violated the truce.</p> <p>The Spaniards neglect the convention and pass the Moselle.</p> <p>19. The French ambassadors annex their subscription to the armistice, or treaty of neutrality.</p> <p>20. The king returns to Francfort with his queen.</p> <p>22. Sends the rhingrave against the Spaniards.</p> <p>24. The armistice expires.</p> <p>The king dispatches duke Bernard on a separate command, who takes several towns about Mentz.</p> <p>29. Protects the trade of Francfort by an edict.</p>	<p>3, &amp;c. Goes to Donawert and Amberg, and forms a scheme of molesting the elector of Saxony, by sending to the Imperialists 10,000 Bavarian recruits.</p> <p>10, 11. Returns to Nordlingen, to hinder Gustavus from entering Bavaria through the duchy of Wirtemberg.</p> <p>18. Sends some ordnance from Wilsburg-castle to Ossa.</p> <p>— Detaches more troops into the Upper Palatinate.</p>	<p>1. Horn continues near Weinfheim.</p> <p>2, 3. Reviews his army.</p> <p>10. Obeys the truce, and visits Iphoven and Nurenberg.</p> <p>— Joined by duke William of Saxe-Weymar.</p> <p>Wismar surrenders to Todt and the duke of Mechlenberg.</p> <p>— A battle between the garri-son and the Swedes.</p> <p>The archbishop of Bremen appears with 8000 men.</p> <p>20. The rhingrave takes Kirchberg by assault, and defeats the Spaniards near Castel: Falls afterwards into an ambuscade.</p> <p>21. Horn returns to Sweinfurt.</p> <p>25. Prepares to possess Bamberg.</p> <p>29 Takes Hochstadt.</p> <p>Duke William of Saxe-Weymar joins Banier and Hamilton in the diocese of Magdeburg.</p>	<p>Aldringer keeps an eye to the city of Augsburg, and prepares to relieve Rotenberg.</p> <p>7. Pappenheim evacuates Magdeburg; and the marquis of Hamilton repossesses it.</p> <p>12. Pappenheim quits Wolfenbuttle.</p> <p>14. The elector of Tryers publishes his manifesto with regard to France.</p> <p>22. Walstein publishes his placart to invite all deserters and discontented old commanders.</p> <p>The elector of Bavaria joins Tilly.</p> <p>Cratz made velt-maréchal under Tilly.</p> <p>Pappenheim retreats cross the Wefer to Hamelen, being pursued by the generals Todt, Lunenberg, William of Weymar, Banier, the landgrave of Hesse Cassel, and the archbishop of Bremen.</p>

# F E B R U A R Y 1631-2.

GUSTAVUS.	TILLY.	SWEDISH ARMIES in other Parts, &c.	IMPERIAL ARMIES in other Parts, &c.
1, &c. At Francfort.		1. Horn takes Bamberg—de- tained by rains and floods.	
4. Quits it to repel the Spa- niards, who had violated the truce.	2. Sends Cratz to succour Forcheim.	Marquis of Hamilton sets out to wait on the king at Francfort.	Pappenheim cuts to pieces 1500 new-raised Swedish dragoons near Corvey.
15. The king of Bohemia ar- rives at Francfort, and Lord Craven.	8—20. Employs himself in fortifying the banks of the Danube.	Banier and duke William of Weymar take Goslar, Nor- theim, Göttingen, and E- richsberg-castle.	
11 —The marquis of Hamil- ton.			13. Di Marradas recovers part of Bohemia.
His majesty goes to Höchst, where the king of Bohemia finds him.		14. The landgrave of Hesse Cassel retakes Warberg.	
— That prince regaled splen- didly by Gustavus, as like- wise a vast number of fo- reign ministers.			
Gustavus sends Oxenstiern am- bassador to Saxony, who does great service at the dyet of Torgau.			
16 —Marches to Mentz in or- der to besiege Creütz-nach.			
18. Invests Creütz-nach.	20. Goes into the Upper Pa- linate.	20. Horn prepares to invest Forcheim.	
22. Takes possession thereof.	23. Prepares himself to attack Horn.	Duke Bernard conquers the whole electorate of Mentz.	
23. Returns to Francfort.	24. Advances to Altdorf.	Palatin-Christian of Birken- felt levies troops for the king.	
24, &c. Reduces the whole bishopric of Mentz.		Count Hanau takes Drusen- heim.	
		Ulm accepts a Swedish garri- son.	
	27. Enters Forcheim.	25. Banier and duke William of Weymar receive orders to march to the king on his entering Bavaria.	
	28. Advances to Bamberg.	— Todt supplies their places.	The town of Cologne signs a neutrality with Gustavus.
		28. Horn prepares to receive Tilly.	
		— Duke William of Weymar sent to reinforce Horn, but arrived not.	





GUSTAVUS.	TILLY.	SWEDISH ARMIES in other Parts, &c.	IMPERIAL ARMIES in other Parts, &c.
1. Advances with his army to Northeim.	1, 2. Lies incamped near Rayn.		Wallstein advances towards the middle of Bohemia; supposed to command 50,000 men.
2. Joined there by Duke William of Saxe-Weymar's reinforcements.			— Crosses the Elbe near Budin; advances to Schlani. Takes Budin and Prague.
3, 4. — Erects his batteries and bridge in order to cross the Lech.	3, 4. Spreads his troops along the Lech.		
5. The battle of the Lech.	5. Defeated, and carried off the field of battle, mortally wounded.		
6. The king advances into Bavaria.			
7. Points his course to Augsburg.	6, 7, 8, &c. The Elector of Bavaria takes the command, and flies towards Ingolstadt.	7. Oxenstiern, duke Bernard, and the rhingrave oppose the Spaniards with 15,000 men.	
8. Incamps at Lechaufen.		Horn detached to pursue Tilly's army, rejoins his master at the siege of Augsburg.	
9. Summons Augsburg. [Treaty signed between France and the elector of Tryers.]	ELECTOR of BAVARIA.		
10. Gustavus receives the capitulation of Augsburg.			
11. Settles the government; restores the Lutheran religion.		13. Luca di Cagno, a Spanish general, intends a camifado, and is defeated by the rhingrave.	14. Don Philip de Sylva joins the Spaniards with 3000 men.
14. Makes his public entrance.			
15. Goes to Waho [Aicha] in his way to Ingolstadt.			
16. Invests that town.			
17, 18, 19. Employed in the siege, and repulses a vigorous assault.	18. Surprizes Ratishon.		
20. Overturned by a cannonball.	20. Tilly dies at Ingolstadt.	20. The queen of Sweden escorted by Oxenstiern to the city of Mentz.	
		21. Col. Horneck surrenders Spires to the Spaniards.	
22. Makes a journey to Neuburg.		23. Horn sent from Ingolstadt to penetrate again into Bavaria.	
24. Gives over besieging Ingolstadt.		25. Returns.	
25. Takes Mosberg.		27. He and Hepburn besiege Landshut.	
29. Goes to Landshut, which Horn and Hepburn besieged.		Todt orders the English to blockade Stade.	Pappenheim raises the blockade at Stade, and ruins Lefley's and Monro's regiments.



# M A Y 1632.

GUSTAVUS.	ELECTOR of BAVARIA.	SWEDISH ARMIES in other Parts, &c.	IMPERIAL ARMIES in other Parts, &c.
<p>4. Turns back to Mosberg.</p> <p>5. Takes Freiffingen.</p> <p>— Recals duke Bernard from the electorate of Mentz, and sends Horn thither.</p> <p>6. Advances towards Munich.</p> <p>7. Makes his public entrance.</p> <p>9. Reviews his army.</p> <p>— Leaves Hepburn governor of Munich.</p> <p>16. Quarrels with Sir H. Vane.</p> <p>20. Advances to Augsburg in order to give Ossa battle.</p> <p>25. Raises the siege of Biberach.</p> <p>27. Returns to Augsburg.</p>	<p>20. Cratz makes an irruption into Bavaria.</p> <p>27. Takes Weissenberg.</p>	<p>The rhingrave opposes Don Gonsalvo in the electorate of Tryers.</p> <p>Bauditzen takes the command against Pappenheim.</p> <p>11. Horn arrives at Francfort, to replace duke Bernard.</p>	<p>Pappenheim attempts to force a passage through Todt's army, but miscarries.</p> <p>— Goes to Wolfenbuttle. Negotiates about selling Stade to the king of Denmark.</p> <p>— Enters the territories of Hesse.</p> <p>20. Ossa besieges Biberach.</p> <p>21. Spanish generals forced to leave Spire.</p> <p>23. Greatly pressed by Oxenstiern's army and the French.</p> <p>25. Retreat with difficulty.</p> <p>26. Wallstein over-reached by Arnheim in a march. Takes Egra.</p>

# J U N E 1632.

G U S T A V U S.	ELECTOR of BAVARIA.	SWEDISH ARMIES in other Parts, &c.	IMPERIAL ARMIES in other Parts, &c.
Leaves Bavaria, and marches to Munich.	— Enters the Upper Palatinate.	Duke Bernard left to pursue Ossa, defeat Hannibal count Hohen Oems.	
— Takes Aichstadt, Dillingen, and Pappenheim-castle.	5, 6, Takes Sultzbach and Amberg.	Barier left with 2000 men at Augsburg.	6. Don Baltazar enters Lusatia.
7. Arrives at Furt.		Duke William of Weymar left with 12,000 men in Suabia.	
8, 9. Reviews his army.		10. Arnheim enters Lusatia to oppose Don Baltazar — saves Bautzen.	
10. Makes a visit to Nuremberg.	10. Advances to join Walstein, and receives from him a reinforcement of 16,000 men.	The administrator of Wirtemberg observes Ossa with 8000 men.	
— Attempts to intercept the duke of Bavaria.		Horn detached towards the Upper Palatinate.	
11.— Reaches Lauff.	13, 14. Returns towards the king.		
12.— And Hirschbruch.	<b>W A L S T E I N.</b>		
— Retakes Sultzbach.	4. Takes Prague and offers Saxony a peace.		14. Eilenbogen in Bohemia surrenders to Holk.
— Seizes the pass of Hartmannshoven.	16. Having taken Leütmeritz, approaches Egra.	17. The rhingrave besieges Coblentz, and takes it the 21st.	
— Retires to Nuremberg, on hearing Walstein and the duke of Bavaria were in full march.	— Enters the Palatinate, in order to join the elector of Bavaria, who had surprised Ratibon.	21. Besieges Trarbach, and takes it.	
19. Regains Nuremberg.		[The French army in and near the electorate of Tryers.]	
— Incamps there.	25. Joins the duke of Bavaria.	25. The elector of Saxony and Arnheim return to Dresden to listen to a negotiation, which Gustavus hinders.	
	26. Both armies advance to Neümarkt. Walstein leaves the district round Amberg.	Dewbatel, with 10,000 Swedes and Brandenburgers, enters Silesia.	
	27. Rencounter between his troops and Colonel Dewbatel.	Arnheim returns with his army, having made a very fine and artful retreat.	28. Pappenheim offers the Swedes battle.
	28. Advances to Freystadt.		
	30. Arrives at Schwabach ; and confronts the king.		



GUSTAVUS.	WALSTEIN.	SWEDISH ARMIES in other Parts, &c.	IMPERIAL ARMIES in other Parts, &c.
4. Removes his camp to Furt.	4. Intrenches at Furt.	3. Horn takes Graffenberg, after six days siege.	
5—10. Common rencounters.		— And Berncastel, and Veldentz.	Pappenheim pressed by the duke of Bavaria to make a diversion in Thuringia or Saxony, which he refuses: and then marches to raise the siege of Maltricht, July 4.
11. Oxenstiern begins his march from the electorate of Mentz, to join his master.	Commanded parties abroad.  Margraviate of Anspach ravaged.	12. Dewbatel seizes Great Glogau.  Banier recovers Munich, and drives Cratz out of Bavaria.  Duke Bernard clears the Lech from arch-duke Leopold's forces.	
		14. Bauditzen razes the fortifications of Duderstadt, and afterwards takes Einbech.  — The duke of Lunenberg besieges Duderstadt.  — Takes it the 24th.	
20. The king takes a great convoy of Walstein's.	20. Walstein sends Holk with 10,000 men into Misnia.	20. Oxenstiern joins the landgrave of Hesse Cassel; they advance into Franconia, making in all 10,000 men; wait at Wurtzburg for duke William of Weymar, who had been dispatched to bring the English, and some Swedish forces from Lower Saxony, and some Saxon regiments; in all about 8000 men.	
		24. Duke Bernard and Banier receive orders by an express to join their master.	
27. Gains intelligence of the imperial magazines at Freystadt.		25. Arnheim clears Lusatia; receives a reinforcement of 10,000 Swedes.  Horn returns to Mentz.	— Serves on the banks of the Wefer, about the end of the month.
30. Dewbatel gives that town a camifado, and destroys the magazines.		30. The duke of Lunenberg blockades Wolfenbuttle.	— Gronsfelt left to command in his room.
The king defeats General Spar, and takes him prisoner.			

# AUGUST 1632.

GUSTAVUS.	WALSTEIN.	SWEDISH ARMIES in other Parts, &c.	IMPERIAL ARMIES in other Parts, &c.
<p>1. His oration to his generals on depredations, contributions, cruelty, &amp;c.</p> <p>4, 5. Parties sent abroad.</p> <p>8. The king pays his army. — Takes Hertzog-Aurach, to facilitate the junction of his troops.</p> <p>17. His four little armies destined to join him, advance to Bruck.</p> <p>18. The king meets them and reviews them.</p> <p>20. Repairs a bridge which Walstein had broken down.</p> <p>21. The junction formed: A public thanksgiving: Battle offered to Walstein. His lines attempted.</p> <p>22. The attack continued.</p> <p>24. The desperate engagement about Altenberg-castle.</p> <p>25. The king's fine retreat.</p> <p>26. He forms a new camp close to Walstein.</p> <p>29, 30. Commanded parties sent abroad.</p>	<p>The court of Vienna highly pleased with Walstein's declining a decisive engagement.</p> <p>That general wants to enter into some accommodation with Gustavus.</p> <p>— Displeased with velt-marchal Cratz.</p> <p>— Sends parties abroad all the beginning of the month.</p> <p>21. Renders his intrenchments extremely strong.</p> <p>24. Makes a very obstinate resistance.</p> <p>26. Sends parties abroad till the end of the month.</p>	<p>1. Lunenberg and Bauditzen divide their armies.</p> <p>Bauditzen, in Pappenheim's absence, breaks into Westphalia. Surprises Warburg and besieges Paderborn the 12th: Raises the siege the 21st.</p> <p>6. Horn routs the Imperialists near Strasburg.</p> <p>9. Arnheim and the Swedes take Breslau.</p> <p>10, 11. Oxenstiern's and duke William of Weymar's armies advance to join each other: Which junction was formed the 13th.</p> <p>Horn enters Strasburg.</p> <p>11.—Advances into the Lower Palatinate.</p> <p>13, 14. Duke Bernard's and Banier's armies unite with Oxenstiern's and duke William of Weymar's between Kitzingen and Weinsheim, having marched through the bishopric of Aichstadt into Franconia.</p> <p>15. Horn raises the siege of Willoch.</p> <p>17.—Cuts to pieces 1000 imperial cavalry by means of an ambuscade. Pushes Montecuculi across the Rhyne.</p> <p>The combined Swedish armies reach Hertzog-Aurach.</p> <p>18.—Lie at Bruck.</p> <p>— Arnheim and Dubalt gain the battle of Limburg.</p> <p>21. The combined Swedish armies all conjoin with their master.</p> <p>Horn obtains Strasburg-bridge.</p> <p>22.—Enters Upper Alsatia. Leaves Dewbatel to besiege Stolhoven.</p> <p>26. Little Jacob joins Bauditzen with 3000 cavalry.</p> <p>30. Horn enters Suabia to assist the Wirtembergers, and takes Offenburg, and Ortenberg-castle.</p>	<p>13. Holk makes an irruption into Vogtland, having taken Zwicka the 12th.</p> <p>16, 17, &amp;c.—Ravages Misnia.</p> <p>21. Gronsfelt forces Bauditzen to retire.</p> <p>Pappenheim's great effort towards raising the siege of Mastricht.</p> <p>23.—Repasses the Rhyne.</p> <p>Montecuculi leaves Alsatia to assist in Bavaria.</p>



# S E P T E M B E R 1632.

GUSTAVUS.	WALSTEIN.	SWEDISH ARMIES in other Parts, &c.	IMPERIAL ARMIES in other Parts, &c.
<p>1, 2, 3, Small rencounters.</p> <p>4. The King explains himself to the Nurenbergers about decamping.</p> <p>7. A public annual commemoration for the victory at Leipzig.</p> <p>8. The king dislodges.</p> <p>9. Lies at Neustadt.</p> <p>13. Removes to Weinsheim.</p> <p>14. Divides his army.</p> <p>15. Returns with half thereof towards Nurenberg, but then marches into Bavaria.</p> <p>— Recalled to Nurenberg by a letter from Oxenstiern.</p> <p>21. Lies at Dunkelspiel.</p> <p>23. At Nordlingen; thence advances to relieve Rayn.</p> <p>25. Mitzval surrenders Rayn.</p> <p>27. The king cuts to pieces 400 Croatsians near the Lech.</p>	<p>1—10. Sends abroad commanded parties.</p> <p>12. Dislodges.</p> <p>14. Arrives at Forcheim.</p> <p>21. Summons Culmbach.</p> <p>24. Advances to Bamberg.</p> <p>25. Parts with the elector of Bavaria and his army.</p> <p>Montecuculi takes Rayn, and attempts fruitlessly to hinder the king from crossing the Lech.</p> <p>29. Walstein takes Bareuth.</p>	<p>Oxenstiern stays at Nurenberg with General Bauditzen.</p> <p>5. Horn returns to Strasburg. —He and Dewbatel command in Alfatia.</p> <p>9. Horn besieges Benfelden.</p> <p>15. Duke Bernard, with 12,000 men, sent to observe Walstein in Franconia on one side, and Pappenheim on the other.</p> <p>Duke William sent to collect some Swedes and English which lay near Hanover.</p> <p>Hamilton and Hepburn leave the King and set out for England.</p> <p>22. Bauditzen enters Hesse. Arnheim in Silesia and Lusatia.</p> <p>24. The duke of Lunenburg forced by Gronsfelt to raise the siege of Wolfenbuttle.</p> <p>Ruthven and the administrator of Wirtemberg command in Suabia.</p> <p>— And the duke of Mecklenberg in Lower Saxony.</p>	<p>13. Galas besieges Lauff.</p> <p>19. Pappenheim appears in the abbacy of Corvey in Westphalia.</p> <p>20. Pursues Bauditzen 20 miles.</p> <p>— Montecuculi opposes the Swedes and English near Hanover.</p> <p>— Gronsfelt, Boninghausen, and Mansfelt act all in Lower Saxony.</p> <p>Offa commands against Ruthven, &amp;c. in Suabia.</p> <p>22. The two young dukes of Tuscany go to serve in Walstein's army.</p> <p>Marradas, Tieffenbach, and Goetz act against Arnheim.</p> <p>Tieffenbach sent into Austria to repress the insurrection of the peasants.</p> <p>24. Galas ravages Vogtland and Misnia.</p> <p>25. Aldringer detached by Walstein to assist the elector of Bavaria.</p>

# OCTOBER 1632.

GUSTAVUS.	WALSTEIN.	SWEDISH ARMIES in other Parts, &c.	IMPERIAL ARMIES in other Parts, &c.
1, 2. Passes the Lech.	1. Takes Coburg.	1. Duke Bernard advances to raise the siege of Coburg.	1. Galas takes Chemnitz. 2. Pappenheim ordered to join Walstein; sends Morosini against Baudouin, and leaves Gronsfelt to observe the duke of Lunenburg. — Raises contributions from Mullhausen. — Attempts Erfurt fruitlessly; marches on to Walstein.
3. Retakes Rayn. — And Landsberg.	3. Repulsed at Coburg-castle.		3. Holk and Galas conjoin their armies in Misnia.
5. At Neuburg on the Danube beheads col. Minvil.	5. Advances into Vogtland.		4. — Take Freyberg.
6, 7. Prepares to besiege some towns in Bavaria, particularly Ingoldstadt.	8, 9. Gains several towns in Vogtland.	Ruthven and the administrator of Wirtemberg act against Ossa in the circle of Suabia.	
8. Marches to Nordlingen.	10. Arrives at Plauen.		
	11. Forms a camp at Weida.		12. — And Wurtzen.
12. Orders Kniphausen to retake Lauff.	13, 14. Advances towards Leipzig.		
13, 14. Pursues and defeats col. Munich.			
15. Returns to Nuremberg, where he is recruited by 5000 Switzers.	17. Sends some cavalry to make a bravado upon it.		
17. Advances towards his army.	18. Summons it to capitulate.		
19. Arrives at Kitzingen, and meets his queen.	19. Takes Weissenfels.		
21. Joins duke Bernard at Schleussing, having marched from Bavaria into Thuringia in 14 days.	20, 21. Besieges Leipzig.		
23. Reaches Arnstadt; stays there some days. — Incorporates the English and Scottish amongst his other regiments.	22. Takes the town.		
Oxenstiern returns to Nuremberg.	23. — And the castle [Pleissenberg.]		
28. The queen of Sweden arrives.	25, &c. Reduces other towns in Misnia.		
— The king reviews his troops at Erfurt.	28. Forms his junction with Pappenheim.	28. Horn takes Bensfelden, after a siege of near 8 weeks.	
29. Marches 13 miles beyond Erfurt.			
30. Continues his march.			



# NOVEMBER 1632.

GUSTAVUS.	WALSTEIN.	SWEDISH ARMIES in other Parts, &c.	IMPERIAL ARMIES in other Parts, &c.
<p>1. Thursday, arrives at Naumburg.</p> <p>2. Displeased at being deified by the people.</p> <p>3. Intrenches himself, not proposing to hazard a battle.</p> <p>4. Intercepts Coloredo's letter.</p> <p>5. Reconnoitres Walstein's lines.</p> <p>— Resolved to fight on Pappenheim's absence.</p> <p>6. Gains the victory at Lützen.</p> <p>— Killed.</p> <p>N. B. When his Majesty died he left six armies in the field, besides his own; namely, Kniphausen's in Lower Saxony, Dubalt's in Silesia, the Palatin of Birkenfeldt's in Bavaria, Bauditzzen's in the electorate of Cologne, Horn's in Alsatia, and Ruthven's in Suabia; not to mention four confederate armies, viz. the Saxons, Hessians, the troops of Lunenberg, and Bremen.</p>	<p>1. Sends some cavalry to Leipzig, and removes to Weissenfels.</p> <p>4. Detaches Pappenheim to Halle.</p> <p>5. Prepares for the battle.</p> <p>6. Defeated, and flies.</p>		





A P P E N D I X

T O T H E

H I S T O R Y of the L I F E

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*G U S T A V U S A D O L P H U S.*





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## A P P E N D I X



# A P P E N D I X

T O T H E

H I S T O R Y of the L I F E

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G U S T A V U S A D O L P H U S.

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## I.

ORATIO GUSTAVI ADOLPHI Helsingfordæ in comitiis  
habita, mense Januarii, A.D. M.DC.XV. ætatis suæ XXI. \*

**I**LLUSTRES, generosi domini, nobilissimi, clarissimi, prudentes ac honesti. Ego quidem in præterito quadriennio, quo per omnipotentis providentiam huic regio imperio præfui, libenter & sæpe quæsissem occasionem, quomodo possem aliquando de harum provinciarum conditione, & omnium vestrum statu certi quid cognoscere: ut in tempore, quod ad omnium vestrum salutem facit, ita ordinare ac disponere possim: quò sub meo imperio queatis (in quantum his incommodis temporibus fieri potest) servari per legum & legitimarum sanctionum custodiam; & ut ipse (prout à Deo mihi commissa potestas hoc exigit) possim querelas vestras & gravamina comperire, & postea illis remedia comparare; sed quàm libenter hoc effectui dedissem, & quantum mihi hoc cordi curæque fuerit; tamen ab hoc per multiplices difficultates, quas bellum secum traxit, semper præpeditus fui ad hoc usque tempus & oblatam occasionem. Hanc autem prætermittere nolui quo minus. Vos omnes ad me & hæc comitia vocarem: ut vobiscum non solum harum provinciarum negotia perpenderem, sed etiam vobiscum agerem de rebus quibusdam, quæ pertinent ad commune regni & charissimæ patriæ nostræ bonum & salutem. Itaque gratias vobis benevolas ago, quod tam promptè, quàm bonos & fideles subditos decet, hîc conveneritis. In memoriam vobis satis revocatis, quomodo Sigismundus rex Poloniæ eo tempore, quo secundum jus suum hæreditarium ad regiam dignitatem ascenderat, hîc in dilectâ nostrâ patriâ statim ab initio, & postea continuè quoties occasio hoc

1615.

\* It was pronounced originally in Swedish, and translated verbatim by Loccenius. Hist. Suec. 4to, 526.

1615. ipsi dictare videbatur, eò annisus est, ut nos deducet à purâ & verâ apostolicâ doctrinâ; & occideret nos pontificiis erroribus ac tenebris, quò omnia ejus consilia & molitiones, tam accommodationis quadam specie, quàm infidelis & vi directæ erant. Ille ut impedirentur, rex Carolus, dilectissimus & honoratissimus meus dominus pater laudatissimæ memoriæ, unâ cum pluribus aliis rectè sentientibus christianis, Suecis, & patriæ verè amantibus viris, summo opere studuit. Super istac extranea cepit arma Sigismundus, eaque in regnum, patriam suam introduxit, & regni incolas ad civile bellum adversus seiplos concitavit & irritavit, & persecutus est beatæ memoriæ dominum parentem meum & illos, donec ipse & illi, necessitate coacti, defensionis arma contra Sigismundum capefferent, quibus ejus & asselarum illius machinationes anno 1598, ad Lincopiam, divinæ gratiæ providentiâ, frangebantur & irritæ reddebantur, ejusque & asselarum contra Deum & patriam perjurium puniebatur & vindicabatur. Inde quoque contra recens pactum ibi præstitum, patriam suam deseruit, omnem offensam & turbationem post se relinquens; per quæ non modò multi honesti viri, sed etiam totius regni status periclitari inò prorsus interire potuissent. Quamvis autem beatæ memoriæ dominus parens meus & regni ordines satis causæ habuissent regium imperium statim ab eo ad alium transferendû; tamen prius in diversis comitiis & conventibus ipsi & ipsius filio hoc obtulerunt. Sed ab ipso deinceps nihil aliud agitatum & susceptum est, quàm damnosum bellum adversus hoc regnum, per quod postea universi regni ordines permoti sunt ad abjudicandum & renunciandum ei jus suum hæreditarium ad hoc nostræ patriæ regimen & imperium; & de cætero mutarunt veterem unionem hæreditariam, atque in beatæ memoriæ dominum parentem meum transtulerunt; prout Norcopiensis & plures recessus, unâ cum renunciacionibus in publicum editis, ulterius continent ac ostendunt quas ut annihilaret Sigismundus rex, postmodò vi & astutiâ operam dedit. Ut autem eò melius reliquum suum propositum hoc modo persequi & promovere posset, exinde non solum bello, sed etiam vanorum scriptorum copiâ hunc præsentem regni statum perturbatum ivit, velut quoque præterito tempore bello in Livoniâ, & diversis diplomatibus ac mandatis huc in regnum missis & disseminatis satis testatum fecit, in quibus non modò dominum parentem beatæ memoriæ & me, sed etiam omnes regni ordines famosis & falsò effectis scriptis, nostras & illorum actiones & facta laude digna conatur Sueciæ subditis totique mundo odiosa reddere. Ego me diversis temporibus ad amicam reconciliationem scripto obtuli: ut daturum illud & cruentum bellum aliquando deponeretur, atque provinciæ & regna salutarem pacem degustarent, & mala bellum concomitantia tandem cessarent. Sed ille nihil aliud quàm probrosa verba rescripsit, magis ad perturbationem, quàm conciliationem facientia. Ulterius contra inducias inter Sueciæ & Poloniæ delegatos præteritâ æstate factas, mandata & libellos famosos huc in Sueciam misit, eo fine, ut per eos, vos à pacis obligatione (qua vos in ante dicto induciarum pacto parenti meo & mihi devinxistis) abduceret, & sic discordiam, quiddam, acque, si fieri posset, intestinum bellum excitaret, à quibus periculosis ejus consiliis vos benevole dehortor. Dat vobis dulcia & fallacia verba, dolet vestras vires & statum, quærit tamen sub eo fucò vos in graves condiciones conjicere. Vocaturatur de eo in suis diplomatibus, quod in bello cum vicinis vestris & circumjacentibus regnis vertimini; sed non addit, quod libenter vos à vestro juramento seducere, atque ad intestinum bellum irritare velit. Artificiosè quoque dissimulare & reticere potest, quis in causâ fuerit, ut cum vicinis nostris

Russis



Russis incideremus in hoc bellum. In summa hoc agit, ut quovis modo subditorum meorum animos à me abducere possit & alienare, atque sic plus motuum creare. Quapropter vos gratosè monitos volo, ut vobis ab hujusmodi scriptis caveatis, & vestros vicinos, conterraneos & parœcianos adhortemini, ne quis vestrum per ea circumveniat. Ut verò eò melius & reipsa intelligatis Sigismundi artes, quibus semper usus est, provincias & regna populatus est, multas turbas, bellum & sanguinis effusionem procuravit, constitui summam coram vobis repetere, quomodo non solum in animo habuerit per bellum in Russia gestum subigere nostram patriam, sed etiam quomodo præcipuà in causà (post delictorum poenam) fuerit, ut implicaremur huic Russico bello, & quâ ficta specie deceiverit Russos; ut inde postea colligere possitis, quid intendat cum suis diplomatibus. Hoc satis notum est, quum rex Poloniæ, bello in Poloniam traducto, contra Sueciæ regnum nihil efficere possit, & ille cum suis & pontificii legati consiliis & auxiliis, modum & viam parentem meum beatæ memoriæ & Sueciæ regnum occupandi ferme impossibilem deprehenderet, aliud excogitat medium, atque sic conatur uno malleo duos ictus facere, ut dici solet. Polonis enim dabatur occasio, ficto dolo Russos ad intestinam perducendi discordiam; in qua sibi non difficile fore arbitrabantur, sive unum provehendi ad imperium, qui cum illis facturus esset, sive totam Russiam sibi subjiciendi. Erat in Russia anno 1605, Boritz Fœdorovitz Gudenou, qui ex vili genere & ortu erat, & czaris Frederici affinis, suo tempore stabuli magistri officium gerens, quum verò factus esset czaris affinis, præponebat eum (quia ipse parum cordatus erat) toti Russiæ, qua re ipsi ansa dabatur plebem in suam fidem & obsequium adducendi, & quia videbat, czarem improlem esse, cogitabat de viâ magnum ducatum sub se redigendi. Sed ipsi obstaculo erat Johannis Basilii, quondam czaris minimus natu filius, Frederici Ivanovitz frater, nomine Demetrius: eoque hunc clam occidi facit. Quum verò czar Fredericus Ivanovitz obiisset absque hæredibus, plebs desiderabat dictum Boritz, qui, pro vulgi arbitrato, non malè præfuerat imperio, defuncto czari succedere. Alioqui sibi in suâ administratoris dignitate quandam auctoritatem & existimationem conciliarat; ita ut magnates, qui possent ratione consanguinitatis esse proximi imperio, non auderent populo contradicere; sed ipsi cogerentur, licet inviti, dictum Boritz eligere in czarem. Sed ille per decennium, quo Russiam regebat, primatum invidiam & odium magis & magis in se derivabat. Quum ergo rex Poloniæ comperisset, istum in omnium Russorum odio tandem esse, effingendum sibi aliquid & tentandum esse cogitabat, quo seditio & intestinum dissidium inter Russiæ incolas cieri posset; nihil moratus, quod ante quinquennium pacem & amicitiam ad XX annos cum eodem Boritz fecisset. Sed reperiebat fugitivum monachum gente Russum, qui ex vili Otrapiorum genere ortus, nomine Griska erat. Hunc monachum Sigismundus putabat esse idoneum, per quem consilium suum effectui mandaret; quia astutus homo & magus erat. Idcirco evulgabatur morem, istum monachum esse Demetrium, Johannis Basilii minimum natu filium, sparsis in Russia (secundum morem ejus hic in regno præterita ætate usitatum) non paucis diplomatibus & literis sub istius Demetrii nomine, prætendens, verum Demetrium non fuisse interfectum, sed illos, qui in mandatis habebant, eum occidere, subduxisse eum & abdidisse in monasterium, ubi in hunc diem educatus esset, & postea, quum ad maturam ætatem pervenisset, se contulisse in Lithuaniam, ut Boritzii tyrannidem eflugeret, ideo monebat eos, ut à Boritzio desciscerent ad illum, qui verus eorum dominus esset. Rex etiam monebat

1615. Woiwodam de Sandomiria, ut quasi per seipsum, ei aliquot millium auxilium præstaret, quod etiam fecit. Ita monachus iste, submentito Demetrii nomine, cum illo exercitu pergebat, & obsidebat aliquot Russicas urbes; quæ se confestim à rege Poloniæ & commento ejus decipi patiebantur. Russi, qui satis sciebant dolum subesse initio quidem ei aliquantum resistebant, sic ut rex cogeretur monacho suo plus auxilium copiarum mittere. Tandem tamen tædio Boritziani imperii afficiebantur, ita ut majorum ac minorum gentium subditi ab eo deficerent, & in partes Demetrii passim transirent. Itaque postquam rex Demetrii sui successum cognovit, foedus cum eo inivit, & promisit ei imperium Muscoviticum, & nuptias Sandomirii principis filiae. Ipsum contra obligatum iri ad introducendam pontificiam religionem in Russiam, & ad juvandum regem Poloniæ in occupatione regni Sueciæ, cum aliis hujusmodi. Proinde rex ei ingentem exercitum auxilio misit; quo nonnullos cogebat, nonnullos ex imprudentia putantes ipsum genuinum czaris filium esse, impellebat ad suas partes sequendum, quidam, ex invidia & odio Boritzii imperii, ei ultrò accedebant; donec Boritzius ex desperatione sibi ipsi mortem consciscerebat. Boritzii filius ad aliquot hebdomadas post patrem suum administrabat imperium; sed ille quoque cum matre suâ veneno sublatus est. Itaque regis Sigismundi monachus ad Russicum imperium coronatur in urbe Muscovicâ. Hic ex Boritzii casu sibi quivis cautelæ exemplum capiat, ac videat, quomodo DEUS plectat illos, qui per latrocinium & malas artes extollunt se in domini sui sedem ac thronum; etiamsi DEUS hoc ad tempus ferat; fera tamen & gravis pœna cum vindicta tandem supervenit. Hic etiam vobis considerare & cernere integrum est, quid Sigismundus rex libellis aut scriptis suis emissiis effecerit, & quomodo dictum Boritzium imperio & vitâ dejecerit, & monachum exaltarit, Russos perturbavit: unde postea omnes hi motus exorti sunt. Potestis insuper ex his judicare & colligere, quàm periculosum propositum hujusmodi scriptis, quæ indies huc mittit, adversus patriam nostram conceperit, à quo DEUS nos clementer custodiat. Quilibet sapiens vir etiam bene pendere potest, in quanto discrimine Sueciæ regnum chara nostra patria versata sit, quando iste regis Poloniæ monachus imperium Russiæ tenebat: erant enim illi foedere conjuncti; erant unius pontificiæ religionis; erant duorum potentium regnorum, nobis vicinorum, compotes, ita ut, nisi DEUS illorum consilia prævenisset & fregisset, impossibile coram humanis oculis fuisset, se contra illos defendere. Sed ut illud sacrum dictum habet: Decerne consilium, & fiat irritum; armate vos, & tamen fugam capite: quia DEUS nobiscum est; pro quo ipsi gloria sit. Quum enim iste Demetrius dicto modo à rege Poloniæ extolleretur ad impem Russiæ, statim cogitabat de servando pacto suo, omnis generis præparationem ad bellum faciebat, quo secum animo constituerat adoriri Sueciæ regnum. Sed quum ei, secundum ante dicti foederis tenorem, etiam illud pactum fervaretur, ut principis Sandomirii filia ei nuptiis daretur, & videretur firmum foedus inter Russiam & Poloniam coaliturum, atque in nos redundaturum, DEUS aliam ingrediebatur viam. In ipsis enim nuptiarum diebus excitabat DEUS Russicum dominum, nomine Basilium Ivanovitz Suski, qui satis sciebat, hoc merè fictum opus cum isto Demetrio esse. Ille fastidivit Polonicum istud imperium; proinde commovit populum, & ipsos quoque magnates, ut eorum favor in ipsum inclinaret, atq; sic, occiso pseudo Demetrio cum suis Polonis, ab ipso pendentibus, hunc Basilium Ivanovitz eligunt sibi czarem. Hic dictum foedus jam cum suo Demetrio expiraverat, hic omnia cassæ erant, pro quibus tamdiu laborant,



rarant, hinc etiam amicitia inter Polonos & Russos in merum odium, vindictæ cupiditatem, & apertum bellum conversa ac mutata erat. Sigismundi regis animo non parum ægrè erat, quod ejus consilium in Russia non feliciter cessisset; putabat tamen, hinc nondum quiescendum esse; idcirco cum ingenti exercitu à se armato ipse proficiscebatur in Russiam. Ut autem Russis, tunc vacillare incipientibus ulterius imponeret, iterum spargebat rumorem de Demetrio, quasi non occiso, sed elapso, & apud se in castris præsentem. Sic Russi, pro barbaricâ suâ levitate, majore sui parte iterum deficiebant à czare suo & revertebantur ad partes Poloni, qua defectione Polonorum castra ita roborabantur, ut czarem & paucos illos, qui adhuc in fide ejus erant, in urbe Muscovia obsidione cingerent, & in tantas angustias redigerent, ut auxilium à patre meo p. m. petere cogerentur; quia verò dominus parens meus haud ignorabat, quanti periculi res futura esset, si rex Poloniæ Russiâ potiri deberet, regia ejus majestas suæ & patriæ securitatis causa, desiderio ejus deesse non poterat. Itaque eò mittebat exercitum suum, & czarem liberabat obsidione; & totam Russiam liberasset, si quorundam extraneorum proditio non intervenisset, prout multis vestrum notum esse potest, qui ipsi adfuerunt. Hæc peregrinorum defectione tantum effecit, ut rex Sigismundus Russiam occuparet, & filium suum, czarem fieri curaret, & Basilium monachum faceret. Per hanc occasionem regis Poloniæ molitiones, quas parens meus beatæ memoriæ, patriæ securitatis causa, non poterat non impedire, primùm incidimus in hæc Russica negotia, quæ postea anno 1613, per Russorum dolum malum eruperunt in hoc bellum. Non potest illud absque admiratione tam extraneorum, quàm incolarum abire, quomodo factum sit, ut nos tam subito cum Russis, quibus nuper auxilium ferebamus, quique nostri amici erant, adeò cruentum bellum nacti simus. Ut ejus rei causam sciatis, & reip̃a videatis, eam ex merâ Russorum inconstantia & perfidia profectam esse, paucis coram vobis referam. Postquam beatæ memoriæ dominus parens meus, ut prius dictum est, ita propter regis Sigismundi molitiones permotus erat, ut succurreret Russis, pro qua re ipsi promissa erat Kexholmia ejusque ditio in remunerationem expensarum; quantumvis autem czarem Russiæ liberasset ab obsidione ferme triennali Muscoviæ urbis: non tamen poterat castelli Kexholmensis compos fieri, nisi illud obsidere & vi cogere deberet. Atque quum Kexholmia jam occupata esset, regia ejus majestas satis rationis habuisset ad dispiciendum, quomodo de circumjacente terra sibi statim in rem suam consulere potuisset; quia Russi paulò ante Uladislauum regis Poloniæ filium, parentis mei inimicum, sibi elegerant in czarem. Nihilominus tamen regia majestas in mandatis dederat suo mareschallo, ut solummodò invigilaret horum finium defensionem. Sed quum Russos pœniteret, quod Polonis subjecti essent, qui crudeliter & violenter illis imperarent, recolligebant se suasque copias, tam validas, ut urbem Muscoviam & Polonos in eâ obsiderent. Quum tamen vererentur, se impares fore obsidioni persequendæ, ex castris ad Muscoviam scribunt Novogardiam, & cives istic jubent petere Campidominum sibi auxilio. Qui quum ex ipsorum desiderio advenisset, Russorum conditio quotidie melior fiebat, partim ob Polonicorum militum seditionem, partim ob alias dissensiones inter Polonos natas, ita uti Russi sibi persuaderent, se per seip̃os hoc bene effecturos. Sed Novogardenses hac occasione circumventum ibant Campidominum, & blandis verbis eum tam diu detinebant, ut omnis ejus exercitus ad extremam famem reductus esset, ea re deinceps adductus est ad occupandam urbem Novogardensem. Hoc facto, Ordines Novogardenses, qui in arce erant, inibant contractum cum

1615. Campidomino, nimirum quod vellent unum ex domini parentis mei filiis sibi dominum & czarem eligere, quod etiam postea à proceribus in Muscovia approbatum est, secundum hujus contractus vigorem postmodò omnes reliquæ domus occupabantur. Posteaquam Russi Polonos, qui in urbe Moschâ erant, tamdiu fame torserant, ut cogerentur arcem & urbem dedere; isti (*Russi*) adeò animis inflati sunt, ut non solum obliviscerentur promissi de Carolo Philippo principe fratre meo in czarem creando; sed etiam omnium gentium juris. Non enim modò alium sibi czarem eligeabant; sed quoque nostros milites, qui Tiphini & Augdoæ erant, ex improvviso obruebant (secundum Nougardensium proprium desiderium, in illorum securitatem qui in præfidiis locati erant) eosque misere trucidabant, quod adhuc tolerari potuisset, si amicæ transactioni se accommodare voluissent. Ad eos diversæ literæ monitoriæ scribebantur, ut nobiscum amicè agere vellent. Sed illi eas literas quasi metu scriptas interpretabantur: ingentem enim exercitum ad Brunitz collocatum habebant. Ut autem illis ostenderem, se sibi ipsis imponere, per mea agmina ad Nougardam stantia excursionem ad eorum castra Brunitzensia fieri jubebam, obsidebam quoque Augdoam; & Deo favente ad Brunitziam sedentes cædebantur, & Augdoa capiebatur. Ut autem mundus intelligeret, quantum mihi displiceret sanguinis effusio & cruentum bellum, deinde ex urbe Narvâ per Campidominum, Aulæ & Campi Marescallum, senatum Russicum ulterius admoneri faciebam, ut ad amicam compositionem animum applicare velint instruebam quoque Campi Marescallum Jesperum Andreæ & Magnum Martini potestate cum illis volentibus transigendi, sed illi probrosa & inania dicta regerebant. Interea tantum valui apud Magnæ Britanniæ Reges & Ordines Belgicæ, ut suos legatos ad hujus negotii compositionem mitterent. Illi quoque jam ad ipsius compositionis actum convenerunt, quomodo verò Deus illorum animos ad justitiam & pacem flectere possit, tempus docebit. Hunc in modum res processit, & nos ad Russicum bellum devenimus, quod mihi, per hoc triennium, impossibile fuit amovere ob hostis pertinaciam; quantæcunque etiam mihi curæ fuit. Spero tamen, Deum per media, quæ nunc dedit, omnia in bonum versurum. Quum ergo ita sit, quod rex Poloniæ omni conatu, diplomatibus & mendacibus scriptis, bello per Livoniam & Russiam, suscitato, hoc agit, uti dictum est, ut dilectam nostram patriam in perniciem præcipitet, & pontificis ac Polonorum servitutis jugo subjiciat; ideo cauto opus est, ne ab illis vos seduci patiamini, velut Russi fecerunt, sed eorum exemplum vos circumspectos faciat, considerantes, quot diversa mala imperiorum mutationes secum trahant; præsertim quando sit per intestinam discordiam. Proinde revocate vobis semper in memoriam varias obligationes, quibus dn. parenti meo beatæ memoriæ & mihi diversis temporibus vos obstrinxistis, additis scriptis & corporalibus gravibus juramentis. Ne quoque oblivioni tradatis immentia pericula ac molestias, quas pater meus b. m. & ego multis modis, vestræ salutis causa, passi sumus & sustinuimus. Intuemini porrò causas & ipsum fundamentum belli Russici, quod non regiæ majestatis b. m. vel meâ culpâ ceptum & tamdiu continuatum est; sed quod ducit originem suam veram ex ipsorum Russorum perfidia & perviciaciâ. Vos itaque boni viri velitis perseverare in illa fidelitate, quam hactenus in vobis comperi, sic ego de cætero quoque, ut hactenus, vestræ salutis summopere studebo operamque dabo, ut vos reducam ad pacem, quietem & meliorem statum; ad quod Deus omnipotens gratiam suam largiatur.



## II.

COPY of Mr. LILLY (the Astrologer's) Letter to the King of SWEDEN upon his receiving an honorary Reward of a gold Medal.

In the Ashmolean Museum MSS. N<sup>o</sup>. 8365.

[This letter was written about 1612, when Gustavus was 18 years of age.]

S I R,

**T**HAT munificent honorarium, sent from your royal hand by our valiant 1612. countryman captain Owen Cox; he (accompanied with the right honourable Sir George Askew) delivered unto me the 5th of October last, (stylo ver.) which, with all humble thankfulness, I did receive.

But finding my weak labours have met with so great esteem in your princely thoughts, even to invite a king, from the treasure of his own virtue, and in the midst of those busy engagements your majesty has now on foot before Copenhagen, to cast your no less gracious aspect than high testimony of favour upon me, is a consideration that would surprise me with the greatest admiration, did not I perfectly see the measure of princes benefit holds more proportion with the largeness of their heart than merit of those on whom bestowed.

What brought me to honour your heroick name, and thence led on the engagement of my pen, in behalf of yourself and nation, was the large relations my only English Mécenas (the right honourable the lord Whitlock at his return from Sweden) gave me of those princely endowments, your heroick virtues and generous inclinations: and now give me leave with humble resolves to engage, that forasmuch as your majesty's favour, like a beam cast from that king of planets, has out of your innate goodness, conveyed influence upon so obscure and remote a person, your majesty shall assuredly draw to yourself greater obligations than hitherto I could manifest; together with the resolution of sailing after your own ship, and under the fortune of your own trophy through the most perilous seas and trial of all your concernment.

And while my being is continued on earth will I retain this signal of your kindness as my chiefest treasure; intending moreover its future preservation in some eminent and publick place, and with such an inscription as shall ennoble your princely bounty, and record my humble gratitude to all posterity.

That God whose great name the reverse of your medal wears dispose of all your designs, and may the guardian angel of Sweden, happily carry on your sword with compleat and continual victory, and plant your trophies

1612. phies throughout the dominions of all your enemies, these are and shall be a part of the earnest and hearty votes of

Your majesty's most humble

and most obliged servant,

A true Copy, Jan. 8, 1759.  
Wm. Huddesford.

W. LILLY.

### III.

LE CAPITOLATIONI della compagnia dell' Indie Orientali e Occidentali, instituta dal rè GUSTAVO ADOLFO di Suetia per beneficio de suoi sudditi, fino dell' anno 1626 \*, che poi fù da lui pochi giorni innanzi la sua morte estesa anco alli sudditi de suoi confederati, e di tutta Alama-gna, con amplissimi privilegi, e sono li seguenti †.

1626. I. **C**HE fra dodici anni à venire nissuno soggetto al regno di Suetia trapasando lo stretto di Gibilterra con altro titolo, che della general compagnia negoziasse nell' Africa, nell' Asia, nell' America, nella Magallanica, ò ne' paesi Au-trali sotto pena della perdita delle navi, e di tutte le mercantie; & i padroni delle navi, i quali in simili paesi haveessero traficato, fossero tenuti render conto de' loro negotii, e come trasgressori de gli ordini, e decreti regii, fossero puniti.

II. Che questa compagnia s'intendesse cominciata al prima di Maggio 1627, e durasse fino à dodici anni venturi; nel qual tempo à nissuno de' compagni fosse lecito ripigliare il danaro sborsato; nè introdurre à parte del negotio altre persone; se poi decorsi i dodici anni parerà alla compagnia prolungare il tempo del privilegio, egli concede questa proroga in quel modo, che più piacerà.

III. Che ciascun anno si saldassero i conti, a i quali potessero esser presenti tutti quelli, che di sua parte haveessero posti nella compagnia mille scudi. Ogni sei anni si facesse un computo finale di tutti i conti; imperocchè se'l guadagno, e l'utile (il che non voglia Dio) non corrisponda al danaro postovi, in guisa, che à gl'interessati non paia doverli continuar la compagnia, all'hora fosse disciolta.

IV. Che si notificassè à tutti con publici editti, che ciascuno entrar potessè in questa compagnia, dandosi di tempo à gli habitatori del regno di Suetia fino alle calende di Marzo, & a' forestieri fino al primo di Maggio; di modo, che chi vorrà ne terà il danaro nella compagnia debba pagarlo in quattro volte; cioè una parte nel termine prescritto, e le altre tre parti in tre anni venturi.

\* Innocentius says in 1627.

† Commentaire de la Guerre successe in Alemagna, &c. Descritto dal Sign. Conte d'Alacorn. In Venet. 4to, 1654.



V. Scorso il tempo prescritto si elegano i soprastanti, i quali solo siano tanti di numero, quante centinaia di migliaia di scudi fossero contati; se però tal'uno quale avesse contribuito cento mila scudi non volesse due soprastanti, i quali però haver dovessero il salario, come se fossero un solo.

VI. I soprastanti debbano essere eletti con i voti comuni de' partecipanti, e chi non avesse contribuito mille scudi, non habbi voto nell' elezione; e nessuno sia eletto per soprstante, il quale non habbia contribuito due mila scudi.

VII. I soprastanti primieramente eletti durino nel loro officio per sei anni; e passato quello termine delle tre parti di loro, due fossero di nuovo elette; e per la terza parte fossero sostituiti i principali de' partecipanti, il che così si osservasse ogni due anni, doppo i sei anni decorati, finche terminasse il tempo prefisso nel privilegio.

VIII. Che tutti, e qualunque si fosse tanto del paese, come stranieri, che contribuito avesse nella compagnia 100 mila scudi, costituissero se gli pareva un soprstante, & a questo fine fossero apparecchiate tutte le nationi con le scritture del contratto, acciò per mezzo di quelle possano trasmettere il denaro nelle mani di coloro, ch' essi stimano fedeli, e buoni; E che ciascuno nella sua partita scrivesse a qual natione aggregar si volesse. Li forastieri, che risolvendosi habitare nel regno di Suetia contribuiranno 25, mila scudi nella compagnia, godano l'istesse ragioni, che i terrazzani, e siano liberi da ogni tributo, purchè non esercitino nelle città negotii civili, e sia loro concesso per ogni volta, che gli piacerà, libero passo per partire.

IX. Li soprastanti siano di autorità, e di potenza eguali, senza riguardo de' gli officii, ò delle dignità, che per altro haver potessero. E datoli il giuramento promettano, di sempre eseguir fedelmente l'officio loro; ogni cosa accomodare; procurare il comodo della compagnia; evitare il danno, favorire giustamente, & egualmente tutti senza riguardo d'amicitia, di nobiltà, ò di dignità di chi si sia; non perdonare ad alcuno, nè condescendere al piacer di altri; ma doppo l'haver à tempi debiti reso i conti, & osservati i capitoli del presente trattato, soddisfare per quanto potranno à tutti. Che non distribuiscano nè mercantie, nè navi proprie, nè ricomprassero da se, nè per mezzo d'altri, ò direttamente, ò indirettamente dalla compagnia mercantia alcuna.

X. Che a' soprastanti si assegnassero di salario mille scudi l'anno.

XI. Se li soprastanti fossero astretti a prò della compagnia far viaggio, per la loro spesa, e fatica, oltre la paga delle vetture, havebbero sei marche Suezzei al giorno, che sono di nostra valuta lire undici, e soldi cinque.

XII. Che alli secretarii, cancellieri, & altri ministri si pagassero i stipendii dalla cancellaria della compagnia. Et i soprastanti di ciascheduna camera rendessero i conti particolari de' loro secretarii, e ministri.

XIII. Ma se per forte alcuno de' soprastanti si riducesse a stato tale in qual si sia camera, che più non potesse assistere, & esser utile alla compagnia, si che per ciò ne risultasse danno alcuno; il danno toccasse alla camera, in cui egli si ritrova, ovvero a quelli, che lo deputarono soprstante; e che si computasse il danno, sempre col danaro contribuito da lui, alla compagnia, quale per ciò resti sempre obbligato ad essa; il che anche s'intendesse de' compagni, e di quelli, ch'entrassero a parte, i quali col ricomprare molte merci havebbero fatto qualche debito con la compagnia.

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XIV. Che non si sostenessero, nè portassero in arresto i soprastanti, nè i loro beni fatto pretello di render conti, nè de pagar debiti; ma tutte le pretensioni, che venissero contro di loro si riducessero al giudice ordinario.

XV. Che i danari, che si metteranno nella compagnia siano esenti da ogni confiscazione, nè in conto alcuno si possano applicar ad altri; anzi, che se avvenisse, (il che Dio non permetta) che il rè di Suetia avesse rissa, ò guerra con altri regi, prencipi, ò repubbliche; li sudditi de' prencipi nemici, che havessero contribuita qualche somma di danari nella compagnia siano capaci di poter ripigliar la loro forte principale, e tutti gli frutti, emolumenti, e commodi, come gli stessi sudditi, e confederati col rè di Suetia, e non altrimenti, che se co' prencipi loro non fosse guerra ò discordia alcuna.

XVI. Che le città commodi alla navigatione, e che esercitano la mercantia se contribuiranno trecento mila scudi, costituiscano camera, e le cose necessarie per la rata di questa somma.

XVII. Che fosse libero anche alle città, e provincie di ridurre il denaro contribuito a questo effetto in una somma, e determinar la camera, e le cose necessarie; dichiarando però, che le spese straordinarie ridondino nelle città, che ne riportano il comodo, e non nella compagnia.

XVIII. Che la flotta delle navi si radunasse à Gottemburgh, e di conserva da quel porto si partissero, e compito il viaggio di nuovo colà si riducessero: & ivi scaricassero le mercantie, e poi di novo rimandassero le navi, dove erano partite cariche, purchè i venti, & il tempo lo permettano, e che non si temesse di qualche cosa sinistra a danno della compagnia.

XIX. Se qualche camera restasse sfornita di qualche sorte di mercantia, le altre, quando ne siano richieste, la provedino, e procurino, che simili mercantie peregrine, e forestiere, si ritrovino in tutti li luoghi.

XX. Che doppo l'electione de' soprastanti, e la deputatione della camera, in cialcheduna di esse si deputino espressi direttori, li quali ogni giorno faccino i conti, e con li soprastanti deliberino, e determinino delle cose necessarie; come del continuare, o non continuare la compagnia, della distributione delle mercantie portate, e di somiglianti cose.

XXI. Che si concedesse alle camere autorità di permutare qualunque soprastante da una camera all'altra; e che ogn'una di esse camere, debba tenere in Gottemburgh un'amministratore; che le camere tra di loro in termine di due mesi doppo la partita delle navi mandino i conti l'una all'altra, acciò si possa saper la spesa delle merci caricate, e de gli apparati delle navi, & ogni tre mesi rimettere la somma delle cose vendute.

XXII. Che ogni volta, che parerà necessario, s'instituiscia una dieta, & adunanza delle camere, accioche deliberar si possa sopra la levata delle navi; quante, & in che modo debbano esser fornite; in che luoco, & a che prezzo smaltir si dovessero le portate mercantie; rendere i conti, & altre cose simili. Il che ne' primi anni osservar dovesse la camera, che haverà contribuito più dell'altre; la quale perciò doverà haver la precedenza sopra le altre; le altre camere poi haveranno la loro precedenza, e luoco ad imitatione di questa.

XXIII. Che nella dieta comparissero dodici soprastanti a nome di tutte le camere, alli quali egli haverebbe aggiunto il terzo decimo voto a suo nome, accioche con più commodità risolvere si possa sopra li maggiori affari; & a questo effetto cialcheduna camera costituisse tante persone, quante somme haveranno  
contribuito



contribuito nella compagnia; per esempio, se qualche camera haveſſe . . . . . 1626.  
la metà contribuiffe ſei perſone, ſe la terza parte, quattro, ſe quattro parti, tie;  
e ſe la ſeſta parte, due; e tutto quello, che con queſto modo dalla maggior parte  
delli voti concluſo, e riſoluto reſtaſſe, foſſe da tutti gli altri accettato.

XXIV. Che tutte le mercantie, che foſſero nel regno di Suetia introdotte, o  
da quello eſtrate fuori, paghino di gabella quattro fiorini per cento, e queſto per  
una volta ſola, doppo la quale ne a' banchi, dogane, ò porte, ſe li poſſa far pa-  
gar altro. Donafi anco facoltà alla compagnia, che dopo l'haver pagato li  
quattro per cento ſopradetti, poſſino trasportar le ſue merci per tutto il regno  
ſenza pagar altro datio, o gabella; purchè le dette merci non ſi vendano a poco,  
a poco, con diſcomodo, e danno de' cittadini, e ſudditi del regno.

XXV. Che egli ricevuto haverebbe ſotto la ſua protezione la compagnia, e la  
conſervarebbe nel ſuo libero eſercitio della mercantia, & uſo della navigatione,  
e la difenderebbe contro tutti quelli, che tentaffero di nuocerli, e ne' tumulti di  
guerra gli aiutarrebbe (richiedendo il biſogno) con la guardia ſua propria.

XXVI. Che in ſe ſteſſo pigliarebbe l'affunto di fabricare caſtelli, e fortezze  
in quei luoghi, che faranno giudicati opportuni alla ſicurezza de' traffichi, e de'  
mercanti ſteſſi, e di preſidiarli con armi, ſoldati, & artiglierie a proprie ſpeſe.

XXVII. Che le prede, e le coſe tolte a' corſari, & ad altri nemici s' impie-  
gaſſero in utile della compagnia, & in diſeſa del trafico; ſenza che egli, o il ſuo  
ammiraglio ſopra eſſe pretenda ragione alcuna; ma ſe l'acquisto delle prede ſi fa-  
ceſſe con l'opera de' ſoldati del rè, in tal caſo la preda ſi compartiffe con egual  
portione.

XXVIII. Che egli non prenderebbe, nè ſi ſervirebbe di navi, artiglieria, da-  
nari, o mercantie, della compagnia, per ſervitio di alcuno di ſuoi, nè meno per  
uſo del regno, ſenza il volere, e' libero conſenſo della compagnia.

XXIX. Che egli dà facoltà a quelli, che hanno parte nella compagnia di far  
contratti con i popoli abitanti fra i termini, e confini ſudetti, di far nuove con-  
federationi con prencipi, e popoli foraffieri a proprio nome, di fabricar città, ca-  
ſtelli, e fortezze; di occupar luoghi deſolati, e di farli abitabili, e di operare, e  
procurare per quanto poſſono l'utile, e comodo proprio, e della compagnia.  
Con queſto però, che non faccia violenza hoſtile contro gli habitatori di quei paefi,  
e che nè anche ſi tenti coſa alcuna contro i ſudditi del rè di Spagna; nè che  
ſi pretenda, & eſerciti commercio alcuno ne' luoghi a loro ſoggetti ſenza eſpreſſa  
loro licenza; ſotto la pena di già ſtabilita contra li traſgreſſori de' ſuoi ordini, e  
contra li perturbatori della pubblica pace.

XXX. Se avveniſſe mai, che queſta compagnia ſotto ſpecie d'amicitia foſſe in-  
gannata, o in qual ſi ſia altro modo mal trattata, e nell'uſo de' traffichi, ò per  
forza, o per fraude impedita, o defraudata; all'hora gli còcedeuà piena facoltà  
di rifarſi de' danni con qual ſi voglia modo, e mezo, che potranno; e di procedere  
contro coloro, che s'ingegnaffero d'impedire li loco tranſichi, o di farli violenza,  
come contro corſari, nemici, aſſaſſini, e turbatori della pubblica quiete.

XXXI. E per maggiormente ſcoprire il deſiderio ſuo di ajutare, e promuovere  
la compagnia, che egli vi contribuirà, e metterà a riſchio della fortuna, come gli  
altri, quatro cento mila talari Suezzeſi.

XXXII. Che oltre li quattro fiorini per cento da pagarſi in vece di datio, egli  
ſi prenderebbe il quinto dell'oro, argento, & altri minerali, che dalle cave de'  
metalli trasportate foſſero; e la decima parte de' frutti di quei paefi, in ricom-  
penſa

1626. pensa de' gli ajuti, privilegi, & esentioni, che loro concedeva. Con queste cose però egli non comprende le mercantie, le quali fossero dalla compagnia distratte; nè Foro, e l'argento, o improntato, o nò, che dalla compagnia fosse stato ricevuto in vece delle sue merci; ma che tutto ciò lascierebbe alla compagnia, & oltre di quanto si è detto non riscuoterebbe cosa alcuna.

XXXIII. E perche Guglielmo Uffelinz da Anversa Brabantino ha speso gran tempo della sua vita in ricercare i sudetti porti, e per testimonianza de' stati della Fiandra, e di Mauritio principe di Oranges, egli sia stato il principal inventore in Olanda della compagnia dell' India occidentale, e con li suoi ammaestramenti habbi molto coadiuvato, & havendo egli di già risoluto di starsene nella Suetia, habbia promesso di fedelmente manifestare quanto egli con tante sue fatiche haveva penetrato; però in ricompensa di ciò egli vuole, che la compagnia le paghi un fiorino per migliaro di quelle mercantie, che dalla compagnia faranno o portate, o levate, per tutto quel tempo, che si faranno i traffichi ne' luochi accennati nel privilegio.

XXXIV. E perche di già abundantemente la compagnia è stabilita, e ne' luochi forastieri sono trasmesse genti del paese; perciò s'istituisca un consiglio, il quale con gli officii, con l'autorità, e con le resolutioni attenda all' amministrazione della giustitia, alla conservatione delle buone leggi, & alla continuatione della guerra; acciò, che questa impresa con giustitia si cominci, con prudenza si proseguisca, e felicemente si fornisca.

Quello consiglio debba determinare sopra il far soldati, deputar governatori, soprastanti, e Giudici, sopra l'edificar città, e castelli; accommodar le differenze, e risse, che nascer potessero fra gli habitatori di quei paesi, & i forastieri colà passati; e lo stesso anco quando fra questi, e li soprastanti, o camere e confederati succedesse qualche discordia.

Finalmente questo consiglio habbi da mantenere, & osservare tutte quelle cose, le quali sono proprie, e convenevoli ad un buon stato, e politia.

Perche li mercanti, che devono attendere alli loro traffichi, adobbamenti di navi, conti, & alle loro corrispondenze (così esse le chiamano) non possono applicarsi a simili affari, perciò con l'erettione di questo consiglio restano sgravati.

Questo consiglio doverà instituirsi de' principali de' partecipanti, quali devono essere esenti da' negotii, & affari delle commissioni, de' nocchieri, & altre consegnationi della compagnia, atteso, che a queste cose doveranno attendere li soprastanti, e dar informatione a loro consiglieri, delle navi, e de' gli avvisi, che potessero alla giornata ricevere, che in tutte l'occorenze si possa risolvere di quelle, che far si debba.

In detto consiglio tutte le cose si risolvino cò forme al parer de' piu.

Il numero de' consiglieri si debba prescrivere conforme all'occorenze, & al giudicio della compagnia.

XXXV. Se per sorte qualche principe, comunità, città, o compagnia contribuiss 500. mila scudi, in questa compagnia, si deputi a suo nome un'agente con ogni plenipotenza, acciòche con lui trattar si possa delle cose necessarie, che occorreranno.

XXXVI. Se alli partecipanti parebbe espediente dimandare altre conditioni diverse da queste, le quali potessero essere di comodo, & utile alla compagnia, purchè non repugnino a gli ordini del regno, salute della republica, & al beneficio della compagnia, gli siano liberalmente concesse.

Questo



Questo privilegio il Re di Suetia poco avanti la battaglia fatta a Lutzen, comunicò a gli attenenti, & a' confederati della Germania, aggiugnendovi questi altri Capitoli.

I. **C**ONCEDE ampia facoltà alli sudditi delle provincie da lui soggiogate, & 1632.  
a tutti quelli, che seco si confedereranno, di costituire camere, & amministrazioni fuori del regno di Suetia ne' loro proprii distretti, & in qualunque luoco, che più loro piacerà. E se a chi farà suo attinente o amico, (non confederato) che di già li fosse stato concesso di entrare nella compagnia, piacesse di adornar le proprie camere, debbano di ciò dichiararsi avanti, perche sua maestà non intende negar simil cosa, conforme però alle occorrenze, & al bisogno.

II. E perche nel primo articolo del privilegio si nominano alcune parti del mondo; non doverli ciò così rigorosamente intendere, che la compagnia fosse stretta più in un luoco, che in un altro, ma che con queste dichiarazioni S. M. concedeva facoltà d'indirizzare la loro navigatione dovunque più li piacesse, e di esercitare li loro traffichi in ogni parte, e di terra, e di mare, dove possano sperare comodo, & utile maggiore.

III. Che l'entrar nella compagnia sia concesso ad ogn'uno fino all'ultimo di Dicembre 1633, passato il qual tempo non possino più entrarci. Nel detto tempo ciascuno, che entrerà sia tenuto di pagar la quarta parte dello sòma, che vorrà contribuire; e questo acciò che la compagnia habbia il suo principio li 10. di Gennaro 1633, & indi durar debbi per lo spatio di dodici anni continui avvenire. Nel resto il secondo, e quarto articolo rimanghi nel suo vigore.

IV. Se poi qualcheduno di quelli, ch'entreranno nella compagnia volesse contribuir in una sol volta tutta la somma, a questi tali la compagnia sufficientemente prometta, & a suo tempo attenda; che fornito il tempo prescritto nel privilegio, li farà pagato la solita portione, e frutto delli suoi danari dal giorno, che li contò; non essendo di dovere, che alcuno tenghi morto il suo capitale, senza il dovuto utile, e frutto.

V. Oltre a tutte queste cose S. M. dichiarava, che il Talaro Suezzeze, di cui spesso si è fatto mentione restasse sempre nel suo valore, cioè di quattro Marche; sei e mezza delle quali fanno uno scudo Imperiale, e che li conti nella compagnia sempre si facessero a ragione di scudi Imperiali.

VI. Che le ragioni, e privilegi, li quali nel quinto, & ottavo articolo sono concessi a quelli, che havessero contribuito cento mila Taleri Suezzezi, si restringessero a cin quanta mila scudi Imperiali, e quelli, che sono concessi nel sesto articolo a quelli, che contribuivano mille, e due mila Taleri Suezzezi si limitassero a cinqu. cento, & a mille scudi Imperiali; & a quanto si è detto nel decimoterzo articolo a quelli, che contribuisseno trecento mila Taleri Suezzezi, si restringa a 150 mila scudi Imperiali; e perche nell' articolo ottavo a quelli, che conferiranno 25 mila Taleri Suezzezi, era concesso molti privilegi, come in esso capitolo appare, hora sua maestà, li restringeva a 12 mila, e cinquecento scudi Imperiali; e di più (oltre le ragioni della civiltà, e l'immunità della gabella, che in esso capitolo si contengono) vi aggiungeva, che volendo essi esercitare gli esercitii della città, & altri traffichi lo possiano fare, e gli sia concesso.

VII. Che

1626.

VII. Che li soprastanti, quali fossero in viaggio per gli affari della compagnia, senza haver riguardo a quanto fù detto nell'articolo undecimo, possano prendere dalle camere quanto farà loro di bisogno, conforme alla qualità de' luchi, & occasioni.

VIII. E benchè nell' articolo decimo ottavo, fusse stata destinata per camera generale, e per la radunanza delle navi la città di Goltemburgh; con questo però dichiara S. M. che se qualche natione, o città haveffe la sua camera non troppo lontana dal mare oceano, e perciò non li fosse di comodo il mandare le sue navi a Goltemburgh; siano tenuti di significarlo alle diete generali de' soprastanti, e nominare il luoco dove potranno, o li farà comodo di unire le loro navi con l'altre.

IX. Se con l'aiuto del signor Iddio, e con l'industria, & opera de' Tedeschi avenisse, che si ergessero più di dodici camere; così anco si accrescesse il numero de' soprastanti, li quali per vigor del vigesimo terzo articolo, mandar si devono alle diete generali.

X. In oltre sua maestà estende il vigesimo quarto articolo del privilegio a tanto che la compagnia sia esente dal pagare datii, e gabelle nel regno di Suetia per li primi quattro anni. Con questo però, che nissuno abusi questa gratia con fraudi, sotto pena della perdita delle navi, e delle mercantie.

XI. Forniti, che siano li quattro anni; ne gli altri avenire si paghino le gabelle conforme all' articolo vigesimo quarto.

XII. Che le navi, e mercantie della compagnia, che capiteranno nelli porti, e città delli stati, prencipi, e partecipanti, che haveranno accettato il privilegio concessò da sua maestà alla compagnia, siano tenute di pagar impositione delli quattro per cento imposta; a questo modo però, li due terzi per sua maestà, e l'altra terza parte sia delli prencipi, stati, e partecipanti sopradetti, proportionabilmente secondo la somma del danaro, che haveranno posto nella compagnia. Non intendendo però di contravenire alle altre impositioni, e gabelle, che potessero avere sopra le altre merci; ma solo delle mercantie della compagnia.

XIII. Che li prencipi, città, e comunità, le quali contribuito haveffero alla compagnia 250 mila scudi Imperiali, oltre il residente concessoli nel trigesimo quinto articolo, habbino anco un assessore del consiglio; il qual consiglio doverà esser formato conforme nell'articolo trigesimo quarto si è detto.

XIV. Che per maggior confirmatione dell'amplificatione, e dichiarazione de' privilegi concessi alla compagnia, sua maestà estendeva la promessa fatta delli 400 mila Taleri Suezzezi in 400 mila scudi Imperiali; per la qual somma di danaro egli non pretendeva maggior utile di quello fosse toccato a gli altri pro rata.

Per chiara intelligenza di ogn'uno il Talero Suezzeze, è di quattro marche, che di nostra moneta sono lire sette, e meza. Il scudo Imperiale, è meza dobla.



## IV.

REGIMINIS SUECICI CONSTITUTIO: Quam  
Rex invictissimus GUSTAVUS SECUNDUS & magnus ultimae  
voluntatis instar regno populisque suis statione hac mortali  
functus exhibendam voluit.

[Supposed to be completed in the beginning of the year 1630, and containing 1630;  
35 pages in quarto.]

N. B. This invaluable M. S. which contained the provisional disposition that was made of the government of Sweden, in case he should be killed in the German wars, during the minority of the princess Christina, who was then aged about four years and something more, was for a considerable time in the author's possession, as all his intimate friends well know, but unfortunately lost, with several other papers of consequence, in going by sea from London to Cornwall in 1758.

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## V.

ARTICLES signed by GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS with JAMES  
marquis of HAMILTON\*.

WE Gustavus Adolphus by the grace of God, king of the Swedes, Goths, 1630;  
and Vandals, great prince of Finland, duke of Esthonia and Carelia, and  
lord of Ingria, &c. To all and sundry whom it concerns, make it known and  
certain, that whereas the illustrious and our sincerely beloved lord James marquis  
of Hamilton, master of the horse to the most serene king of Great-Britain, out  
of his zeal for the publick good, and for acquiring eternal fame, hath resolved  
to dedicate himself and the fortunes and forces of all he is concerned in, for resto-  
ring our oppressed friends in Germany, and for that end hath offered to us by the  
illustrious and our sincerely faithful colonel, Alexander Hamilton, his fidelity and  
service, and that he will on his own expence gather a strength of six thousand  
men, and bring them over, as soon as may be, to any place we shall appoint,  
either against the Imperialists, or any other of our enemies, and maintain them  
on his own charge, and do us all faithful and vigorous service with them, till  
this great affair be brought to a good issue, provided we shall authorize this his  
design with our protection, and give him the underwritten assistance; therefore,  
there being nothing dearer to us, than to make all vigorous resistance to the com-  
mon enemies of liberty, and having in high estimation the brave undertakings of

\* Burnet's memoirs of the duke of Hamilton.

1630. generous men, we not only would not reject, but have heartily embraced the nobleness of so good resolutions: we have therefore admitted, like as by the vigour of these presents we admit, the said lord marquis into our service, armies, and military counsels, on the following conditions:

First, Whenever he shall signify to us, that he is ready to bring over his forces, we shall assign him a place for his landing, either to come and join with our armies, or to make an impression elsewhere, as we shall think fit.

Next, If we appoint him to land in any place from whence he shall not come strait to us, we shall for strengthening his forces, send to the place we shall assign for his landing four thousand foot out of our armies, whom we shall furnish with all necessaries, and maintain on our charges a whole year.

Thirdly, Because the said marquis thinks two thousand horse are necessary for his foot, for whose levy and pay he promises all assistance; we shall therefore think of all ways and means for raising and maintaining these.

Fourthly, We not only give the said illustrious marquis the absolute command of this army in our absence, but shall also join to him a counsellour, with whom he may consult in all things, that so his deliberations be more expedite and clear.

Fifthly, Whatever the illustrious lord marquis shall take from the enemy, the lands and territories shall belong to us, but the revenues and all the emoluments shall go to him, and to the relief of his army: yet so as these revenues shall be gathered decently and in order, without depredations or plunderings; since our design is not to oppress those who have been already enough pressed, but rather to deliver them from the oppressions of others, as much as by the divine assistance we can.

Sixthly, That the marquis may more effectually perform what he hath bravely resolved, and may sooner make those warlike instruments of his own invention, on which he relies much in his expedition, we shall not only with the first occasion furnish him with a hundred ship-pounds of crude iron, but shall also assign hammers for working it according to his design; of which instruments he hath promised to leave a model with us, and we shall be careful that none of our servants shall make use of them before he hath first made trial of them himself.

Seventhly, We shall also furnish him with three hundred and seventy ship-pounds of iron-ball for his guns, and two thousand and five hundred pikes, and as many musquets.

Eighthly, Whenever the marquis shall advertise us of his needing gunpowder, we shall assign him bills of exchange in Holland for buying seventy-two ship-pounds of gunpowder.

Ninthly, If any other kings or states shall concur with us, all they contribute shall be at our disposal; but if the marquis his necessities require further assistance, we shall not abandon him, but faithfully assist him, as much as our affairs shall permit.

Tenthly, For all which the said illustrious lord marquis with all his forces hath promised fidelity to us, and shall be bound to it as well as our men, and these who receive our pay, are, for which both he and all his captains shall be particularly engaged.

But because there is to be a treaty betwixt our commissioners and the Imperialists at Dantzick, therefore if a peace shall be there concluded, so that we shall not need the service of the marquis and his army, he hath obliged himself to pay for the foresaid materials at their entire value.



All which things being thus concluded, and to be firmly observed by us, we have subscribed these articles with our hand, and commanded our royal seal to be put to them. At our castle in Stockholm the last of May, Anno Dom. 1630.

Signed,



GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS.

# VI.

## ARTICLES signed by the marquis of HAMILTON with GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS.

**W**HEREAS there is a mutual compact agreed betwixt the most serene and mighty king of Sweden and me, for joining of our forces; that the articles be fully ratified, and lest any thing afterwards fall in which may put a stop in our counsels, or give matter for finistrous glosses, I therefore subscribe for my part all the articles, adding only the following explication to some of them. 1631.

To the first, if the most serene king assign me a place for landing, I vow and promise by the grace of God to do it, betwixt and the day of the next June.

To the second, If the most serene king of Sweden send me the agreed number of foldiers out of his own forces, at the place and time appointed, I understand that by furnishing them with all necessaries, a full and entire pay without any deductions be laid down for a whole year, according to the establishment of his majesty with his own officers.

Besides, If the most serene king cannot allow of so great a diminution of his forces, it will be necessary that he not only settle a fund, for such a sum as may levy, arm, and pay, as many foldiers, but there will be need of some more; for the odds will be vastly great betwixt his majesty's trained foldiers, and a sudden levy of raw novices.

To the third, Since the article of horse is conceived in general terms on both sides, nothing being certainly fixed on either, it will be expedient that your sacred majesty declare your mind in it plainly, how far you oblige yourself: and what shall be agreed for me, betwixt your majesty and these to whom this affair is trusted by me, I bind myself to ratify.

To the fifth, Since the reasons of my expedition to Germany are the same with your majesty's, I have firmly resolved to help and relieve the oppressed princes and states of Germany, with the ease of all these burdens with which they are now pressed, and therefore shall do every thing in order, and decently, as becomes most friendly auxiliaries; and if any thing be taken by me from the common enemy, I shall desire nothing more than that the right of it be entirely and inviolably your majesty's.

1631. To the ninth, Since I have devoted my whole fortune with all my interests for promoting this our design, I promise that whatever any shall contribute for it, shall all be laid out for this war, which I shall with my whole forces manage and carry on, till either it please God that you obtain a desired peace, or that the liberty of Germany, which is now oppressed, be restored.

To the tenth, Since by this article your majesty requires and expects fidelity from me and my army, I James marquis of Hamilton, by these presents give my faith for myself and them, and bind both myself and them; and for the confirmation of this I do subscribe this article with all the preceding, and put my seal to it, at London the 1st of March, Anno Dom. 1631.

Locus  
Sigilli.

HAMILTON.

## VII.

### SPECIALES CAUSAE BELLI SUECICI \*.

1630. **Q**UANTUM autem nascens, & e Germaniæ malis valida cum tempore incrementa fumens Austriacæ domûs potentia, extraneis regibus, principibus, rebus publicis, sensim hoc modo magis magisque formidolosa facta fuerit, maximè cum, intra imperii Romani fines jam se non amplius continens, vicinis quoque, missis in Italiam, Borussia, Transilvana diversis exercitibus, laceßere haud vereretur: Gustavus tamen Adolphus, secundus ejus nominis & magnus, Sueciæ rex, imprimis suspectam habuit, luculenter deprehensio; quo magis Baltici maris littoribus illius vires appropinquarent, eò plures majoresve adversum se indies feri bellorum occasiones.

Velut jam anno millesimo, sexcentesimo, vicesimo sexto, literæ quædam regis Sueciæ ad Transilvaniæ principem, nec ab hoste, nec ad hostem missæ, a Cæsarianis referatæ, interceptæ, ac confectâ in regis invidiam verborum interpretatione, publicatæ fuerant: ipso internuncio in carcerem compacto, ac durè & hostiliter habito. Quæ injuria, quo inopinatò magis regem a Cæsare, quem, nec verbo, nec facto, luculque læserat, perculit, eò altius in pectus penetravit, ac descendit: maximè, cum verus literarum tenor nihil, in Cæsaris aut imperii Romani præjudicium tendens, loqueretur, sed bellum, quod regi Sueciæ cum Polonis hac tempestate intercedebat, solummodò concerneret.

Porro regi a fide dignis relatum: licet componendorum inter Sueciæ ac Poloniæ regna dissidiorum sæpe numerò spes affulgeret; commissariis utriusque regni annuati in eum finem congregientibus: pacis tamen hos obres, per internuncios ac literas, sedulò apud Polonos operam dedisse, ne vulnus in cicatricem co-

\* Chemnitzius de Bello Sueco-German. Vol. I. p. 7, &c. The reader may peruse a fuller copy of this manifesto in the Merc. Franç. Tom. XVI. p. 297—317.



iret, antequam in Germaniâ suum plene attigisset scopum; spe certâ Polonis datâ, Germaniæ electoribus, principibus, ordinibus sub jugum missis, sese igitur, omnibus viribus collatis, eò gnauiter incubituros; ut Sueciæ quoque regnum à Polonis penitus opprimeretur. 1630.

Et quo verbis facta statim responderent, Suecosque omnibus bellorum gerendorum mediis, quantum pote, nudatos, Polonorum armis, favore suo suffultis, debellandos exponerent, & omni militum, & rei bellicæ commercio, quod utrumque liberum Polonis, Suecorum tunc hostibus, reliquerat, regi Sueciæ in Germaniâ interdicere visum.

Clarius autem odium eorum in regem anno millesimo, sexcentesimo, vicesimo septimo emicabat; quando Adolphus, Holsatiæ dux, cum copiis haud contemnendis, Sigismundo tertio, Polonorum regi, subsidio ablegatus: idque eo potissimum tempore, quo, equitatu Polonico ad Dirschaviam dissipato, & toto exercitu in consternationem haud exiguam coniecto, periculum erat, ne ipsis castris Poloni pellerentur. Quapropter hoc præter opinionem & immerito suo, illatum vulnus, regi eò magis doluit, quo certior spes erat, hostilem exercitum, absque hoc foret, ad internecionem cæsum, atque ita hac vice debellatum iri. Nec verò missione militum, nec alio prætextu colorabantur istæ suppetiæ: quin potius ipsius Cæsaris signa, & imperii Romani aquilæ in hostili acie apertè fulserunt. Dux quoque Holsatiæ, post navatam Polonis strenuam aliquamdiu operam, è Borussia cum residuo milite in Pomeraniam regressus ibidem, non secus ac aliæ Cæsaris legiones, hiberna naclus est: ut vel inde, e Cæsaris stipendio nunquam excessisse, appareret.

Interea Cæsareus miles regis Sueciæ subditos, qui, negotiorum suorum ac innoxiorum commerciorum causâ, in Germaniam appulerant, ubicunque, nancisci contingeret, hostiliter tractare: ablatis vi mercibus, & navibus fisco addictis. Quod iidem, non aliò locorum se justius confugere rati, ad regem detulerunt: ejus opem, auxilium, patrocinium supplicibus ac querulis precibus implorantes.

Imprimis septentrionalibus regibus ac regnis maximè suspectum accidere: quod Cæsar ac rex Hispaniæ supradicto millesimo, sexcentesimo, vicesimo septimo, & sequenti anno, per Georgium Ludovicum, comitem Suartzburgensem, & Gabrielem de Roy, commissarios suos, Lubecam, aliasque urbes Hanseaticas, in partes suas traducere conati, illarum ope classem in mari Baltico comparare molirentur. Ut ut enim alius color rei quæsitus nil aliud, videlicet, intendi, quàm ipsarum civitatum commodum; hac etenim ratione, abrogatis, quæ exteri invexissent, monopolis, navigationem & commercia civitatibus facta, testâ conservatum, ac, inter alia, Hispanicarum mercium vectarum ad solos eorundem portus restrictum iri: septentrionalium tamen regnorum reges, re altius penetratâ, aliorum id interpretati, aliquid monstri alere negotium existimabant; nec modo in regalium suorum super mare Balticum, cujus tutelam & protectionem, ex majorum instituto, sibi asserunt, insigne vergere præjudicium, sed & ipsis in regnorum visceribus oppugnandis, media ac occasionem quæri.

Quæ suspicio in rege Sueciæ validiora incrementa sumsit, postquam, finito bello Danico, a classe & navibus armandis minimè cessatum: in se enim, reconciliato Daniæ rege, fabam hanc cudi, haud sine causâ ominabatur. Præsertim, quia Cæsariani, spe de adjungendis sibi civitatum Hanseaticarum viribus evoluti, Gedanensium & Polonorum, cum quibus regi Sueciæ apertum bellum, naves

1630. in consortium asciverant, illarumque ope mare Balticum, harum artium hæcenus intolens, piratica invellum reddebant: in tantum; ut rex Sueciæ, regaliū suorum, & securitatis maritimæ, commerciorumve conservandorum, classē & ipse suam magnis incommodis atque impendiis adornare, illâque Cæsarianos occupatis portubus, præsertim Wismariensi, inclusos tenere coactus fuerit.

Cum autem anno millesimo, sexcentesimo, vicesimo octavo, Stralsundæ urbs a supremo Cæsareæ militiæ Imperatore, Fridlandio, præsidia, quæ imperabantur, admittere detrectans, arctissimo premeretur obsidio, ferroque ac flammâ extrema quæque perpeteretur, recepit illa quidem ab initio a Daniæ rege militem auxiliarium, quem spontaneo motu, defendendæ urbi, hic submiserat, & necessitate exigente, plus auxiliorum ab eodem consequi poterat: ne tamen cum Cæsaris hostibus [quos inter tunc temporis Daniæ rex] conspirare argueretur, mox ad Sueciæ regem, confugiens, ut addicti neutri parti principis, cujus benignitatem antehac luculentis rerum testimoniis experta fuerat, tutelæ ac patrocinio, sequestro velut deposuit exagitata infestis hostium armis libertatem. Nec rex iustissimis de causis, quas ipsimet Stralsundenses per legatos suos deduxerant, recusare ullatenus potuit; quin civitati, non ipsius modò, sed et publicæ, communisque securitatis gratiâ, missis non contemnendo militum subsidio, subveniret.

Salvâ tamen obedientiâ, Cæsari & duci Pomeraniæ, tanquam superioribus, debitâ; nec ad Cæsaris, aut cujusquam offensionem, sed solam civitatis, portuique Stralsundensis, & consequenter, totius maris Baltici defensionem, commerciorumve libertatem: ut ex fœdere, cum Stralsundensibus initio, sole meridiano clariùs apparet.

Inde militum tribunus, qui Stralsundensibus suppetias missi, in mandatis datum: ne extra obsidium, & necessariæ atque legitimæ defensionis cancellos, adversus Cæsaris exercitum quicquam tentarent. Qui & ipsi, ab initio, Danis, quamdiu illic loci unâ commorati sunt, in expugnatione oppidi Bart, aliisve factionibus, nequequam ad capeffenda contra Cæsarianos hostilia arma, instigantibus, regis sui mandatum causati, intra hos terminos immoti steterunt.

Eodem penè tempore Cæsar duces Megapoleos omnibus ditionibus, quas ab imperio ipsi, eorumve majores, tot per annos, feudi nomine possederant, privârat; ducemque Fridlandiæ summum terrâ, mari militiæ suæ imperatorem, his investitum ierat. Quorum, & religionis, & sanguinis nexu junctorum, ducum vicem rex, ipsâ Christianâ caritate, arctâque necessitudine flagitante, jure miseratus: præsertim cum, omni aliâ ferè spe destituti, in his angustiiis ad regem, velut sacram anchoram, confugerent.



## VIII.

## The monthly Pay of a SWEDISH Regiment of Infantry, under GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS.

Military Establishment.					Per Month			
					Dollars.	English Money.		
						£.	s.	d.
<b>T</b> O the colonel	-	-	-	-	184	32	4	0
Lieutenant-colonel	-	-	-	-	80	14	0	0
Serjeant-major	-	-	-	-	61	10	13	6
Chief quarter-master	-	-	-	-	30	5	5	0
Captain	-	-	-	-	61	10	13	6
Lieutenant	-	-	-	-	30	5	5	0
Ensign	-	-	-	-	30	5	5	0
Two serjeants, each	-	-	-	-	9	1	11	6
The (a) <i>Fubrer</i> (b) <i>Furryer</i> (c) <i>Muster-writer</i> , and the (d) <i>Rust-master</i> , each	-	-	-	-	7	1	4	6
Drummers and pipers, each	-	-	-	-	4	0	14	0
6 Corporals, each	-	-	-	-	6	1	1	0
15 (e) <i>Rot-masters</i> , each	-	-	-	-	5	0	17	6
21 Inferior <i>Rot-masters</i> , each	-	-	-	-	4	0	14	0
A common soldier	-	-	-	-	3 $\frac{1}{2}$	0	12	3
18 <i>Passe-volants</i> , (f) each	-	-	-	-	3	0	10	6

## Civil Establishment, &amp;c. of the same Regiment.

2 Chaplains, each	-	-	-	-	18	3	3	0
2 Examiners, or registers of the court-martial, each	-	-	-	-	30	5	5	0
4 Surgeons, each	-	-	-	-	12	2	2	0
4 Provost-marshals, each	-	-	-	-	12	2	2	0
Clerk of the regiment	-	-	-	-	30	5	5	0
Clerk of the council of war	-	-	-	-	18	3	3	0
Serjeant of the council or court of war	-	-	-	-	18	3	3	0
2 Bedels, each	-	-	-	-	3	0	10	6
The executioner	-	-	-	-	7	1	4	6

(a) The *Furrer* attended the ensign, and took the colours when he was disabled or killed.

(b) The *Furriers* were under quarter-masters, and appeared in action armed with a halbert or partizan.

(c) The *Muster-schreiber* as he is called in German, was clerk of the musters.

(d) The *Rust-master* saw that the soldiers kept their arms clean and bright.

(e) The *Rot-masters* took care of the several *rots* (each *rot*, or file, consisting of six men) which were committed to their charge. Twelve *rots* of musqueteers and nine of pikemen, making a compleat company of 126 men, not including officers, *passe-volants* and servants.

(f) The *Passe-volants* were servants to the officers, and carried arms in the day of battle.

1630. And here it must be remarked, that if the service required *Lehnung*, or advance money, it was his Swedish majesty's custom (a certain sum being due to his officers and foldiers at the expiration of each month) to divide the said month into thirteen equal parts, and pay his troops a fixed portion of their stipend beforehand, upon the first, the eleventh, and one and twentieth day, amounting at the three several payments to the following proportion :

						Per Month.			
						Dollars.	English Money.		
							£.	s.	d.
Colonel	-	-	-	-	-	69	12	1	6
Lieutenant-colonel	-	-	-	-	-	32	5	12	0
Serjeant-major	-	-	-	-	-	14	2	9	0
Chief quarter-master	-	-	-	-	-	11	1	18	6
Captain	-	-	-	-	-	14	2	9	0
Lieutenant	-	-	-	-	-	11	1	18	6
Ensign	-	-	-	-	-	11	1	18	6
2 Serjeants, each	-	-	-	-	-	5	0	17	6
Fuhrer, furrier, muster-writer, and rust-master, each	-	-	-	-	-	4	0	14	0
Drummers and pipers, each	-	-	-	-	-	2	0	7	0
6 Corporals, each	-	-	-	-	-	3	0	10	6
15 Rot-masters, each	-	-	-	-	-	2	0	7	0
21 Inferior Rot-masters, each	-	-	-	-	-	1½	0	5	3
A common foldier	-	-	-	-	-	1¼	0	4	4½
18 Passe-volants	-	-	-	-	-	1	0	3	6

#### Civil Establishment, &c. of the same Regiment.

2 Chaplains, each	-	-	-	-	-	7	1	4	6
2 Examiners, or registers of the court-martial, each	-	-	-	-	-	11	1	18	6
4 Surgeons, each	-	-	-	-	-	7	1	4	6
4 Provost-marshals, each	-	-	-	-	-	7	1	4	6
Clerk of the regiment	-	-	-	-	-	11	1	18	6
Clerk of the council of war	-	-	-	-	-	7	1	4	6
Serjeant of the council, or court of war	-	-	-	-	-	7	1	4	6
2 Bedels, each	-	-	-	-	-	1 $\frac{1}{2}$	0	5	3
The executioner	-	-	-	-	-	5	0	17	6



## IX.

ARTICLES de Confederation accordez entre le Roy de  
SUEDE, & le Duc de POMERANIE, pour eux, leurs Successeurs,  
Provinces & Subjects \*, July 10th, 1630.

PREAMBLE reciproque entre Gustave, & Bogislaus, \* \* \* \* \* 1630.

\* \* \* \* \*

Après que nous Gustavus Adolphus, &c. avons avec tres grande compassion, considéré les tres-griefues & inouyes oppressions que ledit seigneur duc de Stetin & Pomeranie, avec ses subjects & provinces, a souffertes pendant trois ans, & qu'entre la couronne de Suede & les provinces de Pomeranie y avoit non seulement conjonction de sang & de religion, mais aussi une tres grande amitié & confiance, par le moyen du commerce mutuel exercé & inviolablement entretenu de temps immemorial entre les subjects desdits estats, & principalement par une étroite confederation contractée entre nos predecesseurs d'heureuse memoire, les roys de Suede & les ducs de Pomeranie, leurs provinces & estats, en la pacification faite entr'eux le jour de saint Luc l'an 1570, ensemble aussi nostre grand interest à cause de la mer Baltique, entant que les provinces de Pomeranie située a la côte de ladite mer ayans esté occupées, servoyent de retraite aux ennemis, pour, (à nostre grand prejudice) empescher la liberté du commerce, & infester nos royaumes & estats; ayans mesmes, pour pallier leurs violences, abusé de nostre nom. Après avoir aussi considéré que la confederation pour la neutralité (de l'entretenement de laquelle ledit seigneur duc, nous avoit requis) n'estoit assez solidement establie, nous avons estimé (quoyque non requis) devoir accourir au secours dudit seigneur duc & ses estats, pour avec l'assistance divine les delivrer d'oppression; & mesmes pour repousser de nos estats les cruelles hostilités, & venger les machinations & injustes oppressions faites contre nous; estans à ces fins, par l'aide de Dieu arrivez avec *une assez puissante armée* en Pomeranie (après avoir pris la principauté de Rughe [Rugen] y ayans occupé *sans aucune resistance* toutes les isles, villes, ports, & forts, servans pour la defence & conversation de la ville de Stetin, capitale de la province, ayans toutes les places esté abandonnées par ceux qui les tenoient) *nous prîmes occasion, contre l'opinion & l'esperance du dit sieur duc d'entreprendre & venir heureusement à bout de reduire la dite ville de Stetin.*

D'autre part nous Bogislaus, &c. &c. ayans considéré (1) q'estans destituez de tous secours, (2.) nous seuls n'eussions peu resister à si grandes forces, (3.) nos subjects ayans esté pour la plus part desarmez par les precedents pretendus defenseurs (4) estans mesmes despoillez de tous leurs biens, & privez de tous vivres & moyens de defence, (5) &, qui plus est, affoiblis & extenuiez par une

\* Mercure Francois. Tom. XVI. 286. Historical but authentic relat. in Low Dutch. Tom. I. 169.  
cruelle

1630.

cruelle oppression, durant trois ans, n'ont eu pensée ny courage de se delivrer, ny de resister, pour n'empirer leur condition. (6.) Si bien que n'esperans plus aucun secours: (apres tant de capitulations & promesses saintement jurées & toutefois enfreintes.) (7) Survenant le louable & tres chrestien secours de la sacrée royale majesté de Suede. (8) Qui n'est point venu contre l'empereur ny l'empire, avec lesquels sa majesté n'a rien de fâcheux à desmeller. (9) Mais contre ceux qui contre tout droict & equité avoient occupé nos provinces, (10) afin de les delivrer de violence, & les remettre en leur premier estat & liberté, & pour par mesme moyen asseurer sa personne, & sa couronne, & ce avec des protestations chrestiennes & amiables, qui ont esté suivies de leur effet, à l'esgard de la ville de Stralsund, & de la duché de Rugen, occupé par sa majesté. Nous avons eu plustost sujet de louer & accepter, que de refuser à nostre tres grand prejudice, & de nos subjects, son secours & assistance.

Pour ce est il que nous Gustavus, &c. et Bogislâus, &c. avons ensemble convenus & accordez les suivans articles par nous d'un mutuel contentement approuvé.

I. Nous avec nos estats, provinces & subjets respectivement, voulons et promettons sincerement et de bonne foy, conserver à l'avenir entre nous une ferme et constante amitié utile, et convenable à des bons voisins, et ne faire ny ne permettre estre fait l'un à l'autre ouvertement ou couvertement, par qui, et en quelque maniere que ce soit, aucun hostilité; ains nous defendre les uns les autres par armes, et par mutuel secours, contre toutes violences, invasions, ravages, *contributions*, oppressions, et contraventions, ne nous point abandonner, beaucoup moins nous trahir, ou subjurer, mais plustost rechercher, et accroistre le profit et avantage, et destourner tout dommage l'un de l'autre: avancer de tout nostre pouvoir le trafic et commerce de Suede en Pomeranie, et de Pomeranie en Suede; faisans pour ce, cesser toutes inhibitions et empeschemens. A l'effect dequoy, nous roy et duc susdit, pour nous, nos successeurs et estats, avons non seulement renouvelé ladite ancienne paction et accord, pour l'entretienement d'un bon voisinage entre nous, nos royaumes, ducheux principautez et leurs appartenances, mais, aussi l'avons par le present traité de nouveau confirmé et corrobore, pour durer à jamais. Voulans en outre que la presente confederation soit de dix ans en dix ans renouvelée et re-integrée.

II. Le dit accord s'entend estre renouvelé pour la *deffence* mutuelle contre la violence, non point pour l'*effence*, (*si non que pour l'entretienement des choses convenües entre nous, il fust grandement requis*) auquel cas, chacun de nous sera obligé de prester l'un à l'autre, *jusqu' au dernier effort*, mutuel ayde et secours.

III. Au moyen de ce, le present traité ne doit point estre reputé fait contre la *majesté sacrée de l'empereur ny de l'empire*, mais plustost pour le conserver en son ancienne forme, liberté, religion, et paix religieuse et seculiere contre les tumultes, et perturbateurs de la paix publ que: *n'entendans point nous departir de l'obligation par laquelle nous Bogislâus duc susdit sommes tenus à la sacrée majesté Impériale et à l'empire, et au cercle de la Saxe Supérieure*; ains au contraire, protestans de nous y conserver selon nostre devoir (*à la charge tout à fois qu'ils ne requerront de nous aucune chose contrevenante au present traité*), et de demeurer avec nos ducheux, estats, et subjets joints à l'empire, audit circle, et aux constitutions Impériales: ne voulans qua l'occasion du present traité l'estat de nos provinces soit changé ny que rien nous soit oilé ny diminué de nostre souveraineté, ny quant

aux



aux droicts royaux, dignitez, juridictions, droicts domaniaux et territoriaux à nous appartenans, ny semblablement quant aux privileges, tant generaux que particuliers de la noblesse de Poméranie, et des sujets et estats; ny aux concessions, droicts, statuts, loix fondamentales, ny aucun autre droict particulier.

IV. Puis que cette union tend principalement à ce que nous duc fussions delivré de la cruelle oppression, de laquelle nostre constante & fidelle innocence, a esté travaillée pour l'espece de trois ans, contre les lois sacrées de l'empire & dudit cercle, & contre les claires & expressees constitutions de la paix publique, & mesmes contre les speciales sincerations, mandemens & declarations de la sacrée majesté de l'empereur, & les provinces & pays de Poméranie estre conservez en leur ancien estat, sans recevoir aucuns empeschemens limites, ports & passages, & estre delivrez à l'advenir de tous dangers. Pour ces raisons a esté de part & d'autre unanimement convenu entre nous, de s'opposer par jonction de forces à tout autre qui en l'empire Romain contrarie, & peut en quelque facon que ce soit contravenir à la paix de la religion obtenüe avec tant de peine & de travaux.

V. Les villes, lieux & provinces de Poméranie, par nous roy de Suede occupéz, ou que nous pourrons cy-apres occuper, seront par nous remis entre les fidelles mains & au pouvoir dudit seigneur duc de Poméranie avec toutes leurs appartenances, droicts, regales, & juridictions, sans nulle reserve, ny tergiversation, & sans repetition de frais de la guerre: mesmes la ville de Stralsund luy sera par nous rendüe, pourveu que, comme ledit seigneur duc ne doit rien aliener desdites provinces de Poméranie, principalement la principauté de Rugen; aussi il establisie es dites provinces tels officiers, qui en tout ce qui concernera la defence & conservation desdites provinces, se monstrent de bonne volonté envers les commissaires de Suede: pourveu aussi, que les privileges de la ville de Stralsund soient maintenus en leur entier, & que specialement par dessus tous l'alliance faite par la dite ville avec sa dite majesté soit conservée inviolablement,† & que les griefs pareux pretendus soient promptement reparez, & equitablement jugéz.

VI. D'autant l'evesché de Camin estant dans les provinces & estats de Poméranie, & en consequence de ce, devant jouir en son particulier de tout ce qui par le present traité a esté accordé, pour le bien general de la Poméranie, a esté particulièrement convenu, que si contre les privileges, statuts, & loix fondamentales de l'evesché & du chapitre, est attenté quelque chose au fait d'election de l'evesque ou du co-adjuteur, ou à quelque autre occasion que ce soit, nous roy & duc susnommés l'empescherons conjointement de tout nostre pouvoir, & maintiendrons la liberté du chapitre & du diocese, ensemble la libre election de l'evesque, son estat, ses droicts & ses dignitez.

VII. Nul de nous sans le vouloir & consentement de l'autre, ne pourra renoncer au present Traité, & beaucoup moins nous duc de Poméranie ne pourrons, pour ce qui concerne la presente defence de nostre estat, faire aucun traité, ny alliance, avec qui que ce soit. Que si sa royale majesté pour nostre bien et de nos provinces, vouloit faire quelque traité, il nous devra estre communiqué, duquel, si y voulons entrer et estre joints, ny nous, ny nos provinces ne pourrons en estre exclus.

† His majesty in the year 1628, renewed a treaty (for former ones had subsisted) betwixt Sweden and the town of Stralsund. It was to hold in force 20 years, and is preserved by Lotickins. Tom. I. 608.

1630. VIII. Si quelque prince chrestien se veut adjoindre à la presente confederations, et s'y associer à conditions raisonnables, il luy sera libre de le faire, moyennant que par la dite jonction les estats d' aucuns de nous n'en recoivent domage, et n'empirent leur condition.

IX. Parceque qu'en cette confederation particuliere (permise de tout droit, entant qu'elle est pour la conservation de la paix religieuse et seculiere de Pomeranie) nulle mention n'a esté faite des autres confederations et accords cy-devant faits pour la conservation d' icelle ; les dits accords ne pourront en rien prejudicier au present traité, ny estre allegués contre iceluy. Et nous duc susdit promettons de ne nous point allier par traité avec qui que ce soit, sans le special vouloir et consentement de susdit royale majesté.

X. Si le dit seigneur duc, ses provinces, et sujets, à l' occasion de la presente confederation, estoient assaillis en guerre par qui que ce soit, en tel cas non seulement nous roy de Suede et nos royaumes et estats serons obligés, et promettons d'entreprendre soigneusement et fidelement la defence dudit seigneur duc, mais aussi y attirerons les autres princes nos co-seulez, pour augmenter et fortifier le nombre et les moyens de la defence. Comme aussi au reciproque, nous duc de Pomeranie, nos provinces et subjets serons le mesme, au cas que sa royale majesté et ses royaumes et estats fussent interlez par guerre, à cause du present traité.

XI. Par la presente confederation le privilege de naturalité s'entend estre respectivement accordé aux subjets du l'une et de l'autre parties, royaumes et estats de Suede et de la duché et estats de Pomeranie : et la nation Suedoise honorera, aydera et procurera le profit et avantage de la Pomeranoise, et la Pomeranoise de la Suedoise en temps de paix et de guerre ; sauf respectivement aux uns et aux autres, leurs droits, privileges, et immunités particuliers.

XII. Pour la conservation, facilité et advancement du commerce, la monnoye royale de Suede aura cours en Pomeranie, et celle de Pomeranie en Suede, et sera exposée selon l'évaluation qui en aura esté faite sur les lieux.

XIII. Si survient quelque différent ou quelque mesintelligence entre sa royale majesté et ledit seigneur duc ou entre leurs sujets, ou estats, elle ne se terminera point par l'épée et par guerre, ains en la facon présente par la pacification de Stetin en l'année 1570, c'est à sçavoir par personages d'autorité, nommés par les parties, ou elseus par sort.

XIV. Finalement, nous roy de Suede nous sommes expressemment réservé, qu' au cas que ledit seigneur duc vient à deceder sans descendans males, les heritiers, avant que l'électeur de Brandenburg (auquel comme au futur successeur de l' estat, l'hommage a déjà esté fait) ait approuvé et ratifié la presente confederation, et avant que le dit successeur soit venu en personne pour la liberation de ces provinces, ou au cas que cette succession fust revoquée en doute, et rendue litigieuse au dit seigneur electeur ; nous roy de Suede, ou nos successeurs de nos royaumes et couronne, retiendrons ces-dittes province en forme de sequestre et de protection, jusques à ce que le droit successif ait esté pleinement éclairci et établi ; et que par le successeur les frais de la guerre nous aient esté entierement payez et remboursés (sans toutefois en faire souffrir aucune charge ny contribution aux dites provinces, estats et subjets de Pomeranie) et jusques à ce que la presente confederation ait esté par luy delicement ratifiée et confirmée,



Tout ce que dessus s'entend avoir esté accordé & promis de bonne foy & sans fraude. Pour certitude & perpetuelle fermeté de quoy, nous roy de Suede, &c. 1630. pour nous, nos succeffeurs, &c. & nous duc de Poméranie, &c. pour nous, nos succeffeurs, &c. avons la present nostre convention & confederation approuvée & confirmée de nos feaux royal, & ducal, & realle, signée de nos mains, au vieil Stetin le 10 jour de Juillet, vieil stil, l'an 1630.

GUSTAVUS.

BOGISLAÛS.

## X.

## L E T T R E du duc de POMERANIE à l'EMPEREUR.

TRES HAUT, &c. *cum titulis majoribus,* \* \* \* \* \* 1630.

J'estime que ce seroit chose superflüé de redire au long à vostre majesté les non meritées calamitez & griefues miseres, esquelles les ruinaux logemens de gens de guerre faits depuis trois ans en mes duchez de Stetin, Poméranie, & en toutes les provinces, & dependantes d'icelles, m'ont plongé; puis qu'il est notoire à tout le monde, & que les plaintes que moy & le miens en avons faites, & les iterées responces que sur icelles il a pleu à vostre majesté imperiale, me donner, le tesmoignent plus que suffisament, sans faire mention de ce que j'ay encore envoyé expres mes deputez à la presente diete electorale de Ratisbonne, tant à vostre majesté imperiale, qu' au college des electeurs, pour y faire remonstrer en toute humilité & respect, & par toutes sortes de circonstances, l'extremité en laquelle je suis reduit. Mais bien m'est il forcé de représenter à vostre majesté, que sur ces entrefaites le roy de Suede, &c. est arrivé en mes pays avec une puissante armée, & a trouvé si peu de resistance, en ceux qui avoient esté destinez pour la defence, (& qui sous ce pretexte ont espuisé moy, & les miens jusques au fond, & outre ce, desarmé la plupart de mes sujets, & mesme osté leur chevaux) que d'abord il a pris le duché de Rugen, & ensuite le havre de Penemond devant Wolgast, puis s'est emparé de l'isle, & de tout le pays d'Usedom, avec la ville bien munie d'iceluy; du port Wollin, des deux havres Schwein & Divenau, outre le fort qui y avoit esté commencé à si grands frais, & la ville bien murée de Wollin, qui estoient autant de retranchements & forts pour defendre l'accés de cette ville de Stetin, lieu de nostre residence; & notamment l'isle de Rugen, ou il y avoit plusieurs bonnes fortresses. De mesme l'havre de Penemond estoit bien fortifié & retranché, comme aussi Usedom, Wollin, Schwein & Divenau. De sorte qu'il est à presumer, que si ces defenseurs eussent voulu faire bonne resistance, & se porter vaillamment, le roy de Suede n'eust peu en si peu de temps, faire de si grands progres. Mais au lieu de cela, des qu'ils entendrent la venue dudit roy, sans l'attendre, lesdits defenseurs pillerent les places susdites, mirent le feu en quelques unes, & les abandonnerent à la honte, tournans leurs armes, qu'ils dev-

1630. roient employer contre le soldat estrange, contre les pauvres habitans de farmez du pays ; qu'il ont comme en pays ennemy par une cruauté inouye pilléz & saccagéz, de sorte que c'est chose horrible à décrire, mais neantmoins veritable, & dont les preuves & témoignages se pourront suffisamment produire cy-apres. Voire on n'en est pas demeuré là, ains ils ont ataqué mon chateau & ma ville d'Uckarmond, qui est à un notable passage, chassé d'icelle ma garnison contre l'accord expréz, & tout aussi tost l'ont quittés & laisser vuide. A Wollin ils ont pillé la maison de la princesse douairiere, sœur d'electeur de Saxe, & talché d'y mettre feu. De là est ensuivy que le roy de Suede prenant l'occasion & son temps, pendant que Torquato Conti mareschal de camp pour vostre majesté imperiale avec la pluspart de l'armée se jettoit contre la Pomranie) est arrivé le 20 Juillet à la faveur du vent, (qui luy fit faire six lieux en deux heures) devant cette ville, que tout aussi tost il investit de telle vitesse, & bloqua de tous costez, faisans ses approches de si près, qu'il fut impossible de se mettre en defence, beaucoup moins recevoir ou attendre secours de l'armée de vostre majesté.

Que si là dessus il plaît à vostre majesté imperiale, selon sa grande bonté & prudence, de laquelle elle est douée de Dieu, aux electeurs & princes de l'empire, voire à tout le monde, de bien considerer & juger comment, & par quels moyens je suis tombé en ce malheur : je ne crains point d'encourir de droict & equité autre jugement ny censüre, si non que la sincerité & constance de ma foy vrayement Allemande (en laquelle je suis demeuré ferme, nonobstant toutes mauvaises procedures) à esté mal recogneüe ; & que tout ces malheur se doit attribuer à cette nouvelle invention de loger des gens de guerre contre les statuts de l'empire, & *exiger de si grosses contrioutions* que la ruine totale du pays s'en est ensuivy, pour ne point toucher aux autres raisons. Car par la grace de Dieu, je suis tout assuré en ma conscience, de n'en avoir jamais donné le moindre sujet, ny par union ny par correspondance, beaucoup moins par conspiration ou aucune action suspecte, ains plustost comme un vray & fidelle membre de l'empire Romaine, demeurant toujours ferme en termes d'integrité & innocence, pour des tourner ces malheurs, perils, & extremitez de mon pays, ay recherché juiques à present toutes voyes & moyens, & tant envers vostre majesté imperiale, que vers les college des electeurs, comme aussi vers vos generaux, capitaines & tous autres, qui pouvoient servir à la cause, envoyé des ambassades notables à vostre majesté & aux susdits electeurs ; & de fraiche memoire, par l'advis des grands ministres d'estat de vostre majesté commandans icy, *une ambassade à la couronne de Suede*. Encore une à Dantzic ; mesmes encore une presentement à vostre majesté imperiale ; si peut estre, par une singuliere & gracieuse volenté de Dieu, il se pouvoit trouver remede & repos. Que si tout cela juiques à present ait rapporté peu de fruit, & que cette occasion y soit survenue, ny moy, ny mes pays innocens n'en devons point patir, Ains tant plus & faudroit-il penser aux moyens d'une salutaire paix & à des tourner le mal. Aussi ne veux-je perdre toute esperance de paix & de remede, *veu que par le peu de discours que j'ay eu avec le roy de Suede je ne l'ai pas reconnu si animé, qu'il se porte pour ennemi de vostre majesté ny de l'empire Romain ; mais que son dessein n'est que de conserver la liberté du commerce de la cour de Suede & les membres de l'empire ses voisins, de tout temps considerer en leur ancien estat, les defendant contre toute violence injuste que les gens de guerre ont entrepris d'y exercer sous le nom & souvent contre l'intention & mandement de vostre majesté.* C'est que la necessité urgente m'a fait declarer à vostre majesté &



& la supplier tres humblement de me faire sentir les gracieux effets de sa clemence & promesses imperiales, & renvoyer mes deputez, par lesquels je la supplie en toute humilité de me descharger de tant de difficultez, avec bonne despesche. Cela non seulement tournera à la louange & gloire immortelle de vostre majesté, mais le tout-puissant la comblera encore de toute prosperité & benediction, & moy je ne cesseray par continuelle obeyssance & devotion de servir vostre majesté & la serenissime maison d'Autriche; recommandant tres affectueusement vostre majesté en la protection du tout-puissant, à ce qu'il luy donne un regne heureux & plein de prosperité & moy en toute subjection avec mes pays aux bonnes graces de vostre majesté. Donné à Stetin ce 14 Juillet 1630.

De vostre imperiale majesté le tres humble, tres obeyssant,

& fidele prince de l'empire, & Feodal,

BOGISLAÛS.

## XI.

### LETTRE des electeurs catholiques à la lettre du roy de SUEDE.

**N**OUS Anselme Casimir par la grace de Dieu, archevesque de Mayence, 1630.  
Philippe Christophle archevesque de Treves, Ferdinand archevesque de Cologne, Maximilian duc de l'une & l'autre Baviere, Jean Georges duc de Saxe, George Guillaume marquis de Brandebourg, archichancelier, grand escuyer, grand mareschal, grand chambrier, & princes electeurs du saint empire Romain, par la Germanie, la Gaule, le royaume d'Arles & Italie.

Roy serenissime, nostre tres amé cousin & allié, vostre dignité royale nous à exposé par ses lettres du septiesme Avril plusieurs plaintes, ausquelles elle desiroit remedié par nostre entremisse, avant que la necessité la prestast de se pourvoir des remedes qu'elle jugeroit estre plus convenables, lesquels pourroient causer de grands maux en l'empire: comme aussi elle s'excusoit, de ce qu'elle avoit secouru la ville imperiale de Stralsond. Toutes ces choses ayans esté considerées, nous n'estimons point, que de là puisse naistre aucun sujet qui porte vostre dignité royale à desseigner & mediter quelque mauvais dessein contre l'empire Romain: que si ceux de Stralsond se fussent montrez d'avantage affectionnéz, plus parfaits que par paroles envers l'empereur, leur souverain seigneur, la voye pour gaigner sa clemence imperiale, eut esté expediente au remede plus prompt contre les dommages de la guerre: car il ne leur estoit pas convenable d'appeller à eux des secours estrangers, ny d'en donner aux estrangers, au prejudice de l'empire.

Que si vostre dignité royale a esté offensée, & si elle a receu quelques indignitez par les ennemis de la paix; c'est chose que nous n'approuvons pas: & si en la  
suscription

1630. suscription de nos lettres il n'y avoit pas ce qu'elle desiroit, cela n'a pas esté fait d'aucune mauvaise volonté, ny avec dessein de diminuer son honneur, mais bien selon le fil duquel nous usons mesme envers les autres roys. Et pour ce qui concerne les armes imperiales conduites en Basse-Saxe, & par apres aux costes de la mer Baltique, qui ont esté suivies de preparatifs de guerre : pour ces choses nous ne croyons point que sa majesté imperiale ait jamais esté provoquée contre la couronne de Suede, ny ordonné estre entrepris aucun acte d'hostilité sur l'estat de vostre dignité royale : mais que son conseil a esté, d'aller au devant de tous sujets de trouble, que vouloient exciter ceux qui estoient plus portez à ayder les conseils ennemis, qu'à embrasser la bien veillance de sa majesté imperiale qui leur estoit offerte.

Et de ce qu'elle se fâche, que ses voisins & parents ont esté privez de leurs seigneuries paternelles, pour ce qui concerne les principautz & fiefs dependans immediatement de l'empire : nous sçavons que vostre dignité royale deferera d'autant plus equitablement l'arbitrage de cette cause à sa majesté imperiale, comme seigneur direct des fiefs de l'empire, que plus elle recognistra que sadite majesté est portée à la clemence, & qu'elle est tres-prompte d'administrer la justice à ceux qui la demandent. Aussi auparavant nous avons fait voir nostre son par nos lettres, de recommander à l'equité de sadite majesté imperiale, la cause des ducs de Meckelbourg ; & que pour les secours qui ont esté envoyez au roy de Pologne en Prusse, nous ne croyons que cela ait redoublé sa majesté imperiale ennemie de vostre dignité royale, veu qu'il n'apport rien de la raison de ce fait : mais bien croyons nous qu'elle a en a eu des causes particulieres, pour lesquelles elle a jugé n'estre à propos de n'abandonner le party d'un roy, qui lui est parent & amy : & d'avantage, puis qu'à present les tresors sont accordées de part & d'autre ; si vostre dignité royale veut pretendre de là, ou de quelques autres causes, avoir esté offensée, nous ne pouvons croire toutefois, que telles choses puissent ou doivent estre sujet de troubler l'empire par les armes, veu qu'il ne manquera pas d'autres voyes & remedes pacifiques pour composer les differents, & satisfaire à l'une & l'autre partie. Ce qui est cause que nous exhortons vostre dignité royale de ne se laisser induire par les conseils de qui que ce soit, de lever les armes contre l'empire, ny de vouloir faire juger les differents de ceux, qui jusques à present ont refusé de rendre obeyssance à sa majesté imperiale : & ne pouvons nous empêcher de trouver estrange de voir maintenant, d'armées levées contre l'empire par vostre dignité royale, & de ce qu'elle ne retire ses troupes : veu que voicy le temps auquel on peut consulter de plus grandes affaires avec nostre empereur invincible, nous promettans de travailler à l'establissement d'une bonne & solide paix en cette assemblée de Ratisbonne. Et si elle fait autrement, chacun pourra voir qu'elle ne veut recevoir aucun conseil important à sa seurété ; mais que vostre dignité royale veut entendre aux mauvais desseins de sa majesté imperiale. Reste donc qu'en nous promettant de meilleurs succez en toutes ces affaires, & nous confiant en l'assurance de la paix, nous offririons nos offices mutuels à vostre dignité royale, lui souhaitans que toutes choses heureuses luy soient concedées par Dieu tout puissant. Donnée à Ratisbonne le dixiesme jour d'Aoust mil six cens trente. De vostre dignité royale, les tres prompts amis & alliez.



## XII.

## LETTRE du roy de SUEDE aux electeurs catholiques \*.

**G**USTAVE ADOLPHE. Reverendissimes, tres-nobles & tres-illustres 1630.  
princes, nos tres chers amis & alliez. Nous avons receu les lettres de vos dilections du dixiesme Juillet, & dixiesme Aoust, à nous renduës depuis peu de jours, & ayans consideré la forme exterieure d'icelles, nous avons recogneu que maintenant avoient esté corrigées les choses contenuës aux lettres precedentes de vos dilections, concernant nostre titre de roy, ainsi qu'il estoit raisonnable : & ayans ouvert les vostres dernieres, il y a dequoy s'estonner, de ce que, contre la coustume ordinaire, & le stil usité aux lettres electorales adressées non seulement à nous, mais aussi aux autres roys & princes sujets à l'empire Romain, les noms de vos dilections sont exprimez à vos lettres, comme si cela avoit esté fait à dessein de preferer les noms des autres à nostre titre royal, & pour causer quelque prejudice à nostre dignité & majesté royale. Mais nous voulons croire que tout cela s'est fait par les secretaires, la plume desquels a possible esté ainsi conduite par quelques ennemis de la paix publique, afin que toute communication & commerce de lettres d'entre nous & vos dilections, soit à l'avenir rendu plus difficile, veu qu'ils cognoissoient fort bien que nous ne voulons admettre ny permettre aucune chose qui soit contraire à nostre dignité royale : & pour mesme sujet nous n'avons aussi deu par aucune raison recevoir ny accepter les lettres que l'empereur nous a escrites depuis peu, en la subscription desquelles sa majesté nous appelle *Useren Fursten* (nostre prince) en sorte qu'il semble nous vouloir comprendre au nombre de ses sujets, & neantmoins nous ne tenons du benefice imperial la moindre poignée de terre ; mais nous disons que tout ce que nostre empire embrasse est tenu par nous de Dieu seul & de l'espée, sa divine bonté par sa clemence ayant favorisé nostre très juste cause en toutes les guerres que nous avons faites jusques à present. Mais nous ne voulons point nous arrester plus long-temps sur ces choses, veu principalement qu'il se sçait assez, que par tels actes chose aucune ne peut estre derogée d'avantage à nostre majesté royale, que de là il n'en puisse arriver autant à la dignité de vos dilections.

Et pour ce qui concerne ces choses, nous avons eu pour agreable, de ce que vos dilections assurent n'avoir peu approuver les injures & indignitez à nous indignement & injustement faites par les communs perturbateurs du repos public : mais nous aurions bien plus agreable, si les remedes convenables à ces maux eussent esté appliquez en temps & raison ; il semble que maintenant vos dilections s'elevant contre les choses par nous commises, & excusent aucunement & non entierement desadvoüent tout ce qui s'est fait jusques à present par nos ennemis ; veu qu'auparavant par nos lettres, nous avons suffisamment exposé les raisons qui nous contraignoient de donner secours à la ville de Stralsund & de procurer autant qu'en nous estoit possible le salut de cette ville voisine, qui depuis plusieurs siècles est conjointe par divers liens à nous & à nostre couronne, & d'aller promptement au devant du peril eminent, qui menacoit nos estats &

\* Mercure Francois, Tom. XVI. p. 338, &amp;c.

1630. la mer Baltique. Et néanmoins nous n'avons entrepris aucune hostilité contre l'Empire Romain, ny attenté aucune chose à son préjudice; mais plüstoit nous nous sommes persuadéz qu'en cela nous remportions de grands avantages de l'Empire par nos mérites, pour avoir empêché que cette ville ne fust opprimée par les injures persécutives contre sa mesme autorité impériale, & l'ayant veu pressé à tomber és mains des ennemis de l'Empire Romain, nous avons comme embrassé la meilleure voye pour la conservation, l'avons maintenuë saine & entière au mesme Empire: et estimons n'estre nécessaire ny convenable de reciter icy toutes les particularitez de cette affaire, veu que nous pouvons facilement esprimer, que nul rau goût duquel nos premiers actes n'ont peu satisfaire ne pese derechef toutes choses d'une balance esgale: sçavoir si la ville de Stralsund n'avoit par elle de causes justes & pressantes d'implorer un secours estrangier contre une force non moins injuste qu'extreme; & sçavoir si elle pouvoit trouver une voye meilleure & plus expediente, pour s'aller rendre à la clemence de sa miséricorde imperiale, comme à un autel d'un port de salut. Ceux mesme du dedroit du fond sont tous pressés de faire voir cela devant tous les juges plus equitables du monde, & chacun pourra facilement reconnoître combien peu profitoient en ce temps là les decrets de l'empereur, non seulement pour delivrer cette ville innocente du danger d'estre ruinée, mais aussi pour pouvoir tant soit peu refroidir & temperer cette haine mortelle & fureurs inhumaines, qui s'allumoi nt à la ruine extreme de cette place; ses ennemis posans tout droit & raison à la violence des armes.

D'avantage vos dilections disent qu'elles ne peuvent croire que l'empereur n'ait esté provoqué à prendre les armes, & faire des preparatifs de guerre pour envoyer en Basse-Saxe, & qu'il avoit ordonné qu'apres que ses armes seroient conduites és costes de la mer Baltique, elles se jetteroient en ses estats & pays. Ce que nous eussions creu aussi tres-volontiers, si tant d'exemples funestes contraires, que nous avons veu de nos yeux, ne nous eussent fait reconnoître, que plusieurs en ce temps là, pour avoir adjousté trop de foy à ces choses, ont esté chastiez par des peines tres-leveres: & eussions jugé estre chose indigne de nostre dignité & autorite royale, de donner quelquefois trop de creance en de choses de si grande importance, qui regardent le salut de l'estat & des peuples que l'eternel a mis en nostre puissance. Mais nous ne pensions pas qu'il fust trop tard de se plaindre de cela. Toutefois pour ce qui est de l'empereur, nous ne nous promettons pas rien de mal de son côté, quoy que plusieurs ayent esté assez offenséz par ses ministres: mais comme tels perturbateurs de la paix, n'estans par nous provoquéz, n'ont pas laissé de nous faire mille indignitez, & d'adjouster injures sur injures (ainsi que vos dilections cognoistront par la deduction des dommages & deniers recrus d'eux, que je leur aye depuis peu envoyez) & ainsi nul ne doit trouver estrange, si estans frappez de crainte & d'apprehension non vaine & injuste, mais tres-juste, nous avons commencé d'avoir tels procedez plus que suspects. C'est pourquoy nous asseurans sur le droit tres-equitable de la defense, et que nous nous sommes résolu de defendre nostre dignité par d'autres voyes, & avons esté forcéz à prendre en tels maux le remède plus salutaire pour en prevenir de plus grands, & pourvoir soigneusement, qu'eux qui sont faits à la navigation, n'entreprennent d'entrer en nos provinces qui leur sont voisines, & en celles de nos royaumes qui sont au delà de la mer, sans empêcher que le domaine direct sur les choses qui dependent des fiefs de l'empire,



pire, ne soit conservé à l'empereur en l'empire Romain. Et toutesfois ce droit d'amitié, de voisinage & de consanguinité, ne se peut rompre, ny faire en sorte qu'il ne soit licite de se condouloir sur les adversitez des amis & voisins, & beaucoup plus des parents & alliez, & qu'il demeure encores à nous comme roy & prince d'avoir leur cause & raison pour recommandée, veu principalement que non tant en leur propre faute, mais bien que les sinistres desseins des ennemis estans sans defense, & ny ayans en leur cause aucun ordre de droit gardé qu'avoit accoustumé d'estre conservé en l'empire Romain, tant à convaincre qu'à condamner, ils se sont veus precipitez en une si grande calamité.

Vos dilections se persuadent aussi, que l'empereur a eu ces causes particulieres, pour quoy il n'a pas jugé estre à propos que les amis & parents du roy quittassent son party, & que pour cela secours avoyent esté envoyez au Polonois en Prusse, & que par ainsi ils n'estiment pas cela estre si grande chose, qu'il n'y ayt encores d'autres moyens pacifiques pour composer les affaires, & partant que l'empire ne devoit estre troublé par d'autres mouvements de guerre. Et nous au contraire, nous nous laissons facilement persuader, que ces causes impulsives & persuasives n'ont manqué à nos ennemis pour envoyer ces secours, ou bien que ces raisons là sont pour justifier les causes de cet affaire, ou bien pour improuver nos actions. Nous voulons que vos dilections jugeants l'amitié qui est entre l'empereur & le roy de Pologne, ne nous imposent pas la necessité de ne pouvoir souffrir telles invasions & actes d'hostilité : & n'y a sorte de droit qui decide, qu'il ne nous soit loisible de defendre nostre dignité contre tels violateurs, qui ont exercé toutes sortes d'hostilité au tré grand prejudice de nos estats, & d'en poursuivre la vengeance par le juste droit de la loy talion ; & qu'il vaut mieux les aller chercher finalement de hors, & aux costes estrangeres, qu'en la maison & aux entrailles de nostre royaume. Ce qui ne se peut faire, qu'avec une perpetuelle sollicitude & agitation : pour ce que nostre droit, ny les treves faites entre nous & le royaume de Pologne, ne peuvent se rompre ny diminuer. Et quoy que toutes ces choses soient ainsi, les dernieres pourtant ne doivent pas estre premierement entreprises. Car vos dilections se souviendront, combien de fois nous nous sommes travaillez, pour oster toute discorde par composition amiable : mais si les choses que nous avons si bien meditées, ont manqué au succez désiré, cela ne nous doit estre imputé, mais bien à leur iniquité, subterfuge & malice, qui ont indignement rejeté, & se sont en partie moquez des moyens par nous proposez. C'est pourquoy les remedes lenitifs ne profitant de rien, il ne se faut scandaliser, si nous nous sommes resolus aux remedes corrosifs & severes. Et pour ce que vos dilections par leurs lettres n'ont couché aucunes paroles des remedes qui se devoient esperer, afin que par vostre autorité & interposition il fust pourveu à faire cesser ces justes plaintes, ce n'est pas avec injure que nous les recherchons. Car quelle autre chose se pouvoit-il recueillir de là sinon une option ou une necessité qui nous restoit, de pourvoir au salut de leurs estats, & du nostre par une autre voye ?

Neantmoins nous voulons bien repeter icy ce que nous avons souventefois protesté, que nous ne voulons estre ennemis de l'empereur Romain, ny de vos dilections, ny des autres ordres & membres de l'empire, qui ne nous ont offensé, ny les provoquer à l'advenir ; mais seulement de demander par nos armes, que l'ambition, fureur & licence particuliere d'aucuns qui sont accoustumés de pescher en eau trouble, soient reprimées, afin qu'elles ne croissent outre

1630. mesure; & que la feureté de nous & de nos voisins soit certaine. Ce que faifans, nous ne troublerons l'empire Romain, ny ne voulons assister ceux qui refusent l'obeyfance deuë à l'empereur & à l'empire, ny offenser aucun de ses estats, mais plustost poursuivre les perturbateurs du repos public, & conserver les nobles membres de l'empire de ruine & de ravages, & de venger les injures par eux faites. Finalement vos dilections nous exhortent de retirer & emmener nos armées, ce que nous jugeons devoir faire, sinon lors que nous serons affeurez de la fatisfaction des injures à nous injustement faites, & qu'il apparoiſſe de la feureté, tant de nous que de nos voisins. Que si avant l'année courante les autres qui ont esté plusieurs fois admonestez, se fussent monstrez prompts à rappeler leurs troupes ennemies de la Prusse, nous n'eussions maintenant amené nos armées en ces costes. Toutefois si quelques conditions de paix, justes, equitables, & assurees, sont mises sur le tapis, & que nous recognoissions que la chose se fasse par l'autre partie : tant s'en faut que nous nous monstriers contraires au traictés de la paix, que nous confessons ingenuëment que le but principal de nos armes n'est que la paix juste & assurée. C'est pourquoy nous faisons de congratulations à l'empire Chrestien, & à vos dilections, de ce que nous apprenons qu'elles elevent leur esperance à une solide paix, & qu'elles semblent promettre, que la vertu, le soin & l'affection de vostre illustre college inclinent à la paix commune de la Chrestienté : & comme nous nous promettons toute sorte de biens & amitié de vos dilections; aussi nous trouveront elles tousjours disposez & preparez à la paix. Donné à Stralsfond le 13 Septembre 1630. De vos dilections bon amy & parent Gustave Adolphe roy de Suede.

Le mesme roy de Suede ayant veu les lettres que l'empereur luy escrivit au mois d'aoust, cy-dessus inferées, & par icelles comme sa majesté imperiale s'estonnoit de ce qu'il estoit entré és terres de l'empire, le blasmant de cette entreprise voulut se justifier par ce qui suit.

## XIII.

## L E T T R E de l'Empereur au Roy de SUEDE \*.

**N**OUS Ferdinand par la grace de Dieu, empereur des Romains, &c. Au serenissime prince Gustave Adolphe, roy de Suede, des Goths & Vandalles, &c. nostre amitié, dilection, & salut. Serenissime prince & tres cher amy, il nous a esté rapporté de divers lieux, dignes de foy, que vostre dilection a dresseé n'agueres une puissante armée de cavalerie & infanterie, dont elle a inopinément fait entrer une partie, apres avoir passé la mer, dans les isles de l'empire Romain, & en terre ferme au duché de Pomeranie, s'y estant emparée, non seulement de quelques places, villes, & chasteaux d'importance : mais a aussi outre cela commencé d'usurper les gabelles & peages (qui en vertu de droit royal, n'appartiennent qu'à nos) & est encores en volenté de nous assaillir par toute sorte d'hostilité, & d'empieter d'avantage sur les pays dudit empire.



Nous n'avons point souvenance, que depuis que nous soutenons cette grande charge d'empereur il soit arrivé entre nous aucun contraire ou finistie accident, ou que nous ou l'empire ayons donné occasion de trouble ou dissension, moins d'une si ouverte hostilité. Et pourtant il nous semble fort estrange, que vostre dignité a entrepris de jetter contre nous & l'empire, les fondemens d'une guerre, possible tres tacheuse à l'une & à l'autre des parties, & ce pour quelque different particulier, touchant la ville de Stralsfond, duquel vostre dignité n'a deu concevoir aucun ombrage de danger ou prejudice. Car tout cela s'est passé dans nostre terriore, & de l'empire, & concerne les droicts, & privileges d'iceluy, esquels vostre dignité n'a non plus de droit de nous faire la loy, qu'avec raison elle se trouveroit offensée, qu'en semblables debats l'on entreprist, de la maistriser en son royaume de Suede. Et ce d'autant plus, qu'à nostre opinion ledit different pourroit facilement estre composé & assoupy, sous des conditions equitables, sans venir à aucune hostilité ou effusion de sang, par l'entremise du roy de Dannemarc, qui n'a fait aucune difficulté de s'en charger, aussi promptement qu'on le luy avoit proposé & conseillé, si vostre dignité s'y fust portée de mesme zele & affection que nous, & qu'elle eust au temps prefix & assigné envoyé ses ministres avec instruction suffisante. Mais comment que ce soit, il estoit plus que raisonnable par le droit des gens, que vostre dignité (supposé, qu'elle eust creu d'estre assez bien fondée de nous attaquer par armes & de rompre toute amitié) nous eust prealablement denoncé la guerre par un deffi public & legitime, avant qu'envahir l'empire si injustement, assurant vostre dignité, que nos preparatifs de guerre prez la mer Baltique, & ailleurs, n'ont point esté faits pour l'offencer, ny cy devant, ny à present : ains qu'au contraire nous avons eu le desir, de continuer entre nous les effets de bon voisinage & toute amitié mutuelle, comme nous avons encore cette mesme affection, pourveu que vostre dignité par ses procedures contraires ne nous donne plus de sujet de nous porter à d'autres resolutions, & qu'elle fasse cesser cette guerre non necessaire. C'est pourquoy nous l'exhortons amiablement, de ne s'ingerer plus avant es affaires de l'empire & que (ne luy ayans donné nulle occasion) elle n'offence ny nous, ny les membres dudit empire, ains qu'elle retire son armée, au plustost des isles & terres d'iceluy par elle occupées : Qu'elle n'empesche plus par ses navires, la navigation & le commerce maritime, & qu'elle ne nous incommode point, soit par mer, soit par terre, en la perception des droits de l'empire. Que si au contraire (ce que nous n'estimons pas) il arrive, que vostre dignité en mesprisant nostre presente declaration imperiale, & confidente assurance de nostre amitié, persiste en cette hostilité, & s'opiniastre à retinir les places par elles prises, par ruse de guerre, ou par force : nous, avec l'ayde & conseil des electeurs de l'empire mettrons promptement en estat pour les recouvrer, & prendrons à cœur la conservation de nostre reputation & de l'empire, ensemble la defence & manutention des estats, qui continueront la fidelité & obeyssance qu'ils nous doivent, afin d'obvier à une plus grande calamité. Nous esperons, que vostre dignité ne permettra point, que l'affaire vienne à cette extremité ; & selon qu'elle aura deferé à nos presentes lettres imperiales, nous ferons tres prompts & disposez à luy faire paroistre par bons offices nostre amitié & bien-veillance en ce qui luy sera agreable. Donné à Ratisbonne, le dix huietiemes Aoust, mil six cens trente.

D. V. D. cousin & affectionné,

FERDINAND.

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XIV.

## XIV.

## LETTRE du Roy de SUEDE à l'Empereur \*.

1630. **A**U serenissime & tres puissant prince Ferdinand II. de ce nom, empereur esleu des Romains, d'Allemagne, d'Hongrie, Boheme, Dalmatie, Croatie & Sclavonie, roy, archiduc d'Austriche, duc de Bourgogne, Stirie, Carniole & Virtemberg, comte de Habsbourg & Tirol, nostre tres cher cousin & amy.

Serenissime & tres puissant empereur, cousin & tres cher amy. Nous avons (non sans admiration) entendu par la lettre de vostre serenité, datée du 18 d'Aoust, & a nous renduë seulement le 6 de ce mois, en nostre camp de Ribnitz, qu'elle s'emerveille beaucoup, que cet esté passé nous soyons entrez avec nostre armée en Allemagne, & que vous taschez de nous rendre coupables, tant de cette entreprise mesme, que de ce qu'elle soit faite sans aucune denonciation ou desfi public. Certainement nous ne pensions jamais que vostre serenité eust peu tomber en une si profonde oubliance des choses passées, ny se mesprendre contre la personne de celui qui a commencé d'offenser l'autre par ses armes, puis que nous nous sommes tousjours promis de son equité, qu'elle n'imputeroit jamais à la partie innocente ce que la coupable avoit commise, & ne chargeroit l'une de la faute de l'autre : attendu que c'est le maistre de camp de vostre serenité, qui sans aucune prealable denonciation (nous ne rapporterons icy par le menu une infinité de cruautéz & de hostilitéz contre nous exercées) nous a jetté sur les bras és années passées une grande & puissante armée, tant de cheval que de pied, sous les estendarts ou aigles de l'empire Romain. Ce qui est notoire, & autant manifeste comme il est tres veritable que nous n'avons que trop expérimenté les mauvaises intentions & violences de ladite armée, lesquelles, ny nous-mesmes, par nostre innocence, ny le conseil de nostre royaume, par ses remonstrances bien fondées & tres equitables, n'avons peu faire arrester ny revoquer. C'est pourquoy, bien que nous le peziens en gros, ou en detail, nous ne pouvons comprendre sous quel pretexte ou titre on nous pourroit charger de la cause de cette guerre, & par quelle raison on pourroit precieusement demander de nous la denonciation, laquelle vostre serenité a mesme negligée, estant certain que nous n'avons travaillé qu'à tenir pour nostre seureté la guerre esloignée de nous, sans la faire à autrui. Nous ne voyons aussi aucune raison, qu'on nous charge du crime commis contre le droict des gens, puis que ce droict contient en son vray sens, qu'és guerres defensives les deüts ne se font tousjours par des hérauts ou rois d'armes, mais par la nature & qualité mesme de telles guerres, quand on se sent contre le droict tout-a-fait offensé, & ouvertement assailly : voire qui plus est, pour ne manquer à une denonciation, quoyque superflüe, & pour ne donner sujet de se plaindre de nous avec fondement, comme si nous eussions trompé le monde par les projets d'une paix, au envain l'empire à l'improviste, nous nous sommes servis de cette precaution d'adresser à ceux diversés fois aux electeurs de l'empire Romain, comme aussi nous avons

\* Mercure Francois, Tom. XVI. 347, &c.



admonesté vostre serenité par un député de nostre dit conseil vers le general de 1630. vostre serenité, que si l'on n'avoit esgard à nos justes plaintes, en nous donnant satisfaction des fautes contre nous commises, nous serions contraints de pourvoir par autre voye à la seureté & conservation de nostre estat & dignité.

Vostre serenité dit bien, que depuis son advenement à la dignité imperiale elle n'a commis ou permis aucune chose tendante au prejudice ou danger de nostre estat; que vos appareils & preparatifs par terre & par mer, n'ont jamais eu le but d'apporter aucun dommage à nous ou à nos estats, & que par des moyens paisibles on eust peu composer nos differents, n'estans pas d'une telle importance, qu'avec raison on se pouvoit formaliser pour troubler l'empire. Mais sur cela nous disons que nous n'avons pas l'intention de debatre icy, si ces protestations ne sont directement contraires aux actes & effects si evidens, remettans tout au jugement libre de tout le monde. Et que nous ne scavons pas aussi exactement, si vostre serenité (dont les pensées nous sont incogneues) ait eu quelque intention de nous faire du mal, ou de nous offenser: mais que sous l'ombre & l'autorité du nom, & de la haute dignité imperiale, soit par vostre commandement, ou par une grande connivence nous nous trouvons offencez, & outragez de beaucoup de dommages & affronts. Nous le scavons & sentons, veu qu'il est aussi manifeste, que si quelqu'un se vouloit amuser à en faire des demonstrations ou deductions plus ampls, ce seroit esclaire le soleil en plein midy. Dont nous appellons sans difficulté à la conscience de vostre serenité, laquelle nous prendrons pour tesmoin ou juge. Et quant à l'appareil de guerre, & de ce que nous en avons deu juger, nous rapportons à la cognoissance que tout le monde en a, & aux discours tant passez que presens de vos ministres et officiers: mais principalement à leurs aës, traictez, entreprises, excez, desseins & conseils, lesquels comme trop suspects & apparens, descouvrent assez ce que nous en avons deu attendre. Et si tout cela n'estoit assez notoire, le duché de Pomeranie & les provinces voisines pourroient tesmoigner, que sous le faux pretexte de la crainte de nos armes, mais en effect à dessein de nous desplaire & faire du mal, les gens de vostre serenité les ont tourmentez, pilliez et entierment ruinez.

Nous advoüons bien clairement & simplement, que les differents survenus entre nous pouvoient estre utilement terminez par autres moyens que par armes, d'autant qu'il seroit à souhaiter que vous n'eussiez interpreté sinistrement, ains acunement souffert nostre secours justement donné à la miserable & trop injustement oppressée ville de Stralsund, sans prejudicier en aucune façon à l'empire Romain, ains plustost pour garentir les decrets de vostre serenité, comme nous avons de bon cœur, et d'un courage endurcy à la patience & constance, postposé à la commune tranquillité, et au repos public de la Chrestienté, toutes les indignitez et offences que nostre cousin le duc de Holstein, par vostre commandement, et sous les enseignes de l'empire nous a faites. Par ainsi nous ne doutons point que nous n'eussions peu venir à quelque accommodement, au lieu qu'au rebours on nous a contrains d'assembler avec grande despence une puissante armée, et la passer et loger en Allemagne, pour obvier en temps aux perils et dangers qui s'advançoient et nous menacoient trop evidemment. Mais puis qu'il a pleu à vostre serenité de choisir une voye contraire, et vos subdeleguez, lors presens en la ville de Lubec, pour assister au traicté qui s'y faisoit avec le roy de Dannemarc, s'estans enhardis, contre le droict des gens, de refuser et defendre l'accez à nos ambassadeurs y

envoyez

1630.

envoyez à cette fin, pour travailler à la composition de l'affaire de Stralsund; joint aussi que les armées de vostre serenité se sont ouvertement déclarées de nous en vouloir, & l'ont confirmé par toutes sortes d'hostilitez: nous avons cette grande confiance, qu'il n'y aura ame vivante, aimant le droict & l'équité, laquelle estant autorisée pour juge ou arbitre, ne declare que la faute ou coulpe n'est pas en nous, mais bien en vousmesmes, qui avez mieux aimé de preferer la guerre à la paix par une certaine malveillance & inimitié conceue contre nous sans aucun sujet. Or combien que nous sentons si iniquement & sans aucune juste cause provoquez nous voyans hors de toute esperance de venir à quelque accommodement, estans bien certains qu'on ne nous imputera jamais aucun dessein ou attentat inique, ny defraisonnable, pour lequel nous, pour estre plus exempts de tout sinistre soupçon, ne serions plus obligez d'entendre à la paix, qu'on nous a voulu vendre trop chere: toutefois pour manifester à la Chrestienté nostre zele & ardeur au bien & tranquillité publique, nous n'avons point voulu desister de nos conseils & intentions dirigées à icelle, ains par nos serieuses & assidues recherches, avons esineu le roy de Dannemarc, à ce que par son interposition, durant l'hyver passé, il nous preparast le chemin d'une amiable conference, qu'on feignoit devoir estre entamée entre nos commissaires de part & d'autre en la ville de Dantsick, ou nous avions envoyé, nostre chancelier avec les adjoints, bien munis de suffisant pouvoir & instruction. Et afin que les factions de guerre ne troublassent ou empeschassent les propositions & deliberations de paix, nous avons arresté & dilayé de faire avancer nostre armée, non sans grande perte de temps, desavantage notable, & frais extraordinaires. Pour lequel soin particulier, qui ne visoit qu'au repos universal de la Christienté, nous avons pour recompense, que non seulement nos bonnes & salutaires penées ont esté aneanties par plusieurs illusions & subterfuges: mais que vostre serenité ose encores nous imputer la malheureuse issue dudit traité, au lieu qu'avec raison elle devoit plustost examiner les actions & procedures de son commissaire, par lesquelles vostre serenité auroit cogneu, qu'il a empesché que les mediateurs de cette affaire estans à Dantsick ne peussent mesmes venir à quelque entreveuë avec nos ambassadeurs, pour donner fondement a un traité selon que la coustume & la raison requierent en tel cas. Vostre serenité eust aussi outre cela mieux fait, de considerer que ledit traité se pouvoit autant commodément & bien faire en quelque autre lieu, qu'en la ville de Dantsick, puis que cette place, pour quelques differents survenus entre nos officiers & ladite ville, s'estoit rendue suspecte. Et vostre serenité eust deu quitter toute opiniastrété, plustost que de causer au repos public des prejudices & dangers si grands, ou de rompre totalement & à dessein tout traité; principalement à l'égard que nos commissaires esprouverent assez clairement par des raisons manifestes & urgentes, qu'il ne leur estoit plus loisible ny possible de condescendre a aucun traité au susdit lieu de Dantsick, bien que vostre commissaire fist des instances toutes contraires.

Quand donc tout cecy, tant en general qu'en particulier, sera bien consideré, nous pouvons fort librement laisser le jugement à toute personne sincere & exempte de passion, lequel de nous deux a plus juste cause de se plaindre; & sans aller plus loin, nous remettons tout à l'interieur de vostre conscience, afin qu'elle en soit juge, veu que la nostre nous assure fermement, que vous mesmes nous tenez pour inculpables.

Vostre



Vostre serenité dit bien, qu'elle veut conserver avec nous & nostre royaume de Suede une amitié indissoluble, à condition que nous quittions & rappellions nos armées. Mais les choses sont venues trop avant, & ne sont plus en leur entier, puis que les dangers qui ont menacé & menacent toujours nous & nos sujets, ne sont point imaginatifs, mais reels & effectifs: outre ce qu'on nous a, non par paroles, ains par armes, rudement attaqué, en exerçant contre nous toute sorte d'hostilité, tant par mer que par terre. Et pourtant nous esj erons que vostre serenité nous excusera, si pour nostre seureté nous ne pouvons accepter telles offres & promesses, que vous appelez des sincerations, veu qu'icelles ne nous pourront jamais donner aucune satisfaction, parce que nous sommes plus grièvement blessez & offencez en effect, que de simples paroles: & croyons que vostre serenité ne prendra en mauvaise part nostre resolution, de tenir fermes nos armes, que la necessité inevitable, & vos outrages nous ont fait prendre; & de ne ceder, ny ployer en aucune maniere, jusques à ce que nous soyons exempts par vrayes & parfaites cautions, du peril trop evident qui penche sur nous, & que les grandes offenses, & violents affronts à nous faits, soient reparez par une solide & réelle satisfaction sans aucune tache de nostre reputation. En cette constante & tres-juste intention, nous attendrons constamment tout ce qui nous arri vera de la main de Dieu, à la bonté duquel, comme à la justice de nostre cause, nous avons tout remis, & recommandé.

Mais si da'venture vostre serenité est cependant touchée d'un sentiment, qu'il soit désormais que le vaisseau de la Chrestienté, agité & tourmenté par des orages de guerre, soit en fin conduit au port de la paix, autant salutaire & profitable, comme souhaitée de tant d'oppressés sous le joug des miseres, sans l'abandonner plus aux tempestes furieuses des ravages & desolations, & que pour cet effect le renouëment d'un traité de paix aggréera à vostre serenité: nous donnons parole d'y vouloir promptement entendre, & d'y apporter tout ce qui sera en nostre pouvoir pour l'avancement & le progres d'un œuvre si saint & glorieux.

Ce qui aura lieu, si vostre serenité promet & demonstre, effectivement; que les princes & villes d'Allemagne, comme respectivement nos tres chers cousins, beaux freres, parents, amis, alliez & voisins, seront restituez en l'estat au quel ils estoient devant ces derniers troubles, en sorte que nous puissions esperer cy apres de jouir d'une entiere seureté, pour nostre estat, de ce costé là: que l'amitié & bonne correspondance entre nostre royaume & ledites provinces soit reestablie, & que nous scachions estre cassez, aneantis, & revoquez, tous appareils & equipages de guerre par mer, comme nous estans trop suspects & contraires à la prerogative que nous avons de protecteur de la mer Baltique: & que finalement les despeses par nous faites pour nostre defense, à laquelle nous avons esté obligez & contraints par vos injures & offenses, viendront en juste deuë consideration. Alors vostre serenité n'aura pas si tost de son costé accompli ces choses, que par effect elle trouvera que nous ferons voir à tout le monde combien nous sommes poussez d'ambition à maintenir, tant avec vous qu'autres nos voisins, une amitié inviolable, sincere & constante, & que nous desirons sur toute chose vous vaincre & surpasser par toute sorte d'amitié & de bons offices, apres que la bonne intelligence entre nous sera reestablie, & tous mal-entendus oitez. Les choses doncques estans remises en tel .itat, nous ne voudrions veritablement donner aucun sujet à personne de soupçonner, ou de se plaindre justement que nous melassions impertinemment ou presomptueusement des affaires qui ne nous touchent

1630. ent point, ou peu. Car comme nous ne sommes accoustumés de nous ingérer aux affaires d'autrui, quand elles ne sont tellement jointes à nos intérêts, que celles là traient ceux-cy avec elles : tefmoin nos deportements, durant le temps de la guerre par tout allumée en Allemagne, où nous n'avons songé qu'à ce qui concerne nostre royaume, & non à la Germanie jusques au temps que par outre évidence & iniquité de vos ministres, les affaires estoignées nous sont venues sur les bras, & par leur union, conséquence, & reflexion, nous ont poussé & engagé à prendre soin de celles d'autrui, comme des nostres propres. Par ainsi l'on nous trouvera maintenant & à l'advenir en si bonne intention, que nous ne tenons, ny ne voudrions tenir, en aucune façon que ce soit, les affaires d'Allemagne, pour les nostres, & vous asseurons de ne vouloir vous y donner la moindre faicherie.

Nous concluons donc avec cette sincere & sainte protestation, que tout cecy soit entendu, ou droictement, ou sinistrement, & que cette affaire se tourne, ou en paix, ou en guerre : que nous ne couvons aucune inimitié ou hostilité contre l'empire Romain. jaoit que vous taschiez de vous servir de telles expositions pour vostre descharge & excuse, & pour nous charger de hayne & de blasme. Mais tant s'en faut, que nous voulussions jamais songer à aucune chose, tendante à son prejudice ou dommage ; qu'au contraire nous declarons, de vouloir continuer & conferver une pure & vraye amitié & correspondance aussi longuement, que de sa part on s'abstiendra de toute hostilité contre nous, & qu'on ne favorisera par assistance nos ennemis, pour ne nous forcer de venir à des oppositions & revenges legitimes. Et tout ce que dit est vous suffra pour le present d'une declaration bien nette de nostre affection & volonté sur ce sujet. Vous recommandant à la sainte grace de Dieu. Escrit à Stralsund ce dernier jour d'Octobre mil six cents trente. De vostre serenité, tres-affectionné cousin,

GUSTAVE ADOLPHE.

## XV.

H A R A N G U E de l'ambassadeur d'Angleterre (c'est à dire le chevalier ROBERT ANSTRUTHER) à l'empereur FERDINAND II : Prononcé à Vienne en mois d'Aoust, 1630.

1630. **L**E serenissime, & tres puissant roy de la Grande Bretagne, mon seigneur & prince tres clement, salue affectueusement vostre majesté imperiale, luy souhaitant tout bonheur, prosperité & longue vie.

Comme ainsi soit que le serenissime roy mon maistre ait appris tant par lettres & responce, de vostre majesté qui me furent mises en main à Ratisbonne, (touchant l'affaire du prince Palatin :) Que par le rapport de bouche que je luy en ay fait, jusques au il auroit esté procédé en traittant dudit affaire, à sçavoir que vostre majesté imperiale se seroit déclarée, *Que si le prince Palatin accepte tout ce qui est contenu en votre conditions prescrites en la responce de vostre majesté & y consent avec la saine & loyale responce, & l'accomplit de bonne foy, que vostre majesté, non par aucune obligation de droit, mais mesme de sa pure grace, & en consideration des intercessions tant*



*du roy catholique, que de celui de la Grande Bretagne, non seulement luy offroyeroit le pardon de toutes les choses passées, revoqueroit la sentence de son ban, mais aussi luy fourneroit son vivre & entretenement des revenus du Bas Palatinat, & de ce que serenissime infante a sous sa puissance*

& combien, que cette declaration & responce fut *telle* qu'elle auroit peu justement esmouvoir l'affection du serenissime roy mon maistre, & le porter à embrasser & employer les autres moyens, qui pour lors luy estoient, & luy sont encores à present offerts & en main, il auroit toutefois mieux aymé preserer la voye d'un traité amiable, & j'y tant de fois essayé, se fiant & appuyant sur cette esperance & promesse donnée, tant de la part d'Espagne que d'ailleurs, à luy & à ses ministres, que par la continuation du traité commencé, & par l'establissement de la paix entre sa majesté & le roy d'Espagne, *Il viendrait en fin à bout de son juste & equitable dessein par le moyen d'une composition amiable : & que pour y parvenir il a une grande confiance, en la mansuetude & clemence de vostre majesté imperiale.*

Puis donc que par la singuliere grace & faveur de Dieu, l'affaire en est venu jusques là, que toutes occasions de guerre & dissensions estant de tout levées & assoupies, avoit esté faite & affermie une paix heureuse & reciproque entre le roy mon maistre, & le roy d'Espagne, l'incertitude de laquelle avant sa conclusion estoit alleguée, comme empelchement & retardement, à ce que cette affaire ne fut amené à une heureuse fin : il a maintenant jugé à propos & expedient de me deputer derechef comme son ambassadeur vers vostre majesté imperiale, pour faire paroistre à tout le monde par ce nouvel essay, qu'il ayme trop mieux obtenir ce que justement il desire & demande *par la voye douce (& sans guerre) d'une amiable composition.* Pourveu qu'il voye quelque apparence probable de n'en estre frustré de ces pretentions, *que d'embrasser les moyens & conseils plus violents, & remettre l'affaire au danger d'un hazard incertain & formidable.* Ce qui mesme ne se pourroit pas faire, sans faire esbranler ou rompre l'amitié & correspondance qu'il a eu jusqu'à present avec la maison d'Autriche.

Or afin qu'il ne manque rien, de ce qui pourroit estre requis pour haster & avancer l'affaire de questions, le roy mon maistre, comme chacun peut sçavoir par clairs & divers tesmoignages qu'il en a donné, *a tant fait qu'il a persuadé & disposé* le serenissime prince Palatin son beau frere, en sorte qu'il est prest de satisfaire aux quatre conditions proposées & prescrites par vostre majesté, *autant qu'il se peut, avec son honneur & sauve sa conscience,* & autant qu'il fera trouvé convenable, à l'equité & à la raison : se promettant au reciproque, que vostre majesté imperiale, revoquant le ban dudit prince le recevra en grace comme auparavant, & le restablira en ses pays & droicts patrimoniaux & hereditaires, apres tant de calamitez & l'exil de plusieurs années, qu'il a souffert & souffre encores, non sans esmouvoir à compassion tous ceux qui pensent à son estat & condition presente.

Or en quelle sorte & par quel moyen le prince entend de satisfaire ausdites conditions, je l'exposeray plus amplement quand il aura pleu à vostre majesté imperiale (comme tres humblement je l'en requiers) de nommer quelques uns de gens de son conseil, comme il fut fait dernièrement à Ratisbonne, pour ouyer & entendre le tout : car si je voulois presentement exposer lesdicts moyens en presence de vostre majesté imperiale, ce seroit vouloir abuser de la patience d'un si grand prince qui me donne une audience si favorable.

Ces choses estant en ce poinct, & la declaration du prince Palatin estant telle, que l'on espere, que vostre mansuetude & clemence s'en contentera & n'exigera

1630. rien d'avantage ou de plus dur de la part dudit prince : le serenissime roy mon seigneur & maître requiert instamment de vostre majesté imperiale, ayant en fin esgard à ce qu'on s'est effayé par tant d'ambassades & de traittez, & qu'en considerant tant de recommandations de roys & princes, comme aussi tant d'autres raisons & considerations tant de foys mises sur le tapis : & que mettant aussi en consideration l'estat tant present que futur des affaires d'Europe ; & finalement en pesant en la douce balance de sa clemence la susdite declaration,

recoive son beau-frere en grace, & le retablisse selon la poursuite qui en a esté faite depuis tant d'années, avec tant d'ardeur, travail & soin, y estants mesmes intervenües les intercessions presque de tous les roys & princes de l'Europe ; & que vostre majesté ne restreigne point si fort la grace qu'elle luy veut faire, que de la renfermer dans *de limites si estroits, que de ne luy vouloir accorder plus que son vivre*, ains qu'elle l'eslargisse & amplifie autant qu'il est convenable à la grandeur & clemence imperiale du plus grand prince de la Chrestienté, & comme l'ont esprouvée quelques autres, qui toutefois avoyent failli & choppé plus lourdement, à ce qu'il apparaisse & soit notoire à tant presens qu'à venir, que vostre majesté imperiale, aura eu esgard tant à sa propre grandeur, & à sa clemence renommée par tout le monde, ne voulant point que la splendeur & le lustre de sa grace soit obscurci par le nuage d'une beneficence trop refermée, & qui seroit comme contre son naturel : comme aussi qu'elle aura mis en consideration, la dignité des roys & princes, comme estant chose peu convenable à leurs qualitez, si apres une telle moderation, de laquelle ils ont usé dès le commencement de ces mouvemens, apres tant de prieres & services, apres tant d'ambassades, & apres avoir employée tants de labeurs & de despeses, ils ne pouvoient encore rien impetrer en faveur de leur parent & allié, *si non son vivre simplement : ce qui toutefois tant par la prescription du droit, que par la loy de pieté ne peut justement estre denié à aucun*, & finalement que vostre majesté imperiale, aura eu esgard à la condition & qualité du prince, en faveur de qui on intercede : comme estant issu d'une tres-illustre maison, & allié aux plus grands roys & princes de l'Europe. Consideré mesme, qu'estant, pour lors, encore ieune & non en age de majorité, il auroit plustot esté poussé par les conseils precipitez des autres, que non point porté de son propre mouvement à faire ce qu'il a fait, & finalement qu'ayant un grand nombre d'enfants en tout ce fait innocens, il seroit digne d'esprouver une d'autant plus favorable condition & grace plus liberale.

Si donc vostre majesté imperiale le reçoit en son ancienne bien vueillance, & le retablir en sa premiere condition, elle donnera la parachef, & mettra la comble à tant d'illustres triumphes, & rendra la memoire de son auguste nom, non seulement recommandable par tout le monde, comme sur un haut theatre, mais mesme la rendra venerable, comme consacrée au temple de la clemence & de la vertu, ayant atteint le faîte des victoires, qui est de se vaincre soy mesme. D'avantage s'il est vray que les princes en pardonnant sont rendus les plus semblables à Dieu, comme a dit quelqu'un : vostre majesté imperiale laissera un tesmoignage à toute la posterité, & un exemple digne de louange, monstrant combien elle a eu à cœur, & s'est étudiée d'imiter les vertus divines en toutes ses actions, sur tout en s'elargissant à donner & conferer ses graces. En outre, vostre majesté par ce moyen gratifiera à tant des roys & princes entremetteurs, & faisant grace à un obligera tous les autres, & entre tous s'obligera le serenissime roy mon seigneur & maître



maître d'un bien de tant plus ferme d'une amitié inviolable : & obligera encore le prince son beau-frere, & ses neveux issus de sa tres chere & unique soeur, à une obeyssance & reverence perpetuelle : & avec tout cela affermira sa puissance & son estat, & la grandeur de toute la tres illustre maison d'Autriche, comme d'un boulevard invincible d'amour, & la laissera assuree pour ses enfans & leurs descendans à tousiours.

D'abondant vostre majesté imperiale exaucera par ce moyen, & appaisera les sospirs, les doléances, les complaints, les gemissemens & prieres du peuple innocent & foulé depuis tant d'années, & sur lequel retombent toutes les incommoditez & les troubles qui naissent de la guerre, tandis que les plus grands & les plus puissans en demeurent exempts : restaurera aussi & resjouira plusieurs milliers de pauvres personnes tres affligées, & qui ne demandent autre chose que d'estre fomentées par une douce paix, les garentira de la ruine qui leur pend sur la teste, & obligera chacun à prier continuellement pour la prosperité & conservation & de vostre majesté, & de toutè la maison d'Autriche.

Finalement vostre majesté imperiale empêchera que ceux qui se sentent interessez & ausquels il importe, perdans patience, pour se voir entretenus en vain par des longueurs & retardemens à dessein, & par l'apparence de quelque esperance douteuse & ambigüe, ne viennent à se jeter dans les conseils precipitez d'une dangereuse necessité, & coupera les racines d'autres mouvements, & les pretextes de nouveauté que les voisins & estrangers, prompts à en rechercher, & prendre les occasions, pourroient facilement prendre de là : & en suite posera un ferme fondement par lequel d'autant plus promptement & assurement la paix sera rendüe non seulement à l'Allemagne, mais aussi à toute l'Europe, & seront aussi d'autant plus aisement appeaisez les autres mouvemens qui semblent s'eslever & glisser à cette occasion : & pour ausquels remedier il n'y aura aucun de tous ceux qui auront part au plaisir & benefice ; du reestablisement & reconciliation du prince Palatin, qui ne s'y employ promptement & volontiers, estant autrement à craindre que se sentant offensez au mespris qu'on aura fait de leur intercession & priere, ils ne s'en esmeuvent, & qu'ils n'ayment mieux, & n'estiment plus à propos de pourvoir à leurs affaires, en jettant de l'huyle sur le feu, que de l'eau pour l'esteindre.

Que donc vostre majesté imperiale daigne mettre en consideration selon son incomparable bonté & sagesse, toutes telles & semblables raisons, & se remette devant les yeux d'un costé *les prieres intercessoires faites les années passées de Philippe III. roy d'Espagne, & de Archiduc Albert de glorieuse memoire* ; & comme aussi *la moderation* de laquelle a usé le defunct roy de la Grande Bretagne *en la guerre de Boheme*, & ses merites non petits envers la maison d'Autriche, & ses diverses ambassades, tant en Allemagne qu'en Espagne, avec de souvent reiterées protestations ; & d'autre costé qu'elle ayt esgard au moins à cette presente ambassade du ierenissime roy mon seigneur & maître, appuyée d'une part du consentement, authorité, & conjunction du roy catholique, & d'autre, comme comblée de la nouvelle intercession du roy de Dannemarc, comme pour mettre la derniere main à toutes les autres ; & ensemble ait esgard aux humbles prieres, si affectueuses & tant de fois reiterées du prince, du fait duquel il s'agit, aux lettres escrites de sa propre main avec tant d'humilité & de sousmission, à l'affection & desir qu'il a de se monstrier tres prompt à rendre à vostre majesté imperiale toute fidelité & obeyssance, constamment & inviolablement, & de recompenser à l'advenir par un

1630. grand soin & diligence tous les devoirs & services qui par injure du temps auroient esté obmis. — Que vostre majesté imperiale daigne aussi jeter les yeux benignes de ja grâces sur une tendre nombreuse & innocente famille Palatine, & sur une troupe d'autres leurs parents & alliez qui embrassent en suppliant les autels de vostre clemence & bonté imperiale ! & pour fin, que vostre majesté imperiale contemple la gloire, l'utilité, la félicité & le profit qui en redonderont à jamais sur vostre majesté imperiale & sur toute la maison d'Autriche, & s'espandront sur tout l'empire, voire par toute la Chrestienté !

C'est ce que j'ay eu charge & mandement de la part du serenissime roy mon maître de représenter à vostre majesté imperiale, attendant là dessus avec toute humilité & devotion une favorable réponse.

## XVI.

## LETTRE du Roy de SUEDE au Roy Tres Christien \*.

**T**RES serenissime, & tres puissant prince, frere, & cousin ; l'ambassade que vostre majesté nous a envoyée, au mois de juin dernier, nous a esté d'autant plus agreable, que par icelle, elle a déclaré quelle estoit son amitié & sa bienveillance envers nous, comme aussi son affection louable & constante, qui a regné si long temps entre les roys de l'un & l'autre royaume, nos predecesseurs, soit maintenant renouvelée ; voire plus estendue & amplifiée pour ce qui concerne l'utilité de l'assurance, & liberté mutuelle, des peuples des nos royaumes ; ce qui estoit à desirer singulierement en l'estat de l'Europe troublé & agité. Aussi votre majesté nous a elle tellement recogneu & clin & porté à cette affaire salutaire, en ce que nous nous trouvons maintenant conformes en mesmes desseins & desirs. Mais pour ce que l'ambassadeur de vostre majesté le sieur baron de Charnacé, a (pour quelque consideration, qu'à peine pouvons nous comprendre) trouvé un scrupule en l'inscription des patentes de nostre traité d'alliance, et n'a peu agreer que nous missions nos titres & nom aux patentes expedées de nostre part pour ledit traité, ainsi qu'ont accoutumé de faire tous les autres roys : chose, que nous avons trouvé fort estrange, de s'arrester à un point de si peu d'importance, qui ne concencit nullement à la diminution, ou augmentation de l'une ou l'autre majesté ! Toutefois à peine avons nous estimé estre du devoir d'un roy de negliger les moindres choses qui concernent la dignité royale ; & plustost eussions nous souffert la rupture de ce traité, que de relacher aucune chose de cette dignité que nous avons reçüe de Dieu & de nos ancêtres. Mais pour ce que nous ne pouvons nous persuader en quelle facon nous devons interpreter ce fait dudit sieur ambassadeur, ne voulans croire que cela ait esté fait de la volonté & par commandement de vostre majesté ; pour ce que nous avons tousjours reçu des bons tesmoignages de son amitié, & bons offices reciproques & esperons encore les mesmes d'icelle ; pour ce sujet nous avons mieux aimé agir avec elle par toute sorte de bienveillance & offices mutuels, que par aucuns prerogatives, & esperons d'elle toute affection reciproque,

\* Mercure François, Tom. XVI. p. 360, &c.



& qu'elle recognoistra que nos majestez ne despendent que de Dieu seul, & ne voudra souffrir aucune chose contraire à nostre dignité. 1630.

Que si vostre majesté juge estre expedient pour le bien commun, & pour nos royaumes, que le traicté d'alliance soit encore continué entre nous & vostre majesté, (afin que nous persuadions que c'est nous, outre l'utilité commune qui le requiert, & sur l'assurance que nous avons de l'assistance à nous promise de vostre majesté, que nous nous employerons en cette guerre d'Allemagne) il sera nécessaire pour rendre plus facile l'effect de ce traicté, que nos ambassadeurs soient à l'advenir munis & instruits de bons & suffisans pouvoirs, pour exprimer la force & intention des premiers en ce qui concerne cette alliance. Nous recommandons affectionément à la clemence & faveur de votre majesté, les illustres personnes comte de Lenoue, & baron de Semur, porteurs des presentes, qui nous semblent dignes de cette charge, & lesquels nous desirons employer à lever des troupes, sous le bon plaisir & permission de vostre majesté, tant à eux qu'aux autres qui seront par nous envoyez en vos royaumes, *y faire levées des soldats pour nous & nostre armée*, & quoyque nous ne doutions nullement de sa bonne volonté, neantmoins nous demandons amiablement avoir d'elle quelque chose d'assuré, surquoy nous puissions croire qu'il plaist à vostre dite majesté nous gratifier en cette affaire. C'est dequoy nous la prions, comme aussi de se vouloir persuader que nous userons de mesme promptitude, & tant en cette affaire qu'en toutes autres : & que nous sommes tres prests de luy tesmoigner toutes sortes d'affection & service, priant finalement Dieu tres puissant, qu'il donne à vostre majesté toute bonne & heureuse protection, ainsi que nous le desirons de tout nostre coeur.

Donné à Stralsund le 17 de  
Septembre, 1630.

GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS.

## XVII.

### LETTRE du Roy de SUEDE au Cardinal de Richlieu \*.

**P**AR vos lettres à nous rendües de la part de votre dignité illustrissime, le . . . . . ; Nous avons veu comme elle recognoissoit la digne estime, que nous faisons de ses rares & eminentes vertus, & comme nous magnifions sa grande & louable affection pour le bien commun: aussi nous sommes nous persuadez, que vostre mesme dignité illustrissime recognoissoit quelle estoit nostre constante affection & intention; & que non seulement elle conserveroit cette bonne opinion qu'elle en avoit conceüe, mais aussi la rendroit plus illustre pour meriter du bien commun, & du desir de la servir. Aussi ne doutons nous point que nous n'eussions perceu quelque fruit des soins qu'elle a pour la seureté, repos, & liberté publique, si le sieur baron de Charnacé, ambassadeur de sa majesté très Chrestienne, *n'eust trouvé du ser-* 1630.

\* Mercure François, Tom. XVI. p. 363.

1630. *pule, en ce que moins nous esperions y en avoir. C'est pourquoy il sera advisé suivant les conseils tant estimez de votre dignité illustrissime, par quel cont il salutaire toutes les choses destinées au bien public pourroient estre conduites à la fin tant désirée, & ôter toutes sortes de remises & delais à une affaire si salutaire & importante; en quoy la fera deüie à votre dignité illustrissime, laquelle meritera grandement de nous, & de tous autres qui ont principalement interest en la cause dont il s'agit. Sur ce nous recommandons votre dignité illustrissime, à la divine protection, & sommes prests de faire tout ce qui servira à sa gloire.*

Donné à Stralsund le 17 de  
Septembre. 1630.

GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS.

### XVIII.

#### HARANGUE du Sieur CAMERARIUS, Ambassadeur du Roy de SUEDE aux Estats de HOLLANDE & PROVINCES UNIES.

[Pronounced in October, 1630.]

**I**LLUSTRES & tres-puissants seigneurs, &c. Je ne doute point que les lettres du roy mon maistre que je presentay avant hier à M. le president, n'ayent esté leües a vostre assemblée: mais ayant charge expresse de sa majesté de vous deduire plus amplement de bouche ses bonnes intentions, je suis venu pour m'en acquitter en peu de paroles, pour ne point prejudicier au bien public parmy vos grandes occupations.

Vous vous souvenez combien vous avez eu le soin du salut & de la seureté publique, depuis que par le changement des affaires d'Allemagne la maison d'Autriche en Allemagne est devenue puissante, a commencé à entreprendre sur la liberté presque de tous les roys & estats: *Et avez depuis quelques années exhorté sa majesté par ambassadeurs exprés de donner secours aux oppressez.* Vous sçavez aussi que sa dite majesté vous a tousjours communiqué en confiance tous ses desseins, & offert par plusieurs fois son affection & secours: C'est ce qui l'a fait encores à present, vous donnant à entendre, les causes & motifs qui l'ont fait resoudre à passer la mer avec son armée.

Le vint-uniesme de Mars dernier, sa majesté vous avertit *que par l'intercession du roy de Dannemarc il s'estoit porté pour entendre à un traité de paix à Dantzic,* vous donnant moyen, si le trouviez bon, d'y envoyer de vostre part des personnes, qui par leur conseil pourroient servir au bien public & au vostre particulier. Ses lettres vous ont esté rendües *un peu tard;* & je ne sçay si à cause de cela vous n'aurez point *mal pris la bonne intention* du roy mon maistre; *mais vous avez reconnu par effet, que le retardement n'y a point fait de prejudice.* Mais je n'ay peu entendre si vous avez respondu, & quoy, aus dites lettres de sa majesté, qui se sachant de ce que je ne luy fait nulle mention d'une chose de si grande  
consequence,



*consequence*, je m'assure que si je n'obtiens autre chose, pour le moins vous me justifierez envers elle, de ne luy avoir peu escrire ce que je n'ay peu scavoir de vous. 1630.

Or espere-je que, comme sa majesté, ne vous a rien celé jusques icy de ses desseins & conseils, que vous aussi selon l'amitié, qui depuis tant d'années a esté contractée avec vous, traicterez sa majesté avec pareille confiance, afin qu'elle puisse prendre & executer ses resolutions plus promptement & seurement, soit pour la paix, soit pour la guerre, principalement quand il entendra, que vous vizez unanimement au mesme but de recouvrer la liberté publique ?

Le dés en est maintenant jetté :——sa majesté a passé non seulement le Rubicon, mais la vaste mer \*, & s'efforcera, moyennant l'ayde de Dieu, d'acquiescer par armes la feureté qui n'a peu jusques icy obtenir, ny par lettres, ny par ambassades, ny pour foy, ny pour autres : ou, pour le moins, de mettre l'affaire en tel estat que les armes facilitent la paix.

Et sa majesté ayant enterpris une telle charge, non point pour aucune utilité particuliere, mais seulement en consideration de la calamité publique, & principalement pour remettre la mer Baltique (à la domination de laquelle l'Espagne & l'Autriche aspirent il y a long temps pour vostre ruine) en son premier estat : pour faire refflorir le commerce, & procurer vostre bien & utilité ; elle se persuade que vous secondez ses genereux efforts, non seulement de vos vœux & faveurs, mais aussi de vostre conseil & assistance. . . Sa majesté *n'est point ignorante de l'incertitude des choses humaines, & sçait fort bien que les armées sont journaillieres*, & partant elle espere qu'en tout evenement vous ne permettez point qu'elle se voye du tout negligée & destituée de ses amis, au peril & cause commune, elle se porte avec moins d'allegresse en sa prosperité, ou que Dieu ne vueille, elle se trouve plus empeschée à se relever en adversité.

Si le bonheur, dont le ciel vous a comblé cette année passée par tant de victoires & emoluments, est si grand, que vos ennemis mêmes ne peuvent croire que vous ne voulussiez vous prevaloir de tant de favorables occasions à leur ruine, en faveur de vos amis : ne permettez donc point que le fruit de vos victoires vous soit osté & à vos amis, & retourne à vos communs ennemis : ce qui ne peut faillir d'arriver, si vous ne vous portez à rompre de plus en plus *les forces d'Espagne* déjà fort ebranlées : ou pour le moins, assistiez vos amis, qui se portent courageusement à les divertir de vous.

C'est ce que sa majesté m'a commandé de vous représenter, & serieusement enjoinct de luy faire entendre vostre resolution *au plustost*, pour pourvoir de bonne heure à ses affaires, soit pour la guerre, soit pour la paix. *Partant, je vous prie bien humblement de ne point differer vostre reponse, si d'avanture vous ne desirez traiter de cecy particulièrement avec moy par les deputez.* Je vous obeiray de tout mon pouvoir, comme messieurs, &c. &c.

\* One may take the liberty here to hazard a slight conjecture. The expression of *vafemer*, considering the short passage from Stockholm to the isle of Rugen cannot with any propriety be applied to the expedition of G. On the other hand the Germans, if I mistake not, usually call

the Baltic the *East-Sea*, [*die Ost-See*] La Oëst-mer ; which the capital initial to *Vafse* in the French copy, and the hyphen between *that* and *mer* seem to confirm. But a Frenchman thinks nothing deserves orthography, which happens to be out of the limits of his own country.

## XIX.

TREATY of Confederation and Alliance for five Years between LEWIS XIII. King of FRANCE, and GUSTAVUS II. King of SWEDEN, for the re-establishment of the Princes and States of GERMANY; concluded at BERNWALT in the Marquisate of BRANDENBURG, Jan. 13. 1631 \*.

1631. SERENISSIMI ac potentissimi principis domini, domini Gustavi Adolphi, Suecorum, Gotthorum, Wandalorumque regis, magni principis Finlandiæ, ducis Esthoniæ & Careliæ, nec non Ingridiæ domini, domini nostri clementissimi commissarii: nos infra scripti Gustavus Horn, de Malla & Heringa, eques auratus, & exercitus Suecici campi marescallus, Joannes Bannerius militiæ generalis, regni Sueciæ senatores; & Carolus Bannerius de Hufsten, secretarius natus & pro tempore ad aulam Pomeranicam legatus, notum testatumque facimus:

Quod cum ad componendum bellum Sueco-Polonicum à serenissimo ac potentissimo principe ac domino, domino Ludovico XIII. Galliæ & Navarræ rege Christianissimo, missus esset illustrissimus dominus Hercules baro Charnacæus, consiliarius status & tribunus, ac post illud negotium feliciter peractum, non minorem sacræ regiæ majestatis nostræ zelum intelligeret, quam serenissimi sui regis voluntatem fœderis ineundi, in communium amicorum vicinorumque libertatem recuperandam.

Et quoniam conditiones quibus ejusmodi libertas recuperari, & mutuuum fœdus iniri posse videretur, à sacra regia majestate domino nostro, cui horum locorum constitutiones omnium optimè sunt perspectæ, antehac propositæ serenissimo Galliæ regi per dominum legatum communicatæ, ipsi adeo placuerunt, ut mandata & plenipotentiam procuratoris domino legato dederit de iis tractandis ac concludendis; nosque ex parte sacræ regiæ majestatis domini nostri deputati essemus, ut cum eo de toto hoc negotio conveniremus.

Post acceptas igitur traditasque utrinque legitimas principum nostrorum plenipotentias, cum præfato domino legato Galliæ de dicto fœdere, nomine sacræ regiæ majestatis domini nostri, sequentes articulos statuimus & conclusimus, sicuti & vigore harum statuimus & concludimus.

I. Ut sit fœdus inter præfatos serenissimos Sueciæ & Galliæ reges pro defensione suorum respectivè communium amicorum, securitate etiam maris Baltici, & oceani, libertate commerciorum, nec non restitutione oppressorum imperii Romani ordinum; et ut fortalitia ac propugnacula quæ extructa sunt in

\* The present copy is taken from a very curious work, entitled, Recueil des Traites de Confederation & d'Alliance, entre la Couronne de France, & les Princes & Estats Estrangers Depuis l'an MDCXXI, jusques à l'an MDCLXXII.

*Sine Loco* Here are inserted many pieces which the grand collectors of treaties in the French interests have been ashamed to own.—We find another copy of the treaty of Bernwalt in the Swed. Intellig. Part I. 75.



portubus ac littoribus alterutrius maris oceani aut Balthici vel in Rhœtia demoliantur, & in eum statum reducantur in quo proximè ante hoc bellum Germanicum fuerunt.

II. Et quoniam adversæ partis animus à justa illatarum injuriarum reparatione in hæc usque diem alienus fuerat, factasque hæctenus intercessiones rejecerat, idcirco communium amicorum salus armata manu vindicator.

III. In eum finem rex Sueciæ pro tanta belli mole exercitum triginta mille peditum & sex mille equitum suo sumptu in Germaniam ducat & habeat. Rex Galliæ *quadringenta millia talerorum imperialium quæannis tributo*, ejusque summæ mediam partem 15 mensis Maii, alteram 15 Novembris Lutetiæ Parisiorum vel Amsterodami in Hollandia (prout regis Sueciæ ministris videbitur) infallibiliter numerato ac tradito.

IV. Conscriptio militum ac nautarum, exportatio navium ac rerum bellicarum in mutuis territoriis libera sit, hostibus verò denegetur.

V. Delinquentes in disciplinam militarem & fugitivi, domino suo pro administranda justitia in eos tradantur.

VI. Si deo placuerit regi Sueciæ felices successus concedere, in negotio religionis non aliter se geret in occupatis deditisque locis, quam secundum leges & constitutiones imperii, et in locis in quibus exercitum religionis catholicæ Romanæ reperietur, in integro remaneat.

VII. Ad hoc fœdus quicumque alii status vel principes voluerint, sive in Germania, sive extra eam, admittantur. Idque debitè caveatur, ut qui admissi fuerint, nec clam, nec palam, suo vel alieno nomine adversæ parti faveant, aut regibus præfatis, vel communi causæ noceant, quin potius singuli ad hoc bellum sumptus contribuant, quantos unicuique vires permiserint & interesse requirit, eaque peculiari conventionem transigantur.

VIII. Cum duce Baviaræ & liga catholica in imperio Romano amicitia vel saltem neutralitas fervetur, si illi reciprocum præstiterint.

IX. Quod si per dei gratiam occasio tractandi se offerat, ex communi fœderatorum consilio tractetur, nec ullus fœderatorum sine altero quid statuito, pacemve inito.

X. Hoc fœdus quinque annos durato, à data nimirum præsentium usque ad primam diem Martii Stilo Veteri, anni supra millesimum sexcentimum trigessimum sexti; intra quod tempus nisi secura pax obtineatur, ex communi rursus fœderatorum consilio prorogetur.

XI. Conventum est tandem ut quoniam præterito anno de hoc fœdere tractari coeptum, ut in sex annos concluderetur.

Et cum rex Sueciæ multos interea in hoc bellum sumptus contulerit, ideo pro priori illo anno jam ferè elapso nomine regis Galliæ ipso die subsignationis præsentis tractatus N. N. talerorum imperialium præstentur, quæ etiam per certas cambii literas à nobis recipientur, & ad cæterorum quinque annorum summam non pertinebunt.

In quorum omnium fidem, &c.

Actum in Stativis regiis Bernwaldi in Nova Marchia Brandeburgensi, decima tertia Januarii, anno 1631, stilo veteri.

## XX.

A short NARRATION of the PROTESTANT-DIET held at LEIPSICK : beginning February the 8th 1630-1, and ending April the 3d 1631. Printed at London 1632.

[N.B. In re-publishing this piece, we have altered here and there a few inaccuracies of style, and rectified *such errors* in point of *fact* as occurred to us.]

1631. **T**HE imperial dyet at Ratisbon thus ending November 1<sup>st</sup>, left matters in a far worse state than it found them : for that men perceived now their very hopes to be taken away, as their liberties and goods had been before : and the protestant princes finding themselves startled by four things especially, perceived it high time now for them to take the alarm. The first of the four was this : that whereas the duke of Saxony had in the time of the dyet written advice unto the emperor, of the king of Sweden's approaching : the emperor tells him again, how he hoped that himself (the elector of Saxony) and Brandenburg would well aid him with money, ammunition, and other necessaries. By which answer, the elector of Saxony perceived a new bill of charges coming upon the protestants next those parts, where the king of Sweden was landed. The second was this : the compendious course taken by the emperor for the recovering of the church lands ; which neither the elector of Saxony was able to stop by his letters unto the emperor, nor the elector of Brandenburg, and other princes, with their presence at the dyet\* : but that even before their own faces, daily commissions were sent out against them. A third was this : the rigid course (taken by advice of the jesuits) for reformation of the protestant churches and schools, and the forbidding of the liberty of the Augustan confession. The fourth was, that decree of the emperor's (published four days before the breaking up of the dyet, though projected long before) for the continuance of the wars against the king of Sweden : whereas the way had been propounded and advised upon before, how to compound the matter, rather than how to continue the troubles. And what aggravated the decree for the wars being, not only that the princes were to be at the charges of it, but that the levies were to be laid and collected, not by the consent of those who should pay them, but at the pleasure of the imperial commissaries : for the moderating of whose power, and repressing the numbers and insolences of the soldiers, notwithstanding some slight promises were now made ; yet how far they would be kept, was in their own pleasures. The protestants by these arguments being not only made suspicious, but sensible too, that there were not over-many good intentions in the emperor towards them, their estates or religions, began to enter into a consultation for their own safety. The plot for it was laid thus. That whereas there had been a conference between them and the catholicks at the former

\* We have proved the contrary of this assertion in the part of our history that relates to it: the two electors alledging by way of excuse for their per-

sonal absence, that the imperial troops had rendered them unable to deffray the expences of such a journey. See also memoirs of the house of Brandenburg.



dyet, concerning the church lands; the further treaty thereupon, was referred 1631. unto a diet (procured by the catholicks) to be held at Franckfort upon Mayn, in August following; the duke of Saxony should write his letters unto the emperor (which was seconded by the mediation of the electors of Mentz and Bavaria,) The emperor grants the dyet. intraiting liberty for the protestants to hold a diet by themselves, in some convenient place; that so by their united councils they might be provided, for an answer at the future diet of Franckfort.

The imperial assent being thus obtained, the protestant princes by their letters and ambassadors, agree upon the diet: the place to be Leipfick, and the time the 8th of February. That the several princes and states therefore might know beforehand, what instructions to give unto the ambassadors they were to send; the duke of Saxony in his invitatory letters to each of them, lays open the purpose of the intended diet; fairly communicating the main propositions, both unto them and to the emperor. The contents whereof were, first, to consult how the church might with a good conscience, be maintained in her ancient liberties and happy state. Secondly, how to keep their due obedience to the emperor, and yet preserve the ancient constitutions and peace of the empire. Thirdly, how to maintain correspondency with the catholick princes. And fourthly, what to answer for themselves both in general and particular, as well concerning the maintenance of the reformed religion, as to the emperor's edict concerning the church lands, when they should come to meet at the dyet of Franckfort.

The princes thus invited, and the time now come, upon the fourth of February 1631, the elector of Saxony enters Leipfick in great state, and the elector of Brandenburg a little after him. Thither in person came these protestant princes also. Christian, another marquis of Brandenburg, John, William, and Bernard, dukes of Saxe Weymar. William landgrave of Hesse-Cassel, Frederick marquis of Baden, Augustus prince of Anhalt, Frederick count of Solmes, John, George, and Ernest Lodowike, counts of Mansfelt, and the deposed dukes of Mecklenburg. The following princes sent their deputies, the duke of Deuxponts, John Ernest, another duke of Saxony, Frederick Ulrick, duke of Brunswick, the duke of Lunenburg. † The several princes of the Circles of Suabia and Franconia, the lady of the abby of Quidlinburg, the bishop administrator of Mecklenburg, the counts of Stolberg, the barons of Reussen and Schonberg. These towns and states sent their agents also. Norimberg, Straßburg, Franckfort, Lubeck, Bremen, Brunswick, Hildesheim, Mulhausen and Northausen. \* Duke Lodowic Frederick, administrator of the dukedom of Wirtemberg was newly dead, and duke Julius not yet settled; and therefore being not able to come himself, he sent the vice-chancellor of the dukedom called dr. Loeffler, and some other counsellors as deputies for that dutchy. And these are the protestant party in the empire: some whereof being Lutherans and some Calvinists; they first of all agree to have that distinction of names (which had caused so much schism and hatred heretofore) to be utterly taken away, making a general decree, that both professions should from thenceforth be called by one name of Evangelical. The protestant party in the empire. That is, professors of the gospel.

† Duke of Saxe-Altenberg; add likewise John Casimir duke of Saxe-Cobury, Augustus count Palatine, and Augustus prince of Anhalt. \* Add the deputies of the arch-bishoprick of Bremen.

1631.

Saxony's  
oration.

No man was suffered to stay within the town, whose business was not known : the streets ends were chained up and barricaded, guards set at the several ports ; and the keys of the gates every night brought into the duke's chamber. And all this, was to prevent spies and surprisals. The duke, elector of Saxony, (on whose greatness and countenance, the party and action very much depended) makes a speech first of all, which had reference unto his former letters of invitation unto them ; protesting withal, his own firmness and forwardness for the peace of the empire, and the maintenance of the Religion ; and that he would be ready to venture both life and goods in the cause ; so desiring every man freely to give his counsel in such manner as they might be able to render a fair account of it unto the emperor. Unto this meeting, the king of Sweden also sends his ambassador, doctor Chemnitius, who in his master's name delivers them this assurance : that his majesty's intentions were no other, than to restore the empire to her ancient peace, the princes to their liberties, and to defend the church in her religion ; telling them moreover, that the French king was newly entered into a league with him for five years to come. The ambassador had both speedy audience and honourable entertainment. The diet, to be brief, broke up on Palm-Sunday, the 3d of April following. The conclusions agreed upon, themselves express in their letters, in humble and complaining manner, enlarged in many sheets of paper, sent by an express courier unto the emperor, in which their joint desires were thus signified.

Their  
humble  
remon-  
strance  
unto the  
emperor.

Their complaint and remonstrance, I reduce into these propositions.

That the Golden Bull and constitutions of the empire, had of late been all abused ; that the emperor's late edict for restitution of the church lands, and his endeavours to root out the protestant religion, were the main causes of these late troubles. The first of these, breeding jealousies and discontents betwixt the protestants and the papists, and the second tending to the utter ruin of the two electors of Saxony and Brandenburg. Then they complain of injustice done unto particular princes and cities, some of which were injured by the violent taking away of their church lands ; as the dukes of Wirtemberg and Brunswick, the prince of Anhalt, the counts of Hoenloe, Stolberg, Lippe, Waldec, Werthimb, Erpach, &c. the town of Aufburg, and others ; some hindered in the exercise of their religion, as Augustus and Frederick, princes Palatine, and younger brothers unto Wolfgang William, Palatine of Newburg, now turned papist. Others had their estates confiscated, as the lady electress Palatine\*, and her son Lewis, prince Palatine, the dukes of Mecklenburg, &c. for whom the whole college of electors had interceded in the late diet, but not prevailed. Others complain of the violent altering of the feods and tenures of their lands and lordships, as the last before-named princes and John Casimir elector of Saxony, into whose lands the imperial commissaries have with force and arms intruded, changing the tenures of the tenants, and altering the religion. Ernestus marquis and elector of Brandenburg, complains of the same wrongs offered unto his pupils, the young marquises of Onspach†. Ulme duke of Brunswick complains, first of the ravages of his lands done by Tiliy, upon pretence of monies owing to the king of Denmark, and made over by the said king unto the emperor, who employed Tilly thus to strain for them. Secondly, of the seizure of his bishoprick of Hildesheim.

And

\* The  
mother  
and bro-  
ther of the  
king of  
Bohemia,  
Lewis be-  
ing duke  
of Sim-  
mern.† Which  
are of the  
house of  
Branden-



And thirdly, that the chief town of his own residence Wolfenbüttele, had been 1631. forced to take an imperial garrison.

Others complain, how they might not have the benefit of the law, but were driven away by threatnings and discourtesies. The electors and princes complain of contempts and indignities offered unto their persons, some of them having been threatened the bastinado by some of the emperor's soldiers. The cities and circles of the empire complain, that undue and excessive impositions and taxes had been laid upon them, not by the consent of themselves, (as the imperial laws command) but at the pleasure of any of the emperor's commissaries. That, under colour of protecting them, they have been forced to afford quarter and maintenance, unto the imperial armies, who when they should indeed have defended them, most cowardly ran away. That when they would not endure the soldiers insolencies, they have been declared enemies of the empire, and forbidden to defend themselves, that their lands have been given to soldiers, as if they had been conquered. That they have been forced to contribute to imaginary companies of soldiers, (perchance to four or five) as if they had been a compleat band. That the commissaries have assigned quarters and passages unto the soldiers, without ever asking leave of the princes or countries; that people have been tortured for their money, had their cattle driven away, their houses fired, and all commerce driven out of their country. That the soldiers neither observed martial discipline, nor moral honesty, neither keeping the laws nor fearing God; that virgins and women have been ravished upon the high altars; that if the weekly contributions were not paid at the commissaries absolute pleasure, the soldiers then spoiled the country. The marquis of Brandenburg complains, that notwithstanding the king of Sweden had two parts of his country, (the old and the new Mark) yet was he forced to pay a full contribution for the whole marquissate to the Imperialists. That himself, by the soldiers being so long in his country, was left so poor, that he was not able to entertain a garrison for the defence of his own palace, and was fain to abridge even the necessary provisions of his own table and family; that the soldiers, entertained by the protestants for their own defence, have been turned against them, to take away the church lands; that trebly more contributions have been raised against no enemy, than ever were when the Turks were in Germany. That when the princes of the house of Saxony, as namely, Altenburg, Weymar, and Coburg, had excused themselves of disability to pay each of them 1454 dollars a month, which the commissary Ossa had required of them; then Tilly threatened to draw 10,000 more dollars a month out of them. That considering all this, they could perceive nothing else, but that the emperor had intended their utter ruin: whereas he had dealt more gently with those of his own hereditary dominions. That all this is most contrary unto the oath of the emperor, and unto the laws of the empire, inasmuch as such hath been complained of, by the several electors and princes, and by them protested against in the late diet of Ratisbon; wherefore they now humbly petition to be relieved, protesting otherwise, that they are no longer able to endure, but shall be enforced to defend their persons, consciences, estates, and subjects; resolving notwithstanding to continue their due loyalty and obedience unto the emperor, humbly now desiring a fair and gracious answer from him. Leipzick, March 18, 1631.

burg:  
their  
land: by  
ing by  
Nurem-  
berg.

Their

1631.

Their conclusions were answerable unto their propositions.

Their  
conclu-  
sions pub-  
lished.

1. That considering it was their sins which deserved these punishments, they command publick prayers to be made unto Almighty God for the diverting of these miseries.

2. That means might be thought upon, and a friendly treaty appointed with the catholick princes, for removing all jealousies, and restoring good terms and concord betwixt them, as for seventy years before it had been.

3. That when the time and place for this treaty were once appointed, the protestants should there appear a little before, to prepare themselves what to say in it.

4. And the more fairly to dispose both Cæsar and the catholicks unto their intentions, that their grievances should in humble manner be before-hand by letter presented, both unto the emperor and the three catholick electors.

5. That these grievances should in those letters be pressed, to be contrary unto the emperor's oath, the imperial laws, the privileges of the princes, the honour and safety of the empire. That the wars would undo all, the insolencies of commissaries and soldiers were so insufferable, as that it stood neither with their consciences, their safeties, nor their honours, to suffer themselves and subjects to be any longer thus abused; and that they would hereupon desire the benefit of the emperor's so often promised protection.

6. That seeing these greater and fuller assemblies were both chargeable and tedious, they agreed, that certain deputies should as necessity required, be in the names of all the rest appointed, both to treat and determine of what should seem convenient for the common cause.

7. The decree of levies of soldiers (both of horse and foot) to be made in their severall dominions and divisions, without crossing the constitutions of the empire, or offence of any, and only in their own defence.

The dyet  
of Aug-  
sburg.

8. That whereas in a diet of the empire held 1555, it had been decreed, how that neighbouring princes should live neighbourly, and if any oppressed others, the rest should relieve them; this relief they now promise one another, desiring that if in these troublesome times, the levies and other carriages could not possibly be every way agreeable to the constitutions of the empire, that it might not be interpreted to be done on purpose.

9. They decree the continuance of their loyalty and obedience unto his imperial majesty.

10. They agree also upon the proportion of the levies.

Thus the elector of Saxony engages himself to raise six regiments, Brandenburg three. The severall circles of Suabia, the Rhine, and Franconia, three regiments a-piece; and the circle of Lower Saxony agreed to furnish monies for the raising and paying of one regiment. Each regiment of foot was to be 3000 strong, and of horse 1000. And thus the dyet being ended upon Palm Sunday with a sermon, Saxony displays his defensive banner, beats up his drums, begins his levies, and so at their coming home do the rest of the princes.

These conclusions and resolutions of the protestants, were not a little boggled at at court, did not slightly displease the emperor, and startle the catholick leaguers, with their adherents. The protestants hear of it in both ears; for this are they both by words and writings, threatened and reviled; yea, their new league and strength were by some confident not a little scoffed and scorned at.

But



But they that had been used to hard deeds before, were sufficiently hardened against foul words now; they were not to be discouraged this way, they did their business, and let the others talk their talks. Things going thus on, it was by the middle of May every where perceived, how that these leaguers of Leipſick, were now in very good earnest. For now upon the taking of Magdeburg, the protestants strongly suspecting by the inhuman cruelty there used by the imperialists, that it was not a heat of war alone, but that there was a core of malice discovered in it; not an imperial, but a popish spite, unto that city above others, for having been one of the first that harboured Luther and his religion, they begin to make it their own case, and that for their religion's sake, they were all not likely to be much better used. Some therefore of the neighbour princes (those namely of Saxony and Suabia) demand of the cities of Ulm and Memmingen, &c. situate in Suabia by the river Danube (which were of the protestant league with them) to entertain for garrisons some of these new levied forces. Memmingen consents, but Ulm being a greater city, relies upon her own strength. These things being done, command is given by the emperor unto Eggon count of Furſtenburgh, (appointed general of the circle of Suabia) to employ those 8000 (lately come out of Italy, after that the wars of Mantua were ended) together with 8 or 10,000 more, against those towns aforesaid. Furſtenburgh presses so hard upon Memmingen, that about the beginning of June, he enforceth it to renounce the new league, and to purchase the emperor's pardon, at the rate of 50,000 florins ready pay. and 25,000 monthly contribution. The protestant league being now noised abroad, and another meeting at the latter end of May at the same Leipſick intended, thither come the ambassadors of England, Sweden, Saxony, and Brandenburg; there is the uniting of their forces with the king of Sweden propounded, but not concluded; only the passage of Wirtemberg heretofore denied him by Saxony, is now yielded to, to be open for his army. Mr. Tilly about the same time dispeeds a message unto Saxony with overtures of a peace, promising shortly to come himself with sufficient commission to confirm it. This being suspected to be a plot, either to divert or stagger the resolution of the duke, or a trick to gain time, and that Tilly's commission might perchance be in his scabbard, the message was not accepted, notwithstanding that Tilly did in mid June following, come in person indeed, and at Oldſleben had treaty with the duke's ambassadors.

When this would not do, and the emperor by the duke's second letters (dated the day after the end of the late dyet) understanding the resolution of the leaguers, which by their general levies he perceived them ready to maintain; and hearing withal, the king of Sweden to be victoriously already advanced quite through Pomerania and Mecklenburg, into some places of Brandenburg, out thunders he his imperial ban against the Leipſick leaguers, dated at Vienna May 14, peremptorily forbidding any place of the empire, to grant either relief, passage, or place of quarter, muster, or rendezvous, unto any of their forces; commanding every man to destroy, kill, and persecute them as enemies: and the easier to deter the leaguers, his majesty offers to release them of their oaths taken in prejudice of him at Leipſick, and to grant pardon to as many as should come in: upon pain of death forbidding all their subjects, either to contribute to their levies, or to serve under their ensigns, but to turn both their monies and persons towards

The emperor's proclamation against them.

1631. towards the advancement of his imperial service, promising the freedom of conscience and estates to all that should thus obey him.

Divers people are naturally afraid of thunder; some of the leaguers therefore, (and especially the grave-headed burghers in the richer cities), began now to quake at the noise of this so hideous a proclamation: which fear of theirs, much cooled their bloods, made them the less zealous and warm in the resolution; but he that hath not courage enough to fight, hath wit enough commonly to excuse his cowardice. So fell it out here, divers of the backwardest palliating their own remissness, with the news they pretended to have heard, of the mammering of the chief man in the action, the duke of Saxony. And this had like to have arrested the whole design. Saxony hearing of all this, notwithstanding he was at this instant hard laid at by Hagen Muller the emperor's ambassador, to come over to his master; yet (to prevent a jealousy) would he not so much as once speak with him then at Torgau, but referred him for audience over unto his privy council.

Hagen Muller's propositions were these four:

1. To consult how the business about the church lands might best be compounded.
2. How the inconveniences occasioned by the wars might be eased.
3. That the agreement of Leipstick for standing upon their own defence might be cancelled.
4. That he would advise how a peace might honourably be concluded with the Swede, and that the duke would mediate it. The answer of the duke's council is too long to insert, and to be brief, the ambassador returns not well satisfied. Immediately hereupon, the duke dispatches his letters unto the several leaguers, assuring them of his own constancy, and inviting them with all speed to hasten their preparations.

These letters of Saxony brought about the matter again, and he to shew that he meant to do more than write letters, lays sure guards upon his own frontiers, some eight or ten thousand men; proceeding warily hitherto, and all upon the defensive. The protestant princes of Suabia (which lie along the Danube, between the dukes of Wirtenburg and Bavaria) do hereupon assemble at Essingen, resolving to stick close to the articles of Leipstick, reinforcing their levies thereupon. And now the fair city of Norimberg in the Upper Palatinate returns to her former resolution, notwithstanding the particular threatenings of the emperor, to give the spoil of it unto their great neighbour, the duke of Bavaria. The city of Strasbourg arms also, and the city of Ulm encouraged by the new administrator of Wirtenbourg, duke Julius, refuses to give passage to the late troops coming that way out of Italy, and sends three hundred musqueteers to aid their neighbours of Memmingen against them.

The landgrave of Hesse Cassel (against whose country it was generally reported that Tilly would forthwith come, and that he was already for that purpose upon his march as far as Duringen) bestirs himself all this while, levies men, and fortifies his frontiers. Tilly sends before he comes to him, and that these four demands.

Tilly's  
quarrel to  
Hesse  
Cassel.

1. To pay the arrear of the contribution due unto the emperor.
2. To give sufficient hostages or security for the future, directly professing him either a friend or a foe to the emperor.
3. Immediately to cashier his army.

4. To



4. To lay open his passages for the emperor's forces, to receive imperial gar-1631.  
risons into Cassel and Sichenheim, and to give quarter to five other regiments.

Hard terms all. Unto which the landgrave returns though a negative, yet a modest answer. This way not speeding, it seems the way of practice and of treachery was attempted, for the landgrave presently upon this discovers some correspondency entertained by two or three of his own chief lords with Tilly, for the delivering up his two chief towns of Cassel and Sigenheym, for which they are executed. Tilly after this in a rage sends three several troops into his country, his own intended expedition against him being diverted by news of the king of Sweden.

All this while (namely until the latter end of June) was there no assurance of the protestant princes purpose to unite with the king of Sweden; but they all stood upon terms of neutrality, kept their obedience unto the emperor, standing only upon the defensive, without once offering any act of hostility, where they were not first provoked. Saxony had now 17,000 foot and 3000 horse, all in a readiness. Upon the same terms stands the marquis elector of Brandenburg, who notwithstanding the near alliance betwixt the king of Sweden and himself, (the king having married the sister of the said marquis) yet that he seemed far enough from uniting with him, appears by an action of his, which had like to have cost him dearly. The elector denies a request of the king's for two passages for his army, (now in the Brandenburgers country) and especially for that the marquis now desired his town of Spandau again, which upon some terms had at the first been lent unto the king; which the king taking very unkindly, (divers circumstances perchance occurring) all of a sudden besieges the elector's town of Berlin, bending his cannon upon the very palace, threatening to pillage it. The difference is at length appeased by the electress, together with the promise of 30,000 rixdollars a month, and to have the town of Spandau (Cultrin he also desired) again consigned over unto him as before.

## XXI.

Regis SUECICI de MAGDEBURGENSI excidio publica expurgatio.

*Quocirca rex culpam amissæ, nec servatæ urbis, publico scripto à se amolitus est:*  
[Chemnit. de Bello Sueco-Germ. Tom. I. 134.]

**E**RRORE Magdeburgensium, quo in ipso turbarum limine, ad habendos delectus sufficientem pecuniæ summam minime anticipando, impegerant, sub initium perstricto, luculenter deinde, & ad oculum demonstrans: summis quidem viribus ad succurrendum Magdeburgo contendisse, nec quicquam in eo fecisse reliqui: sed ineluctabilia obstacula objecta, quæ conatus suos remorata fuerint; nec, nisi in præsens exitium seque suosque præcipitare voluerit, priusquam, hoste Viadri & Wartæ ripâ ad Francofurtum Landsbergamve depulso, quæ e tergo erant, in tuto collocaret, iter maturare potuisset. Nihilominus, utut hostis post  
VOL. II. I Francofurtanam

1631. Francofurtanam cladem ad Glogoviam majorem fe recollegerit, plus obfessæ urbis salutem ipsi cordi, quàm pericula, quæ ab hoste, vires integrante, imminerent, curâ fuisse, aut sollicitudini : ideoque Cæsarianos, quos proligatos persequi ratio belli dictitabat, ad præsens omiffis, versûs Havelam & Albim signa, liberandæ urbi, transfuliffè. Quod autem propositum hoc effectu caruerit, electores vicinos unicè in causa. Quippe cum Saxo, cujus vel maximè interfuerit urbem servari incolumen, non modo arma regiis armis jungere, sed & transitum, commeatum, tormenta, rem tormentariam flagitanti præbere detrectârît : Brandenburgicus verò, nec commeatum, naves, similia, ad tentandam rei adeò momentosæ aleam necessaria, quæ alibi reperire non erat, satis maturè subministravit aut subministrare potuerit, nec idoneam cautionem, qua fîsus rex ulterius progrediretur, præstiterit tempori ; partim quoque de iis, quorum rex certus esse volebat, ac sensum suum eousque, dum Saxo mentem suam explicaret, suspenderit. Summatim, uterque ita se gesserint : ut rex, hostiline an amico in se essent animo, non satis nosset, nec quicquam solidi aut firmi de iis sibi posset polliceri.

## XXII.

TRAICTE' de confederation & d'alliance pour huit ans entre Louis XIII. roy de France, & MAXIMILIEN electeur de Bavière, signé par le dit electeur á Munich, le 8 May, 1631.

**Q**UANDOQUIDEM rex Galliae & elector Bavariae amicitiam bonam ac defensionem reciprocam confirmare & inire desiderant, ideò in sequentes articulos sub fide data secretos consenserunt.

Sit inter regem & electorem Bavariae sincera, bona & constans amicitia ac defensiva utrique firma obligatio ad octo annos, virtute cujus rex obligatur novem millibus equitum, cum convenientibus tormentis bellicis, & propriis sumptibus defendere electorum Bavariae ejusque provincias hæreditarias & acquisitas, si hostiliter invadantur ; possit tamen elector Bavariae, in ejusque optione consistat, à rege vel militem, vel pecuniam tanto militi sufficientem petere.

Eodem modo elector Bavariae obligatur tribus millibus peditum, et mille equitibus ac convenientibus tormentis bellicis propriisque sumptibus defendere regem Galliae, ejusque provincias hæreditarias & acquisitas, si hostiliter invadantur : similiter tamen in arbitrio regis positum sit, ab electore Bavariae vel militem ipsum, vel pecuniam tanto militi æquipolentem poscere.

Rex Galliae promittit arma sua nullo modo applicare vel conferre contra vel in electorem Bavariae ejusque supradictas provincias, nec directè nec indirectè assiltere militibus aut pecunia iis qui volent electorem Bavariae aut ejus provincias hostiliter invadere, nec eis permittere ut militem in regno Galliae contra electorem & supradictas ejus provincias conscribant, aut illis arma, tormenta, vel pulveres tormentarii ab illorum amicis subditis regiis submittantur.

Viceversa



Viceversa elector Bavariae promittit sua arma nullo modo applicare, & conferre in & contra regem ejusque provincias hæreditarias, sive acquisitas, nec directè, nec indirectè assistere militibus, vel pecunia, nec permittere conscriptionem militum in suis provinciis, vel extractionem armorum, & pulveris tormentarii iis qui volent regem ejusque provincias invadere hostiliter. 1631.

Rex promittit agnoscere, defendere & manutenere dignitatem electoralem in persona ejusdem electoris & domo Bavariae, contra omnes qui voluerint vel tentaverint illam dignitatem eis auferre, aut eos in exercitio dictæ dignitatis impedire.

Quandoquidem ex urgentissimis causis necessarium est, ut hæc amicitia & defensio hoc tempore tantum inter regem & electorem Bavariae conclusa, nulli alii pateat, sed secretissima maneat, ideo utrinque de secreto observando in specie quoque cautum est.

Quos omnes articulos eò libentius rex Christianissimas & elector Bavariae inter se comprobarunt, & sibi invicem promiserunt, quia & jure naturali liciti, & regiae majestati, & electorali dignitati convenientes sunt : reservat ideo tamen ac excipit hic elector juramentum suum imperatori & imperio præstitum ; reservatione autem sic excepta præfatus elector omnia, & singula quæ in hoc tractatu mutuae amicitiae & reciprocae defensionis continentur sincerè, exactè, & bona fide se præstiturum promittit, regemque Galliae ejusque provincias hæreditarias & acquisitas adversum quoscumque defendere tenebitur, eo modo quo in supradictis articulis continetur.

Vicissim verò quoque rex Galliae omnia ea se denuo sincerè, ac bona fide præstare velle promittit quæ in supradictis articulis spopondit.

In fidem horum omnium elector Bavariae propria manu subscripsit, eaque proprio sigillo communiri fecit.

Datum in urbe nostra monachio 8. die mensis Maii, anno Domini 1631, subsignavit Maximilianus, & infra Gulielmus Jocher, cum insignibus electoris Bavariae.

*Il est ainsi en l'original, que j'ay mis entre les mains de monseigneur le cardinal duc de Richelieu. A Paris le 20 Juin, 1634.*

Signé, BOUTHILLIER.

*Il y en a un autre pareil signé par le roy à Fontainebleau le 30 May, 1631. LOUIS, & plus bas, BOUTHILLIER : avec les armes de France ; dont l'original a esté remis des mains dudit seigneur cardinal duc de RICHELIEU.*

## XXII.

## HASSIÆ Landgravii cum Rege Fædus, ejusq; capita.

[*Quod fædus velut norma fuit, ad quam reliqua pleraque postmodum amussitata; id-  
eoque plenius & articulatim historiæ nostræ intexere, operæ pretium duximus.*

*Chemnitz. Bellum Sueco-Germ. T. I. ibid. &c.]*

1631. 1. **R**EX Landgravio in tutelam, protectionem, & clientelam recepto, quicunque offendere, aut armis impetere eum intenderent, pro hostibus haberet, non secus, ac si ipsimet, coronæ suæ injuriam ac bellum intulissent; pro virili parte, quantum occasio permiserit, hostiliter persequeretur; landgravio consilio, auxiliove adesset; nec cum quoquam alio, seu extra seu intra Romanum imperium, fædus, quod huic deroget, iniret. Imprimis vero
2. Si landgravio aut ejus subditis vi hostili eripi quippiam, aut munitiones & arces ejus obsidio cingi contingeret, illis liberandis rex nil faceret reliqui; arma landgravii armis jungeret; summis viribus laboranti succurreret, nec ulla cum ratione defereret.
3. Cum Cæsare, & pontificii fœderis fociis, aliisve hostibus, de pace minimè gentium transigeret aut exueret arma; nisi landgravio pactis, & ita quidem incluso; ut ei, ejusque subditis nomine illorum, quibus, cum in conscientia sua, tùm aliàs gravatos se, justissimè, conquerebantur, satisficeret; de justitia adversus quemcumque equaliter administranda caveretur; et is in statum, quo landgraviorum stirpis Cassellanæ familia ante Bohemicas & Palatinas turbas fuerat, omnino reponeretur.
4. Sicubi rex, ejusve miles a landgravio in munitiones, arces, urbes, exigente necessitate reciperetur, nihil, quod regalibus, privilegiis, utilitati, juribus landgravii præjudicio esset, tentaret; sed necessitate & causâ receptionis cessante, loca isthæc landgravio iterùm in manus consignaret.
5. Sin tormenta quoque, & alia belli gerendi instrumenta, regi è landgravii munimentis præberentur (id autem non, nisi cautione prius de restituendo præstitâ, factum iri) postquam pro tempore satis usus, restitueret.
6. Quod si landgravius propriis viribus ac Marte aliquem pontificiorum ordinum, qui regis hostes ultrò semet professi, opprimere, ejusve ditiones, urbes, loca occupare potis esset, sperinde ac si ipse patrasset, rex id rati haberet, & landgravium, siquidem eo nomine infestaretur, regiè propugnaret.
7. Si ipsemet rex landgravio, ut fœderato suo, præsens adesse, & absolutæ belli gerendi directioni, a landgravio delatæ, vacare impediretur, egregium habilem expertæque prudentiæ ac virtutis ducem landgravio adjungeret: qui ipsius, ut capitis & principis in contracto fœdere, loco landgravii, copiis præesset, in militaribus, gerendove & continuando bello summi imperii clavum teneret, & hoc nomine data speciatim fide obstrictus, quæ belli ratio flagitat, ad communem fœderatorum scopum consequendum, communi consilio perageret ac exsequeretur. Quò rebus decenter & ordine gestis, confusione, aliàs faciliè irrepenti, omnis præcluderetur rima. Quos summi imperii fasces,

8. Rex



8. Rex ipsimet landgravio contulit ac permisit.

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9. Quò dexterius autem omnia administrarentur, & aliquis exercitui afforet, observantiæ fœderis (ne, aut huic, aut regis imperio quicquam committeretur adversum) rei que simul pecuniariæ intentus; utile visum, summo armorum imperatori fidelem & prudentiâ clarum consiliarium bellicum adjungere: qui illi, ut legatus ad confœderatos, adhæreret, consilio opeve juvaret, & providam, ut dictum, omnium rerum curam gereret; cum quo etiam imperator è secretioribus quibusque statum rerum concernentibus, communicatum iret.

10. Quod landgravius haud abs re fore arbitrabatur, id nec regi displicuit; videlicet, hominem candidum & rerum intelligentem, legati ordinarii seu residentis titulo ad regem a landgravio mitti; qui, ut individuus comes, nunquam non eundem sequeretur, landgravii petita, temporum successu emergentia, ad eum deferret, & mutuæ communicationi per literas daret operam. Tandem

11. Rex landgravio alios principes, comites, barones, civitates, ordines, universitates in fœdus hoc recipiendi potestatem contulit: iisdem illos legibus admittere, nec minùs, ac si cum ipsomet ea de re tractassent & transsegissent, flagitantibus assistere pollicitus. Quod si alii eventum demùm rei operire, animum inducerent, & jam fœderatos cum belli periculis luctari solos sinerent, post trium mensium decursum haud potituros ampliùs optimis his conditionibus, sed ad novos tractatus, & novas conditiones paciscendas, remissum iri.

### E contra Landgravius data fide recepit

1. Eandem subire cum rege fortunam, nec eum deferere, nec ulli tractatui cum illius hostibus præbere aures, multo minùs de pace transigere; nisi præscio, volente, & consentiente rege: ita ut ipse, ejusve corona pactis simul includeretur; ea penitus calculo suo approbaret; tractatui adhibitus, deque eo certior tempore factus foret; et omnia rati habuisset.

2. Ut federatum regis & clientem, ejusdem, illiusve fœderatorum ac regnorum damnum avertere, commodum autem promovere; nulli consilio aut actioni immisceri, quæ regi, aut ejus regnis, principatibus, dignitati adversarentur; fideliter potius illi assistere, et pro virili, ad bellum hoc debellandum, milite pecuniave adminiculari: munimenta autem sua, quantum in se foret, communi fœderatorum bono conservare; hostes in ea nequaquam admittere; sed, quo inde excluderentur, laborare enixè & summis viribus.

3. Illa ipsa munimenta, provincias, arces, ac loca transitu opportuna, necessitate flagitante, regi, cum in adventu, tùm in receptu, absque tergiversatione referare, et permittere, ut aut singulatim, aut cohortatim & turmatim, aut integris legionibus pertransiret, nec circa illa modò, sed et in illis ipsismet hospitaretur. Militem tamen intromissum utrique fide addictum esse debere, et landgravio simul in fœderis hujus articulos sacramento obligandum: omnemve arrege ac regiis hac in parte captionem abfore.

4. Si quando rex landgravio e copiis suis subsidio mitteret, jungere se illis; eas suscipere; uterque pro alterutrius incolumitate laborare; et in communem hostem toto impetu ferri.

5. Exercitum aliquot millium, nulla interposita morâ, suis cogere impensis, eundem, quantum possibile, citiùs aut seriùs, prout occasio ferret, grandire; simul ac in procinctu stare, seve, suasve provincias tributo, hostibus pensitari

scilicet.

1631. solito, subtrahere; potentiam virescere eorum minuire ac suppressere; militem hostilem, in territorio suo hospitantem, concidere; diribitoria hostium disturbare, et ubicunque fieri posset, tum exigendo tributum, tum urbes, arces, ac loca situ commoda occupando, præsidiove militari firmando, quinimò, si daretur occasio, personas eorum in potestatem redigendo, noxam illis inferre ac detrimentum.

6. Si, a rege clade affecti aut profligati in landgravii confiniis receptum quærent, penitus eos dissipare ac disjicere; ne coire illic locorum, aut gradum denudò firmare ullatenus possent.

7. Comites, nobiles, alios quoscunque, seu fines ejus inhabitarent, seu extra fines haberent domicilium, vassallos, cum equestribus, ad quæ intuitu possessionum feudorum obstricti, servitiis, quotiescunque necessitas exigeret, ad regis postulatam & commune utriusque placitum convocare; imò subditos, sicubi videretur, viritim ad arma concire, militarive illorum opera, sub regis imperio uti. Quo in articulo rex landgravio vice versa cavit: Si forte vassalli aut refractarii existerent, aut moratores, affore illi ope suâ, in ordinem eos redacturum, pro hostibus habiturum, & privationis pœnam executioni adversus commeritos daturum; ita quidem, ut landgravio tanquam domino directo, dominium factum, tectum maneret; utilitas vero, seu redditus feudorum fisco & communi ærario inferrentur. Ubi tamen præstitutum scopum attigissent, aut maturitis forsân, si inter utrumque de eo conveniret, utile quoque dominium ad dominum directum redundaturum, et cum proprietate consolidatum; landgravium autem a rege hoc in casu propugnatum, nec cuiquam, ejus ingratis, veniam admitti concessum iri.

8. Cautum, ut neuter ab altero, sumtuum, qui bello gerendo, aut munitionibus extruendis impenderentur, nomine, quicquam præter id, de quo expressè conventum, posceret, sed uterque conventionis legibus, et communi ærario, brevi instituendo, acquiescerent: pacta quoque hæc reliquis omnibus fœderibus, quæ cum aliis magnatibus, electorumque ac principum familiis essent inita (si hi forte alterutri fœderatorum, hujus fœderis & piæ intentionis, animo illis propositæ, intuitu, hostes redderentur, aut ipsa fœdera, ut contraria, invicem se destruerent) quantum ipsorum scopum attinet, præferrentur, nec vetustiorum fœderum respectu alter ab altero resilire, nec nova, huic adversantia contrahere animum induceret.

9. Si rex landgravii munimenta, majoris securitatis ergò, novis adjectis operibus, munitiora reddi, è re communi arbitraretur, landgravius non permetteret hoc modò, sed subditos quoque, inevitabili necessitate flagitante, compelleret ad manus operi admovendum.

10. Regiis copiis landgravii ditionem transeuntibus, & illic divertentibus, pedes candelâ & ligno, eques stramine & fœno, servitiorum, quæ vocant, nomine præbitis, contenti, nulla ulterioris flagitationis molestiâ hospites vexarent: modò alia sustentationis media in promptu forent. Extra vero hunc casum, & in hostico, alimenta sua exinde, secundum commune utriusque arbitrium, miles quæreret.

11. Si in landgravii territorio militum diribitoria instituere ratio boni publici necessariò exigeret, id quod landgravium æquo passurum animo: ultra duos tamen cum dimidio avenæ modios in equos singulos, unâ cum sex straminis mergitibus, & fœni velæ, ipsisque equitibus, equitumve ductoribus, cujuscun-

que



que conditionis, loco alimentorum, ultra duos Joachimicos, usque ad armilustrum, quot mensibus minimè præbitum iri.

12. Rege arma in Austriam, aut aliàs in hosticum transferente, et hostem illic, ne fœderatorum terras infestare possët, occupante, landgravium tot militum millibus, quot securitate propria salva liceret, subsidio ei affuturum; militemve hunc communi utriusque impensâ sustentandum.

13. Quod si a rege unum, alterumve locum, extra illa, que pertinerent ad landgravium, aut in quibus jus aliquod haberet, expugnari contingeret, regi, donec de expensis eidem satisfieret, landgravium in manibus illa relicturum, & ne adversarii rursus evincerent, sedulam unâ cum rege daturum operam.

14. Controversiâ aut lite int̃er federatos subortâ, duos a rege arbitros, & totidem neutri parti obnoxios, a landgravio nominandos; qui de tertio conveniant. Horum fidei negotium committendum: proposita pactorum formulâ, & in medium adductis, quæ causæ decisioni facere videantur. Quicquid autem hi æquum judicaverint, eo utrumque contentum fore, & acquieturum.

15. De transfugio utriusque conventum: ne quis alterius ductores, equites, pedites, aut facinorosos etiam, transfugientes, in stipendia sua reciperet, aut ullatenus toleraret; sed si quis ejus notæ, ubiubi tandem, seu intra seu extra jurisdictionis terminos, deprehenderetur, cujuscunque ordinis aut dignationis, in vincula conjicerent, delitescerent quoque summa industria, quantum pote, indagarent, alter alterum de iis redderent certiores, & comprehensos pœnis militaribus afficerent. Subditos autem, si qui, criminis hujus rei, pœnæ se subtrahere effugio niterentur, honorum, tribuum, jurium omnium ac bonorum privatione quisque eorum mulctaret, nec ullum, nisi alterius consensu, in integrum restitueret. Demum, ultimo, landgravius pollicebatur, primo quoque tempore contra subditos ac vassallos suos, hosti stipendia merentes, acerrima promulgare mandata avocatoria, confiscationis bonorum, tam allodialium, quam feudaliū, amissionis insuper vitæ ac honoris pœnâ præstituta: illaque stricte & rigide exsequi, si unus alterve, cujuscunque dignitatis aut conditionis, morem his gerere differret, præterlabi pateretur.

Werbenæ, pridie Iduum Augusti, 1631.

#### XXIV.

GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS Dei gratia SUECORUM, GOTHORUM, VANDALORUMQUE REX, magnus Princeps FINLANDIÆ, DUX ESTONIÆ et CARELIÆ, nec non INGRIÆ Dominus, Serenissimo & Potentissimo Principi Domino Carolo Dei gratia Magnæ Britannæ.

SERENISSIME princeps, frater, consanguinee & amice charissime. Cum quæ serenitatis vestræ in rem communem et ergà nos constans propensio est; certi sumus ex illis, quæ nobis prosperè, et bono periclitantis rei Christianæ evenirent, serenitatem vestram partem sibi quoque sumere, intermittere nolimus,

1631. mus, quin de memorabili quam divina benignitas nobis (hisce diebus) largita est victoriâ, vos certiores rederemus. Postquàm armis nostris sua elector Saxonie junxit, nobis cum utroque exercitu contra hostem progressis, hostilis exercitus generalis illius universas copias suas è castris Lypsicis ad Milesum lapidemeductas, septimâ die Septembris opposuit. Prælio incepto magnâ contentione per 4 amplius horas res utrimque acta est, donec singulari Dei beneficio, hostilis exercitus (virtute indefensâ nostrorum) in fugam versus dissipatusque est; nostris fugientem sub mænia usque urbis prosequis, tormenta ac res armamentariæ hostis nobis cesseret erepta ei vexilla derelicta à conturbato ad Lypsicæ castra cum impedimentis. Generalis accepto vulnere in episcopatum Halberstadensem discessit; iis, quos deinceps insequi sumus gratiæ nostræ et militiæ relictis. Occisi ex hostibus in loco pugnæ jacuere plurimi, cum illis generalis vigillum, alii apud hostem præfecti. Inter captivorum aliquot millia dux Holstatie, & ex præcipuis alii, quorum successuum laudes cum Deo optimo maximo tanquam auctori debeantur, ejusque divinæ benignitati tribuendum meritò sit quod nunc non solum illa tot millium votis hætenus expetita restituendæ religionis et libertatis spes, sed et erigendi afflictam regis Bohemie causam facilitas affulgeat. Non diffidimus quin serenitas vestra non tantum gaudio et affectu prosequendam hanc victoriam, sed etiam tam pulchrâ occasione utendum, et omnia huc deinceps conferenda esse judicatura, atque ipsi rei Christianæ suorumque salutis, heroicis suis consiliis auxiliisque consultura regio studio sit. In nobis amplius aliquid desiderari non patiemur, serenitatem vero vestram divinæ protectioni ad auspicata rerum omnium incrementa commendamus. Dat Halæ Saxoniæ 13 Sept. 1631.

Bonus frater et consanguineus

GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS.

## XXV.

The famous *Armistice*, or *Treaty of Neutrality*, accorded by GUSTAVUS at the Intercession of FRANCE, to the *Princes of the League*.

[N. B. Having never been able to see the original of this treaty, we have thought it more proper to give the English translation thereof made in the year 1632, than render into modern language the French translation published in the same year, and preserved by the author of the *Mercurie François*\*; since *that* ed. only proves to be the version of a version, and might depart still more and more from the first meaning.]

HIS sacred majesty of Sweden, taking special notice of the desire which the duke of Bavaria and the Catholic Leaguers have for obtaining a Neutrality; although by their making themselves parties with the emperor in the

\* Tom. XVIII. p. 135, &c.



wars, they had deserved nothing of him but hostility : yet upon the earnest intercession of the most christian king presented by his ambassadors ; and to testify withal his own brotherly affection unto him ; he is contented to conclude the Neutrality, upon these following conditions :

1. Let this Neutrality be religiously and inviolably kept with his sacred majesty of Sweden, his kingdoms, dominions and subjects, as well those that are hereditary to him, as those that have in Germany been conquered by him : as also with his confederates, the electors, princes, nobles, cities, common-wealths, commonalties and states, and with the elector of Saxony in particular ; by the duke of Bavaria and his associates the catholic princes and states of Germany : who shall also give sufficient caution unto his majesty for the sure keeping of it. The true articles of the Neutrality. The king in especial (I suppose) means Franconia; which himself incorporated and made a dukedom. Yea his soldiers also called Mentz, the dukedom of Mentz, more frequently the bishoprick of Mentz.
2. Let the said duke of Bavaria and the catholick princes of Germany his confederates, forbear all acts of injury and hostility ; both towards his sacred majesty of Sweden, his army and dominions now in his possession ; and towards his confederates the evangelical electors, princes, earls, nobles, cities, commonalties, states, and all other evangelical professors of what condition soever : and let them not by their soldiers be troublesome hereafter unto them in their dominions, upon any pretext whatsoever ; nor suffer them to be disturbed by any forces of the emperor's.
3. Let the duke of Bavaria and the said catholick princes of Germany, as many as are of the League, restore unto the evangelical princes and states of what condition soever, all and singular strengths, fortresses, castles, cities, territories and countries how many soever, which in all the time of this war, begun in the year 1618, they have taken and kept from the evangelics in the Lower Saxony : and leave them in the same state they were in, before the beginning of the war.
4. Let the duke of Bavaria, with the catholic princes of Germany his confederates, withdraw all their armies out of the countries of the evangelical electors, princes, and states, so soon as may be ; sending for the soldiers into their own territories.
5. Let the army of the duke of Bavaria, and of the catholick princes of Germany his confederates, be reduced to the number of 10000 or 12000 men : all the rest being presently cashiered. Which army, let it be distributed and quartered here and there among the cities and proper dominions of the said princes, and not be kept together in one entire body.
6. The duke of Bavaria and his associates, the said catholick princes of Germany, shall not with the said soldiers (being either cashiered or distributed among their territories) give assistance either openly or under-hand, unto the emperor or any other prince, enemy unto his sacred majesty of Sweden.
7. Nor let the duke of Bavaria and his confederates the catholic princes of Germany, give leave unto the house of Austria or any other whatsoever enemy of his sacred majesty of Sweden ; to raise soldiers, appoint places of muster or rendezvous, buy up arms, or make any other military provisions within their dominions : but let them every where observe an inviolate and sincere Neutrality.
8. Let all their passages be without deceit either open to either party, or shut up as it shall be agreed upon : provided it be without all injury and damage unto the owner.

1631.

The bi-  
shop of  
Bamberg  
excepted  
out of the  
treaty.

By the  
Landgrave  
of Hesse,  
in Co-  
logne's bi-  
shoprick  
of Pader-  
born.  
\* *Salva di-  
citate Spi-  
rensi, sibi-  
que relicta.*

IX. His sacred majesty of Sweden with his confederates in like manner, shall in no ways offend the duke of Bavaria, nor any prince or state of the catholick league, whose dominions he is not yet master of, excepting only the bishop of Bamberg, nor shall he lay any other kind of military impositions upon them, but shall keep and observe a sincere neutrality with them.

X. All those places of the Lower Palatinate whatsoever, now taken away from the duke of Bavaria, will his sacred majesty restore unto the said duke of Bavaria again; until by the mediation of the kings of Great-Britain and France, there be some friendly composition made betwixt the duke and the prince Palatine, for which some short day shall be appointed. So likewise will his majesty restore unto the arch-bishops of Triers and Cologne, whatsoever places are taken from them, the city of Spiers and the places now remaining unto it, being left intire unto itself.

XI. All other countries and places of the catholick princes and states (besides those forenamed) already possessed by his sacred majesty, shall not the duke of Bavaria, nor the catholick princes of Germany his confederates, make demand of again, in any kind, either by themselves or by others, but shall leave them in his majesty's hands until some general treaty.

XII. All states, princes, earls, nobles, cities, and commonalties evangelical whosoever will, may be under the protection of his sacred majesty of Sweden; nor shall they to the prejudice of the said protection be disturbed any manner of way, either directly or indirectly, by the said catholick princes of Germany.

XIII. Let all commerce with his sacred majesty of Sweden, his subjects and evangelical confederates on the one party, and with the duke of Bavaria, and the catholick princes of Germany, his confederates on the other party, be free and open every where, and no ways hindered.

XIV. Let all prisoners on both sides be delivered without ransom, and in particular, let the administrator of Magdenburg, taken by Tilly, be forthwith set at liberty, without prejudice.

XV. For the better security, shall the most christian king of France engage his royal word, that the duke of Bavaria, and all other catholick princes, states, and cities of Germany his confederates, shall religiously observe this neutrality in all the articles of it, which if they shall infringe, then shall he declare himself for his sacred majesty of Sweden, and fall with all his power upon the violaters, until he hath compelled them unto satisfaction.



## XXVI.

The SUBSCRIPTION of the French Ambassadors to the  
*treaty of neutrality* \*.

**N**OUS soubsignez ambassadeurs du tres-chrestien roy de France, sçavoir 1631.  
 faisons, que le serenissime & tres-puissant prince & seigneur Gustave  
 Adolphe par la grace de Dieu roy de Suede, &c. ayant voulu comprendre dans  
 le traicté public de la neutralité avec l'electeur de Baviere, & la ligue catholique,  
 que tout ce qui avoit esté pris par droit de guerre par les dits electeurs & ligue  
 catholique, sur les princes & estats protestants & evangelique tant en la haute  
 Allemagne qu'en la Basse Saxe, & qui est occupée par les garrisons des dits duc  
 de Baviere & la ligue catholique, seroit rendu à tous les seigneurs & precedens  
 possesseurs evangeliques: nous, pour eviter certains scrupules qui eussent peu en  
 provenir, & apporter difficulté à l'entretienement du traicté de la dite neutralité,  
 avons de faire retrencher des articles du dit traicté, la caution & l'assurance pro-  
 mise au nom du roy tres-chrestien nostre seigneur, & que nonobstant cette clause  
 tout ce qui avoit esté pri par droit de guerre & estoit occupé par les garrisons du  
 duc de Baviere & de la ligue catholique, sur les prince & estats evangeliques &  
 protestans, comme s'il estoit nommement stipulé & accordé par les actes du dit  
 traicté, seroit rendu, & restitué ausdits evangeliques & protestans, ausquels il  
 auroit esté osté: & pourtant nous promettons au nom du roy tres-chrestien nostre  
 seigneur, que sa dite majesté royale fera en sorte, que la restitution desdits lieux  
 pris par droit de guerre sur les princes & estats evangeliques, sera faite tout ainsi  
 que file mesme avoit esté promis par les articles de la neutralité: excepté toutes fois  
 les lieux & places qui auparavant appartenoint au duc de Baviere en l'un &  
 l'autre Palatinat. En foy de quoy &c.

A Mayence le 19 de Jan. 1632, St. Ver.

## XXVII.

The KING's letter to GUSTAVUS HORN, (and probably to  
all his other generals) concerning *the Armistice* †.

**G**USTAVUS ADOLPHUS, by the grace of God, king of the Swedes, &c.  
 Right trusty and well beloved, &c. we will not conceal from you, how  
 that the king of France hath made a kind brotherly suit unto us, by his am-  
 bassadors, for a neutrality betwixt us, and the elector of Bavaria and the catholick  
 league. Forasmuch as we have thereupon framed certain articles, and delivered

\* Mercure Franc. tom. XVIII. p. 139, &c.

† From the copy printed in London 1632, 4to. Mercure François, tom. XVIII. p. 134.

1631. the same to the said ambassadors, who have promised to bring us within the space of fourteen days, a plain declaration and confirmation thereupon; and in the mean time, by virtue of their power to take order, that Pappenheim shall forthwith withdraw himself with his troops out of Westphalia and the bishoprick of Munster, and likewise, that the forces of the electors of Bavaria and of the catholick league, should forthwith be called and drawn out of Bohemia, if any there should be. For this reason, and for the furtherance of such a work, and to satisfy withal our said good brother the king of France: we have thought good to yield them so small a time, and to abstain from all hostility, during the said fourteen days, against the said catholick league and the duke of Bavaria: if so be that (according to the said promise) they do behave themselves in like manner, withdraw their forces, and use no hostility against us, whereof we do hereby give you notice: and withal do will and command you, forthwith to publish this said cessation of arms for fourteen days, throughout the army which you do command, (to which end we have dispatched this trumpet unto you) and thereupon to cease and abstain from all hostility, pillage, robbing, and other deeds of enmity, against the said elector of Bavaria and the catholick league, and during the said time to remain quiet \*. But yet we have expressly excepted (as the said ambassadors do know) and we do intend, that such towns, places, and castles, which are now by us besieged and blocked up, shall so remain besieged and blocked up; and that the besieged shall have liberty during the said time, to treat, conclude, and compound with us, to deliver up the said places, and to depart from thence according to the agreement that shall be made with them. This you are to observe, and to govern yourself accordingly. And if some one or other place be at this present by you besieged or blocked up, you are by no means to remove or depart from the same, but rather to continue and finish the design, with all your best endeavours, as being a thing no ways contrary unto the said cessation of arms by us granted, &c. Given at Höchst the 10th of January, 1631.

## XXVIII.

TRAICTE' de LOUIS XIII. roy de France, &c. avec PHILIPPES CHRISTOFLE archevesque de TREVES, electeur & evesque de SPIRE: Par lequel le roy s'oblige d'assister ledit electeur, contre ceux qui le voudront opprimer; & de plus, de faire sentir desdits archevêché & évêché les gens de guerre du roy de SUEDE. A Ehrenbreistein, l'an 1632, le 9 Avril.

NOS Philippus Christophorus Dei gratia archiepiscopus Trevirensis, ac princeps elector, episcopus Spirensis, administrator Promiensis perpetuus, & praepositus Wormsburgenfis, & Ludovicus de Briançon de la Saludie, magister

\* Pourveu que le due de Bavière se comporte de mesme. Merc. Franç.



## A P P E N D I X.

de campo christianissimæ regiae majestatis Franciæ, cum plenipotencia missus legatus; notum facimus atque fatemur: postquam christianissima regia majestas se intra serenissimum & potentissimum regem Sueciæ, ac serenissimos, illustrissimos ac reverendissimos electores principes, aliosque catholicæ unionis status, pro salute ac pace publica in Germania reintegranda ac restabilienda uti mediatorem, fide jussorem ac sponsoem interposuit, illa intentione ut neutralitas in regiam majestatem Sueciæ, & prædictos unionis catholicæ status erigeretur, quæ neutralitas à parte utraque non fuerit conclusa, approbata & confirmata, sed potius contrariis factis cassata, idcirco nos cum regiae majestatis Franciæ legato supra dicto, sequentes pacis articulos conclusimus, approbavimus, sigillisque nostris & manuum subscriptione munivimus, sequentis tenoris.

I. Nos Philippus Christophorus archiepiscopus Trevirensis & princeps elector, in manus & custodiam christianissimæ regiae majestatis Galliarum fortalitium de Ehrenbreistein nostræ archidiœcesis Trevirensis primum deponemus eo usque donec pax generalis in Germania sit conclusa; ex tunc enim christianissima regia majestas militem abducatur, ac dictum fortalitium in liberas nostras nostrorumque successorum manus in eo statu quo tempore depositionis inductionisque militis fuit, iterum tradat & restituat.

II. Pro qua custodia & assistentia christianissima regia majestas mille peditum & centum equitum selectorum Gallorum mittet, ut ingrediantur supradictum fortalitium.

III. Qua militia ita introducta ex Christianissimæ majestatis permissione & mandato, quod in simul transmittetur nobis jurabit.

IV. Rogamus tamen christianissimam regiam majestatem, ut eadem propter devastationem modernam archiepiscopatus Trevirensis, ad sustinendum militem tertiam partem expensarum & stipendiorum eo usque exsolvere dignetur donec subditi nostri contributiones necessarias præbere possint & valeant.

V. Et ad statim atque depositum fuerit supra nominatum fortalitium, christianissima regia majestas ex archiepiscopatu Trevirensi exturbabit, expulsiabitque non solum copias regiae majestatis Sueciæ, sed & omnes alias quas tum inveniat; in quem effectum expressam ordinantiam ante ingressum pro majore asscuratione ostendet, curabitque & omnia loca satrapiae, civitates, pagi & territoria occupata quantocius deoccupentur, milites in totum abducantur, ac ad liberas nostras manus tradantur; ac conditione ut iisdem in locis cessis, aut deoccupatis nos uti ante occupationem disponere, proprioque militi ibidem quarterium abique ullo impedimento concedere possimus.

VI. Eadem regia majestas christianissima non solum prædicto modo nostrum fortalitium Ehrenbreistein custodiat, sed etiam nobis nostrisque subditis, contra hostilitates, oppressiones offensionesque reali assilientia succurret, omnia quartiria & pressuras avertet, omnibusque quibus potest modis ac vijs defendet.

VII. Quo in casu christianissima majestas ex regia liberalitate sumptus expendet, nec à nobis plusquam subditi territoriumque nostrum Trevirensis in commatu præstare possint postulabit, neque ullam aliam actionem contra nostram archidiœcesin, nos ac successores nostros in futurum prætendat.

VIII. Et quam primum fortalitium Ehrenbreistein prædicto modo custoditum, & reliqua juxta articulos præmissos asscurata fuerint, tunc supra scriptis conditionibus eodemque plane modo nos fortalitium nostrum Philippsburgum in christianissimæ majestatis manus depositum, mille peditibus & centum equis selectis

1632. feleſtis intromiſſis, quoque trademus; ita tamen ut ſupradicto modo totus epiſcopatus Sireniſis, ac omnia loca ſatrapiz, civitates, pagi, & territoria ex tunc quantocius à regia majeſtate Sueciæ ejuſque adhærentibus deoccupentur, milites in totum abducantur, ac ad liberâs noſtras manus tradantur, hoc modo ut nos iſſdem in locis ceſſis & deo cupatis uti ante occupationem diſponere, proprioque militi iſſdem quartirium abſque ullo impedimento concedere poſſimus.

IX. Eadem quoque chriſtianiſſima regiâ majeſtas non ſolum, uti prædictum noſtrum fortalitium Philipſburgum cuſtodiet, ſed etiam nobis noſtriſque ſubditis contra hoſtilitates oppreſſionesque quaſcunque reali aſſiſtentia ſuccurret, omniaque quartiria & preſſuras avertet, omnibuſque quibus poteſt modis ac viis defendet.

X. Hæc tamen cum clauſula ut in utroque fortalitio cum aulicis noſtris, ordinaria guardia & cancellaria noſtra pro libitu noſtro manere, ibique rebus noſtris vacare poſſimus.

XI. Ulterius caſu quo metropolis noſtra civitas Trevirenſis à milite regiæ majeſtatis Sueciæ occuparetur, tunc illa ad manus noſtras mediante chriſtianiſſima majeſtate tradenda erit, ac in eandem nullum aliud præſidium quam noſtrum prædicto modo plane iſſdem ſub conditionibus introducatur ac ſuſtentetur.

XII. Ultimo tranſitus omnes utrique parti militanti ſine fraude ſint aperti, ſine injuria & damno proprietarii.

Igitur nos Philippus Chriſtophorus archiepiſcopus Trevirenſis ac princeps elector promittimus obſervare, & obſervari facere ſincerè, realiter & cum effectu, abſque aliqua ſiniſtra interpretatione, & ego Ludovicus de Briſanſon Baro de la Saludie, magiſter de campo chriſtianiſſimæ regiæ majeſtatis cum plenipotencia legatus miſſus, prædictos articulos nomine ejuſdem chriſtianiſſimæ majeſtatis totidem verbis pro more ſtipulatus ſum, polliceorque me certò effectuſum chriſtianiſſimam regiâ majeſtatem omnes & ſingulos articulos & conditiones, uti & hanc noſtram concluſionem, ſubſcriptionem ac ſigillationem, manu propria & ſigillo regio confirmaturam, realique aſſiſtentia adimpleturam. In quorum fidem has præſentes propriis manibus ſubſcripſimus, & ſigillo noſtro communivimus.

Acta conventaque hæc omnia in fortalitio noſtro Ehrenbreitſteiniano, die nona menſis Aprilis, 1632, ainſi ſigné, Philippus Chriſtophorus archiepiſcopus Trevirenſis, & la Saludie, avec le cachet dudit ſieur electeur.

## XXIX.

### ODE ſur la mort du GRAND GUSTAVE. Par M. ARNAUD D'ANDILLY.

#### I.

**P**LUS vite que l'eclair, plus craint que le tonnere  
 Portant avec moi la terreur & la mort,  
 J'ay paſſé comme un Mars des rivage du nord  
 Par tout où m'appelloit la juſtice & la guerre.



## II.

1632.

L'Allemagne m'a vû briser comme du verre  
Tout ce qui s'oposoit à mon puissant effort ;  
Et mon secours fatal lui servit de suport  
Lorsqu'il ne sembloit plus qu'elle en eût sur la terre.

## III.

Le plus sage au conseil, le premier aux hazards ;  
Mes vertus ont terni le lustre des Césars,  
Et rendu l'univers étonné de ma gloire.

Quel siècle vit jamais un si grand conquérant ?  
Vivant j'ay triomphé, je triomphe en mourant,  
Et choisis pour tombeau le champ de ma victoire.

F I N I S.





# I N D E X.

N. B. Articles with this mark \* after them refer to the notes.

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 L

AUCHI

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
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